ALPHA’S REPLY TO THETA.

by L.B. Wilkes

Theta’s reply to Cullan and Alpha is before me. The same fine spirit and high Christian bearing that characterized his former article are found in this. I am inclined to think, therefore, that, if no good has been done by the preceding discussion, no evil is likely to ensue. But I hope much good will result to us for our work of faith and labor of love.

It is eminently important that every one should know whether he has a right to sit at the Lord’s table, in the Lord’s house, “which is the Church of the living God,” or not. In deciding this question, we must not trust fallible human reason too far; we must not rely upon the deductions of our own minds, drawn from premises not well and plainly laid down in the Word of God. Indeed, it is a postulate with us never questioned, that nothing shall be an item of our faith, nor shall any thing be required in our practice, for which the Word of God furnishes not the law. Now, that the Word of God either plainly or obscurely require us to believe that the pious unimmersed are in the kingdom of Jesus Christ, I do most confidently deny.

My feelings might incline me to say much in behalf of the honest, earnest, misguided soul, who, like blind Bartimeus, may sit close by the way-side of “the truth.” and cry: Lord have mercy on me. But what, when all had been said, would it avail? Would it benefit the misguided one? No. It is “the faith” for which we are to contend, not a feeling. The prayers and alms of a merely “good man” may go up as a memorial before God; God may answer his prayers, bless his soul, and even count him “as a child;” but unless the Lord should reveal it to me, I can not know it, and, of course, can not, in good faith, say that I believe it. If it be answered that this view of the subject is uncharitable, I reply, that the love of God, so far as I know, hath no greater bounds for a man than the Word of God lays down; any charity that transcends this limit, transcends the limit of my faith. Nay, it is sickly, and even dangerous.

While I admire the brotherly kindness and charity “that believeth all things,” manifest in Theta’s second essay, I would suggest that, to my mind, there is a little too much ductility in it; a little too much wiry special pleading. I feel no great concern as to whether I am consistent with Alpha or Cullan, or neither. Such compositions have their value, but it is a very small one indeed when we come to settling the faith or fate of an immortal being. Here, let God be true, “though every man a liar.” Here, though wrong yesterday, let us be right to-day. Our earnest, prayerful desire should be, that in faith [38] and practice we may be consistent with the Bible—the only infallible rule of both.

Could I see my brother Theta, face to face, I should chide him a little for some naughty things his piece contains. I did not affirm, my dear brother, without qualification, that any one’s sins are pardoned, or that any one is or can be saved in heaven, without immersion. Both may be true, and yet the truth of your position is not involved in either; this is what I tried to show, and I believe did show. Neither of these hypotheses is known positively to be true, and this is precisely the reason why the conclusion resting upon one or both of them cannot be accepted. The tingle of satisfaction that may have been felt upon the supposed discovery of absurdity in my reasoning will be entirely lost after a more mature reading of my former article. I may admit, for the sake of argument, that Luther, and “such like,” are saved in heaven, as I have. I may admit that, allowing Luther to have been saved, he may have been pardoned “at death, or even before death,” without its being necessary to conclude that God “put him into the church.” But to affirm, categorically, either of the foregoing propositions as my faith, I can not.

I asked Theta in my former essay to tell us for what he baptized the pious unimmersed, if they are, as he contends, already in the church. He proceeds at once to give us four distinct, inharmonious, and mainly unscriptural answers, viz., 1. “I baptize them for the answer of a good conscience” (which, of course, they could not have had before), “that the evidence of their pardon may be based in the Word of God instead of their own unsteady feelings.” Of course, then, according to Theta, their evidence of pardon was not “based in the Word of God” before they were immersed; or, which is the same thing, the Word of God does not authorize the pious unimmersed to believe that his sins are pardoned. So reasons Theta, and we leave him in the glory of his first answer.

2. “I baptize them because, though they may have been counted for circumcision, they have not been properly introduced into the kingdom.” This answer, though not, in word, phrase, or sentence, the exact language of the Saviour, or of the fishermen, is nevertheless nearer the truth. Not properly in the kingdom! Then they are not in it at all. Or, if our brother must have them in the kingdom, I would cite him to a careful perusal of Matt., xxii., 11, 12, 13.

