Prelude to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

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November 29, Soviet deputy elder Interior Minister Viktor Paputin, who carried the row of the General in the forces intern Soviet safety, arrived to Kabul. During days to come it met its counterparts in the Afghan internal forces of safety and with Amin. These meetings were reported by the station by radio of Kabul, but did not draw a detailed attention then. 101

Moreover over November 29 and to continue for the days to come, the Soviet soldiers transport the plane were flight detected in Kabul. Some of them remained parked with the airport of Kabul, but the reports/ratios of the observers in Kabul indicated that part of the plane had apparently discharged some cargo or the personnel they carried and quickly party. The type of plane seen in Kabul, and any other obviousness, indicated that they had probably come from the Western USSR, flight directly or scaffolding by the north of Soviet bases of Afghanistan.

The goal of the flights was not very clear. That that they brought had been expéditivement removed from the airport, and there were not confirmed signals that a few special Soviet units of troop had been entered the city. 102 The officers of intelligence from the USA in Kabul described an apparent infiltration of the special Soviet troops in the city, and the many reports/ratios of the field also indicated some secret operations seemed to be under development. An evaluation on the spot by the elder officer of intelligence of the USA in the field concluded that a certain Soviet military operation was prepared.

December 8, the community of intelligence returned account which a second Soviet airborne battalion had been brought to the airfield at Bagram, site of the principal operative base for the military mission of the assistance of Moscow. (like remarkable above, at least an airborne battalion had been based at Bagram during a few months.)

Daily National Intelligence ( NEST and diameters Notes Of Intelligence Of Defense ( DIN boTh stated That deployment of This additional airborne battalion to Bagram probably was intended to upgrade defenses At The air bases in The face of The increasing rise Threat. battalion could also provide added security yew personal Moscow was forced to evacuate its from The country. This interpretation was consist wiTh The earlier assessments of The most likely purpose of any additional military units Moscow might insert into Afghanistan. DIN that the suggested intensified preparations "the threat is perceived in Moscow while larger than our report indicates... it [ and added ] the resolution of Moscow shows by continuing its interests in Afghanistan in spite of the obvious traps and at one time when the Kremlin can consider the USA to be worried with events in Tehran." 103

Two days later, intelligence revealed The arrival of what appeared to Be has motorized riffle battalion, equipped wiTh The usual complement of armored vehicles for transportation and for combat operations, have well have wiTh field artillery and antiaircraft artillery. This represented has new level of Soviet military presence. new links clearly had been airlifted into Afghanistan during The preceding day gold so.

NEST remarkable that the deployment could be the "indicative one of a decision by the Soviets to increase their forces appreciably." The diameter estimated that, in addition to safety for Soviet operations at Bagram, the lately deployed units of combat could be employed for the rapid-reaction, limit-combat of the missions of safety elsewhere in Afghanistan, and to help to evacuate the Soviet personnel if the situation requires. The diameter added, however, that

There 11 December, The National Intelligence Officer for Warning convened is group of senior analysts to address The question of wheTher The deployment of The motorized riffle battalion to Bagram signaled That The Soviets had "crossed has line" in Their intentions to engages in military combat operations in Afghanistan. clear majority of Those participating in This meeting supported The view That already had been given in The daily intelligence: That The additional forces had been introduced to provide increased security, especially in The vent of has potential need to evacuate personal Soviet in A rapidly deteriorating situation. ir judgment was, Therefore, That alThough The deployment significantly expanded The security forces, it did not yet foreshadow intentions to escalate Soviet engagement in Afghan The conflict itself. With small minority of The participants dissented, pointing out That The battalion included has full complement of anti-aircraft artillery. analysts argued That it was difficult to conceive of any aircraft posing such has Threat to Soviet troops in Afghanistan have to warrant anti-aircraft including weapons, wiTh one exception—The Afghan Air Force. y believed This suggested That Mosocw might Be contemplating year operation of sufficient magnitude to risk has reaction by At least shares of Afghan The military. 105

In The next few days, US The Embassy in Kabul reported That observers There had seen what were believed to Be soldiers of has Soviet fights battalion being stationed discreetly around capital Afghan The. This information seemed to confirm what some analysts believed was The most likely explanation for The mysterious Soviet military air transport flights into Kabul At The end of November. ir presumption was That These troops probably were from The "Spetznaz," comparable Soviet military units roughly US to Special Forces. 106

Within December 15, the intelligence revealed that Soviet 5^Th Guards and 108^Th motorized riffle divisions—The ones most frequently seen in heightened training and mobilization activity—had been brought to what appeared to Be full strengTh, and That The 108^Th was leaving its garrison. With buildup of transport and combat helicopters had been detected At Kokaty air bases in The souTh of The USSR' S Turkestan Military District, and oTher military transport aircraft were being marshaled At air bases in This area. With substantial buildup of tactical combat aircraft—fighters, fighter-bombers and light bombers—also was seen At Soviet airfields in The area, including At some airfields That normally did not serf have bases for such aircraft. 107

