With 1971 commenced the most tragic year of our history; a year of political crisis and conflict, immorally aided and abetted by Indian intervention, first covertly, and when that failed, by overt military aggression. Failing to resolve a political problem by political means, a Martial Law regime, manipulated by some megalomaniac politicians, resorted to military action in East Pakistan on night 25 / 26 March. Widespread insurgency broke out. Personnel of two infantry divisions and Civil Armed Forces with only their personal weapons were airlifted in PIA planes, over-flying about 5000 miles non stop via Sri Lanka in the first week of April 1971 - the longest operational air move by Pakistan Army - without a hitch. By May near normalcy had been restored, thanks to the fast reaction, dedication and cool courage of our soldiers, sailors and airmen operating in a hostile environment under adverse climatic and terrain conditions, without adequate logistic or medical support. India's immoral covert armed intervention having failed, by October it had concentrated four times our strength in over 12 divisions (400,000) supported by five regiments of tanks, and about 50,000 Mukti Bahini guerillas, trained and equipped by Indian Army. They were supported by Indian Navy's one aircraft carrier, eight destroyers/ frigates, two submarines and three landing craft, against our four gunboats, eight Chinese coasters and two landing craft. Eleven IAF squadrons - 4 Hunter, 1 SU-7, 3 Gnat and 3 MiG 21 - from five airfields around East Pakistan faced our one valiant No. 14 squadron of F-86F Sabres based on a single airfield around Dhaka. (See Map 5).

On 21 November, Eid day, when our fatigued soldiers had been operating in the most hostile environment for almost ten months, including a month of fasting, the Indian army felt emboldened enough to launch a full scale invasion at over twenty fronts in the east, west and north of East Pakistan. Divisions attacked our brigade positions, brigades attacked our battalion, company and platoon positions, sorted by their armour, artillery and air force. When most of our defensive positions, rooted to the ground, could not be overrun, Indian forces after suffering heavy casualties resorted to outflanking moves. The aggressors could not capture, till the ceasefire on 16 December, a single town except jessore, which was not defended for strategic reasons. For the Pakistani soldiers this was their finest hour, fighting against heavy odds, with their backs to the wall, inflicting heavy casualties, bloodied but unbowed! When an Indian commander, through a messenger asked for our Jamalpur battalion to surrender, encircled by two brigades, the commanding officer, Lt Col Sultan Ahmad, SJ, of 31 Baloch replied in a message wrapped around a bullet which read, "I want to tell you that the fighting you have seen so far is very little; in fact the fighting has not even started. So let us stop negotiating and start the fight." Similarly 4 FF under 205 Brigade (Brig Tajammul Malik) held out at Hilli for 19 days against 6 battalions, inflicting heavy casualties, till withdrawn on 11 December, after getting outflanked. Similar hard fought actions took place at Bahaduria and elsewhere by Punjab, Baloch, FF and AK units, all arms and services, and Civil Armed Forces including West Pakistan Rangers and police units. 107 Brigade (Brig Mohammad Hayat, SJ) held at bay a division of 5 brigades and 2 armour regiments at KhuIna inflicting heavy casualties till 17 December and ceased fighting only after repeated orders of our Eastern Command. (See Maps 5 and 6 at home page).

On the West Pakistan front, on 3 December 1971, India attacked with the main effort against Shakargarh sector with three infantry divisions supported by three armoured brigades against our 8 Division front, operating under our 1 Corps (Commander Lt Gen Irshad Ahmad Khan). The attack was halted in the tracks, inflicting heavy casualties. 8 (Independent) Armoured Brigade (Brig Mohammad Ahmad, SJ) effectively blocked and destroyed enemy penetration in our minefield and saved Zafarwal from being outflanked by enemy armour. In Jammu and Kashmir, Chhamb, Lahore, Kasur, Sulemanki and Rajasthan sectors, war was carried into Indian territory with success at some points, not so successfully at others due to inadequate forces and air support. For the Pakistan Army, Navy and Air Force this conflict was their finest hour. Fighting, against overwhelming odds in both wings of the country, raged with full fury. Before our counter offensive could be launched in West Pakistan, India asked for ceasefire in the UN. The Ghazis and Shaheeds proved in their supreme hour of trial all the military virtues of Faith, Honour, Valour, Fortitude, Endurance, Loyalty, Group Cohesion and Unlimited Liability, and above all, the spirit of Jehad.

On 4 December 1971, the US moved a draft resolution calling for ceasefire and withdrawal of Indian forces, which was vetoed by USSR. Thereafter, another six resolutions including one by China, were introduced calling for ceasefire and withdrawal of forces, some of which were accepted by Pakistan authorities. However, due to behind the scene political machinations by India and her allies their passage and implementation was stalled till Dhaka fell on 16 December 1971 and the ceasefire had been perfidiously converted to surrender. "I took a careful look at the documents and was aghast to see the heading - which read 'Instrument of Surrender....' ," writes Lt Gen J.F.R. jacob, Chief of Staff, Indian Eastern Army.

Flawed national and operational strategy proved to be disastrous for Pakistan, both politically and militarily.