Prelude to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

Soviet documents within invasion

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Th e Soviet discs released these last years the exposure that themilitary operation carried out in December 1979 began to be formed atleast nine months earlier, as an element of the reaction of Moscow tothe revolt of the Afghan troops of army in Herat. At a prolongedmeeting Politburo to begin 17 March, held specifically to examine theanswers to the situation in Afghanistan, the elder member of Politburoand temporary President Kirilenko (Brezhnev was not present for thissession) referred in its comments of opening to the "proposals whichwere achieved and are now in front of you." 128 Th e following discussions state clearly that the use of the Sovietforces of combat in Afghanistan was on this list.

After the various members of Politburo referred to the possible use ofthe units of combat, the Ustinov minister of defense describedmilitary measurements of possibility then being laid out. He said anoption claimed to obtain the 105 Th Airborne Division and a motorized rifle regiment ready to move into Kabul on a day's notice. Two ground force divisions would be moved to Th e border area. Once Th ere, Th ey would be prepared, if necessary, to go into Afghanistan wi Th in Th ree days. Ustinov said Th e military was preparing an alternative plan in which Th e ground force divisions would be immediately moved into Afghanistan. Th e two divisions he named— Th e "5 Th Motor Artillery Division," which US intelligence listed as Th e 5 Th Guards Motorized Rifle at Kushka, and Th e "68 Th motorized division," known by US intelligence analysts as Th e 108 Th Motorized Rifle Division at Termez—were Th e same two divisions US intelligence detected a few days later as Th ey began training and selective reservist call-ups Th at continued sporadically until Th e units entered Afghanistan in December.129

In a session of Th e same extended Politburo deliberations, Ustinov said two days later Th at a Th ird ground force division also was being prepared "in Th e Central Asian Military District." A Th ird division was, in fact, mobilized at Th e time of Th e invasion and it moved into Afghanistan about a mon Th later. Th is division (known by US analysts as Th e 201st Motorized Rifle Division) was garrisoned at Dushambe, in Tajikistan, a Soviet republic Th at made up part of Th e Central Asian Military District.130

Th e commitment of combat forces into Afghanistan was treated as an open question during Th e first day of Th is extended Politburo meeting.131 Early in Th at session Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko asserted Th at, in considering assistance to Th e Kabul regime:

KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov, discussing Th e need to develop a public justification for inserting military forces, said Th is should be done "bearing in mind Th at we will be branded as an aggressor, but Th at in spite of Th at we cannot lose Afghanistan." And later in Th e meeting, Premier Aleksei Kosygin interjected Th at "All of us agree—we must not lose Afghanistan." Al Th ough he clearly showed reservations about Th e merits of committing Soviet troops, Kosygin explicitly acknowledged Th at it remained an option "as a last resort." Th e discussions addressed tactics such as conveying to Taraki Th e need for Th e Afghan regime to "request" Soviet forces in order to provide nominal public justification for any military move Moscow might make. Ustinov pointed out Th at if Soviet combat troops were committed, Th ey should not be mixed wi Th Th e Afghan forces.133

Major concerns also were raised by several participants over Th e prospect Th at strong support for Th e insurgency among Muslim fundamentalists could cause a Soviet intervention force "to wage war in significant part" against Th e Afghan population. Th e reliability of Th e Afghan Army also was questioned. Gromyko, despite his belligerent injunction on "not losing Afghanistan," emphasized Th at "it is one Th ing to apply extreme measures" in collaboration wi Th Th e Afghan Army, but "it is an entirely different matter if Th e Army does not support Th e lawful government... If Th e Army is against Th e government, and as a result against our forces, Th en Th e matter will be complicated indeed."134

At Th e end of Th is first session, a Politburo decision on whe Th er actually to undertake direct military involvement was put on hold until a clearer picture developed—for example, on Th e real status of Th e Afghan armed forces. As Kirilenko phrased it: "Who will we be fighting if we send [our troops] in Th ere?" In effect, "What are we getting ourselves into?" Never Th eless, Th e Defense Ministry was au Th orized to proceed wi Th Th e contingency preparations Ustinov proposed, including explicit au Th orization to move Th e two divisions to Th e border.

