| Jesse's Internet Cage |
|
|
Home | About Me | Quotes | Links | Writings | Artificial Tear Vessel | Art Gallery | Listen | Guestbook
|
Home > Writings > The Paradoxes of Skepticism
The Paradoxes of Skepticism
by Jesse Durst
Throughout philosophical history skepticism has questioned our basic understanding of the world we claim to know. Oftentimes skepticism has taken its own criticism, however, as a philosophy riddled with seemingly irreconcilable paradoxes. Philosophers have argued that skepticism is naturally self-defeating; its problems emerge because the skeptical arguments themselves are false and unsound. For instance, in order to make the claim that knowledge is unattainable, it appears that the skeptic is making a knowledge claim. One would ask, "How do you know that we don�t know?" In order to address conflicts such as this, a proper study involves an analysis of the classical skeptical tradition and its arguments, an examination of the medieval, Renaissance, and modern reactions to skeptical argumentation, an investigation into the claims of skeptics today, and a full-scale interpretation of the contradictions skepticism has brought about.
Skepticism, the word of which comes from the Greek word skepticos ("inquirers"), has a long history in both pre- and post-Socratic Greek thought. This past is vital to the study of epistemological problems, because, even though skeptical philosophy today differs somewhat in function from the skeptical tradition that evolved over 2000 years ago, the arguments are similar. A skeptic�s primary method is that of doubt and by doubting the skeptic admits nearly all, if not all, conclusions to be uncertain. Often this doubt concludes that knowledge is virtually impossible, and, indeed, skeptics take great care to devise argumentation refuting the possibility of knowledge. Hellenistic skepticism differs from the highly epistemological and semantic skepticism of today in that it purports an almost mystical state of happiness called ataraxia that one can achieve after discarding the desire for knowledge. For the skeptic, this is the only enlightenment possible and, ironically, it consists of pure ignorance or epoche�suspension of assent (Burnyeat 10).
The skeptics of the Academy were certainly influenced by the mass of pre-Socratic and Socratic thought that had emerged prior to them. Heraclitus purported that everything exists in a state of flux, and, consequently, that we cannot determine anything constant or fixedly true about anything. Even if such truth exists, Xenophanes wondered whether we could obtain any reliable or true criterion to discriminate truth from falsity. The beginnings of the skeptical tradition are also apparent in the works of the sophist Gorgias; Protagoras, who proclaimed, "Man is the measure of all things;" and others like Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Democritus, and Socrates (Edwards 449).
In Plato�s Apology Socrates boldly asserted his ignorance and challenged the common knowledge others of his time professed to hold. The skeptics, however, differed from both Socrates and the Stoics, who were also prominent in the Academy, in that they claimed no knowledge whatsoever; as Metrodorus said, "None of us knows anything, not even whether we know anything or not" (qtd. in Burnyeat 14). Arcesilaus, who lived during the third and fourth centuries BCE, is commonly referred to as the founder of Academic skepticism. Arcesilaus�s method, argument, and subsequent counter-argument were unoriginal, but his purpose was unique. Rejecting Platonic doctrine, he utilized a system of doubt and rigorous argumentation to extinguish belief and refuse to admit any truths (Burnyeat 10). For Arcesilaus and the skeptics, recognizing one�s ignorance was the height of the philosophical life and led to ataraxia. Carneades, another academic skeptic, rejected the idea of superior criteria for deciphering one�s perceptions, although he seemed to admit some reasonable probability in judgment. Future skeptics would refer to Carneades as the skeptic who had lived out non-belief: he suggested following convincing impressions without assertion (Burnyeat 17).
The skeptics of the academy were primary rivals with Stoics like Zeno, who argued that the Sage has cognitive knowledge of truth. Wise men, according to the skeptics, would hold no beliefs. The obvious question is "Is complete suspension of belief possible?" In this way, skepticism reaches a certain self-defeating position for, in order to suspend assent, one would have to believe that he should disbelieve certain knowledge claims. The answer that the Academics gave avoided the problem, but left another sore in its place: If a skeptic can fully convince himself of the truth of the statement "We should suspend assent," he can then abolish his belief in it also. In retrospect, however, this essentially means that the skeptic will not value the end he has reached once he has arrived (Burnyeat 12). This is a biting paradox that manifests itself many times when discussing the practicality of skeptical philosophy.
