"The invasion of Norway" by Simone Pelizza
The six months of calm following to the Nazi conquest of Poland brusquely finished
on April 9 1940 when German troops entered Denmark and they disembarked in more
points along the coasts of Norway. The audacity of these movements, open challenge
to the large naval superiority of Great Britain, wondered the allied chiefs. Particularly,
to the English military and political authorities seemed unbelievable that Hitler
had been able to try a similar venture; but, before the end of the day, truth
was clear and terrible: the Germans had occupied almost all port cities of Norway
and even Oslo, the capital city, had fallen in their hands. None of the landings
was failed. For the British admiralty it was the humiliating collapse of so many
guilty illusions: Scandinavia in fact had become battleground because of the allied
rashness and uncertainty. This time, the diabolic mind of Hitler was important
in relative measure; he had only anticipated the adversaries. London and Paris
had thrown the pacific northern countries in the Nazi jaws, showing a lack of
scruple non-dissimilar from that of the fierce German dictator.
A dangerous and unwise choice
On September 19 1939 Churchill, at that time First Lord of the Admiralty, solicited
the English Cabinet to take in consideration the idea to predispose a mined field
in the Norwegian territorial waters to halt the transport of Swedish iron from
the port of Narvik to Germany. He affirmed that a similar measure would have revealed
“of the maximum importance” to paralyze the war industry of the enemy.
The idea of Churchill was not new: already in 1918 the British government had
taken in consideration an analogous project, but in that occasion the admiralty
had opposed with strength to it since it would have involved “the territorial
violation of a neutral country.” Lord Beatty, chief of the Grand Fleet, had
defined a similar eventuality “a most reprehensible crime than those more
serious completed by the Germans.” The project decayed and nothing was done.
In that occasion, the sailors had shown wiser and more scrupulous than the statesmen
had; but in 1939 the things had changed. The English authorities were more regardless
of international rights than it had not been at the end of the First World War.
However, the State Department tried to throw water on the fire and noticed
to the Cabinet the factors that were against effecting the proposed violation
of the Norwegian neutrality. The discussion was more and more widened and the
press also intervened defending the thesis of Churchill. It was really this the
surest way to arouse worries in the Germans and to push them to adopt drastic
countermeasures.
At the beginning of October, in fact, the admiral Raeder, commander in chief
of the Navy of the Reich, expressed his fears about the possibility that the Norwegians
opened their port to English and he said to Hitler which strategic disadvantages
would have involved a English occupation of Norway. But Hitler didn't give weight
to the annotations of Raeder. All his attention was for the plans for the offensive
to West, against France; he didn't have any intention to embark in other military
operations that involved diversions of means and men.
The matter was proposed with great weight to the two parts after the Russian
attack to Finland, at the end of November. To Churchill, it seemed that that new
developments offered a good occasion to the Allies to strike, with the pretext
to help Finland, the side of Germany. In one note on December 16 he returned to
sustain with strength his project, listing all the elements in favor of such war
action. He was aware that with every probability it would have pushed the Germans
to invade Scandinavia, but in that writing he affirmed: “We have more to
earn that to lose from a German attack against Norway and Sweden.” It was
a cynical reasoning, absolutely deprived of scruples toward the destiny of the
Scandinavian people. The Cabinet was still opposed to the violation of the Norwegian
neutrality and preferred to abstain from sanctioning the immediate realization
of the plan of Churchill. However, they authorized the Head Quarter of the army
to elaborate a plan for a possible “military landing in Narvik”, terminal
of the railroad that connected the Norwegian coast to the iron layers of Gallivare,
in Sweden, and to Finland.
In that same month an untrustworthy visitor reached Berlin from Norway: it
was Vikdun Quisling, former minister of the Defense now head of a small party
of clear Nazi inspiration. He met with the admiral Raeder, to whom he foresees
the risk of an imminent English occupation of the Norwegian harbors. Affirming
that many exponents of the politics and the military world were ready to do a
putsch, he demanded money and clandestine collaboration to effect it: once taken
power, he would have solicited a German intervention to protect Norway, anticipating
so the English movement. After Raeder, Quisling also met Hitler: the dictator
still affirmed to prefer “the neutrality of Norway and after all of Scandinavia.”
He didn't have any intention “to widen the theater of war.” Quisling
had to be satisfied of a promise of financial helps and the insurance that the
problem of the concession of a military support to his movement would have been
studied.
In January, unexpectedly, the situation fell. On 15 of that month, in fact,
the French commander in chief, general Gamelin, met Prime Minister Daladier to
illustrate the importance to open a new theater of war in Scandinavia. The plan
of Gamelin foresaw a landing of allied forces in the north of Finland and the
“precautionary” occupation of harbors and airports of western Norway.
