" Grounding a Principle of Liberty in the
Principle of Utility, as Mill attempted to do,
is an exercise in squaring the circle".
Discussion by Olivier Charnoz
Perhaps the most fundamental question faced by any liberal thought is
whether there can be or not any rational
and non axiomatic justification of
liberty - as a right held by individuals. A doctrine able to show that there
are reasons for granting individuals with untouchable liberties would
necessarily be superior to the great number of those which give up the search
for a justification. Can one justify liberty in value-free terms ?
John Stuart Mill's philosophy
addresses this question within an utilitarian framework. It intends to justify
individual liberty on the ground that it promotes happiness. However in doing
so, Mill is led to put forward a Principle of Liberty which is at least partly
independent from the ultimate Principle of Utility. The traditional strand of interpretation
of Mill's attempt holds that 'grounding a Principle of Liberty in the Principle
of Utility is an exercise in squaring the circle'.
In order to discuss this
view, this paper first puts forward the
straight-forward criticisms that can be made against any utilitarian attempt to
protect liberty from the trade-off between different goods. Then it moves on to
reassess the nature of Mill's Principle of Utility, showing thus a strong need
for secondary and more practical principles that ensure its efficient even
though indirect application. From there it becomes possible to put the case for
the defence of the Principle of Liberty as an 'utility maximising constraint'.
Finally this paper stresses the limits of the Enlightenment's views over human
nature and history which are indeed essential to Mill's argument. Basically
this paper argues that Mill is a successful liberal and utilitarian thinker of
his time, even though he has not founded a pure philosophy of liberty.
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According to the traditional critics
of Mill's liberalism, the latter suffers from fundamental flaws that can hardly
be overcome since they are not even related to Mill's arguments, but to the
very project of an utilitarian theory of liberty.
The utilitarian logic primarily
holds that there is a single and ultimate principle as regard moral and
political matters : the Principle of Utility which means according to Mill
himself that ' actions are right in
proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the
reverse of happiness'. Yet in On Liberty
Mill presents a Principle of Liberty, largely independent of the former, which
holds that no limitation on liberty can ever be justified unless it prevents
'harm to others'. Why should Utilitarianism need any other principle that the
one of Utility ?
Not only the Principle of Liberty
puts into question the uniqueness of the Principle of Utility, but also its
primacy. Even if squashing the liberty of 0.0001 % of the population makes
99.9999 % far better off than any other available policy could do, this is not
yet sufficient to justify such a policy in Mill's view. The Principle of
Liberty proves therefore to be an absolute bar against many utilitarian
policies.
Behind the conflict of Mill's two
Principles, lies actually a conflict between two distinct values, namely liberty and happiness. Only happiness is supposed to be a value for its own
sake. However whenever liberty and collective utility conflict, Mill gives
always priority to liberty. How can an Utilitarian consistently accord priority
to the latter ?
Yet, the most powerful utilitarian
argument against Mill's project itself is that it is essentially a
right-granting project. Indeed the aggregative character of any principle of
utility is an inescapable feature of utilitarianism which makes it caring about
the sum of happiness present in a
given society and not about the amount of happiness enjoyed by every single
individual. No utilitarian principle should be indifferent to the aggregate
amount of happiness that its implementation yield. However the Principle of
Liberty is.
Another way to put Mill's problem
is to say that he wants to bring about an exceptionless principle (Liberty) as deduced from but de facto conflicting with the Principle of
Utility.
Escaping the authoritarian
consequences of utilitarian ethics using utilitarian arguments seems therefore
to be a pure exercise in squaring the circle.
In order to defend Mill's
utilitarian account of liberty, one has to show that, even though the Principle
of Liberty is definitely a constraint put upon the Principle of Utility, there
is a sense in which it is a 'utility maximising constraint', justified in
utilitarian terms.
Before this can be properly shown,
this paper still has to argue that the Principle of Utility is not
self-sufficient, and needs some kind of secondary principles or side
constraints to be fully enforced.
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For this task, it is crucial to
reappraise the common understanding of Mill's Principle of Utility. The first
feature generally misunderstood or forgotten by Mill's traditional critics is
that his Principle of Utility is axiological
and not consequentialist.
