Charles Taylor, Philosophical Arguments (1995)
Notes, Questions & Answers & #1: "Overcoming Epistemology"

1. ". . . It is clear what overcoming epistemology has to mean. It will mean abandoning foundationalism," What does this mean? What is foundationalism?

The Platonic metaphysical outlook which believes in objective transcendentals, such as Forms. This outlook considers that events/objects are flawed examples/instances of ideal Forms.

2. On p. 3 Taylor talks about Platonic metaphysics & the machine metaphor (Newton) of the 17^th c., saying that knowing something meant that you could explain the (theoretical/mathematical) principles of which the phenomena was a logical (& determinative) effect. Taylor says that before this, in Europe, knowing something - in the outlook provided by Aristotle - meant:

"the mind (nous) becomes one with the object of thought. . . . Mind & object are informed by the same eidos." One can authentically know how to throw a pot, how to raise children, or how to govern a polis, without necessarily knowing foundational or ideal principles of which these would be instances. This is genuine knowledge, not opinion or "my way is as good as your way" taste.

3. A (Platonic) correspondence or representational model/theory of truth says that the true concept must be a photocopy of the original. However, "Aristotle's model could much better be described as participational: being informed by the same eidos, the mind participates in the being of the known object, rather than simply depicting [photocopying] it," 3.

4. According to Taylor, why does Platonic/Aristotelian epistemology make no sense today?

"This theory totally depends on the phil. of Forms. Once we no longer explain the way things are in terms of the species [Form/ideal type] that inform them [i.e., of which the individual is an instance], this conception of knowledge is untenable [&] . . . almost unintelligible."

5. Taylor writes, "If Plato or Aristotle were right, the road to certainty [truth] couldn't be inward - indeed, the very notion of certainty would be different: defined more in terms of the kinds of being that admit of it . . . ," 5. Why would this be the case?

If transcendentals exist (e.g., justice, goodness, etc.), then "good" actions would replicate or actualize an instance of the Form. Choice or variation can only mar the process. The authority is not personal ("my choice"/inward/subjective); the standard is objective & universal.

What is the profound difference in Cartesian/modern epistemology?

It is not enough to have faith in ideals/Forms. Authority shifts from external/objective to subjective. One's choice must be made on the basis of logical self-evidency: "this choice makes sense to me." (This shift is illustrated by the Reformation. In Catholicism the believer was told how to pray & how to live. In Protestantism, one had to decide individually how to pray & how to live by making personal deductions from the New Testament.)

6. According to the cybernetic/computer metaphor of the mind, how do human beings make their "way around rooms, streets, and gardens or pick up & manipulate the objects we use"?

". . . the widespread faith that our intelligent performances are ultimately to be understood in terms of formal operations." "It is as though they [individuals] had been vouchsafed some revelation a priori that it must all be done by formal calculi."

7. According to Taylor, "To be free in the modern sense is to be self-responsible, to rely on your own judgment, to find your purpose in yourself."

8. On p. 12 Taylor rejects the foundationalism that runs from Plato through reductive (Modernist) science, saying that "What you get underlying our representations of the world . . . is not further [better or deeper] representation but rather a certain grasp of the world that we have as agents in it." Know-how; appropriate technique.

9. On p. 13. On the social theory spectrum, Taylor & pragmatists fall to the right of utilitarians (& left of historical fascists), claiming that much, if not all, of what is claimed as unique to the individual (what makes me uniquely me) is the result of what social process?

Learning a native language as an infant.

". . . the capacity to speak [is] not simply in the individual but primarily in the speech community."

10. If pragmatism rejects "moralities based purely on instrumental reason " (15), what kind of morality would it likely develop?

"Thick" descriptions; historiography; a morality in which axioms/principles are replaced or at least supplemented with a recognition of contexts, of numerous situations & complications. Instead of 10 Commandments, we would have a thousand novels.

11. What, according to Taylor, is wrong with Nietzsche & his postmodern followers? See p. 17.

"How do we adjudicate . . . dispute[s]?" For N. there is no objective (Platonic) standard/Form. Nor is there Aristotlean knowledge/know-how that is superior or illustrates the right way to do something. All choices are arbitrary, hence without logical justification. This position entails abandoning philosophy/reason (including science) since they are always rationalizations.

On to #2: "The Validity of Transcendental Arguments"
Oct. 96