In the first days of February it was gathered the Allied Supreme Council of War
in Paris, with the presence of Chamberlain and Churchill. During this reunion
the plans related to the preparation of an Expedition Corp constituted from two
English divisions and from an almost equivalent French contingent, denominated
“Help to Finland” were decided. With the purpose to reduce the danger
of a direct clash with Russia, these troops would have had to be “camouflaged
as voluntaries.” The principal objective was to make sure the control of
the layers of Gallivare; only a part of the allied forces had to bring help to
the Finns. It was established that the operation would have started at the beginning
of March: the landing of the troops would have happened at Narvik.
The German reaction: the attack in Denmark and Norway
At this point, however, the Germans have already understood the plot. The signals
of an imminent allied movement in Scandinavia were too much numerous. Hitler changed
idea and gave instructions to his generals quickly to prepare a plan for the invasion
of Norway. Invasion still “possible”, since the Nazi head didn't want
to undertake new action in other fronts of war now that the attack to West was
almost ready. Unexpectedly, however, news arrives that England was putting together
already rallying troops and transport ships for an action in the Norwegian sector;
besides Churchill gave a rash broadcast speech in which sustained “the moral
obligation of the neutral countries to take sides with the Allies in the struggle
against Hitler's regime.” A clear, evident reference to the Scandinavian
nations. The German dictator became even more paranoiac and on February 20 summoned
General Von Falkenhorst entrusting command and preparation of a Corp of expedition
for Norway.
On March 1 the preparation of the invasion was completed. As intermediary strategic
step and to assure a suitable protection to the German lines of communication
toward north, Denmark had to be occupied. During the following weeks in Germany,
anxiety became feverish. On March 14 the Germans intercepted a message with which
it was ordered to the allied troops to be ready to set sail; the following day,
numerous French officers arrived in the Norwegian port of Bergen . The Germans,
not yet ready, had the certainty that the allies would have preceded them; and
they accelerated so their movements. But how were the things indeed in the allied
field?
Paris was anxious to attack; Daladier gave speeches that resembled too much
to those of Hitler. Instead London prevaricated; Chamberlain still hoped that
the Norwegian and Sweden governments would have consented to the entry of allied
troops in the respective territories. Churchill pushed for an immediate action,
but without success. On March 12, during a reunion, the English Cabinet decided
to widen the operations of landing to the harbors of Trondheim and Bergen, still
maintaining Narvik as principal target. The military operations had to depart
the following week, more precisely on day 20. But the allied projects went in
smoke for the surrender of Finland to Russia on March 13: the pretext for an intervention
in Scandinavia vanished. Other problem was the fall of Daladier and his substitution
from Paul Reynaud. He was spokesman of the opinion public French that demanded
an offensive politics and rapid actions; as first action of government, he went
to London and he solicited the immediate realization of the Norwegian project.
The English government accepted the point of view of the ally and decided the
immediate action; but, as it had happened in the case of Poland, it acted without
reflecting. It was established that Norwegian waters would have been mined on
April 5, and that the first contingent of troops had to sail towards Narvik three
days later, on day 8. But at this point new obstacles rose, new slowness. In the
meantime, the British State Department informed the French and English governments
that numerous German ships, loaded with troops, had gathered in the harbors nearest
to Norway. To explain this worrisome novelty, it was suggested the absurd hypothesis
that these forces were held ready for a counterattack to a possible English landing
in Norway. It was an enormous error, but the allied commands, incredibly, judged
it for good. The beginning of the Norwegian operation was postponed on April 8.
It was a fatal delay because, thanks to it, the Germans succeeded in preceding
the Allies in Norway of narrow measure.
At 5.15 AM on day 9, in fact, in base to the directives of Hitler, Nazi forces
disembarked in the principal Norwegian harbors , from Oslo up to Narvik, and they
appropriated without meeting resistance. The castles of paper in London and Paris
collapsed ruinously. And for the Scandinavian people it began tragedy.
Defeat and hypocrisy
The German commanders, after the attack, announced to have intervened for protecting
Norway from an imminent allied invasion: obviously the allied spokesman denied
such announcement, and they continued to deny it also in the following years.
