Combating domestic terrorism
I first met him in 1993 at a conference in Chicago. combating domestic terrorism Marijuana terrorism. Cohen said he was working on a history of Israel's nuclear weapons program, and then he described in copious detail precisely where he was on the project. Although Cohen is an historian, he reminded me of the best journalists I had known over my 30 years in the news business. Good journalists are persistent; the best are pit bulls. combating domestic terrorism Solutions for terrorism. They never let go. They are the Ida Tarbells, the Henry Morton Stanleys, the Woodwards and the Bernsteins, the people whose reporting stirs things up and sometimes inspires change. But for every Woodward and Bernstein, there are dozens, perhaps hundreds, whose obsession with compiling every fact about a story, exploring every nuance, covering every angle means they never quite get the thing done, or they describe all the trees without ever quite seeing the forest. combating domestic terrorism Terrorism-in-korea. Over the years, I wondered whether Cohen would fall into that trap. The answer came last fall with the publication of Israel and the Bomb. Lawrence Korb, writing in the New York Times, said: "Cohen has achieved the impossible. With Israel and the Bomb, he has written a scholarly treatise that includes over 1,200 footnotes, yet reads like a novel. "Cohen's writing is clear and compelling, but novelistic it is not. Nonetheless, Korb is close to target in saying that Cohen achieved the "impossible. " Cohen has written a near-definitive work on the history of a secret and heavily censored weapons program that the Israeli government scarcely acknowledges. Readers of the Bulletin are familiar with the rough outlines of Israel's program, in part because of Cohen's past articles. (The most recent: "And Then There Was One" in the September/ October 1998 issue. ) Bulletin readers know how David Ben Gurion, the founding father of Israel, became the father of the nuclear program; how Shimon Peres, Ben Gurion's protege, put the program fully on track; and how Lev Eshkol, Israel's third prime minister, authored the famously vague statement, "Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East. "Israeli proponents of that formulation argue that it has contributed to keeping the peace in the Middle East. Although everyone "knows" that Israel has a nuclear deterrent, goes the conventional wisdom, the failure to proclaim it publicly means that Arab leaders are not backed into corners and forced to pursue their own bomb programs. Nonetheless, nuclear ambiguity--or "opacity" to use the more rigorous term favored by Cohen- -has enormously complicated U. S. -Israeli relations over the decades. The Eisenhower administration suspected that Israel had a bomb program, but left office before it could fully check the matter out. President Kennedy was haunted by the prospect of global nuclear proliferation, and he believed that an Israel with nuclear weapons would destabilize a volatile region. Nevertheless, his administration could not quite get a handle on whether Israel was actually going nuclear, in large part because the Israelis dissembled at the highest levels. President Johnson was determined to leave the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty as a legacy, and he sorely wanted Israel to come into the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. Although some Israeli leaders favored that, in the end Israel would not do it.
Combating domestic terrorism
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