3. “I baptize them because, though ‘an independent act of sovereignty’ may have placed them in the kingdom, their disobedience, when their duty is known, would soon put them out of it.” Whether this position should be flanked left or right, or whether it should be taken in the rear, I hardly know.

It seems the pious, etc., are in the church, not properly, but by “an independent act of sovereignty;” but notwith­standing the “King [39] Eternal” did, by an act of sovereignty, put them in the church, some simple-hearted preacher may come along and preach the truth to them; “their disobedience, when their duty is known, soon puts them out of it.” The simple truth, according to Theta, is that the God of truth puts a man into the church, and the preaching of God’s truth puts him out again; so, after the preacher preaches him out of the church, for “pity’s sake” he baptizes him back again!

The current value of baptism, in Theta’s literature, is certainly on the rise; for it is found to be equal to a sovereign act of the Omnipotent. The fourth reason for baptizing the class under consideration I will not quote. It is stranger than fiction. Why our brother did not give us a dozen or so more reasons for baptizing the pious, etc., I can’t say, unless it was for want of space.

But since I am understood to believe (which I do not) that Luther, and “such like,” are saved in heaven without immersion, Theta asks, with some apparent feeling: “For what do you baptize them? Answer me.” I will. I baptize them in the “name of Jesus Christ for the remission of sins.”

I baptize them because, “except they are born of water (baptized) and of the Spirit, they can not enter into the kingdom (church) of heaven.”

I hope this will be satisfactory, and I am sure it is scriptural.

After passing these a b c items, our author says: “We now approach the discussion of several subjects requiring an ample development. First, in this ‘deep water where an elephant cannot swim,’ is the novel doctrine of ‘equivalents.’ Whether God ever accepts any other thing than that which he appoints for man’s good, instead of the thing appointed; or, more briefly, is it a “vain thing to worship God, teaching for doctrine the commandments of men?”

Suppose it could be established that equivalents are sometimes accepted, of what advantage would that be to Theta’s “position?” None that I can see; unless it could be shown that they are always accepted. And even then we must know whether these equivalents are accepted in favor of everybody, or of only a class or classes. If they are accepted in favor of a class only, then of what class? And does any given man belong to this class? Again: we must know whether any thing will pass as an equivalent, or whether some particular thing must be done; and, further, will this particular thing do for every member of the class, or for a part only? If this particular thing, when once ascertained, will avail for a part only of the class, then what other thing must be done by each of the rest of the class? Again: must this particular thing be prescribed by the Word of God, or does God leave each one to his own taste, judgment, or “inner light,” in selecting the equivalent of the Bible requirement. [40]

These and many similar questions I would propound to the benevolent Theta, for his reflection. I propound them not to plain men and women, who “are not prepared to read this controversy, but to those who venture more;” who, like the Spirit, would “search all things, yea, the deep things of God.” In vindication of the assumption that this controversy is not to be settled by appeal to the plain truths of the Bible, Theta affords us the following delightful specimen of verdant logic: “Addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division will not serve for the solution of problems in the higher mathematics, yet these are the plain simple teachings of mathematics.” The argument, immediately following is: That John, iii., 5, is the plain, simple teaching of the Bible on the question who is, and who is not, in the kingdom; that this text and other similar ones answer to the elementary rules of mathematics, and, of course, the truths not plain—the higher and more difficult texts of the Bible—answer to the higher rules of the more abstruse branches of mathematics. Unfortunately for our essayist, this illustration fails at the very point in the comparison where it should not. For while it may be admitted that the elementary rules of mathematics will not suffice for the solution of problems in the higher mathematics, still it is untrue that the higher rules will or do contradict the elementary ones, which is the thing that they ought to do to make the illustration worth any thing to Theta’s purpose.