Behind this barbarous vocabulary
the argument is simple and straightforward. The Art of life set out in A System of Logic refers to the
Principle of Utility not as directly action-guiding but rather as axiological,
that is to say specifying that only happiness has intrinsic goodness. This
principle serves therefore as a standard of assessment of states of affairs, and not as a practical principle. Two
consequences follow. Firstly, there is a need for other principles than
Utility. Secondly, as a guiding principle Liberty cannot be directly opposed to
Utility.
Yet the foremost argument showing
the need for other principles than Utility, is its feature of being arguably self-defeating if directly enforced. In other words the direct application of the
Principle of Utility (that is to say its misuse as a consequentialist
principle) generally undermines its very aim. This can be shown from two
viewpoints.
Firstly, the direct pursuit of general happiness is self-defeating. Two
reasons can be put forward. The first one is that we always lack reliable tests
to identify with certainty the best act. This argument is linked with the
crucial fact of human faillibilism. The second one is that there are certain
indispensable conditions of social co-operation or even peace that a direct
application of the Principle of Utility would not meet. What stability can be
expected of a society which allows public policies to completely squash the
essential interests of some of its members ? For these member anarchy would
thus appear to be preferable. Therefore the sole recourse to the Principle of
Utility can but promote anarchy. As we shall see in the following section the
Principle of Liberty meets this criteria of social peace.
Secondly the direct pursuit of individual happiness is individually self-defeating. In Mill's
view it is not by directly pursuing pleasure but rather by the pursuit of
activities and projects which are valued for their own sake that a given
individual can achieve happiness.
This self-defeating character of
the Principle of Utility entails a need for some secondary principles, much
more action-guiding than the merely axiological Principle of Utility. Arguably
Mill can be said to propose an indirect
utilitarianism [1] whereby
the Principle of Utility remains the ultimate one even though it cannot be
enforced without the use of a secondary principle (the Principle of Liberty as
we shall see) which imposes upon it a 'utility maximising constraint'. We now
ought to explain the full meaning of and the rational for the latter
expression.
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The paradox of a 'maximising
constraint' is that its aim is to maximise utility by disqualifying direct
appeal to it. Let us see how Mill argues that his Principle of Liberty is such
a constraint, in so far as it holds that no limitation of liberty can ever be
justified unless it prevents harm to others. If limiting liberty of some merely
promotes happiness of many it cannot be justified.
The utilitarian rationale behind
the Principle of Liberty is twofold. The first claim is that liberty is an essential
ingredient of individual. The second claim, stated in the last chapter of Utilitarianism, is that the general
welfare of the society increases by granting every single individual
unalienable rights guarantying his or her liberty.
We must therefore primarily throw
light upon Mill's link between human happiness and liberty. Indeed, Mill
identifies as man's most vital interests
both security and autonomy which are
two sides of liberty, and represent some kind of pre-condition to happiness in
Mill's view.
As regard security, "no human
being can possibly do without; on it we depend for all our immunity from evil,
and for the whole value of all and every good, beyond the passing moment
". Meanwhile in Utilitarianism
the emphasise is put upon security, in On
Liberty it is put upon autonomy
It must be noted that Mill does
not use this word, even though this concept is arguably at the centre of his
conception of happiness. Yet, from Mill's writing emerges an implicit ideal of
autonomous men, who would be rationally self-directed (as opposed to
emotion-directed), have a strong will, enjoy the negative freedom of
implementing their life-plans, and are finally able to think critically about
what influences them, as for instance their social environment. Mill argues
that this type of man cannot emerge if liberty is over restricted, that is to say
beyond the limit stated by the Principle of Liberty.
Furthermore only a principle of
Liberty can sustain and foster the realisation of Mill's concept of human
happiness which strongly emphasises in Berlin's words "diversity,
versatility, fullness of life - the unaccountable leap of individual genius,
spontaneity and uniqueness"[2].
What Mill hated and feared, was "narrowness, uniformity, the crippling
effect of persecution, the crushing of individuals by the weight authority or
of custom or of public opinion".
