Prelude to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

Military Decisions

Officially released Soviet materials contiennentpresque nothing whichspecifically treats the decision for introduireles terrestrial forceswith at the end of December. The nugget which drew laplupart attentionthese last years is a note manuscritesimple, December 12, 1979, underthe title of "résolutiondu DC CPSU Concerning the situation in ` A.'"The textecomplet reads as follows:

A more recent testimony gives a prospect some peudifférente. A formerSoviet officer on Généralsoviétique Staff then said that andropovand Ustinov have obtenul' verbal approval of Brezhnev for the plan ofinterposition lorsd' a meeting with him December 8. The formerAmbassador soviétiqueDobrynin says primarily the same thing. He couldnot mettreune date on the meeting where this occurred, but Aconfirméavait place in at the beginning of December, which seemscertainly constant by lanote of Andropov presenting arrangement forthe use of troupessovietic to support the change of Parcham.Réclameque Dobrynin Gromyko Was Also Present. According to Dobrynin,it étaitBrezhnev which ordered that the proposals are presentedauPolitburo larger.153

All this reinforces simply the impression which it meeting of12décembre and the handwritten note were pro forma the exercises to put the stamp "of a collective"officielle decision ona process already started. Before cettenote was written and signed,the community of intelligence desUSA had already discovered at Bagramthe battalion motorized defusil which later fixed the passage ofSalang the terrestressovietic forces entering the area of Kabul. Thefirst of let us deuxbataillons airborne additional had been broughtinside, etun an unknown number of special forces had been infiltrateddansKaboul. Andropov had already informed Brezhnev arrangement topourfournir it forces nouveaugouvernement to support the creation ofone by the faction of Parcham.

Because of the lack of the official documents of the period bringingàl' military interposition, the majority of what are compriseaujourd'today about the Soviet decision-making concernantcette operation aredrawn from the accounts by participantspolitic the or military ones.Much gave interviews, and ontécrit or contributed to the articles andthe books on the subject. Lesdétails of the accounts make theattractive reading, but little are sanspoint of sight. Nevertheless,even after holding account of a certainniveau of justifying goal, theobviousness is clearly persuasive quela planning and thedecision-making were faitesprincipalement in compartment by the smallgroup of Andropov, Ustinov and Gromyko. Each defender moves àl'influence of one of the others, and in this contest Ustinov seemsavoirles some defenders. 154

The military interposition carried out in last week of décembre1979was primarily the Ustinov plan described in March, plusl' secretoperation to install new a régime.L' displaced intelligence provesthat the preparation of the forces poureffectuer this plan originalfirmly continued so modestly toutau long summer and fall, and abruptlyintensified when latentative of September to remove Amin pétardé.Divisionaéroportée based close to the border was increased withunniveau higher constant of promptitude, and of unitésaéroportéesin the west were moved with a sector duquelelles could spread itselfmore quickly. What indicates quel' military option in Afghanistancompletely outrede was not bus the table like was generally pled.

The military preparations recorded by intelligence of USAfont a goodcase which the Soviet civils servant derrièrel' interpositionobtained their operation lends even before last by the process ofpolitical decision formel.Quelques old Soviet military sourcesilsétaient indicated that cen' was not up to December 10 that ustinovordered pleinappellent-towards the top of the reservists to bring thedeuxdivisions of terrestrial force to the full promptitude. Thisajusteavec which intelligence saw, but two divisions with moinsavaientpartially mobilized since last week denovembre. The displacedintelligence of the USA confirms that battalions deuxcombattent,including a motorized battalion of rifle, had already entered Bagramwithin December 10, and a nombreinconnu of troops of special forceswere already in Kabul.

The team of Andropov-Gromyko-Ustinov apparently supposed thatilspourraient to obtain Brezhnev slightly-weakened to be appropriate,etavec that the others would be obliged to connect itself. Laréunionof December 12 seems to be presented with unaccompli near in fact.Many advances units had étédéjà inserted in Afghanistan, divisionson the ground which devaientse to deploy were carried balances some tocome to the pleinepromptitude in a few days, and the President ofpart, the ministrede defense, the Foreign Minister and Présidentdethe KGB have all agreed that it should be made. 155

December 14, during two days after the handwritten note étésignée,the Akhromeyev marshal arrived to Termez for prendrela ordering of theoperation. The next day, the intelligence saw entirely mobilizedladivision now based there to leave sagarnison and head towards theborder. During three days after that, December 18, a team of theregistered offices of Akhromeyev estarrivée at the air base ofBagram. (the air preparation of cettebase as site of the post of orderopérationnelanticipé was probably a principal factor while insertingadditional lesunities of combat the previous week.) It was lejouraccording to the EC intelligence detected a second divisiondans themilitary zone of Turkestan on the basis of its garrison, andadécouvert the mobile fuel containers close to the points depassageof the borders.

And it took place this day, December 19, 1979, that the DCI sentunmémorandum alarm declaring that that "the preparing... close toSoviet-Afghan lafrontière suggests that more augmentationlà isprobable soon and that the preparations for a more substantialrenfortbeaucoup can be in hand."