Now let us examine the doctrine of equivalents. While it is by no means necessary to infer from Theta’s articles that he would require a Bible equivalent for a Bible requirement in every case, yet I will not conclude that he would intentionally do otherwise. That I am right in this opinion is manifest from the following: In defining the real question, he says: “It is rather what does the Bible teach as to the moral condition of such men as have not been able to learn the whole truth.” Here, then, comes the contest as to Scripture teaching, etc. But still we must settle a few other preliminaries. I here enter my protest against a distinction which Theta now makes between men belonging to the same class, “good men.” Up to this time all sails have been set, and decks have all been cleared, to receive this class, all of them of course, into the church. But perceiving now, as Cullan has most effectively shown, that the phrase “good men” is rather too broad; that he might be compelled to associate in the church with the Catholic, Universalist, Deist, Atheist, Spiritualist, Moralist, and Heathen, our good brother narrows the foundations a little, and insists that to some extent a man must know and do God’s will in order to be a citizen of Christ’s kingdom. (The programme might, may, would necessarily exclude some men, good in the sense in which the term has all along been used.) He says (vol. i., p. 423): “To be in the kingdom of Christ, it is necessary for a man to know [41] the will of Christ; if not the entire will, at least so much of it as will put him under God’s spiritual control.” Stripping this beautiful and cautious theological preparation of its unnecessary verbiage, which tends only to confuse the unwary, makes it stand thus: It is necessary, in order to be in Christ’s kingdom, for a man to know enough to put him in. Marvelous! But why does not our author tell us how much a man must know, or what particular part he must know? Of course, I understand that it is not essential to know John, iii., 5; Mark, xvi., 16; Acts, ii., 38; Acts, xxii., 16; Rom., vi., 4; Gal., iii., 27; 1 Peter, iii., 21, et al.; but there is a large area of truths besides these texts. Is it true that all who are so unfortunate as to be unable to believe or repent must be left out in the cold; must not be taken into the church; must not be allowed to commune; must be allowed to die without ever having sat at the Lord’s table in the Lord’s house?

But why, I press the question, will our essayist exclude from the church and table of the Lord the man who is simply unfortunate, and therefore has not learned of the duty of godly sorrow and “repentance into life;” or of faith in the Lord Jesus Christ in order to be saved? How does Theta know that the knowledge of such a one is too limited to admit him into Christ’s kingdom? Is it because the Bible does plainly teach it? So it teaches, and quite as plainly, that to enter the kingdom of heaven we must be baptized.

If it must be denied that the unfortunate infidel, or impenitent man, is in the Christ’s church, on the ground that the Bible plainly excludes them; on the same ground we must deny that the unbaptized man is in the church.

But if it be replied that the plain Scriptures are not the authority by which this controversy is to be decided, I shall answer that the Scriptures, on the subject of faith and repentance, are as plain as on the subject of baptism, and that the fate of the first and second shall be the fate of the third. Nor am I prepared to believe that the higher truths of the Bible are in conflict with the elementary plain ones. In fine, I do not believe that the higher truths do teach that the unbaptized man is, or can be, in the church of Christ. Neither is it true that the higher rules of mathematics are, in any sense, in conflict with the elementary ones. Not only so, but, the higher principles and rules of every science, Christianity included, must in the very nature of the case, or according to the demands of science itself, be in perfect harmony or accord with the elementary ones.

So true is this, that if any one should construct a science so arranged that the higher truths should contradict the more elementary ones, such an unqualified and unsparing condemnation would [42] come thundering from every scientific quarter, that he would soon wish that it had never been born.

This is precisely the predicament of our brother, from which no amount of logical legerdemain can ever extricate him. If this be true, and I feel certain that it is, the whole controversy is ended; for it is not denied that plain truth puts every man out of the church, who has not been baptized.

But this doctrine of equivalents must receive a more minute examination. The text offered in proof must not be one from which it might be inferred that one thing may perchance be accepted as an equivalent for another; it should be one in which the doctrine is positively declared; or from which it must necessarily be inferred that one thing will, in every case, be accepted instead of another. As an illustration, or it may be as an example of the doctrine under review, Theta says: “Did not God accept Abraham’s faith as an equivalent for a perfect obedience to the law?” No. God never accepted Abraham’s faith instead of any thing lacking in his obedience to law. And it is singular that Theta makes no attempt to prove it, except to cite the following text: “Faith was counted to Abraham as righteousness.” What law was enjoined on Abraham which he did not obey, whose faith, while he was in disobedience, was counted to him for righteousness? None whatever.

