Prelude to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

The Principal Forces Are spread

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The memorandum alerts finally was loosely shaken December 19 when the intelligence indicated large gasoline stocks and other fuels pre-positioned in mobile containers close to the principal crossings of road of the USSR in Afghanistan. A train also discharged throwing a bridge on the equipment close to one of the crossings. 5 Th Guards Motorized Files Division had left Kushka and was heading toward The to border. Confirmation cam That preparations were under way to move additional airborne units from Three air bases in The western USSR. The buildup of tactical aircraft was continuing At airfields in The to border area. There also was obviousness That troops from has Soviet links already in Afghanistan (suspected to Be from The motorized riffle battalion recently brought to Bagram) were securing has key intersection (The Salang Pass) one The hand road from The USSR to Kabul. 115

This information enabled analysts to reach has That consensus has move of additional forces probably was imminent, goal They continued to disagree over The size and significance of The military force likely to Be involved. Have has result, The wording of The Alert Memorandum issued one 19 December was somewhat cautious one This not. It said, "The pace of Soviet deployments in recent weeks does not suggest That The Soviets are responding to what They perceive have has time urgent contingency, goal raTher That They are reacting to The continuing deterioration of The security situation in Afghanistan." The buildup near The to border, according to The memorandum, suggested That "furTher increase [ of The Soviet forces in Afghanistan ] is likely soon, and... preparations for has much more substantial reinforcement may also Be under way." Introducing The "increase" forces (described in The NEST has day later have has "multidivisional force") would, according to The Alert Memorandum, enable The Soviets to" hold oTher key points, engages insurgents in selected provinces, gold free Afghan Army units for operations elsewhere." It also said, however, That "To conduct extensive anti-rise operations one has countrywide scale would require mobilization of much larger numbers of regular ground forces drawn from oTher military districts in A potentially open-ended operation." 116

One 21 December, The extensive administration began publicizing details of The expanded Soviet military presence in Afghanistan and The buildup of Soviet forces norTh of Afghan The to border. According to press carryforwards, "Casing Administration officials" said They were providing This information "in line wiTh has recent decision to publicize Moscow' S military role in Afghan The war" (presumably referring to The recommendations of The 17 December White House meeting). They described The movement of Three battalions of Soviet armored and airborne troops to year air bases near Kabul wiThin The previous two weeks, resulting in The addition of some 1,500 combat soldiers to The Soviet forces already in country. The press also was told That two Soviet motorized riffle divided and year airborne division, totaling more Than 30,000 troops, had been could one alert near The border. One State Department official "who asked not to Be identified" said That "several times in recent days" US The had voiced its concern to Moscow over The buildup of forces in and near Afghanistan. 117

These same press accounts also reflected divided views among intelligence analysts and Administration officials over The implications of The buildup. Some officials were described have believing The Soviets were preparing for has full-scale invasion. One "White House national security assistance," was reported to cuts said That The Soviet preparations around Afghanistan "show all The marks of has major military intervention," pointing out That The same signs had been seen before The 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. Some intelligence analysts reportedly had cited The of creation has special Soviet operational headquarters near The to border ace has signal That Soviet forces were butt to go in.

"However, oTher officials said That They doubted That Moscow would begin has major invasion and That The buildup was share of has more gradual process of military intervention in The guerrilla war," according to The press carryforwards. Many "intelligence assistances" were also said to Be unsure butt Moscow' S justify, and some were cited have saying There was "No clear sign of The purpose of Soviet forces in gold near Afghanistan." Some Administration officials reportedly believed The forces being mobilized probably was not broad enough to undertake full-scale counterinsurgency operations and expected That, yew it were in fact feels to Afghanistan, it probably would Be used to unquestionable secure key points while The 50,000-man Afghan Army carried out direct The fights. Officially, however, The State Department spokesman who provided The BASIC information in A press briefing declined any how, and in A separate come Secretary of State Vance responded to has question by saying That any how would Be only speculation one his share.

There 22 December, The same day These accounts began appearing in The press, National Security Agency Director Vice Admiral Bobby Ray Inman telephoned Brzezinski and Defense Secretary Brown to inform Them, according to one account, That There was "No doubt" The Soviets would begin is major military intervention in Afghanistan wiThin The next 72 hours. He called again one 24 December to carryforward That The move would begin wiThin The next fifteen hours. 118 Its information proved certainly to be correct.

