T H E   A R E S   F O R U M

October 20, 2001

Exploring The Emerging Possibilities For Realignment

Following September 11, the major political parties and interest groups ceased partisan combat to proclaim unity in the face of national catastrophe.  While political maneuvering has been suspended, participants and observers readily recognize the truce will only last as long as the crisis.  More pointedly, the fact that reasoned debate continues in regard to our response as it pertains to fundamental values of privacy and due process is a poignant demonstration of democracy’s strength and flexibility vis-à-vis this latest challenge presented by avatars of intolerance.  Alternatively, both parties harbor concerns over the longer-term impact of the crisis; Democrats wonder if success will bestow President Bush with unprecedented political capital and Republicans vividly remember the earlier Bush Presidency’s inability to translate 90% approval ratings into re-election.  In the end, the American body politic may again begin a process of alignment that has been unfolding since the end of World War II.

With the close of World War II in 1945, the United States found itself political, economically, and militarily triumphant on the world stage and embracing its new global leadership vis-à-vis the USSR.  Unlike the aftermath of World War I, neither did the national political leadership espouse a return to isolationism nor did the voting public demonstrate a preference for one.  Similarly, the laissez faire and protectionist approach to economic policy was widely discredited with the onset of the Great Depression; President Roosevelt’s New Deal and the seemingly impressive management of the war economy overcame inherent opposition to welfare programs and governmental intervention.  As such, liberal anti-communism emerged dominant and was labeled “the vital center” by US historian Arthur Schlesinger and enjoined by Democrats and Republicans alike; its pervasiveness was most evident in the 1960 presidential election where the nearly indistinguishable Nixon and Kennedy candidacies resulted in historic levels of turnout and a razor-thin margin.

However, as liberal anti-communism endeavored to defeat communism in Vietnam and establish a “Great Society” at home, conservative and liberal wings of the vital center launched insurgencies against a center they no longer deemed so vital.  Conservatives rebelled first, urging a greater commitment to Vietnam, opposing the passage of expansive welfare and civil rights programs, and denouncing the permissive attitudes toward law and order and the emerging counterculture; their departure culminated with the Barry Goldwater candidacy and takeover of the Republican Party in 1964.  Liberals revolted thereafter, condemning US intervention in Vietnam, endorsing expansion of welfare and civil rights programs, and espousing greater tolerance and diversity within society; their insurgency eventually succeeded with the George McGovern nomination and capture of the Democratic Party in 1972.   Thereafter, the alignment of political ideologies across the three key issue-areas in US politics can be summarized as such:

•  The Republican Party post-1964 supported a “nationalist” foreign policy, a “free market” approach to economics, and “traditionalism” in regard to social values;

•  The Democratic Party post-1972 espoused an “accommodationist”  foreign policy, an “interventionist” approach to economics, and “progressivism” in regard to social values.

Similarly, American voting preferences re-aligned, however, not uniformly across the executive and legislative branches; in 1968, American voters elected a president with both houses of Congress in the opposition for the first time in 120 years.  Following the 1988 election, US political scientist Byron Shafer explored this phenomenon and how it was connected to George Bush’s election, the fifth out of six presidential contests. Shafer concluded after 1968, American voters’ preferences for a strong president on (national) foreign policy and social values and a Congress populated by members responsive to their (local) economic concerns and social mores resulted in cross-cutting majorities, which in turn, created majorities for successive Republican presidencies and Democratic Congresses for the next twenty-four years; the occasional competitiveness in the US Senate reflects its institutional closeness to the president on foreign policy making while being politically responsive to constituent economic and social concerns. 

(In the author’s estimation, the Carter Administration elected in 1976 can be rightly judged an aberration amidst the succession of Republican executives; despite the depth of public revulsion after Watergate and an error-prone Ford candidacy, Carter still only won by one percentage point.  Carter’s 1980 defeat stemmed from the incompatibility of his and the party’s agenda in the executive branch to voter preferences; Republican Ronald Reagan trounced Carter and delivered a Republican Senate, handing an incumbent president a defeat for the first time in forty-eight years.)

Shafer surmised the seeming permanence of cross-cutting majorities could be altered with major events in any of the three issue-areas that would effect changes in American voting preferences.  In the author’s judgment, between 1989 and 1991, events did occur across all three issue-areas that led to a complete reversal of the political alignment. 