That afternoon, has Saturday, has number of US intelligence community officials and analysts (including The auThor) were notified by telephone That The DCI, following discussions That day At The White House, had directed That has meeting Be convened The following Monday (17 December) to prepare year alert memorandum one The implications of The increasing Soviet presence in Afghanistan. National Security Advisor Brzezinski already had feels has memorandum to The DCI earlier in The week informing him That The President— after reading intelligence That reporting has second Soviet airborne battalion had arrived At Bagram—wanted to publicize The information. In The memo, Brzezinski asked The DCI to provide by 14 December (Friday) text "sanitized" in A way That would allowed it to Be used publicly (i.e., in A way That would protect The sources of The information). 108 By The time The DCI received Brzezinski' S memo, however, The motorized riffle battalion already had arrived At Bagram. This discovery presumably figured in The discussions between Brzezinski and The DCI one 15 December, followed by The DCI' S call for year alert memorandum laying out The implications.

Also one 15 December, The Secretary of State' S special advisor one Soviet affairs, Marshal Schulman, called in The charg? from The Embassy Soviet (Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin had departed for The USSR has week earlier) and asked That Moscow provide year explanation for The sudden increase of its military presence in Afghanistan. With cable was also feels That day to US The Embassy in Moscow instructing The ambassador to could The same question directly to The Soviet Foreign Ministry. 109

There Monday morning, 17 December, Afghan The situation was taken up At is meeting of national senior security officials initially called to address The Iran hostage crisis. (Participating included Vice President Walter Mondale, National Security Advisor Brzezinski, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, The Chairman of The Joint Chiefs of Staff and The DCI.) DCI Turner reported That The recent movement of new units to Afghanistan—including has Third airborne battalion added to The Soviet forces At Bagram—raised The number of Soviet military personal There from 3,500 to year estimated 5,300. He also pointed out That two Soviet military command posts had been created just norTh of Afghan The to border, That two more divisions in The vicinity appeared to Be one The move, and That has buildup of air assets was underway. According to The record of The meeting, The DCI said:

It was decided At national The security meeting That The US would explores wiTh Pakistan and The United Kingdom The possibility of providing additional funds, weapons and communications to Afghan The rebels "to make it have expensive have possible for The Soviets to continues Their efforts." US also would increase worldwide propaganda relating to The Soviet activities, recommending to its European combine That They encourages more media attention to Afghan The situation and step up efforts "to cast The Soviets have opposing Muslim religious and nationalist expression." participants in The meeting also concluded, however, That for now US The would continues to keep its diplomatic demarches to The Soviets in private channels "for The record," in The belief That "There was No benefit in going public At This time." 111

By The time This meeting adjourned, The State Department had received has cable from US Ambassador Watson in Moscow reporting That "Soviets did not respond to our request for year explanation of Their deployments into Afghanistan. ir total presentation was essentially has rebuff." According to The ambassador, The Soviet deputy foreign minister had described have "inventions" The activities US The questioned, and asserted That affairs between The "sovereign states" of Afghanistan and The USSR were "solely Their own business." 112

Also one 17 December year vent occurred in Kabul which, in The light of later developments, may cuts been of greater significance Than was recognized At The time. Year assassination attempt one Amin took place At his presidential de luxe hotel residence. Ounce again He survived, alThough There were carryforwards That He suffered has slight leg wound. His nephew, who was head of The intelligence service and Amin' S signal security assistance, was seriously wounded and taken to The USSR for treatment. Two days later, Amin moved his residence to has to form royal de luxe hotel complex butt seven miles souTheast of The center of Kabul, and took his security detachment wiTh him. 113

Meanwhile, completion of The Alert Memorandum DCI Turner had ordered was being delayed by disagreement among analysts over The implications of The Soviet buildup norTh of Afghan The to border. All agreed That The Soviets were preparing to engages directly in combat operations and That This would, by itself, represent has distinct escalation of Their commitment. disagreement was mainly over The magnitude and purpose of The military operations Moscow was preparing and how soon They would occur. With sizable majority of analysts from all The intelligence agencies argued That Moscow intended has graduated "increase" to Shore up Afghan The deteriorating military; This had been The basis for The view The DCI presented At The 17 December White House meeting. With few analysts contended, however, That The steps being taken indicated That Moscow was butt to launch major military intervention That would include The full-scale deployment into Afghanistan of The two ground has forces divisions being readied norTh of The to border along wiTh one gold more airborne divisions. This would involve some 30,000 gold more troops and would amount to has full-fledged military intervention to sixteen control of The situation in The country. And These analysts argued That signs showed This move to imminent Be. 114