Could stating facts be no more than
making consistent
demarcations in the world? In saying that two lines are parallel, we
are
splitting the world into three. We divide the world into one line,
another
line, and everything else in existence not included in the parameters
of said
lines (note: not just the mereological sums, but the groups exactly
as they are). Expressing the
relationship between the two lines is merely shorthand for what is not
in the
parameter of these lines and would be redundant if the entire state of
the
universe were known. This is different from saying that by knowing the
entire
state of the universe we would know the relationship between the two
lines. My suggestion
here is that the relationship is nothing independent of the groupings
themselves.
For an example that is easier to picture, we may state the
simple fact above that the object B13-D13 is 4 units distance from the
“L”
object including H13, but no talk of relationships is necessary if we
merely make
three demarcations: B13-D13, the dark “L” including H13, and everything
else
composing the grid; in other words, the relationship can be
reduced
to divisions of the system. It
is essential that we recognize that the system is
all
that exists.
An interesting thing happens when we get divisions that can
be interchanged; we find universals. For instance, if we divide the
world into
the objects B3-D3, B13-D13, and the remainder of the system, we see two
divisions have been picked out that can both occupy the same position
arbitrarily in respect to the remainder of the system. To extend this
idea, if
I were to make three demarcations in the actual world, two identical
copies of
the
Tractatus and the remainder of
the cosmos, the universiality of the
Tractatus
is reached not by anything taken between these two demarcations alone
as wholes
(although universals will be found
within
both copies for the same reason as I’m about the express), but by their
arbitrariness with respect to the third group that is the remainder of
the
universe.
Using something as compound as a book
was probably confusing
because it requires all of the elements of the compounds themselves to
be
identical. Electrons, let’s use: the universal “electron” exists in the
ability
to divide the world into every individual electron and the remainder of
the
world. The remainder of the world is the unique group, whereas all of
the
electrons in their specific relations with the rest of the world can be
moved
without altering the world.
I might also represent the sentence
“the ball is red,” for
instance, not by relating the demarcation “ball” with the universal
“redness,”
but merely by dividing the world in three ways: the ball, all things
red
(including the ball), and the rest of the world. The most difficult
thing to
note here is that we are only dividing the world into groups, not
making
relationships between the groups that are over and above the groups
themselves
because we would then have something outside of the groups, which, as
stipulated, encompass everything in existence. The groups are all that
exist.
The universal “redness,” again, exists
in the arbitrariness
with which this “aspect” of the demarcation “ball” (I wish I could
avoid saying
it in this way) could be swapped with the same part of other members of
the
group with respect to the remaining group demarcated that is the rest
of the
world. We can note that grouping the red ball with all blue things and
the rest
of the world would strike us as flawed because there is nothing common
among
the two former groups that can be interchanged without altering the
latter.
This is, of course, merely an
experiment in thought, and I’m
skeptical on the truth of the matter. Many will naturally object that
the
relations do exist and cannot be short hands for the remainder of the
system as
they are not identical with the remainder of the system, thus they
themselves
exist within the system and are as unique, if not more so, than the
groups
themselves. I’ll let these thoughts rattle for a while.