Aesthetics	Ethics	Modern Science	Reason	Aesthetics 2

An Essay On Ethics

The naturalistic fallacy is where one tries to define good in terms of natural properties.To do this we must first understand what a natural property is.A natural property is one such as mass or colour, or any property that can be empirically verified.Moore claims that it is not possible to account for good by using natural properties.This, he claims is because good is not a natural property.

The naturalistic fallacy is also where the assumption is made that because a quality is accompanied by the quality of goodness, and goodness is often or always accompanied by this quality, the assumption that this quality is identical to goodness is committing the naturalistic fallacy.For example, if we take the emotion of pleasure, this is often/always associated with goodness, and goodness is likewise often/always associated with pleasure, then it therefore follows, that whatever is good, is therefore pleasant and visa-versa.This is a prime example of committing the naturalistic fallacy.For, if the two had the same connotations or meanings, to say what is good is pleasant, would be like saying, “What is pleasant is pleasant.”This is put well in Arthur N. Priors The Naturalistic Fallacy: The logic of its Refutation.

“What the man who commits the naturalistic fallacy fails to realise is that 'good'

and some other adjective may denote or be applicable to the same things, and yet

not con- note the same quality, i.e. describe the things in the same way”

Moore also claims that there are two kinds of properties in the world, simple and complex.Complex properties are made up of many simple properties, e.g. a table, which is made up of many colours and many other physical aspects such as height and mass.Simple properties are those where their terms cannot be broken down any further, one example of this is colour.Moore claims that good is a simple property, and therefore its meaning cannot be ascribed to any other properties.

“...yellow and good, we say, are not complex: they are the notions of that

simple kind, out of which definitions are composed and with which the

power of further defining ceases.” (Principia Ethica, chapter 1 page 8).

We may recognise instantly what may appear to be yellow, or what appears to be good, but Moore says that good is undefinable.This in itself can lead to problems as to define something is to be able to understand it, yet if something is undefinable does it then follow that we cannot understand what good is?This is obviously not the case, as if no one understood what good meant, then there would be no point in having the word at all.

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This point is emphasised by what is called the ‘open question argument’.This is where Moore claims that if good could be defined in terms of some other property, then asking if this property is good is not needed, because the answer is obvious.It is a bit like asking an unmarried man if he is a bachelor, but do the words actually have the same meaning?For any property that that we associate with goodness, or try to explain goodness in terms of, we can then ask “Is this property itself good?”Once again, if I use the example of pleasure.We can ask “Is pleasure itself good?” and the fact that this question makes sense, shows that pleasure and goodness are not the same thing.Moore believes that no property can pass the open-ended question, and therefore furthers the claim that goodness can not be described in terms of other properties.

The open-ended question faces many criticisms.One of the main ones that was put forward by the philosopher Geach.Geach uses language to try to disprove Moore.He claims that there are two types of adjectives, predicative and attributive.Predicative is where the adjective can survive when taken out of its context.For example the adjective red in the statement, “that’s a red fire-engine”, is predicative, this is because it can be split into two.It is red and it is also a fire engine.However when an adjective is attributive it cannot be split.The following is an example of an attributive adjective, “that’s a big mouse”.This obviously doesn’t work because when taken out of its context, the word big is no longer true, as mice are small, yet in its context it is true.Geach saw good as being attributive, whereas Moore treats good as being predicative.For example if we were to say that we saw a good film, but that is not to say that the film was also good, but only in its context, the film may have been good, but not intrinsically so.

It is however possible to say that although Geach is correct in his reasoning, it is not applicable in the terms we are looking at.It can be said that Geach’s reasoning only works when we use it with objects, and more so with functional ones.Yet, I believe that his approach raises some serious questions about Moore’s claims, for example is a person a functional object.If this is so then the implications are that Geach has found a fault in Moore’s reasoning.

