Capt. James R. McElroy
"Skipper"
Mike 3/5

I served with "M" Co. 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines from 15 Dec 66 to 24 June 67. Participated in Operations Spoil, Desoto, Union (hospitalized 13-21 May 67), Union II, and Adair (until transferred to 2nd Combined Action Group, III MAF). Had an additional tour as an advisor to VN Marine Corps from 9 Dec 70 to 1 Dec 71.

During Operation Desoto most of Mike's action was against insurgent Viet Cong forces which utilized bunker complexes, hedgerows for fighting positions, open rice paddies approaching their defensive positions; and well-constructed cave hill sites for logistical support and living areas. Mike Company's action was in Duc Pho and the immediate surrounding area.

Artillery smoke rounds were successfully used in crossing a large rice paddy against heavy VC resistance. SSgt. Dinota, plt cmdr., was especially creative at ensuring trench-connected bunker complexes were eliminated. The Marines out front and in frontline foxholes fought with valor, and made Marines throughout the ages proud.

UNION II, like UNION, involved coordination with the 6th ARVN Regiment and the 1st ARVN Ranger Group. The 1st and 3rd Battalions, 5th Marines once again became the maneuver elements for III MAF's portion of the operation. The operation plan directed Lt. Col. Hilgartner's 1st Battalion to establishblocking positions in the western portion of the valley. The three RVN Ranger Group battalions were to attack southwest from Thang Binh, while two units of the 6th ARVN Regiment were to attack northwest from a position near Tam Ky. Lt.Col. Esslinger's 3rd Battalion would move by helicopters into the southern portion of the basin and sweep northeast. The ARVN named their part of the operation Lien Kit 106. On the morning of 26 May, Esslinger's Marines, three companies and a command group, made a heliborne assault into an area five kilometers east
of Nui Loc Son outpost.
Company L's first two waves experienced only sniper
fire as they landed at LZ Eagle, but as Company Mike
and the command group landed, heavy small arms and mortar fire struck the
LZ.
At 1134 the enemy defenders shot down a CH-46 over the LZ. As Company I
landed, Companies L and M attacked
north to relieve the pressure on the LZ.
The attacking companies found a well-entrenched enemy force northeast of the
landing zone.
While artillery and air strikes pounded the NVA positions, Company I moved
to the northeast to envelop the enemy's flank, and in the face of strong
resistance drove through
the position.
Fighting continued throughout the afternoon.
When the Marines finally overran the last enemy
positions at 1630, they counted 118 dead NVA soldiers scattered over the
battlefield.
The 3rd Battalion lost 38 killed and 82 wounded,
including Lieutenant Colonel Esslinger,
who was wounded in the eye.
While the Marines of Esslinger's battalion engaged the enemy force,
Hilgartner's Marines established blocking positions to the northwest as
planned.
The ARVN ranger and infantry elements closed from the northeast and
southeast to box in the enemy.
For the next three days, all four forces swept the area.
There were only isolated exchanges of fire;
once more the 3rd NVA Regiment had withdrawn
from the basin.
Convinced that the enemy had escaped,
the South Vietnamese ended their operation,
but Colonel Houghton did not believe that all
the NVA forces had left the Que Son region.
After anaylyzing available intelligence,
Houghton decided to change the direction
of attack toward the hills along the southern
rim of the basin, southeast of the 3rd Battalion's
battle area of the 26th.
On 30 May, he had his two battalions flown into the
area by helicopter and began a sweep to the northeast.
Their advance encountered only long-range sniper fire.
By the afternoon of 1 June, both battalions had reentered
the basin and moved northwest generally toward the site
of the original 26 May contact.