During the Process of Nuremberg, a lustrum later, it was included between the
most serious charges on Germany the aggression to Norway and the execution of
the relative plain. English and French had an unbelievable behavior to approve
the inclusion of the Norwegian operation in the charges and to solicit a verdict
of guilty on a similar base. It was a macroscopic case of hypocrisy: London and
Paris set all the responsibilities on the defeated enemy, covering so their own
serious guilt in the Scandinavian tragedy. The appointment of some British historians
and the honesty of Churchill who admitted in his memories allied indiscretions,
allowed reestablishing historical truth in the first fifties.
Examining the campaign, an amazing revelation is that related to the smallness
of the German forces that conquered the capital city and of the principal harbors
of Norway with the initial hit of hand. The initial landing was completed with
2000 men; the force of invasion counted three real divisions only, supported by
some auxiliary units to employ for finishing the attack. Overall, 10000 soldiers:
the effect "surprise" was therefore essential for the result of Hitler's
plain. A battalion of paratroopers immediately occupied the airport of Oslo. It
was the first time in which in war use of paratroopers was done and the experiment
was positive. . But the factor that contributed to the German success more than
every other was the intervention of the Luftwaffe that employed 800 fighters and
250 transport airplanes. It succeeded in paralyzing every possible allied countermeasure.
Why was the British reaction to the hostile hazard weak and inconclusive? Why
a Corp of expedition already embarked and ready to sail was so slow, first in
crossing and then in the landing? A most definite action would have sent away
the small German units from the Norwegian harbors, preventing them receiving reinforcements
and consolidating so their own positions. The answer consists of the surprise
with which the English admiralty welcomed the news of the invasion: incredulity
prevented the preparation of valid counterattacks. It took 48 hours before the
allied commands succeeded in preparing something; in the meantime, the contingent
of the operation "Norway" stayed jammed at the base of Scapa Flow for
unjustified and absurd fears. In 48 hours, Norway was forced to surrender to Germany.
The Norwegian army was not in fact able to sustain the German offensive: in Narvik,
the coastal defense faced with courage the German naval units, but it was liquidated
soon; the land defenses didn't try instead any resistance, more for incompetence
that for betrayal. In Oslo, the fortress Oscarborg succeeded in torpedoing the
cruiser Blucher, stopping so the entry of the port: the intervention of the Luftwaffe
forced the men of the garrison to surrender, but their action allowed the escape
of the king and the government. For how much Denmark concerns, it surrendered
after few hours…and some shots!
Only a week after the German hit of hand, English troops disembarked to north
and south of Trondheim. It was too late to change the situation. In addition,
the operations of landing and consolidation of the positions were of an unthinkable
slowness, because of the continuous afterthoughts of the Head Quarters and the
Admiralty; besides, the allied soldiers were shown less able than those German
in getting used with the environmental difficulties. It was so that few German
units succeeded in stopping superior hostile strengths. Without any aerial coverage,
submitted to the continuous attacks of the Luftwaffe, the allied forces had to
give up as soon as possible to every offensive action and to start their own complete
evacuation. On May 2 the last allied units finished the operations of reimbarkation
leaving the total control of South and central Norway to the enemies. At this
point, only to save its honor, London assembled all the efforts on Narvik. A first
landing was done on April 14, but despite the courage and the energy of the troops,
every attack ended up getting bogged down in the continuous afterthoughts of the
high commands. Also when landing forces had reached the considerable amount of
20000 men, their advance continued to be too slow.
On the other part, general Dietl, with 2000 Austrian alpine troopers and few
sailors of reinforcement, cleverly exploited all the defensive advantages of the
ground frustrating every hostile action. Only on May 27 English conquered Narvik,
but by now it was too late: the German offensive on the western front was bringing
France on the brick of the disaster. This way on June 7 the allied soldiers, tired
and demoralized, abandoned Narvik. Together with them, the king and the members
of the government left Norway. In the Scandinavian affair, the allied governments
had given evidence of a too much aggressive spirit accompanied from a serious
lack of timeliness, with worst results for the peaceful northern people. For contrast,
Hitler had shown reluctant to strike. But he did not wasted time when he decided
to do it and his forces operated with dreadful rapidity and audacity such to compensate
the numerical smallness during the crucial phases of the operation.
Simone Pelizza
[email protected]
Sources: B.H. Liddel Hart, “Military History of the Second World War”,
Oscar Mondadori, Milan 1996 (pag. 71-88)
Sources in English: of the same author, besides the original edition of the aforesaid
book, they can also be consulted “The Other Side of the Hill” ( Cassel
Publishing, London, 1951) and “ChurchillFour faces and the Man” (Penguin
Press, London, 1969); Winston Churchill, “The Second World War”, Cassel
Publishing, London, 1946-51 (particularly, the first volume: “The Gathering
Storm”, 1967 last reprint)
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