There is no such case of equivalents, in view of any disobedience of Abraham’s, to be found in the Old Testament or the New. The monosyllabic brevity with which this, almost the only, text cited in proof of a strange doctrine is dispatched is most suggestive. Why was it not shown to be in point; or why, at least, was not the attempt made? Was not a certain troublous dubiety—a degree of painful uncertainty as to its applicability to the thing to be proved—the reason why no exegesis of the passage is attempted; and why one or two brief lines of common-place remarks should suffice?

Abraham had been a servant of God long before this passage was said of him, or was applied to him. Melchisedek says (Gen., xiv., 19): “Blessed be Abraham of the Most High God.” See also Gen., xii., 7; xiii., 18; xv., 1. By an examination of these passages it will appear that Abraham was already in whatever kingdom, state, or relation was vouchsafed to the good and pious of his time. Now, after all these things, in Gen., xv., 6, it is said: “Abraham believed in the Lord and he counted it to him for righteousness.” So the passage proves nothing for the doctrine, so far as terms of induction into any state or kingdom, patriarchal, Jewish, or Christian, are concerned. Abraham, at this time, was childless, and yet God had promised him that in him “all the families of the earth should be blessed.” Sarah was past age; and Abraham questioned whether “one born in his house” should be he through whom the world’s Saviour should come. [43]

God decided the question for him: “This shall not be thine heir: but he that shall come forth out of thine own bowels shall be thine heir.” And God brought him forth abroad, and said: “Look now toward heaven, and tell the stars if thou be able to number them. And he said unto him: So shall thy seed be.” Now it is said, and not before, “Abraham believed,” etc.

In view of these facts I ask, was Abraham’s faith received as the equivalent of some law which he did not keep, or of some obedience which he did not render? Certainly not. God had made a great and comforting promise to Abraham, requiring of him nothing, except that he should believe it. This Abraham did; and hence, having fulfilled the Divine requirement, he was accounted righteous.

In Paul’s time the Jews insisted that the Gentiles should be circumcised, and keep the law of Moses, else they could not be saved. Their major premise was a sweeping denial that any one could be saved as righteous who neglected or refused conformity to this law. But Paul puts them to shame, by citing a favorite text from their own Scriptures, showing that their father, Abraham, who lived hundreds of years before the law was given, and also many years before he was circumcised, was accounted righteous; hence their major premise was false, and their whole argument a fallacy.

The Apostle James quotes this passage also: “Was not our father, Abraham, justified by works when he had offered his son, Isaac, upon the altar? * * * and by works was faith made perfect. And the Scripture was fulfilled which saith: Abraham believed God, and it was imputed to him for righteousness.”

That is, when the command to Abraham was to offer his son, his only son, Isaac, upon the altar, the only way in which it was possible to fulfill the Scripture “which saith, Abraham believed God, and it was imputed to him for righteousness,” was by offering his son, which he did. I affirm it, as my settled conviction, that no man was ever, is, or will ever be decided righteous, according to the Bible, for his faith only; provided that, in the case, specific acts of obedience are required, but not rendered.

Some of the twelve tribes addressed by James had fallen into the error of supposing that, so they had faith in God, it was not very necessary to keep his commandments. It may be that the very dangerous doctrine of equivalents had occurred to them, and that by a substitution here and there, they were endeavoring to make the way to heaven shorter or easier. Certain it is, that the Apostle James taught them that the Scripture under examination could not be fulfilled by those who refused or neglected obedience. It may be, nay, it is likely, that this very text was relied upon by these Jews to support them in their error. But the apostle settles the controversy very briefly. He says: Abraham was commanded to offer his child upon the altar; that the did it; that then, and not before, was the [44] Scripture fulfilled: “Abraham believed,” etc. That is, wherever a command of God is, requiring obedience of either body or mind, the righteousness in request is not attained unless the obedience is rendered; that no man’s mere faith is worth any thing, is the equivalent of any thing good, where God requires any act or acts of obedience, unless the prescribed obedience be rendered.

Will Theta say that, in fact, Isaac was not offered upon the altar, and that a ram was accepted as the equivalent? I hope not. I think not. The statement would not be true. The ram was not accepted as an equivalent for Isaac. The offering of Isaac was stopped; though the righteousness of Abraham depended, up to this time, upon offering Isaac; now, however, since it is forbidden, it would be wicked to offer him. In both offering and withholding his son, righteousness with Abraham depended upon doing the will of God. If, in the first instance, Abraham had selected a ram and offered it as an equivalent for his son, and God had accepted it, then the doctrine might have received some support from the transaction; but as it is, it receives none whatever.

