Prelude to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

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Less than one month later, a delegation "of the political Generals" Soviet arrived to Kabul. The analysts of intelligence supposed that its goal was to evaluate the situation policy-soldier and the possibilities and particularly the fidelity of the components of army in the country following the rising of Herat. The report of intelligence specified that the head of this delegation—General Yepishev, head of the principal political administration of the Soviet ministry of Defense—had seldom travelled apart from the European military alliance of Soviet-Is. When it had made thus in the past, it had had to support communist modes worried with the council and the political and administrative offers of the military aid. The agencies of intelligence of the USA learned that, on his arrival in Kabul, the Yepishev General informed the Afghan heads that the assistance of Moscow to fight the insurrection was not opened, and that it belonged to the Afghans to improve their own effectiveness. During the reference in Moscow per week later, one said that Yepishev reports to its superiors that "the weak ideological prospects" ("weak engagement read with the communist cause") among the Afghan officers for army were a significant problem. The Soviets later intensified their political efforts of endoctrinement at the Afghan army and in the population as a whole. 53

In May and June, the level of the insurrection continued to develop in Eastern Afghanistan and of the North-East, and the incidents started to occur near Kabul. The execution of the Afghan army continued to decrease, and the effectiveness of the units of guérillero continued to develop. In June 1979, according to evaluations by the embassy of the USA, half of the country of the mode controlled—at most—only. 54

The Soviets answered the situation deteriorating by boat of more than Afghan weapons to the army and the Air Force, providing not only the additional tanks, artillery and the small arms, but also the fighter, the gunships of helicopter and transport. The Soviet soldiers transport the plane providing the assistance actuated regularly in and out of the just basic north air of Bagram of Kabul. At least 2.500 Soviet military advisers were supposedly in Afghanistan towards the end of June with approximately 2.000 civil advisers. There were signals that additional military advisers were assigned to the Afghan units engaging in the combat, and that of the Soviet military personnel flew helicopters in the strikes on the ground and the tanks operative in the combat. 55

Erosion continues ordering of the Afghan mode, coupled with the increasing Soviet participation, carried out analysts of intelligence still to review the factors which could lead to the pure Soviet military interposition. An increased possibility was that the Soviets could resort to such a course if they became convinced that the ouster of the Afghan mode by the insurrectionists could lead to an arc of the militant Islamic states of anticommunist on the southernmost border of the USSR which would threaten stability in the Soviet central Asian republics. Some analysts also specified with the loss of Afghanistan, after a significant Soviet engagement, would be seen like blow prestige and image so much strongly evaluated by Soviet control.

Everything considered, however, the evaluations of intelligence then continued to depict the insertion of the Soviet forces of combat like not very probable, although it was not eliminated. The principal factors seen as weighing against him were soldiers and political. The ground and the mountainous routes of transport of limited—and vulnerable—ground in Afghanistan would compose the military difficulties inherent in confront forces of guérillero, according to evaluations' of intelligence. Moscow also was seen like little laid out to absorb the high political costs of quashing the prospects for the ratification for the treaty for limitation for Salt-II arm. Moreover, invading Afghanistan would be sure to cause a backlash in other Moslem countries. In did conformity with this judgement, a counselor political Soviet elder in Kabul, Vasily Safronchuk, say the charg the USA? June 24 that the USSR had any intention to send the combat does not assemble in Afghanistan. It moved to the evil that such a movement would make with the Treaty Salt-II, and with the political position of the USSR in the whole world. 56