Problems also arise when we consider in greater depth the problems that arise when we think of the simple notions, such as good and yellow.Yellow is a simple notion, yet this is detected through sense perception.Good is detected through intuition, but is intuition supposed to work alongside sense perception and understanding?Yet, intuitionists obviously hold that what we can intuit, can be held as being real and trustworthy.Intuitionism is a branch of non-naturalism, which Moore holds to, as he says that good is a non-natural property.This view is often disliked as you cannot reason logically or prove by empirical methods anything that is said to be intuited.

There are many objectors to Moore’s account of natural and non-natural properties, which lie at the heart of his theory.Moore describes a natural object as anything that that is capable of existing in time.He gives two properties that a natural object has, the first is that any natural object must be able to be thought of as existing in time all by itself.The second property is that the object is a whole and is made up of its characteristics.Non-natural is described as being the opposite of natural.It cannot be thought of as existing in time all by itself, but only as a property of a natural object, and it is not part of the object.

C.D. Broad takes up this point in his book Ethics.He uses the example of a penny as being a natural object.

“Surely its brownness and its roundness cannot be conceived as existing in time all by .And surely a penny is not a whole, of which its brownness and roundness are parts.”

Broad views brownness and roundness as attributes of the penny, which are obviously not natural.Yet Moore regards the roundness and brownness of the penny as natural ones.This brings obvious troubles to Moore, as his basic premise is that good is non-natural, but if his definition of non-natural is incorrect then the results are that his theory becomes nulled.

Moore on having established his opinion that good is a simple, indefinable notion, goes on to examine and criticise the alternatives. He sees only two other alternatives, either that good is a complex notion that is capable of analysis or it is meaningless.As has been seen, the notion that good is a complex notion has been disproved by the open question argument.He then says, that the suggestion that good is meaningless is completely false because “we all” know what is meant by good, at least in some sense or another.
 

Now that we know what the naturalistic fallacy is, there still remains the question of whether it really is a fallacy or not.If we consider the word fallacy in its literal sense, it means a mistake in reasoning. To help prove the fact that his naturalistic fallacy is indeed a fallacy, he once again refers to the property of yellow.Moore says that it is a fallacy to infer,

“...all things which are yellow produce a certain kind of vibration in the light…But a moments reflection is sufficient to shew that those light-vibrations are not themselves what we mean by yellow.”

By this he means that the property of being yellow is coextensive with producing a certain vibration in light.But the property of yellow is not the same as the property of producing a certain vibration in light.If we look at good as being coextensive with pleasure, we can infer that it is indeed a fallacy.

If we take the view of William K. Frankena then we come to the conclusion that it is not a fallacy.According to Frankena, there are three points that enable a fallacy, such as Moore’s, to falsify the naturalist view.The first point is when a non-natural property, like goodness is defined in terms of a natural property, but Moore simply states that goodness is non-natural, without giving acceptable proof.The second is where a property is defined in terms of another property, but Moore does not show that goodness is different from all other things with which it is equated.The third point is where one attempts to define the indefinable, but many believe that Moore does not conclusively show that good is simple, because he does so by means of analogies alone.In general, Frankena seems to think that Moore does not give enough proof for his claims of the fallacy to be acceptable.

In my views Moore’s account, is not a fallacy, but perhaps a group of fallacies. I believe this because, as I have pointed there are many faults in his reasoning, for example his attempt at proving that good is a non-natural property, and a fallacy is a mistake in reasoning.There seem to bee too many holes in Moores work for it to be a fallacy, as some of the basic suppositions that are made by Moore can be questioned.This is why Moore is often accused of “begging the question”, for when you conclude something, the basic premises have to be true for the conclusion to be valid.

Moores claims do come under many criticisms, but I think that it is an important work, as it tries to combat the problems with ethics by attacking the root of the questions that ethics pose.It is quite a bold claim that he makes, and he does have many good points, although most are subject to criticisms, but, as is the case with all theories.
 
 
 

Bibliography
 

G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica

C.N. Broad, Ethics

Arthur N. Prior, The Naturalistic Fallacy: The logic of its Refutation