“In Paul’s day,” says Theta, “did not the Jews fail to attain to righteousness, seeking it by a perfect obedience?” Very likely they did; but the reason of their failure was not that their obedience was imperfect, making way for the doctrine of equivalents, but rather because they sought it, not according to the righteousness of the faith of Jesus Christ, but by the law of Moses, not then in force. Again: “did not the Gentiles attain to righteousness by means of faith?” Very likely they did; but not by faith, without the acts of obedience prescribed in the faith. “Now, a perfect obedience is equivalent to legal righteousness (no; it is legal righteousness itself), and faith is equivalent to legal righteousness (in the sense here used, it never was in the world), and two things that are equal to the same thing are equal to each other; that is, (or therefore), an active faith in Christ (a term not introduced into the premises, and hence the whole thing is a fallacy) is accepted as an equivalent for a perfect obedience to the law of Moses.” An active faith in Christ is now received instead of a perfect obedience to the law of Moses, not as an equivalent for such perfect obedience, but instead of it, and this only because the law of Moses is, and was in Paul’s day, done away. But Theta says: “In this way alone the ‘righteousness of the law (of Moses) is fulfilled in (by) us,’ faith being a constant work of God.” I do not understand this. Truth is said to be stranger than fiction; but this is fiction, and is a case stranger than any truth known to me. Moses and Paul settle the manner in which the righteousness of the law is fulfilled in us. Their explanation may be too plain for Theta, and be rejected on that account; for he tells us that this controversy is not to be settled by plain Scriptures. Yet, as I write to benefit people, not to confuse [45] them, I do not object, even in this controversy, to the plainness of Scripture texts. “Moses describeth the righteousness which is of the law. That the man which doeth these things shall live by them” (Rom., x., 5); that is, the man under the law is righteous who keeps the law, and no one else is. Now Paul, after telling us that we are made free from sin, etc., by the law of the Spirit of life, says: “That the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit.” That is, he who walks after the Spirit is the man in (by) whom the righteousness of the law is fulfilled. Just as the man under the law was righteous who obeyed the law, and no one else was; so, under the ministration of the Spirit, the man is righteous who minds the things of the Spirit, and no one else is. Where now is there foundation in these passages for the doctrine of equivalents?

There are other strange things found on pages 420, 421, to which I feel no disposition to make any answer. I will just raise one or two of them up from their recumbent posture a little, that the reader may take a fresh look at them, and then let them lie down again, and sleep that sleep that knows no waking. Here they are. “It still remains that uncircumcision was counted for circumcision—taken as an equivalent under the circumstances—the will for the deed, the spirit of obedience for obedience!” “What! Fulfill the law without having obeyed that ordinance which initiates a Gentile into the Jewish Church? It really seems so,” etc.

I omit the discussion of several points cleverly and even sharply made, in word, phrase, and sentence well selected, because, though answerable, they do not seem to me to have much weight in this controversy. In other connections, and sooner or later they must be met. I reproduce a few of them: “Has communion any peculiar effect in averaging the aggregate piety of the communicants all around?” “People generally seem to think the object of this ordinance is not so much to, etc., * * * * as to produce a sort of spiritual equilibrium among the communicants; that is, they all indorse for one another,” etc. We now come to the discussion of an old subject in a new dress. The subject of equity.

The rules and laws of a court of equity are just as definite and vigorous as those pertaining to courts of common or statutory law. The laws and principles of procedure are all of record and of easy reference, so that the judge has no more option in the case than in a common law court; and the litigants, through an intelligent lawyer, may anticipate the result with the same degree of certainty as though their suit were one at common law. Now, before the reference to a court of equity is to serve any valuable purpose for Theta’s cause, it will be necessary for him to show that, besides a birth of water and spirit, by which persons are allowed entrance into the [46] church, there are rules and laws, definite and rigorous, plainly laid down, and of easy reference, in accordance with which a high court of equity receives men into the church, not so born. Nor need there be any controversy if such be the case; for, on a single page, Theta might read us, from the Christian’s book of statutory, common, and chancery law, these laws and rules. Then and there the controversy would cease. This he has not done, and can not do.

