Prelude to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

The insurgent attacks developed firmly in all July, and the territoryof Afghanistan under the ordering of government continued to narrow.The revolts drew aside in all the army, and the insurgent incursionscaptured ammunition of army. Roads were cut and the Afghan units ofarmy depended more and more on the provisioning by plane, includinghelicopters of transport. The mode always had the cities, but theinsurrectionists had the countryside. The pressure quoted the civilsservant of the USA which declared the civil war in Afghanistan hadbrought back the ordering of government to approximately 25 percent ofthe country. And, like already shown in Herat, even the order of theprincipal cities depended on the capacity on the mode to deploydefense and to save missions of the central center of power of Kabul.The Afghan units of army, with the advantage of the Soviet-providedweapons, could motionless make such movements by the countryside, butcould not hold the significant areas of the territory apart from theprincipal cities.

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This deterioration continued in spite of the greatest participation ofthe Soviet personnel by guiding Afghan operations and the logistics ofcombat. The role of the Soviets supposedly increased council with theactive participation in a large variety of operations with regimentaland the battalion classified units. The new information ofintelligence reinforced signals earlier than the Soviet pilots ofhelicopter with the copilots Afghan (or vice versa) controlled thestrikes on insurgent positions. There were additional reports/ratiosof the Soviets actuating of the tanks in missions of combat. 61

The increasing Soviet military participation in Afghanistan andresistance spread to the Soviet-constant regime—combined withMoscow pushes back when Washington informed about compromising theWe-Soviet relations— encouraged a first presidentialauthorization (officially called a "conclusion") for the secretsupport with the Afghan insurrection. Secret assistance helped withactivities of propaganda in support of the cause of theinsurrectionists, and if medical aid and other provisioningnonmilitary. The assistance was dug drains by "third countries,"mainly Pakistan. To advise Brzezinski of national safety also proposedto the president that the USA make a public expression "sympathy" ofthe Afghan forces of the "indépendance". It also increased with thepresident, in a discussion of July 23, the prospect which the Sovietscould try to move the government running, whose tactic was to prove tobe contreproductif with the objectives of Moscow. The presidentordered that something is done to put a public projector on thequestion. 62

An apparent result of this was a speech by Brzezinski August 2 that Times Of New York paid in an article put the "USA in the high-speed motorboat tighteningRussians indirectly to stop the interposition of Afghanistan."Speech—describing the USA "prudence" of Brzezinski with regard toIran and to declare that others were envisaged "abstain from theinterposition and the efforts to impose the foreign doctrines on amention deeply religious and nationally conscious of people"—didnot explicitly the Soviet Union or Afghanistan. The article indicated,however, which a "civil servant of the USA" had clearly made deprived"in" that the speech was specifically directed to the threat of theSoviet interposition to Afghanistan, where the pro-Soviet governmentwas close of collapse vis-a-vis to the spread Islamic opposition andthe rebellion tribale. The article "the intelligence that Western alsodescribed brings back" "several hundreds... armed the Soviet advisersaround a north with airfield [ Bagram ] of Kabul," and said that the"report/ratio of Mr. Brzezinski' S was obviously envisaged likewarning against a participation [ Soviet ] major." 63

During three days later, August 5, a revolt burst in an Afghangarrison at Bala Hissar, on the peripheries of Kabul. A group ofofficers seized the ordering of the center of order of garrison, goneup a formation of the tanks and armoured carriers of troop, andtogether with far for the presidential palate in Kabul. The movementwas crushed in a question of the hours by the Afghan forces loyalsupporters enormously higher of army using of the tanks and thegunships of helicopter.

The embassy of the USA described this event as among the most seriouschallenges however met by the Afghan government. Although the modeshowed it always had the force to defend its towns of fortress, therevolt discovered one of the fundamental weaknesses of the mode: thedeteriorating fidelity of the regular units of army. In the sight ofthe embassy, this announced increasing problems for the Afghan modeand its Soviet mentors. The Western accounts of pressure described therevolt like the most serious dissension since the ouster of the monthsof Daoud sixteen earlier. The pressure also announced that, althoughthe mode rather quickly deposited the revolt, the government of theUSA was sufficiently worried by the situation in Kabul which itstarted to reduce the number of employees to his embassy there. 64

Within the Community of intelligence of the USA, a mémoranduminternesubmitted to the national officer intelligence pourl' warning 65 the sight offered that the last revolt increased the perspectivepourthe direct Soviet military interposition. It has préciséque thefirst evaluations of intelligence had already concluque the Afghanmode had been led in a maintenance of ladéfense of fortress. TheAfghan army constituted the wall of cetteforteress, and revolts it ofBala Hissar proved that there were significant lesfissures in thewall. The Soviets étémaintenant confronted with the possibility thatthe army to which ilsfournissaient the assistance could separate. Thenote known as this forçaitles Soviet to examine options and costs torather ensure lefardeau principal of the against-insurrection bydeploying leurspropres forces than to accept the consequences ofunchangement of insurrection in Kabul.