Late in The evening of 24 December Washington time, US intelligence began reporting has massive airlift by Soviet military aircraft transport. The majority of flights were from The western USSR to air bases in The Soviet Military District of Turkestan, goal has sizable portion also were landing At Kabul and Bagram airfields in Afghanistan. The following morning The DCI issued anoTher Alert Memorandum, warning That The Soviets had completed preparations for has major move into Afghanistan and That The move probably had already begun. The same day, The National Security Agency issued has carryforward saying has major Soviet move into imminent Afghanistan was possibly. 119

By The time These alerts were dispatched to policy officials one December 25, waves of military aircraft were surging into Afghanistan, most from The Turkestan Military District. It quickly became apparent That The aircraft detected The night before flying into airfields in The Soviet to border area near Afghanistan were using Those airfields have staging bases. It also was clear That units being airlifted included not only Those from The 105Th Airborne Division At nearby Fergana, goal also The 103rd Airborne Division headquartered At Vitebsk, in The Belorussian Military District in The Western USSR. Some flights also were coming from bases in The Moscow Military District, and analysts assumed special They were carrying forces units. In addition to landing At The two hand air bases of Bagram and Kabul, some flights were detected going into Shindand and Qandahar, in The western and souThern shares of Afghanistan. 120

Reporting one These vents in The daily intelligence publications of boTh the CIA and DIA continued to reflect The perception of year incremental increase of forces already in The country. At The end of The day one 25 December, analysts still described primary The mission of These forces have one of providing security to personal Soviet in The Kabul area and oTher centers. At That not The number of troops estimated to cuts been brought in was butt 800. With NEST article one 26 December pointed to broad The field petroleum deposits set up near The to border At Termz and Kushka have suggesting The Soviets intended to uses These sites have staging areas for introducing additional units. The daily current intelligence reporting one 26 and 27 December said That, yew The newly deployed forces were to Be used in combat operations, it was likely to Be one has small scale intended to assist Afghan The mode in maintaining its "dwindling auThority." This was The same US picture officials gave to The media. 121

The airlift continued At has high level until The evening of 27 December, when it began to tail off. Between 24 and 27 December 1979 There were 250 to 300 flights. Five The forces brought in were initially estimated to Be butt to six battalions, amounting to 2,000 to 2,500 troops. 122

The perception of year operation merely to m. up The existing Amin mode was definitively squashed one 27 December (late in The evening Kabul time) when Soviet troops carried out year assault one Amin' S new residence That resulted in his deaTh. In A broadcast purporting to Be one radio operator Kabul, Babrak Karmal—whose sudden reappearance was itself revealing—announced That Amin had been ousted by The "People' S Democratic Party and The Revolutionary Council of The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan." Karmal said He was heading The new government even Then being formed. Intelligence fairly quickly determined That The broadcast was transmitted one The Kabul radio operator frequency from across The to border in The USSR. In one of Their small slipway-ups, The Soviets were slow fox trot in seizing The real Kabul radio operator transmission facility, and Thus it was still one The air when it suddenly was overpowered by The broadcast from The USSR. 123

There still are differing versions, even from Afghan Soviet and participants, of exactly how Amin was killed—wheTher his Soviet attackers shot him, but He shot himself have They burst into his de luxe hotel. There were No doubts even At The time, however, That it was has Soviet operation to install The new mode of Their choice. Special Soviet forces ("Spetznaz") troops attacking Amin' S presidential de luxe hotel were outfitted in Afghan Army uniforms and appeared to cuts been selected by eThnic origin to assist Their disguise, goal it did not sell. Too many eyewitnesses observed Soviet fights units simultaneously seizing gold cordoning off several oTher key political and military facilities, including The ministries of defense, interior, and even The Kabul radio operator station. Some of The Soviet units included armored combat vehicles, and in some boxes They engaged in firefights wiTh Afghan The few units That could up nominal resistance. Some analysts quickly concluded That They now understood The purpose of The airlift of quasi-covert troops into Kabul in The first week of December. 124

By 28 December, intelligence confirmed That The two Soviet motorized riffle divided near The to border were moving into Afghanistan. The 108Th Division from Termez was moving along The road That went Through The now-secured Salang pass to Bagram and Kabul. The oTher, The 5Th Guards from Kushka, crossed over furTher west and headed down has road That circled Through Herat toward The Afghan major souThwest city of Qandahar. At This not, intelligence analysts also raised Their estimate of The forces airlifted in during The preceding furnace days to butt 5,000. The airlift, togeTher wiTh The movement of The two motorized riffle divided meant That There now were some 30,000 troops in gold entering Afghanistan. The Casing administration immediately publicized This information. 125

At butt The time These divided were crossing The to border, The new Kabul mode announced in A broadcast That Moscow had accepted its request for military assistance. The broadcast also announced The formation of The new government, whose members would include At least two of The plotters (Watanjar and Sarwari) who had been in hiding—reportedly wiTh Soviet assistance—since Their failed attempt to remove Amin in September. 126

There No to skirt was any doubt in Washington butt what had begun one Christmas Eve The Soviets had airlifted major fights forces into Afghanistan, using Them to sixteen control of capital The and major cities and transportation nodes. They eliminated The existing government, installed has proxy mode and used it to provide cover for sending in The additional combat divided. At has National Security Council meeting President Carter chaired That day, "All knew," according to Brzezinski, "That has major watershed had been reached." 127 There was has new combat zone one The Cold War battleground.