He insists that there is a court of equity in heaven, and also in front of the church. He asserts the fact and gives us the philosophy of its existence. He says:

“The court of equity proceeds upon rules of equity and conscience, to moderate the rigor of the common law, and to give relief in cases where there is no remedy in the common law.”—Webster

Three questions legitimately arise: 1. Does such a court exist? 2. What is the philosophy of its existence? 3. Besides being held “in front of heaven,” is it also held “in front of the church?” If the first question can be decided in the negative, then, of course, it can have no philosophy. If it can not, by incontestable evidence, be decided in the affirmative, then, concerning it, there is no ground afforded for any man’s faith. An opinion he may have, but faith he can not.

Now, will Theta affirm that he has, by such evidence, established the existence of such a court? I ask not whether Cullan or Alpha may have admitted that from which the existence of a court of equity in Christian jurisprudence must be inferred. My logic does not authorize me to make logical deductions concerning a question, from admissions which may have been improperly or foolishly made. True, as our chancellor says: “God can hold his court of equity in front of the church as well as in front of heaven.” But does he do it?

How it happened that our essayist, in studying English grammar, became so enamored of the potential mood, I do not know; but he has certainly worried some of its auxiliaries nearly to death; especially may, can, and might. What God may, can, or might do, we ought all, by this time, to know pretty well, provided Theta is competent to inform us.

Yes, in one sense, God can hold a court of equity “in front of the church.” But, as before asked, does he do it? And is it the decision of the court, that any unimmersed man shall be taken into the church? No man knows either to be true. A merry king once asked the question: “Why a tub of water, with five pounds of living fish in it, weighs no more than it does without the fish?” Immediately the whole learned fraternity proceeded to furnish cogent and elaborate reasons to account for the fact, never stopping to inquire whether or not the fact existed. Theta did not mention, formally at least, the existence of a court of equity, in his previous article; and of [47] course he will not claim that he proved the existence of that which he did not mention. In the second article he does mention the said court, but he says not one word in proof of its existence. True, he insists that persons go to heaven without being baptized, which, with him, as with any one else, must be a mere opinion. From this opinion he infers, I suppose, that a court of equity must have been held “in front of the church,” since, with him, no one of his class can enter heaven who has not first been in the church. This is the best that can be done for the cause he pleads. Thus it seems that I am required to take all this favored class of men into the church, and to concede to them the right of communion; upon a compound fractional opinion; or, more briefly, it is Theta’s opinion that some persons go to heaven not having been baptized; it is also his opinion that, in that case, there must have been a court of equity held in front of the church, etc. Now, it happens that the value of a fraction resulting from the operations indicated in a compound fraction, is always less, both in mathematical and moral reasoning, than any one of the single fractions composing the compound one.

Without attempting a discussion, seriatim, of the three questions propounded, I will state and examine the real point at issue.

The theory which we combat, syllogistically stated, stands thus: No one amenable to the law of the Spirit of God is received into heaven except through the church; God does receive some good men of this class, unimmersed, into heaven; therefore, they were in the church.

The major premise of this argument, though true, will not afford Theta any assistance; for if an unimmersed man is saved in heaven, it is because he tried his best to learn the duty of immersion and could not, and therefore does not belong to the class, viz.: those amenable to the laws of the Spirit of God; that is, this is not a case embraced in the major premise. This must be so, unless it be that a man who does not and can not know the law is amenable to it, which is not true. The minor premise is false; for no one is amenable to the law of the Spirit of God who could not learn it; and no one who has learned it can be good who has not been immersed. Hence, the whole is a fallacy, non-logical, under the head of undue assumption.