The Academic skeptics subsequently grew somewhat dogmatic in their assertion of ignorance, compelling some like Aenesidemus to form a breakaway group. Aenesidemus, who lived during the first century BCE, began a theoretical form of skepticism called Pyrrhonism, focusing on the goal of final epoche. This philosophy claims its origin from Pyrrho of Ellis (360 - 270 BCE), a Democritean philosopher who denied the possibility of knowledge. Pyrrho concluded that reality could only be described as undifferentiated, unmeasurable, and unjudgable and emphasized detachment as a final goal of life. In addition, he suggested we dispassionately appeal to the social norms of our society as a practical approach to life. Consequently, skeptical Pyrrhonism emphasized the practicality of Pyrrho�s philosophy�that it was a means to freedom (Burnyeat 14-19). We will later return to this idea of freedom through doubt. The successors of Aenesidemus�s Pyrrhonism, ironically, de-emphasized the lifestyle Pyrrho worked to promote, beginning to utilize skepticism in a fundamentally more modern way�the method as a system of noncommittal inquiry (Burnyeat 22).
Primary to late Pyrrhonism is Sextus Empiricus who worked during the late second century CE. He organized and collected materials from the skeptical tradition, including the Ten Tropes, a collection of arguments attributed to Aenesidemus, which countered the possibility of knowledge. Sextus Empiricus, like most Pyrrhonists, did not deny the appearance of things and events, but questioned knowledge claims from dogmatists about the reality behind those appearances (Edwards 450). Indeed, in Outlines of Pyrrhonism he writes that skepticism is "a capacity for bringing into opposition, in any way whatever, things that appear and things that are thought, so that, owing to the equal strength of the opposed items and rival claims, we come first to suspend judgment and after that to ataraxia" (Buryeat 120). Sextus uses arguments of relativism to question the basis behind simple impressions. For instance, how are we to know that our impressions are correct if people we label madmen have quite different cognitive experiences that are normal for them? (Burnyeat 91) How can we know if they are wrong or in an abnormal conscious state or if we are? Sextus concluded that, as many previous skeptics had, for practical purposes one had to follow the appearances of things when going about daily life. According to this philosophy, tradition, bodily drives, and nature are our best guesses in guiding our way of life, but these appearances do not divulge the truth (Burnyeat 126). In his book Ignorance, Peter Unger outlines a logical argument in the traditional Tropes form. His argument follows as such:
With the advent of post-Greek philosophy, this argument would prove inadequate in maintaining the skeptical position.
Also vital to the current shape of the skeptic arguments are the Christian, Renaissance, and modern reactions to Academic skepticism and Pyrrhonism. Early philosophers like St. Augustine and later modern philosophers began to see holes in the skeptical philosophy that the Stoics failed to recognize or, at least, emphasize. Clear and distinct ideas such as "1 + 1 = 2" seemed to be undeniable principles that the skeptics could not refute with ordinary argumentation (Unger 45). Upon these self-evident foundations, modern philosophers claimed the ability to develop bodies of knowledge that could withstand skeptical inquisition. As the modern story unfolds, skeptics will have to regroup and reformulate their arguments to meet the demands of the new knowledge claims.
Religious argumentation and skepticism have had a long and interesting past. For St. Augustine, skepticism was undesirable and he adopted a more Platonic viewpoint of knowledge. He thought that the Bible revealed the truth, leading him to write Contra Academicos in opposition to skeptical claims of human ignorance. The Renaissance period, however, experienced a rediscovery of the skeptical position this time in favor of the Christian religion, as many reacted against the evolving scientific movements. Although figures like Martin Luther believed that a Christian should be certain and not skeptical, his critic Erasmus felt that skepticism could serve as an impetus to accept the dogma of the Church (Edwards 451). His argument, as well as the arguments of Pedro Valencia and Michel de Montaigne, opposed the emerging Renaissance view of the cosmos. In his Academia Valencia concluded that human reason was inherently flawed and, therefore, we should turn toward God for guidance. Indeed, Montaigne and others like Gentian Hervet, the secretary of the Cardinal of Lorraine, stated that God�s revelation is the only true source of knowledge. The skepticism that emerged from the Renaissance, consequently, was forced to adapt to the new demands of both science and religion. Francisco Sanches envisioned a mitigated skepticism that acknowledged some probabilistic, limited knowledge but admitted that a pure science is unattainable (Edwards 452).