On the national level, the peaceful close of the Cold War and successful prosecution of the Persian Gulf War in 1991 closed the need for a strident nationalist foreign policy and provided an opening for voices in support of multilateral or accommodationist global stance.  The recession of 1990 and inability of the Bush Administration to provide viable solutions created an opportunity for presidential candidates in favor of greater government assistance and intervention to rescue the economy.  The Los Angeles riots of 1991 graphically demonstrated the still delicate state of American race relations and necessitated greater presidential leadership on the issue.  As such, the Democratic Party was poised to win the presidency.

Conversely at the local level, the end of the Cold War also inspired calls for a narrower application of US power abroad, less involvement in global commitments, and guarding against the diminution of US sovereignty in international bodies.  Additionally, the recession of 1990 spurred a reaction against the current level of regulations and taxes on the economy with increasing calls for their reduction.  Finally, the Los Angeles riots of 1991 also ignited calls for increased emphasis on law-and-order and bolstering of family values.  In this context, the Republican Party was finally going to make headway in state and congressional contests.

The result was a reversal of the post-1968 order.  Democratic candidate William Clinton achieved a major upset winning the White House in 1992 representing a more accommodationist foreign policy, pledging to assist the economy with government-led stimuli, and promising to create a more inclusive America.  The Democrats retained control of Congress, but Republicans made inroads; moreover in off-year elections, Republicans scored successes in the New Jersey and Virginia governors races as well as the unprecedented victories in the New York and Los Angeles mayoral contests.  However by 1994, the Clinton Administration’s inability to articulate a coherent foreign policy, its overly complex and ambitious health care proposal to take over a seventh of the economy, and overreaching on various social issues produced a voter reaction in which the Republicans took both houses of Congress for the first time in nearly 40 years.

Between 1994 and the present day, the subsequent alignment held up.  Despite the historic loss of Congress in 1994, Democrats retained the White House; similarly, Republican majorities in Congress have narrowed but have remained, save for the loss of the US Senate given the departure of Republican Sen. James Jeffords in 2001 to vote with the Democratic leadership. 

On the ideological landscape, the chasm between the two parties that existed prior to 1992 became more muted; under Clinton, the Democratic Party adopted more conservative positions and the Republican Party (under Speaker Newt Gingrich and like-minded leaders) brought innovative solutions to traditionally liberal concerns, such as welfare and education.  With the end of the Cold War, the “era of big government,” and freedom without responsibility, the national political elite evolved philosophically closer to each other; the competition remained and grew even fierce, if only because personality differences and negative advertising were the only means to “meaningful” differentiation.  Witnessing the 2000 election, Democrat Al Gore and Republican George Bush were deemed the Coke and Pepsi of American politics and indeed, Bush won only by the narrowest of any election outcome ever. 

Prior to September 11, President Bush’s political position was tenuous indeed.  Successes such as securing passage of a massive tax cut and threading the needle on stem-cell research were offset by the failure to assuage Sen. Jeffords to preserve a Senate majority and continued embitterment of numerous Democratic constituencies, especially African-Americans, stemming from the contentious 2000 elections.  In addition, the staunch adherence to a conservative agenda and atmosphere of criticism alleging the president’s capture by big business compounded the political handicap of lacking an electoral mandate.  (Keeping in line with the earlier Carter analogy -- and minus the events of September 11, would the future have remembered Bush presidency as an anomaly too amidst a line of Democratic presidencies, delivered only via the public revulsion with Clinton-era scandals and inept Gore candidacy?)

But the events of September 11 have passed and the Bush presidency is presidency transformed; Americans of all political stripes have put the 2000 election behind them and partisan rancor has stopped.  Looking into the future, does the event of September 11 qualify as yet another catalyst in Shafer’s model?  Given the passage of only one month since the events, any such hypothesis would be grounded the aforementioned observations and entirely speculative as only subjective data would be available.

Beginning obviously in the foreign affairs realm, the terrorist attacks drastically raised the urgency of the national security agenda.  After languishing for eight years under the Clinton Administration, national security returned as a major priority for the executive branch and helmed by a team with the deepest experience in a generation.  Since September 11, national security has rightly become the prime focus of the Administration, whose performance has been applauded by pundits and public alike.  Given the natural affinity for the Republican Party establishment for involvement in foreign affairs and national security and the professed commitment to combat terrorism (and the current public acquiescence), the Administration’s performance over a period of time and public endorsement may translate into an eventual voting majority for a more nationalistic foreign policy.  The Democratic Party possesses a reservoir of talented foreign affairs leaders, however its congressional and gubernatorial ranks are populated with individuals with limited experience (or interest) in national security or intelligence; in some cases, they have been determined opponents of unilateral undertakings or expansion of defense or intelligence expenditures.