On 2 June, the Marines moved out, two battalions abreast, with the 1st Battalion on
the right.
Objective Foxtrot in the Vinh Huy Village complex
was their destination.
By 0930, the two lead companies of the 3rd Battalion
were under heavy fire from 200 dug-in North Vietnamese troops 1,000 meters east of
the scene of the 3rd Battalion's heavy action on 26 May.
By 1300, after savage fighting and extensive use of supporting arms, the Marines
overran the position.
As the companies consolidated and began to evacuate
their casualties, a helicopter took a direct hit from a
57mm recoilless rifle, killing one Marine and wounding seven others.
While the units of the 3rd Battalion, now commanded
by Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Webster, engaged the enemy, Hilgartner's 1st
Battalion pushed forward to
relieve the pressure.
The battalion moved with Company D on the right and an attached company,
Company F, 5th Marines, on the left. About 1130, Company D began crossing a
1,000-meter-wide race paddy that contained
a horseshoe-shaped hedgerow.
The location of the hedgerow was such that the
Marines could not approach it except by crossing
the open paddy.
When the company was halfway across the field,
well-camouflaged NVA troops in fortified positions
in the horseshoe opened fire.
The enemy fire swept the Marines' front and left flank, catching the left flank
platoons in a crossfire.
The reserve platoon tried to envelop the enemy,
but heavy automatic weapons fire forced it back.
The Marines consolidated their positions while artillery
and air strikes softened up the enemy fortifications.
Company F, commanded by Captain James A. Graham, was in serious trouble on
Company D's left.
Initially, Graham's unit moved under the cover of air
and artillery strikes and encountered only sniper fire.
As it began crossing a large open paddy area,
a Kit Carson Scout with the company started
shooting at several mats of hay lying in the paddy.
The NVA had concealed themselves under the mats
and the Marines killed 31 of them as the company advanced.
As the company continued across the open area,
mortar and automatic weapons fire inflicted many casualties.
Hardest hit was the 2d Platoon; two concealed enemy machine guns stopped it in the
middle of the open field. Captain Graham quickly organized his small headquarters
group into an assault unit and attacked through the 2d Platoon's position, forcing the
North Vietnamese to abandon one of their guns.
With some of the pressure relieved, the platoon moved
some of the wounded to a more secure area.
Captain Graham then tried to silence the second gun,
but was unsuccessful.
Wounded twice by this time and with his men's
ammunition exhausted, the captain ordered his
Marines to move back to friendly positions while
he stayed behind to protect a wounded man who
could not be moved.
The last word over the radio from Captain Graham
was 25 enemy soldiers were attacking his position.
At 1420, Lieutenant Colonel Hilgarner's CP came under heavy mortar, recoilless rifle,
and RPG fire.
Despite the extensive use of air and artillery
by the Marines, the Communist force was too
well dug-in and too big for the battalion to dislodge.
Colonel Houghton, advised of the situation, asked for help. Since his 3rd Battalion
was already involved in heavy fighting, he asked for the commitment of the division
reserve, Lieutenant Colonel Mallett C. Jackson, Jr.'s
2d Battalion, 5th Marines.
Major General Donn J. Robertson, a Navy Cross holder who had just assumed
command of the division on 1 June, concurred and the 2d Battalion prepared to move
out by helicopter to join in the battle.
The three companies that made up Lieutenant Colonel Jackson's force for this
operation were his own Company E' Company D from the 1st Battalion, 7th
Marines' and Company E, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines.
The 5th Marines' commander paved the way for the 2d Battalion's entry into the
operation by ordering 90 minutes of air and artillery preparation of the planned
landing zone. He intended to insert the battalion northeast of the
enemy position so it could drive south into the left flank
of the NVA force.
By 1900, the battalion command group and two companies had landed.
They were unopposed and quickly organized the position.
As night fell, one of Jackson's companies still had not arrived.
Aware of the urgency of the tactical situation facing Hilgartner's battalion, and
concerned about the fate of Captain Graham's company from his own battalion,
Lieutenant Colonel Jackson requested permission to begin his attack without the
missing company.
Colonel Houghton concurred.
Leaving a security platoon in the landing zone,
Jackson maneuvered his force south against the enemy.
The battalion had not gone far in the darkness before it collided with an NVA force
trying to withdraw to the north. The Marines quickly drove through the Communists
and continued south.
The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines suffered almost 20
casualties in this initial contact.
To evacuate the wounded, the battalion's forward air controller called in a passing
CH-53.
The pilot landed his helicopter in the middle of the
command post, not far from where Company E still
engaged the enemy.
As Marines completed loading the wounded,
an enemy mortar round landed just to the rear of the aircraft and enemy automatic
weapons took it under
direct fire.
The pilot quickly took off.
The 2d Battalion later heard that,
on its arrival at Da Nang, ground crews counted approximately 58 holes in the
helicopter.
The sudden presence of a strong force on its northern
flank caused the NVA units to disengage and make a hasty withdrawal to the
southwest, but the move proved costly. Once NVA soldiers left the protection of their
fortifications, they were easy targets for Marine supporting arms fire.
Air strikes were devastating.
On one occasion two F-4 aircraft used an unusual
technique of target acquisition which proved especially effective.
The first aircraft approached the area at low speed and switched on its landing and
running lights.
When the enemy fired at the plane, the second aircraft, following closely behind
without lights, spotted the enemy and dropped napalm on the firing positions.
While supporting arms fire hastened the Communist departure from the battlefield,
the 5th Marines spent the night regrouping and evacuating casualties.
The following morning, all three battalions swept
the battle area.
The Marines counted 476 dead North Vietnamese
in and around the contested rice paddy and its
formidable hedgerow complex.
The Marines themselves suffered 71 killed and 139 wounded in the fight.
During the sweep of the battle area,
Lieutenant Colonel Hilgartner received a radio message from one of his companies
that enemy working parties
were out collecting the NVA dead.
The company commander asked if he should open fire. Hilgarner declined for he saw
this as a chance to recover his own dead, including Captain Graham's body.
For the remainder of the day there was an undeclared truce; the two sides
intermingled but ignored each other as they went about collecting their dead.
When the enemy main body withdrew, they transported their wounded on two poles
lashed together, similar to the "travois" used by the American Plains Indians.
The day after the undeclared truce, Hilgartner's battalion tried to follow the travois
skid marks but could not catch up with the main body of the NVA force.
Halts to call in helicopters to evacuate casualties caused
by the enemy's rear guard hindered the Marines' progress.