As the Renaissance period ended, giving way to modernism, skepticism would face some of the biggest challenges it had yet seen. Although there are many philosophers from which to choose during this period, this analysis will primarily focus on Ren� Descartes, Benedict Spinoza, David Hume, and Emmanuel Kant. Their philosophies were perhaps the most influential of modernism in the development of skepticism. Descartes viewed skepticism from a unique functional approach, in that out of his doubt stemmed undeniable knowledge. In his Meditations Descartes made an appeal to the skeptical approach outlined by Peter Unger in the passages above. From the basis of classical skepticism, he concluded that the thinking self, res cogitan, must exist in order to doubt things. In other words, because Descartes thinks, he is; cogito ergo sum. Beginning with this, Descartes then begins to rebuild his previous knowledge with a rationalist method, pointing, along the way, to the clear and distinct ideas reminiscent of the Stoics. These perceptions, upon contemplation, should be irrefutable and completely resistant to disagreement. In a similar frame of mind, Spinoza suggests that doubt in cases of irrefutable truths is so absurd that perhaps philosophers should not even consider skeptical arguments at the fundamental level. Speaking of skeptics, he writes,
Accordingly, doubt from this viewpoint is a problem of clarity within the doubter, not within the philosophy. The paradox that Spinoza emphasizes here presents a problem that skepticism will be forced to address if it is to remain sound in at least the minds of the skeptics.
The modern skepticism that emerged from such powerful arguments as that of Descartes and Spinoza included the philosophers Pierre Bayle, David Hume, and Emmanuel Kant. Bayle focused on the abundance of contradictions involved in all philosophical argumentation, concluding that all of man�s efforts to describe the world rationally end in some form of failure. For him Descartes had failed to prove the existence of an independent reality, as all qualities were products of the mind (Edwards 455, Burnyeat 380). Hume built upon these considerations, often expressing extreme skeptical views of science, religion and the like. He questioned the very basis of thought, bringing inductive and deductive reasoning under the skeptical knife, and challenging logical argumentation for the existence of Self, God, and the Universe itself (Edwards 455-56). The response to Hume�s skepticism came from the German philosopher Emmanuel Kant. According to Kant, space and time, among others, are necessary forms of all experience and doubting their existence, therefore, is unjustified. Inductive reasoning, he merited, is limited and empirical conclusion is probabilistic, making a valid metaphysics unattainable. Kant, however, did not deny the possibility of mathematical knowledge, which, since it was not inductive, could lead to the truth (Edwards 457). Another philosopher Solomon Maimon settled for mitigated Kantianism. Although he agreed that rational a priori knowledge in math is possible, he concluded that the application of these concepts to the physical world is a primarily inductive process. In Maimonian skepticism, these inductions are only probable and no universal or necessary knowledge is possible (Edwards 457).
Skepticism after modern philosophy would be forced to approach the arguments produced by Kant and others, many of who claimed the validity of common sense knowledge. With the advent of modern science, we can systematize our collection of information concerning our experience, but, instead of truth knowledge, we build probabilistic models. Indeed, the problems of truth often seem insoluble for modern-day philosophy. Still, the contradictions of skepticism make it so undesirable to philosophers that they cling to common sense beliefs. Nicholas Rescher, for instance, draws a distinction between the absolute certainty skeptics doubt and the certainty of practical life. If we have adequate grounding for our claims to knowledge, then certainty is a pragmatic possibility, he writes. The exhaustive grounding that skeptics require for mundane knowledge is unnecessary (Rescher 49, 120). Spinoza�s remarks are fresh in critics� minds and skepticism is ignored or written off as absurd. In order to discern what these criticisms mean for skepticism, we will now explore the contemporary skeptical approach.
The classical skeptical argument having fallen to Descartes, skeptics now must devise a new epistemological approach. In his book Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism Peter Unger proposes a thesis of universal ignorance, that "no one knows anything about anything" (Unger 1). Unger takes his argument to its logical end, claiming that no one is ever reasonable or justified in anything, that there is no functional truth, and that, in fact, no one ever believes, feels, or thinks anything. Interestingly enough, throughout his book Unger appeals to intuitive senses he has about ignorance, a blatant paradox that Unger admits willingly. This claim, of course, is something we will be forced to approach in our analysis. According to Unger, skepticism serves the "truth," and traditional philosophy is dead. Dissatisfied with the way philosophy currently runs, he feels that most philosophers engage in a highly uncritical examination of their most sacred beliefs (Unger 3-4).