Our understanding of the primacy
of the ideal of autonomy is therefore increased by the taking into account of
Mill's conception of human nature. Mill believed in Individuality as a given
nature which has to be found through 'experiments in living'. He inherited the
concept of individual nature from romanticism and especially Humbold whom he
quotes at the beginning of On Liberty.
The paradoxical view of Mill is therefore that even though happiness involves
autonomous choice-making, it consists ideally in finding one's own nature which
is somewhat given.
At this point of the argument, it
is worth noting that Mill does not value choice for itself, as many non
utilitarian philosophies do. Mill remains utilitarian : the argument for
liberty flowing from this conception of happiness is that liberty is necessary
to render experiments in living possible, which in return can solely render
self-knowledge and ultimately happiness reachable. Liberty as an essential mean
towards happiness.
However there is a sense in which
Mil goes even beyond this conception of freedom as a mean, by elevating liberty
as an irreducible ingredient of happiness. Liberty is therefore seen as an end
in itself, insofar as it is a necessary part of human happiness, and not only a
mean towards its realisation.
This step is crossed by the Theory
of the Higher Pleasures which assumes that those activities are the most
preferred which involve autonomy of thought and action, that is to say the
distinctive generic human powers. Ultimately it holds that once a man has a
taste of liberty he cannot forget it easily and generally includes liberty in
his own concept of happiness. The Higher Pleasures play therefore an important
role within Mill's doctrine of Liberty, since they allow Liberty to be a end in
itself, insofar as it is part of (and not a mere mean related to) the ultimate
end of happiness.
In Mill's view Liberty is
therefore irremediably linked to happiness (first claim). It remains yet to be
proved (second claim) that the society as a whole has no utilitarian ground for
squashing the fundamental interests of
even a single individual. Mill argues that they are to be protected as mere
rights. This is the essential claim contained in the last chapter of Utilitarianism, which consequently sets
up an utilitarian theory of social justice. This seems to directly challenge
the aggregative character of the ultimate principle of Utility.
Actually Mill's conception of
Utility is not as aggregative as the one held by classical utilitarians as Bentham
or Mill's father. This flows from the fact that Mill abandons the passive
conception of the mind, and connects happiness with individual activity. As a
result it is not a 'collective something' that can '[swell] any aggregate', but rather the search for individual life style and
activities that express each man's own nature. Men cannot be happy without the
exercise of their active faculties of thought and action (theory of the Higher
Pleasures), and therefore no collective aim can be utility maximising since it
imposes by definition a single goal to a manifold population which is therefore
reduced to a passive state of mind and must receive a goal which is unlikely to
fit most people's natures.
Mill's understanding of the
Principle of Utility is therefore a key argument of the last chapter of Utilitarianism, in which is set up an
utilitarian defence of equality and impartiality.
" This great moral duty rests upon a still deeper foundation, being
a direct emanation from the first principle of moral, and not a mere corollary
from a secondary or derivative doctrine. It is involved in the very meaning of
Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle. That principle is a mere form of
words without rationale signification, unless one's person happiness, supposed
equal in degree (with the proper allowance made for kind), is counted for
exactly as much as another's. [...]" [3].
Therefore, in Mill's view the need
for equality and impartiality is originally embodied in the Principle of
Utility, as an almost methodological principle. However, those two important
features of Justice are justified on a more classical cost-benefit utilitarian
ground by Mill's argument that social peace cannot be reached in the long run
without the recognition of individual rights protecting fundamental interests.
In the Logic Mill gives an account of
the indispensable conditions of social stability, like for instance an
educational system which fights against men's selfishness, and develops a sense
of loyalty to basic social institutions. Mill's argument draws on the idea that
individual loyalty cannot be promoted if the basic institutions of the society
do not recognise individual rights. Consequently :
" The moral rules which forbid mankind to hurt one another are more
vital to human well being than any maxim ". And earlier: "Justice
remains the appropriate name for certain social utilities which are vastly more
important, and therefore more absolute and imperative, than any others are as a
class "[4].