Turning to the social values arena, varying pieces of anecdotal evidence point to (only) nascent trends that could manifest in changed voter preferences.  Since September 11, the nation has witnessed an outpouring of patriotism as flags have been flown across the landscape and individuals have poured millions into the coffers of charities to aid the victims.  Additionally, news stories have noted an increase in church attendance, bible sales, television viewing (interpreted by some as a reflection of families spending more time together at home), and even use of dating services (whereby single patrons have stated their desire to have a family because of September 11).  Taken in combination with the perennial Republican conservatives’ reliance on “family values” as part of their appeal, the voting public may respond positively. 

Conversely, the most austere conservative voices in support of family values (such as Pat Robertson and Jerry Falwell) have discredited themselves completely by hypothesizing the September 11 events were a sign of God’s displeasure with the allegedly deficient moral character of the nation.  Moreover, as the nation continues to learn more about the victims and their families, and more significantly their “partners,” will public empathy translate into inclusion of homosexual or unmarried unions into the legal rubric now permitting only heterosexual family units?  Given the Democratic Party’s stance favoring an expansion of civil rights, voters may endorse this agenda.  Ultimately, the social values landscape will shift in a more positive direction if the ethos of President Bush’s inclusive “compassionate conservatism” endures and matches progressive Democrats in search of common ground.

Finally, on economic policy, the Bush Administration had already been aggressively tackling the slowing economy with its massive tax cut and other measures.  Leading economic indicators prior to September 11 had pointed to an emerging recovery.  However, the terrorist attacks knocked the recovery off track, and various sectors (the airlines and insurance most prominently) have been pressing for a federal bailout.  The precepts of Republican free market doctrine would proscribe government intervention, even under such circumstances; nonetheless, inaction in the face of massive layoffs and reduced economic activity is nearly impossible politically. 

Opponents within the party have voiced their objections and warn that such concessions will precipitate only additional requests; Democrats, in line with their ideological bearings, have endorsed government intervention and have considered repealing the already passed tax cut.  In this environment, the key factor will probably be President Bush’s vivid recollection of similar conditions during his father’s administration and a determination not to suffer the same fate by not acting.  In the end, the voting public may endorse government intervention and it will be the Republican Party which stretches to accommodate political realities -- for how long will be the question.

In reviewing the possible impact of September 11 across the three issue-areas and subsequent voting majorities, there is no definitive trend to identify but perhaps inclinations that may play into a new electoral order.

•  In foreign affairs, voting majorities will readily endorse a nationalist foreign policy with the edge going to the Republican Party.

• On social values, the voting majorities may re-emphasize their division of preferences for a progressive executive and a traditionalist legislature; in this realm, the deciding dynamic will be whether the public judges President Bush and his “compassionate conservatism” as progressive.

•  Regarding economic policy, the Bush Administration may contravene its free market bearings for the sake of re-election; however, should a split develop within the Republican Party over sustained government intervention or the economy fails to recover substantially, the Republican Party may suffer in the face of Democratic criticisms and appeals based on the economic management during the Clinton era.

As such, the electoral order may shift availing an opportunity for the Republican Party to make inroads against voter preferences for a Democratic majority; similarly, the outcome of public sentiment regarding the economy and social values may make the Congress even more competitive with the Republicans retaining their narrow margins.

In closing, the sum and substance of the challenges faced following September 11 present a potentially positive future for American political discourse.  Despite the tragedy of September 11, the terrorist attacks provide a foundation for the national leadership to define future national interest and subsequent grand strategy.  Similarly, the content of the nation’s social values debate may witness the bolstering of family values and community trust as well as acceptance for redefined family structures.  Finally, the current economic downturn has been aggravated by the terrorist attacks, but it will not amount to a catalyst for rethinking now universally accepted precepts in favor of free trade, lower taxes, and lesser regulation.  Partisan combat is sure to return, but the national tragedy may ultimately restore confidence in government’s capacity to tackle constructively the issues of the day.