art. "The objectivism of the scientific approach" The counter-revolution of science"
ti a common but dangerous error to believe that things wich our senses or our mind treat as members of the same class must have something else in common beyond being registered in the same manner by our mind" (p. 47)
Ti interesting tht this remark (which reminds me of Wg's Familieahnung) occurs in an article devoted to repudiation of (materialist) reductionism.
Eu pot trg de aici ccluzii pt un eseu g Wg: justificarea transcendentala a F.Ahnung ea depinde de
refuzul metalbj: daca alea ar avea comun in plus ceva, atunci cvle care se refera la ceea ce au ele in plus comun sunt in melbj fata de the family-resemblance -word.
refuzul dtctiei lbj phic/lbj stific
ru creierului.
elaboreaza despre legatura dtre HAYEK (citatul rosu), FAMILIEAHNUNG si REFUZUL CREIERULUI. (Inadins le-am scris cu litere mari ca si cum ar fi teze...)
Dc felul cum clsificam obectele prin cuvinte s-ar datora creierului, atunci neam putea imagina ca creierul le-ar clasifica altfel. Ar fi un fapt cg ca pasarile - si numai pasarile - sunt pasari. nu e clar cum ultima stc decurge? uite asa "pasari" e luat o data in referinta vulgara, alta data in referinta stifica cu ce cuvinte am clasifica insa bucatile de creier? Care ar fi referinta vulgara a , de pilda, bucatii de creier responsabile pt vaz? (A sinapselor, "structurii" care face chestia asta?) It would even be a contingent fact that the brain is the brain...it would be, in principle, possible that we discover we really think with our kidneys, or that thought is really excretion.
An essay on this should psycho-analyze (explain): why do people like to look for overlaps, i.e. seek to find different words with the same reference? I proved thy shouldn't...
RELEVANCE FOR CONCENTRATION RICUZ! RICUZ IS NOT MERELY A MENTAL FACULTY- IT DEPENDS ON OUR ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE...IF THESE ASSUMPTIONS ARE WRONG (I.E. THE BORDERS OF THINGS SHD BE PLACED ELSEWHERE) THEN SOMEONE WHO SEEMS LO MERUCAZ COULD BE MERUCAZ AND VICE VERSA!!!!
Keep in mind my thesis tht any attempt 2 translate a part of language into another is in fact an expansion of lgge to new parts of reality. i assume lgge is referential...so take care about it: phaps i shd reformulate: if the language were referential, then my above thesis
Hayek again: "...to explain our knowledge wd require tht we shd know more than we actually know, which is, of course, a self-contradictory statement"
CONTRA: "Yes, but to xplain our seeing by hearing we should KNOW more than we actually see - we shd not SEE more than we actually see."
AGAIN:Wat;s wrong with explaining seeing by hearing and vice versa? Look wat's wrong:
2 explain seeing by hearing we need to hear more than we see. Thrfore we could not see more than we hear. Thrfore a "permutatory" xplanation cannot do.
"If we heard as many objects as we saw..." How do you count them - by seeing or by hearing? What is measured by what?
If we explained seeing by hearing , should this explanation be intelligible by our hearing? Obviously not - for then we shd explain the way we hear it. The explanation of seeing by hearing shd be formulated in a medium other than hearing (and, obviously, seeing). But this medium shd be in turn explained!!!
Note on the "intelligible" above: better to say: its being heard (in a certain particular way) wd stand as a proof of its intelligibility; it could spare us the effort/need to understand it
Concluzia mea este ca reductia unui lbj la alt lbj pp un letalbj care trebuie sa fie diferit de lbj reducator. But Hayek's point is stronger: he thinks that attempting to reduce ordinary language to scific language (mental language to neurological language) is wrong bc such a reduction can only be effected in ordinary language.
Unlike hayek, i only implied that a reduction can only be effected in a language different from neurological language. For me, it is a contingent matter that we do not do away of ordinary language. THE GOEDELIAN SAVOUR OF THIS ARGUMENT..."it seems" as the goedelian true-but-unprovable