Unger thinks that philosophy is wholly embedded in language, an idea that is vital to the contemporary skeptical cause. Language, he says, involves absolute terms like flat and certain, of which a perfect representation can never (or almost never) be reached. The word flat in this sense means perfectly flat, in that nothing could ever be flatter than the object being described. Of course, when we say something is flat, most likely the object has many imperfections, perhaps on the atomic level, which qualify it as a bumpy object. Certainty works the same way, in that, in order to be truly certain, one must at least be the most certain that anyone has ever been. This happens rarely, or perhaps once, and then it is still questionable as to whether that individual who was most certain was absolutely certain (Unger 49). The object that we said was flat, may in fact not be flat, but it is not certain that it is not flat, because absolute certainty is ultimately too demanding. Accordingly, our language theory is so blatantly wrong that it involves us in lies and impossibilities such as certainty, truth, and knowledge. After some rearrangement of the wording, Unger�s language theory leads directly into his epistemological proof of universal ignorance:
Ignorance, consequently, is universal. Unger says we do not know this to be so, but can still hold that it is true that "ignorance is necessary and inevitable." Knowing, like certainty, is an absolute limit of mental states that is virtually impossible (Unger 93).
Following his argument for universal ignorance, Unger makes the case for the irrationality of dogmatism. Referring to the classical argument for ignorance, he says, considering that someone may be certain of p and it is true that there is no deceiving scientist, it is still irrational to be certain of p (Unger 26). Certainty for Unger is so absolutely severe that the individual who is certain will accept no new information that could possibly affect his or her certainty. Unger calls this state of mind dogmatism or the attitude of certainty, and, since no one can really ever be certain of anything, this attitude is unreasonable (Unger 30). Being reasonable and justified is far too demanding, because it requires knowledge of the reason p to which an individual refers (Unger 199). Knowledge, in this case, is a direct relational state to an external reality. Unger holds that true knowledge is impossible by redevising his argument for universal ignorance from the proposition that there is no truth. He defines truth as "at least roughly, the property of being in agreement with the whole truth about the world" (Unger 273). Each truth that we state is the whole truth about something, but is also part of the whole truth about something else. Indeed, even the whole truth about the world is a part of the whole world. Unger argues that in order to know any single truth you must first know its relation to the whole truth and, therefore, must know the whole truth (Unger 275-76). This argument may seem confusing and, recognizing this, Unger ultimately appeals to an intuitive sense he has about the existence or possibility of truth. He writes, "I find it almost incredible that there should exist or obtain what must be a much greater abstract thing, our central entity, the whole truth about the world. Indeed, I am quite as confident that there really is no such thing, nothing such at all" (Unger 308). Because this overarching truth is impossible and nonexistent, there can be nothing that is part of this truth, and no one can ever know anything about anything. Unger writes that even common sense knowledge cannot escape from this conclusion. Unger then takes the conclusion to its frighteningly logical conclusion: no one is ever happy, regretful, sad, or feeling in any way and no one ever believes or thinks anything. He argues that in order for someone to have a feeling that p (sad that p, happy that p, etc.), one must know that p. Because knowledge is impossible, so is feeling. In addition, because there is no truth about the world, nothing can be consistent or inconsistent with the truth about the world. Since what is believed or thought must be either consistent or inconsistent with the truth about the world, no one can ever think or believe (Unger 309-10).
Unger�s conclusions seem so nonsensical, although he follows his critics� own procedures of reasoning, that we are compelled to fall back on the Spinozan criticism of skepticism�that such people are devoid of intelligence. When dealing with the claims of contemporary skepticism, however, we must be sure to analyze fully every epistemology that presents itself. Reasoning itself cannot fall outside our scrutiny, which brings the discussion to the numerous paradoxes encountered in skepticism. Throughout philosophical history, these contradictions have been written off as fundamental flaws in the skeptic�s mode of thought. Nicholas Rescher says that, although the skeptic is correct in stating that our collective knowledge is imperfect, his arguments about mundane or local knowledge are self-defeating (Rescher 249). Can the skeptic live a life without knowing? Does the skeptic claim to know that no one knows? These questions, and more, must all be addressed in order to explore the issue.