3/5 Commander  Lt.Col. C. B. Webster
H&S Company/Weapons
Battery F, 2nd Battalion 11th Marines
1st SP Battalion (HST)
1st Engineer Battalion
1st Tank Battalion

India Company
Company Commander Capt. F. M. Burke
H&S Company
Medical Platoon
81mm Mortar Platoon (FO Team)
Comm. Platoon (FAC Team)
Interpreter, Scouts and Chieu Hoi

Mike Company
Company Commander Capt. J. R. McElroy, Jr.
H&S Company
Medical Platoon
81mm Mortar Platoon (FO Team)
Comm. Platoon (FAC Team)
Scouts and Interpreter

Kilo Company
Bn. Reserve
Company Commander Capt. J. R. Tenney
XO 2/Lt. J. C. Gracida
H&S Company
81mm Platoon (FO Team)
Comm. Platoon (FAC Team)
Interpreter, Scouts and Kit Carson Scouts
Operation ADAIR was initiated by the need of support for Kilo's combat
patrol which met a well-entrenched force of Viet Cong on the afternoon of 15
June. The initial action caught Kilo's lead elements in open flat terrain, but the
patrol regrouped, assaulted, and then held its ground until the arrival of relief
forces. The enemy withdrew, and was later estimated to be a reinforced
company. This VC unit was heavily hit by air strikes as it retreated inland.
The link-up with Kilo and subsequent area sweep was successful, and revealed
the extent of damage upon the VC which was greater than earlier believed. In
continuation of search and destroy missions for the remainder of Operation
ADAIR, 3/5 was fortunate in having tank support. (This was the 1st time 3/5
worked with tanks). While there was minimal enemy contact for the duration of
ADAIR, the presence of tanks appeared to largely eliminate sniper fire against
the company of which they were in support.

The operation was not particularly fruitful in terms of enemy destroyed,
however the wide coverage and sweep of enemy held areas showed again that
the Viet Cong and NVA were very reluctant to face organized offensive action,
and avoided contact even in strongly pro-enemy territory whenever possible.
This followed Union &Union II.
They didn't want to fight MARINES.
GET SOME