Prelude to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

Sights of the Community of intelligence of the militairessovieticoptions

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The memorandum of intelligence of mediation of 28 September 1979aégalement provided a detailed examination from where theintervention militairede Moscow in Afghanistan was likely to carry outto more longterme. It noted that the number estimated advisersmilitairessovietic in Afghanistan had developed of 350 at thecommunist hour ducoup to approximately 750-1.000 with the beginning of1979, and with 2.500 àl' hour of the change of Amin. It alsospecified that desconseillers was attached to each level orders dansl'armed Afghan, including units of level at least quelquesrégimentairesand battalion occupied in the combat.84

The evaluation of intelligence of mediation described themilitairessoviétiques ones as having two very distinct optionsenAfghanistan: to be useful in a capacity of support, helping forunecampagne military carried out mainly by the Afghan army, oupour toassemble an interposition on a large scale in which lesforces Sovietwould ensure the majority of the operations of combat.Des potentialactions in the first category has étédécrites like including:

1) increased equipment and advisers, with allowed advisersdeparticiper more intensively in support of combat and of air ofcombatet as men and material transporting out of vat in Afghanistan;limited 2)interposition of the units of support of combat andservicede combat, including units of helicopter of attack anddescomposants of logistical support and maintenance for augmenterl'Afghan "extension and effectiveness of combat;" 3)interpositionlimitée with the Soviet units of combat to providelasecurity for principal Kabul and cities and points critical,etpeut-to be to function selectively in operations decombat beside theAfghan units of army to stiffen leurrésolution.85

To do anything beyond fixing principal of city or critical Kabul andsome autrespoints, the evaluation of mediation devoted to the Sovietsonly the second category of the military nombresmassifs ofoptions—committing of the forces terrestresdans a potentiallyopen operation.

Like practical question, the three postulated policies sousla firstcategory were not solutions of replacement, maisdes gradations toclimb the military participation, and choixétait it at which distanceoutward journey and how quickly. All cesmouvements were conceived tohelp the Afghan army with défaireles risen forces, and all were basedon the army afghaneprenant the principal role in military operationsin toutle country. Thus the key of axle of the goodwill and lacapacityof Moscow to undertake one or more these étapesétait, according toanalysts' of intelligence, its evaluation of lafidelity and cohesionof the Afghan army.86

The analysts also believed that, even for options limitéesd' tacticalsupport, the Soviets should move avecprécaution for fear theyalienate rather than support lesforces Afghan that they hoped alwaysabove to play the rôleprincipal of combat. For this reason, even ifSoviétiquesdécidaient to present the limited forces of combat, oneestattendu so that they make so much incrémentalement, commençantparsome battalions and working until one divisionaéroportée or to twoat the maximum. The 105Th Division—seenaéroporté guard inpreparatory activities during desbouleversements preceding inAfghanistan, and with a complement detroupe of full-force of7,900—was judged to be the force leplus likely to bring inside.87

One postulated the exception which could make move lesSovietic morequickly would be a backlash to the blow of Aminqui caused the seriouscombat in the capital. In a tellesituation, according to theevaluation of intelligence, Soviets ontété willing probably todeploy one or more divisionsaéroportées in Kabul and to protectdesSovietic already there too although to maintain a mode depro-Soviet(still, the preparations of Divisionaéroportée of 105Th guards wouldcertainly have supported a tellevue.) The analysis of the community ofintelligence indicated that one teldéploiement would not be plannedfor the use in combattantl' Moslem insurrection but was recognizedthat, once that there, the Soviet units could obtain drawn in thecombat.88

If the Afghan army separated, according to this analysis,Moscouconfronterait the prospect that preserving the Afghan modecourantsignifierait to take the role of wire in combattantl'insurgency—what the evaluation described as ainterpositionmilitaire Soviet "massive". The Soviet units offorceterrestre entering Afghanistan would run up againstoppositionarmée not only of insurgent but to desert theforcesafghanes from army.

The memorandum of intelligence of mediation described atelleentreprise by the Soviets like "a opérationmultidivisionnaire"requiring more than four divisions of forceterrestre and an airbornedivision (the 105^Th ) based in The Turkestan Military District. It noted That someadditional divisions could Be drawn from The nearby Central AsianMilitary District opposite The Xinjiang Province of China, goal saidThe Soviets probably would Be reluctant to weaken Their Thereposition. "Year operation of This magnitude would Therefore requireThe Re-deployment of forces—and Their supportingelements—from central western and [ USSR ] military districts, inaddition to Those near The Soviet-Afghan to border," according to Theassessment.89

The memorandum said Moscow had seemed prepared before The Amin blow tooffer some combat help well shorts of The major intervention That Theassessment defined have has "multidivision ground forces operation."Given The uncertainty immediately following The blow, any such movesprobably had been deferred, according to The memorandum, until TheSoviets were satisfied That Amin would consolidate his position. Acesoon drank have Moscow felt assured He had done so, according tointelligence analysts, The Soviet leaders' desire to avoid facing yearall-but-noThing choice would causes Them to begin increasing Theirfights support, up to what The memorandum characterized have has"sprinkling" of Soviet fights units.

Yew, in fact, The Afghan Army did come apart, and Moscow confrontedhas situation where only broad-scale intervention by Soviet troopswould save The mode, The intelligence analysis concluded That Sovietleaders were more likely to abandonment The Khalq mode Than to Bewilling to incur The costs of invasion. Their first choice obviouslywould viable Be to find some leftist alternate to Amin, goal yew Nosuch faction appeared, according to The analysis, "The Soviets wouldpromote of installation has moderate mode willing to deal wiTh Them."Intelligence analysts acknowledged That abandoning has communist modeMoscow had so demonstrably sponsored would Be seen by many Sovietleaders have damaging to The USSR. The Soviets could deflect This tosome extent by standing behind Their policy and blaming Afghan Thecommunists for not following Moscow' S guidance.

By comparison, according to The intelligence analysis, The price ofyear invasion would include:

One balances, The Interagency Intelligence Memorandum concluded (wiThNo dissents) That Moscow would not believe That saving The currentKhalq mode gold even anoTher communist mode was worTh This price.Final The sentence of The memorandum listed examples of situations inwhich There would Be has "substantially greater" chance That Moscowwould Be willing "to pay broad-scale The price of and length-termmilitary intervention." Examples included "The prospective customer ofThe advent of year anti-Soviet mode," "foreign military intervention"and "prolonged political chaos."90 In light of The events That ultimately occurred, it should Be notedThat The condition of "prolonged political chaos" could accompany mostscenarios for intervention.

The interagency assessment did not address The activities That hadbeen observed in The airborne division gold in Three of The furnacemotorized riffle divided in The Turkestan Military District. NOR didit mention The alerting of airborne divisions in central The andwestern USSR during times of crisis in Afghanistan. The only howoffered one The status and activities of The Soviet forces was Theconclusion That "We cuts not seen indications That The Soviets are AtThe broad-scale moment preparing ground forces for militaryintervention in Afghanistan." Broad By "scale" The memorandumpresumably was referring to The "muliti-division" forces describedabove.