Or, state it thus: The principles of God’s moral government in reference to induction into the church and into heaven are the same. Some good men are received into heaven who, though they had not done God’s will in order to enter it, did the best they could under the circumstances; therefore, good men, those who do the best they can under the circumstances, are to be received into the church below. That this statement may avail any thing for Theta’s cause, it is [48] necessary: 1. To believe that, in heaven’s chancery, the law is relaxed in favor of certain ones (which can be no more than an opinion). 2. To believe that the law, being relaxed at heaven’s gate, will be relaxed at the gate of the church; which is not certainly true, unless the circumstances surrounding the “good man” at heaven’s gate are so precisely the same as those surrounding him at the church door, that he law, being relaxed in the former case, will certainly be relaxed in the latter. Now, what all the circumstances in either case may be, I do not know; hence I can not say they are the same in both. The church is presided over my men; heaven is not. The church is a place of probation; heaven is not. The church is a place where the recognition of any one as a member, not legally such, must have a most injurious influence on the preaching of the truth, both to the man thus received and to others; heaven is not. The circumstances of the two cases present differences neither few nor small. I can not think, therefore, that though the principles of God’s moral government are the same everywhere it is established, or can be, that a relaxing in the one case established must involve that the relaxing takes place in the other.

The objections to the major premise are: 1. It is not known to be true. 2. It is most probably false. Will it be answered, that the argument concerns principles, and not the application of them. I reply, that I am concerned in this examination about the moral principles of God’s dealings with man, only as to their application in receiving men into the church and into heaven. The objection to the minor is, that an opinion is the most that I or any one else can have in regard to it, which is no proper foundation for an argument. The whole is therefore a fallacy.

Now, if God really does hold a court of equity in front of the church, no man knows it; for it is not taught in the Bible. If there be such a court, we have no means of knowing what its decisions are, for the Bible does not tell us. But before we can recognize any one as a member of the church, and therefore as entitled to the Lord’s Supper, the Bible must declare of that man that he is a member. But it may be held that some are admitted by this court, and that the fact is not revealed; or, being revealed, that the class is not particularly described; or that we, who know the law, are not concerned about it; and therefore God locks up his knowledge in his own mind. This may be Theta’s view; for, in speaking of the court of equity, page 426, he says: “We have nothing to do in this high court—no seat there.” Of course, I know that he is not judge, jury, witness, or lawyer in this court. Then what does he mean by having nothing to do in this court—no seat there? If this court have any existence on earth, and its decisions are that unimmersed men of a certain class are members of the church, and these things are known [49] to or knowable by us, then Theta has much to do in this court in the only sense in which it is conceivable, in any event, that he could have any thing to do with it. He has to respect its decisions by giving them full force and effect. He must recognize the persons adjudged worthy of membership as members. He must commune with them, etc. Now, since the claims of the Baptist orthodox to the communion are certainly as good as those of the Pedobaptist orthodox, my brother will allow that they are in the kingdom also. Let us bring all these different parties up to the same table, the long-bearded Dunkard and the blue-stocking Presbyterian, and look at them. In the language of my brother Theta: “This is a miscegenation scarcely allowable in the kingdom which we have received.”

And finally, John, iii., 5, Mark, xvi., 16, etc., furnish me the law for receiving members of the Christian church, and I know of no other law for such a purpose; nor do I think that Theta has shown, or can show, any other. The number thus inducted is exactly commensurate with the number that may, or do, commune; and our effort should be so to teach, and allow secret things to remain with God; or, if we must write about them, let us speak of them as mere opinions.

Alpha.  

A suggestion.—It has been suggested to me on more occasions than one, that we have many wealthy brethren, who could, by a small sum from each, render the support of the Quarterly sure, and enable me thereby to do with it a most important and benevolent work. These brethren, it is alleged, could just as well contribute ten or twenty dollars apiece, as to pay their regular subscription; and that all over their subscription I could devote in the way of distributing volumes of the Quarterly qratuitously. I should extremely like if the suggestion were generally acted upon. It might not only enable me to do much good in the way proposed, but might enable me to realize a little for my hard efforts to supply the brethren with a first-class religious Quarterly. It hurts me to think how hard I work for the cause of Christ and my brethren, and that at the moment when I write this my heart is aching even for a scanty support for my family. There is such a thing as positively degrading a man and utterly destroying his usefulness by the manner in which even bread and clothing are withheld from his children. This is alike hard and plain, but it is the truth. I do not ask to be placed above want, but I do above disgrace. Will any one act on the foregoing suggestion? I confess both my faith and hope are well nigh buried. [50]

[Volume II: October, 1864]

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