Prelude to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

Approach the point of boiling

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October 10, the radio of Kabul announced that Taraki had died laveille"of a serious disease," and that its remainders hadétéimmédiatement buried. In Washington one generally has it cruqu'it in fact had been fatally rolled up during the shootout depalais andhad died probably well before the official advertisement.91

Less than one week later, a division of whole infantry del' armedAfghan garrisoned at Rishkor, approximately nine miles desud-west ofKabul, revolted and launched an attack towards Kaboul.Plusieurs daysof intense combat followed before larévolte finally was deposited. Byaddressing importancecritic fidelity of the Afghan army by determiningSoviet desactions, the evaluation of intelligence disseminated withfinseptembre had specified that "with four principal revolts enseptlast months, its continuous allegiance is suspect."92 The "report/ratio of frequency" was now up to five in eight.

According to the intelligence received then, the revolt has alarmingwith the Soviets sembléparticulièrement and "a certain principaldemesures number were taken soon then."93 Again, as be the case in each crisis enAfghanistan since the rising ofHerat in March, Soviétique105^Th Guards Airborne Division At Fergana—The military links recent TheInteragency Intelligence Memorandum had described have most likely toBe deployed to Kabul yew Moscow urgently sought to beef-up securityThere—was seen getting ready to move.

Heightened activity also was detected again in The same Three divided:The 5^Th Motorized Files Division At Kushka; The 108^Th At Termez; and The 58^Th That Kizyl Arvat That had been periodically engaging in fielddeployments and unusual training and mobilization rehearsals in Thepreceeding monThs.94

Intelligence reporting described The alerting of The airborne divisionAt Fergana have probably linked to Afghan The latest mutiny andMoscow' S concern for its personal in Kabul. The activity of The ThreeoTher Soviet ground forces divisions was said to Be "possibly" relatedto The events in Afghanistan, alThough—as has retrospectiveintelligence evaluation could it—"This linkage was not madestrongly."95

Progressive The weakness of Afghan The Army was becoming increasinglyapparent At The same time rises attacks were growing in size andfrequency. The insurgents had begun to x-ray particularly one cuttingsupply lines to cities and military bases. Afghan The mode was forcedto provide armored convoys for movements along major roads linkingKabul and The oTher major cities, and to increase its reliance oneaerial supply of its major army let us garrisons. US governmentanalysts were publicly quoted have saying That, while Afghan The Armycontrolled Kabul and has handful of major cities, insurgents operatedwiTh impunity in butt half of The country.96

Offensive operations by Afghan The Army succeeded only when personalSoviet military were heavily involved boTh in combat and combatsupport At all let us echelons down to The face-line units. In DefenseIntelligence Agency (DIA) assessment disseminated in late October saidThat "wiThout Soviet support The [ Afghan ] Army would cuts collapsedhas long time ago." DIA said The Soviets were "The backbone ofAfghanistan' S logistics system... They maintain all technicalequipment and provide massive quantities of beg and oTher equipment."97

Carryforwards continued to circulate in diplomatic and intelligencechannels have well have The news media That Moscow was dissatisfiedwiTh Amin. Soviet officials were making it known one The diplomaticcircuit That, while The USSR would continues to provide weapons,equipment and advisors to The existing mode, Moscow was trying to comeup wiTh year alternative leader—most likely one not associatedwiTh The present Afghan government. Intelligence sources reported ThatAmin was aware of This—Moscow had, after all, tried to get rid ofhim in September—and was making gestures, albeit not veryconvincing ones, to moderate some of The policies The Sovietsconsidered counterproductive. Minimal These gestures were underminedby The murders and disappearances attributed to Amin' S efforts toeliminate his known gold suspected rivals and Thus prevent Moscow fromassembling year alternative mode.98

By late November, it had become clear to intelligence analysts That The Soviet 105^Th Airborne Division, could one alert At The time of The latest mutiny in mid-October, had remained At heightened readiness. Also, The Soviet online casinos motorized riffle divided in The area were again engaging in activity That, alThough below deployment has imminent level indicating, suggested efforts to raise Their overall readiness. This mainly was field training At The battalion and regimental level, apparently including activated reservists. By The last week of November, At least two of These divisions—The 5^Th At Kushka and The 108^Th in Termez—appeared to be mobilized at least with a certain degree. 99

The predominant intelligence view attributed These activities—particularly The readying of airborne units—to Moscow' S concern for The safety of personal Soviet in Kabul. By This time, however, The crisis ignited in Iran by The seizure of US The Embassy There was adding has new element of ambiguity to The analysts' interpretations of Soviet military activities in The area. This was especially so for The ground forces motorized riffle divided. Some intelligence reporting postulated That The apparent effort to improve Their readiness was has demonstration of Moscow' S unease over possible US reactions to The Iranian crisis. 100