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October 6, 2001

What the Architects of the Cold War Taught Us

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On September 11, the terrorist strike on the World Trade Center and Pentagon exacted a level of destruction, human carnage, and spiritual injuries unprecedented in American history.  With the heart-wrenching images and the panic-inducing uncertainty throughout the day's remaining hours, September 11 has been rightly described as the moment where history is marked Before and After.  The attack on the United States has been labeled the "first war of the 21st century;" however, the battle plan for such a war remains unclear.  Old security frameworks do not apply and a new strategy must be conceived to marshal the nation's resources for the subsequent global and domestic challenges.

In searching for a precedent, commentators have offered September 11 as a modern day Pearl Harbor - a moment where America's domestic and global character was completely transformed.  The contention has merit, but does not provide instruction for today's policymakers.  September 11 more accurately presents an encapsulation of the decade long arc traveled by America between Pearl Harbor and the Korean War; Pearl Harbor marked the end of its isolationist tradition and the Korean War forced a sobering realization of its internationalist responsibilities in the emerging Cold War.  Similarly, September 11 exposed the hollowness of the post-cold war peace while simultaneously presenting new obligations vis-à-vis the violent new realities of the modern global arena.

In the present day, the nation is arriving at conclusions identical to those of that decade - the recognition that national security has been challenged in an unprecedented manner and a new comprehensive grand strategy is necessary to coordinate the US resources and population for the impending conflict.  In the case of 1950, the premises and practice of containment were ratified in NSC-68, a policy blueprint for the deployment of US political, economic, and military capabilities that endured for the next half-century; with the current US leadership asserting its commitment for the long-term battle ahead, it stands that a contemporary equivalent must be conceived in order to guide American policy and activities into the future.

An "NSC-68 2001" should delineate a doctrine of preemption as the basis for American defense policy in specific regard to terrorism and enact a substantial increase in the resources available for intelligence and covert military activities.  Preemption recognizes that US defensive actions must step action beyond containment of threats to their elimination prior to execution; furthermore, preemption would not discriminate between the agents conducting terrorism or the states harboring them.

Relying solely on deterrence would be insufficient given the recent evolution of modern terrorism; while incidents have declined, their lethality has increased dramatically, reflecting the increasingly virulent and fanatical nature of perpetrators.  No longer is terrorism the means to radical political ends; terrorism has become the end in and of itself.  With no negotiation possible, the only dignified defense is preemption.  As such, expansion of intelligence and covert forces strengthens the US capabilities necessary for enactment of psychological warfare, elimination of terrorist cells, destruction of nodes supporting terrorist activities, or even the decapitation of sponsor state leadership.

As just stated, preemption entails an end to the prohibition on assassination.  To carry the argument further regarding military actions, compellence via exercise of tactical chemical or nuclear capabilities against sponsor states should be examined.  Given the near historic impossibility of invading and pacifying Afghanistan, shouldn't American strategy at least consider surgical strikes featuring use of battlefield nuclear and chemical weapons? Such tactics capitalize on America's "full spectrum" of superior capabilities and would provide effective siege capabilities for US forces against mountain-based cells or sponsor state security organs.

Beyond Afghanistan, a concerted effort by our leadership should inform the American public as to the risks involved with this war; the offensive will be taken on all fronts and counter-attacks on all fronts must be anticipated.  The Gulf War restored the utility of military action, however, it unreasonably raised our expectations regarding casualties.  Recalling the maxims offered by Clausewitz, Sun-Tzu, and Sherman, wars are fought to achieve national policy, are meant to be won, and are episodes of hell on earth.

On the domestic level, an NSC-68 2001 would define preventive preparedness and consequence management, the primary components of homeland defense.  Both elements are achieved by the sacrifice of some conveniences associated with modern living via additional layers of security in our transportation, immigration, and communication systems and bolstering resources for all response systems, from emergency medical and evacuation reaction teams to cybersecurity to financial due diligence.  Finally, a rationalization of currently duplicated structures would enhance efficiency and effectiveness.

Alternatively, the urgency for homeland defense should not be construed as acceptance for extraordinary entitlements for law enforcement and internal security; after reviews of this last incident are completed, vulnerabilities in security procedures will be evident but not necessarily a glaring lack of power on the part of security agencies.  Pursuit of homeland defense must guard against overreaction.  The early Cold War period was marred by McCarthyism; a parallel danger now arises from racial profiling against Arab Americans, which have vehemently denounced the attacks as counter as Islam and deserve respect for their civil rights. 

As for the solution to long-term security, it remains as originally posited by NSC-68 - "we have no choice but to demonstrate the superiority of the idea of freedom by its constructive application, and to attempt to change the world situation by means short of war in such a way as to frustrate [enemy] design." Ultimately, the source of our security has always been our faith in the American creed of liberty and the demonstration of its fruits to the world; the September 11 attacks inflicted a terrible toll on our landscape and sense of security, but this nation will endure if it preserves and champions its commitment to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

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