We now have arguably a clear
picture of Mill's twofold utilitarian defence of his Principle of Liberty.
Firstly Liberty is intrinsically connected to happiness. Secondly the granting
of individual with rights (against any liberty limiting policy which is not
based upon the prevention of harm to others) is based upon an utilitarian
rationale (given Mill's understanding of the utilitarian aggregation and the
need for social stability).
The Liberty Principle therefore
emerges as a 'maximising constraint' to which the Principle of Utility is
subject to, even though the former flows from the latter.
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From all this it follows that in
our view, Mill's project of "grounding a Principle of Liberty in the
Principle of Utility" cannot be said to be a mere exercise in squaring the
circle. However this does not mean that Mill's liberalism does not face any
fundamental flaws, since his defence of the Principle of Liberty is still
subject to the following powerful
criticism.
Indeed, Mill's utilitarian defence
of the Principle of Liberty is essentially linked to a conception of human
beings as 'progressing' towards the universal valuation of the Higher Pleasure,
namely autonomy in action and thought. Thus, as Mill acknowledges himself without
any ambiguity in his writings, his defence of Liberty rests upon a whole
philosophy of History, deeply optimistic, whereby history is supposed to
implement the 18th Century's concept of 'progress' according to
which, in a Millian vocabulary, the Higher Pleasures are historically bound to
be universally endorsed by Mankind. There is a sense in which On Liberty and Utilitarianism merely express a belief in the absolute value of
liberty. As Isaiah Berlin puts it in John
Stuart Mill and the Ends of Life :
"At
the centre of Mill's thought and feeling lies, not his utilitarianism but his
passionate belief that men are made human by their capacity for choice - choice
of evil or good equally"[5].
The commitment to Liberty can therefore be seen as 'an act of faith,
expressing the religion of Humanity Mill shared with the French Positivists'[6].
In this line it can be rightfully argued that Mill's defence of Liberty
consists in the universalisation of an European ideology of self creation and
valuation of choice making. If such an universalisation seems to be unfounded
it is because there is arguably no definite empirical link between modernity
and the ideal of an autonomous individual. One has just to consider the
successful modernisation of traditional societies such as Japan, Singapore, or
South Korea, which have fully entered modernity without promoting any such
conception of human nature and happiness. Even the Asian communities living at
this very moment in liberal countries as the United States, have not given up
their traditional concepts.
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Therefore our ultimate conclusion
is that 'grounding a principle of Liberty in the Principle of Utility' is not
an exercise in squaring the circle, as long as one assumes Mill's view of human
nature and belief of a universal convergence of preferences towards the Higher
Pleasures. Given those two assumptions, Mill's project his a success. In so far
as most philosophers of his time, included Bentham and his father, shared this
conception of History as an open ended progress towards Enlightenment, Mill is a successful liberal and utilitarian
thinker of the 19th century.
However, given the history of
the twentieth century it is no longer possible to uncritically share Mill's
optimistic view over history and the supposed ever increasing will of human
beings to be autonomous and self constructed. Therefore, the Kantian project of
a pure foundation of Liberty as a an unquestionable value is once more and
perhaps definitively put into question. Thus liberal thinkers face the following
alternative : either moving towards an openly unfounded Liberalism, as Rorty
intends to do, or trying to move beyond Liberalism itself by framing a new task
for political philosophy, namely the one of "theorising conflict and the
pursuit of peace among diverse cultures, communities or ways of life".
Bibliography
· John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and other essays, Oxford's
world classic, 1998.
· Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on
Liberty, especially John Stuart Mill and
the Ends of Life,
Oxford University Press, 1969.
· John Gray, Mill on Liberty : a
Defence, first edition, 1983, Routledge.
· John Gray, Postscript of the second
edition of Mill on Liberty : a Defence, 1996, Routledge.
[1] John Gray, Mill on Liberty : a Defence.
[2] Isaiah Berlin, John Stuart Mill and the Ends of Life, in Four Essays on Liberty.
[3] On Liberty p 198-199, , Oxford University Press
[4] On Liberty, p 201
[5] Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, p.192