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T H E A R E S F O R U M October 6, 2001 What the Architects of the Cold War Taught Us |
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On September 11,
the terrorist strike on the World Trade Center and Pentagon exacted a
level of destruction, human carnage, and spiritual injuries unprecedented
in American history. With the
heart-wrenching images and the panic-inducing uncertainty throughout the
day's remaining hours, September 11 has been rightly described as the
moment where history is marked Before and After.
The attack on the United States has been labeled the "first
war of the 21st century;" however, the battle plan for such a war
remains unclear. Old security
frameworks do not apply and a new strategy must be conceived to marshal
the nation's resources for the subsequent global and domestic challenges. In searching for
a precedent, commentators have offered September 11 as a modern day Pearl
Harbor - a moment where America's domestic and global character was
completely transformed. The contention has merit, but does not provide instruction
for today's policymakers. September
11 more accurately presents an encapsulation of the decade long arc
traveled by America between Pearl Harbor and the Korean War; Pearl Harbor
marked the end of its isolationist tradition and the Korean War forced a
sobering realization of its internationalist responsibilities in the
emerging Cold War. Similarly,
September 11 exposed the hollowness of the post-cold war peace while
simultaneously presenting new obligations vis-à-vis the violent new
realities of the modern global arena. In the present
day, the nation is arriving at conclusions identical to those of that
decade - the recognition that national security has been challenged in an
unprecedented manner and a new comprehensive grand strategy is necessary
to coordinate the US resources and population for the impending conflict.
In the case of 1950, the premises and practice of containment were
ratified in NSC-68, a policy blueprint for the deployment of US political,
economic, and military capabilities that endured for the next
half-century; with the current US leadership asserting its commitment for
the long-term battle ahead, it stands that a contemporary equivalent must
be conceived in order to guide American policy and activities into the
future. An "NSC-68
2001" should delineate a doctrine of preemption as the basis for
American defense policy in specific regard to terrorism and enact a
substantial increase in the resources available for intelligence and
covert military activities. Preemption
recognizes that US defensive actions must step action beyond containment
of threats to their elimination prior to execution; furthermore,
preemption would not discriminate between the agents conducting terrorism
or the states harboring them. Relying solely on
deterrence would be insufficient given the recent evolution of modern
terrorism; while incidents have declined, their lethality has increased
dramatically, reflecting the increasingly virulent and fanatical nature of
perpetrators. No longer is
terrorism the means to radical political ends; terrorism has become the
end in and of itself. With no
negotiation possible, the only dignified defense is preemption.
As such, expansion of intelligence and covert forces strengthens
the US capabilities necessary for enactment of psychological warfare,
elimination of terrorist cells, destruction of nodes supporting terrorist
activities, or even the decapitation of sponsor state leadership. As just stated,
preemption entails an end to the prohibition on assassination.
To carry the argument further regarding military actions,
compellence via exercise of tactical chemical or nuclear capabilities
against sponsor states should be examined.
Given the near historic impossibility of invading and pacifying
Afghanistan, shouldn't American strategy at least consider surgical
strikes featuring use of battlefield nuclear and chemical weapons? Such
tactics capitalize on America's "full spectrum" of superior
capabilities and would provide effective siege capabilities for US forces
against mountain-based cells or sponsor state security organs. Beyond
Afghanistan, a concerted effort by our leadership should inform the
American public as to the risks involved with this war; the offensive will
be taken on all fronts and counter-attacks on all fronts must be
anticipated. The Gulf War
restored the utility of military action, however, it unreasonably raised
our expectations regarding casualties.
Recalling the maxims offered by Clausewitz, Sun-Tzu, and Sherman,
wars are fought to achieve national policy, are meant to be won, and are
episodes of hell on earth. On the domestic
level, an NSC-68 2001 would define preventive preparedness and consequence
management, the primary components of homeland defense.
Both elements are achieved by the sacrifice of some conveniences
associated with modern living via additional layers of security in our
transportation, immigration, and communication systems and bolstering
resources for all response systems, from emergency medical and evacuation
reaction teams to cybersecurity to financial due diligence.
Finally, a rationalization of currently duplicated structures would
enhance efficiency and effectiveness. Alternatively,
the urgency for homeland defense should not be construed as acceptance for
extraordinary entitlements for law enforcement and internal security;
after reviews of this last incident are completed, vulnerabilities in
security procedures will be evident but not necessarily a glaring lack of
power on the part of security agencies.
Pursuit of homeland defense must guard against overreaction.
The early Cold War period was marred by McCarthyism; a parallel
danger now arises from racial profiling against Arab Americans, which have
vehemently denounced the attacks as counter as Islam and deserve respect
for their civil rights. As for the solution to long-term security, it remains as originally posited by NSC-68 - "we have no choice but to demonstrate the superiority of the idea of freedom by its constructive application, and to attempt to change the world situation by means short of war in such a way as to frustrate [enemy] design." Ultimately, the source of our security has always been our faith in the American creed of liberty and the demonstration of its fruits to the world; the September 11 attacks inflicted a terrible toll on our landscape and sense of security, but this nation will endure if it preserves and champions its commitment to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. |