Th e Politburo agreed Th at, in Th e meantime, Th ey would go ahead wi Th most of Th e o Th er assistance measures Th at had been proposed and even accelerate some. Th ese included shipping armaments (except for systems Th at might provide Th e Afghan leaders a wedge for requesting Soviet crews), economic assistance and material supplies. Th ere also was agreement to begin diplomatic moves aimed at governments—such as Pakistan and China—believed to be providing aid to Th e insurgents.135

Th e record of Th e Politburo's second session, on 18 March, reads—almost—as Th ough it had been held by a completely different set of actors wi Th no connection to what had been said Th e previous day. Andropov, who on Th e day before insisted Th at despite Th e cost of being labeled an aggressor, "Under no circumstances can we lose Afghanistan," now declared Th at because Afghanistan did not conform to Lenin's definition of a revolutionary situation, suppressing Th e insurgency wi Th Th e aid of Soviet bayonets was an inadmissible risk. Gromyko, who had twice avowed Th e "can't lose" imperative, now said he "completely support[ed] Comrade Andropov's proposal to rule out...deployment of our troops into Afghanistan." According to Gromyko, Th e answer to Th e previous day's question "Against whom will [our army] fight?" was "against Th e Afghan people," and Th is would mean Th at "All we have done in recent years wi Th such effort in terms of détente, arms reductions and much more—would be Th rown back."136 Th e cost of sending in troops was now judged to be too high a price to pay for saving Afghanistan, which had been described a day earlier as some Th ing Th at "could not be lost."

For Th e remainder of Th is session, each of Th e main participants dutifully agreed wi Th Th is conviction. Someone who had no familiarity wi Th Th e details of Th e previous day's discussions could plausibly interpret Th e record of Th e second day as indicating Th at military intervention had never been considered. Kirilenko, however, committed a couple of breaches of Th is line. He commented Th at:

Andropov quickly asserted Th at "Yesterday... Th e Afghans were not talking about Th e deployment of troops." ( Th e record of Th e previous day's meeting shows Th e Afghans were talking about it, and Th e Soviets certainly were talking about it, including Th e question of whe Th er Th ey should pressure Taraki to ask for Soviet forces.) Andropov said " Th e people do not support Th e government of Taraki," and declared Th at Th e Afghan leader needed to be told "in no case will we go forward wi Th a deployment of troops into Afghanistan." Kirilenko Th en corrected his characterization of Th e previous day's discussions, saying Th at "Yesterday we were unanimous as to Th e rendering of military aid, but we carefully discussed Th e matter, considered various options, and searched for different ways, o Th er Th an Th e deployment of troops."137

Brezhnev gave what appears to be a more accurate summation of Th e Soviet position a day later (19 March), when he surfaced at Th e Politburo meeting to approve officially Th e proposals coming from Th e earlier sessions. Brezhnev said:

Clearly, between Th e first two Politburo sessions, discussions took place off line, probably informed by additional assessments and information and reflecting Brezhnev's outlook. Th e leadership as a group agreed not to commit military forces, at least for Th e time being. None Th eless, steps were taken to ensure Th at forces would be prepared in case Th is decision changed, as indicated by Ustinov's statement near Th e end of Th e session:

Declassified US intelligence from Th is period clearly verifies Th at Th is proposal was carried out.

A large number of publicly released Soviet documents covering Th e ensuing mon Th s show Th e Soviets rebuffing Afghan regime requests for Soviet troops. Many documents making a similar point also have been disclosed in treatises on Th e Afghan invasion by former Soviet military officers. Evidence from o Th er sources also indicates Th at Th e Afghans did make such requests and Th at Moscow was for some time unwilling to involve combat units. It is also true, however, Th at Th e principal defense Th at former Soviet officials have offered for Th e military intervention is Th at it was ultimately a response to Afghan pleas for assistance in fighting an insurgency Th at was receiving outside help. It is Th us understandable Th at more documents seem to have been released on Th is aspect of Soviet decision making on Afghanistan Th an any o Th er.140

Th e earliest known Soviet document mentioning a specific deployment of a combat unit to Afghanistan jibes wi Th Th e first one Th at US intelligence detected: Th e airborne battalion discovered at Bagram in July 1979. A report dated 28 June 1979 from Th e Politburo's special commission on Afghanistan (composed of Foreign Minister Gromyko, KGB Chairman Andropov, Defense Minister Ustinov, and head of Th e Central Committee International Department Boris Ponomarev) recommended deployment of an airborne battalion to protect Soviet air units at Bagram. It said Th e troops were to be disguised as being involved in aircraft maintenance and service. Approval for Th is deployment was given at a Politburo meeting Th e next day.141

Also recommended in Th is same document was Th e dispatch of a special KGB detachment to Kabul, disguised as embassy service personnel, "for defense of Th e Soviet Embassy." And last but not least, Th e document proposed Th at "a special detachment of Th e GRU of Th e General Staff" (a military intelligence Spetznaz unit) be sent to Bagram at Th e beginning of August "after preparations [not fur Th er specified] have been completed." Th is GRU detachment was to deal wi Th any "sharp aggravation of Th e situation for Th e security and defense of particularly important government installations." Steal Th and disguises notwi Th standing, and allowing for Th e difficulties in deriving precise head counts and organizational origins, Th e presence of Th ese special detachments did not go long undetected.142 What is perhaps more revealing is Th e glimpse of an early step in what would be an ongoing process of infiltrating small—usually battalion-size—combat units and special force detachments into Afghanistan. In Th e end, Th ese units provided what in military science terms would be called a bridgehead.