Oftentimes, it appears that the skeptic is attempting to argue a philosophy from "nowhere;" that is, the skeptic�s arguments attempt to disprove knowledge without particular knowledge-based assumptions. This is clearly a mistake, however, because argument relies on certain definitions and assumptions. From the beginning, the skeptical philosophy has striven to meet a final goal of universal ignorance, epoche. In order to make arguments for such an end, however, one must begin with certain assumptions. While Cartesians and Stoics would characterize these ideas as clear and distinct, for the skeptics they are refutable and uncertain. So, although the skeptic argues toward ignorance, he or she cannot even claim knowledge of this�hence, universal ignorance. In other words, the skeptic uses admittedly doubtful claims, not any less certain than the claims of other philosophers, to bring on more doubt. As Unger writes, someone can assert that p or make the case that p is possible, completely understanding that he or she does not know that p or even believe that p (Unger 254). One could even, at first, take the skeptics� assumptions as truth and still arrive at the conclusion of ignorance.
Consistent with the objection to skepticism as a philosophy from "nowhere," Berkeley, a modern Irish philosopher, set out to eliminate the absurdities and paradoxes that flood philosophy and, in particular, skepticism. He, like many philosophers throughout history, felt that skepticism ran counter to common sense. Berkeley also proposed that, although skeptics claimed to be against dogmatism, they actually held such doctrines themselves: "the skeptic doubts everything," "the skeptic doubt the validity of sensible things," and "the skeptic doubts the existence of real objects like bodies and souls" (Burnyeat 377-79). In like vein, Rescher writes that the skeptical claim that there can be no absolutes is an absolute in itself, making the argument self-defeating (Rescher 56). This reasoning, however, has a few obvious flaws, which the skeptic would be quick to point out. Skepticism does not necessarily require that there is no way to knowledge, and it is certainly not committed to the conclusions of its arguments�that we are all ignorant and should doubt. To their critics these skeptical arguments often seem so unintelligible and unprofitable that perhaps skepticism is not fit to consider anything (Stroud 41). Perhaps Spinoza caught on to the approach skeptics took to philosophers like Berkeley, prompting him to write how absurd it was. Can a skeptic doubt that he doubts or not know that he is thinking? Again, it seems that the skeptic has reduced himself to an idiot, devoid of all perception and intelligence. Peter Unger suggests that this underlying flaw is not a product of skepticism, however, but stems from the very language we use to express ourselves. The paradoxes associated with skeptical epistemology and many other fields of philosophy may be products of a badly wrong theory of language, embedded deep within our minds (Unger 314). In this case what we say is inadequate and unrepresentative of what is actually occurring. Even the statement I just made makes no sense in Unger�s philosophy�we cannot say what actually occurs or if something is really inadequate. If Unger is right, our entire theory of knowledge, all of our explicit impressions, beliefs and thoughts, and all of our statements are wrong. Even Unger, in fact, is unreasonable in proposing his views, something he willingly admits (Unger 199).
Another objection philosophers have had since the birth of skeptical philosophy involves practicality. If skeptics will not even accept simple processes like knowledge, belief, thinking, and, most importantly, reasoning, perhaps they do not have the necessary conditions to practice philosophy. In his book Skepticism: A Critical Reappraisal Nicholas Rescher attempts to separate the skeptic from the critically "reasonable" human. He says that although argumentation may not be able to refute skepticism for the skeptic, it can at least keep the rest of humanity from falling into the skeptical trap (Rescher 8). Can skeptics play the philosophical game without the rules? Although this raises interesting questions, it surreptitiously bypasses Unger�s assertion that when we reason we are implementing uncertain rules. According to Unger, the difference between the skeptic and others is that the skeptic does not think he believes anything, whereas others claim to believe or know many truths. Accordingly, the strictest skeptic thinks that no one plays with rules anyway, so that the skeptic is in at least as good of a position�that being a bad one�to argue as anyone else is. A final argument takes the previous one to its extreme�perhaps skeptics cannot even play the game of life. Many philosophers have questioned whether it is possible to truly separate belief and philosophy from life. If such a feat really is impossible, then the skeptic�s cause is a dead one. But is belief a necessary characteristic of life? I am fairly assured that no philosopher in his or her right mind would say that a tree or even a bacterium actually believes anything. Neither has a sufficient nerve system�none at all, in fact�to provide for such a feat. According to modern science, however, the bacterium is most certainly alive. Perhaps beliefs come later in the evolutionary structure, with the mammals or perhaps with consciousness in the species Homo sapiens. Nonetheless, wherever one decides to draw it, the line for self-awareness is obviously vague. Even in humans it is questionable whether infants have explicit knowledge or belief in their own existence. Conceivably, this is why few people can remember anything about their childhood before age two. For all intents and purposes, the line between consciousness and a lack thereof is nonexistent, making belief and knowledge blurred also. The best description we could hope for is that of varying degrees of what we call thought, knowledge, and belief, whatever those may be. Unfortunately, because our language was ill founded, many become dogmatic and adopt an attitude of certainty that purports an impossibility.
The ancient skeptics solved the practical problems by relying on the way things appeared, but it no longer seems that modern-day skepticism can support such an approach. Ultimately, skepticism is an epistemology and has little or nothing to say concerning practicality, action, or method. Perhaps there is some hope, however, for both the skeptics and the rest of the species. Various religious leaders, particularly ones from the East, reflect a particularly skeptical outlook at times. The Buddha once had a discussion with a disciple Malunkyaputta, who had been trying to uncover various mysteries of the universe�if the cosmos is eternal, if the body and soul are separate, et cetera. The Buddha compared such a philosopher to a man who had been shot by a poisoned arrow and refused to remove it until he knew the name and tribe of the man who shot it, and all of the specifications of the bow and arrow. "The man would die and those things would still remain unknown to him," the Buddha told Malunkyaputta (Cula-Malunkyovada Sutta). Living the desired holy life, according to the Buddha, does not depend on knowing or believing whether the cosmos is infinite or whether the soul is separate from the body. After adopting such views, "there is still the birth, there is the aging, there is the death, there is the sorrow, lamentation, pain, despair, & distress" (Cula-Malunkyovada Sutta). Furthermore, believing these things does not lead to dispassion and self-awakening. The Buddha, consequently, only teaches what leads to the ultimate goal of the Buddhist�s life.
The critic might be quick to point out that the Buddha and others like the Chinese sage Lao-tzu actually make claims to knowledge of the intuitive type. It is obvious, however, that the knowledge of which the enlightened speak is quite different from the everyday form of knowledge to which philosophers refer. It is not linguistically expressible knowledge, nor is it knowledge of what we might call facts. Lao-tzu writes, "In the pursuit of knowledge, every day something is added. In the practice of the Tao, every day something is dropped" (Lao-tzu 48). The ancient sage distinguished intellectual pursuits from the Way. In fact, Lao-tzu may be suggesting that the path to enlightenment follows not from knowledge acquisition but from abandonment of knowledge. Consistent with this idea, Lao-tzu writes, "Not-knowing is true knowledge. Presuming to know is a disease" (Lao-tzu 71). For the Taoist, truth comes not with knowledge but with practice and experience of the Tao. As Henry Bugbee proposes, human condition and philosophy is actually driven by individual experience not the fundamental knowledge over which philosophers have long argued. Indeed, perhaps anything anyone has ever done is a process of experience independent of knowledge. If this is the case, then Western philosophy may have tricked us into thinking that we know, thinking that we believe, and even thinking that we think. Indeed, skepticism in the West it seems has fallen prey to this philosophy of knowledge, involving itself in an impossible task that is scoffed at in some Eastern traditions. This burden is the attempt at linguistic argumentation. In any theory there is a hole, a counter-argument that forces the philosopher to reexamine and turn inward. Perhaps this is why the Tao te Ching reads, "Those who know don�t talk. Those who talk don�t know" (Lao-tzu 56). In any case, there appears to be a strong connection between the Buddha�s, the ancient skeptic�s, and Lao-tzu�s approach to life. The resounding message is: One should not be concerned with knowing or believing�the attitude of certainty�but should focus on the attitude of experience, dissolving all desires and doctrines in an ultimate quest for ataraxia�enlightenment.
Works Cited
"Skepticism." The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Vol. 7. 1967.
Burnyeat, Myles, Ed. The Skeptical Tradition. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983.
"Cula-Malunkyovada Sutta." Majjhima Nikaya 63. Trans. Thanissaro Bikkhu. Access to Insight Internet Site. http://world.std.com/~metta/canon/majjhima/mn63.html
Lao-tzu. Tao Te Ching. Trans. Stephen Mitchell. New York: HarperCollins, 1988.
Rescher, Nicholas. Scepticism: A Critical Reappraisal. Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1980.
Spinoza, Benedict. On the Improvement of the Understanding. Trans. R. H. M. Elwes. Washington: M. Walter Dunne, 1901.
Stroud, Barry. The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984.
Unger, Peter. Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.
|
Home | About Me | Quotes | Links | Writings | Artificial Tear Vessel | Art Gallery | Listen | Guestbook
|
© 2003 Jesse Durst (email) - Last Updated February 16, 2003 |
