Slick's Sleight of Hand:

A Review of Matt Slick's Rebuttal to My Criticism

Moreover, Slick apparently thinks that a the choice not to accept a claim as legitimate knowledge can only be valid if it produces a proof that the arbitrary is arbitrary. In other words, Slick endorses the ruse that, if one cannot prove that there are no gods, then the atheist is not rationally justified in not believing that there are no gods because, as a result of failing to prove that there are no gods, atheism is not "viable" as he puts it. One only need replace the term 'god' - a notion to which Christians have an emotional (as opposed to intellectual) commitment - with any other nonsense term, to see how vacuous and superficial this defense is.

For instance, if atheism is not "viable" because atheists cannot prove that there is no god or gods, then a-Zeusism is also not "viable" because a-Zeusists cannot prove that there is no Zeus. Consequently, according to his own logic, Slick himself is unjustified for not believing in Zeus. This point has been made to Slick before, and he has not dealt with it. And unfortunately, this defense scheme is encountered over and over again in his rebuttal, which only proves that he is not willing to deal with the real issue at hand, which is that god-belief is irrational, a position the truth of which I make crystal clear in the following. Slick's determination to persist in this defense only reveals how arbitrary his faith in Christianity is, that this faith is emotion-based, not reason-based.

As I examine Slick's rebuttal, numerous other points also come to the fore which only serve to support this conclusion. For instance, Slick exhibits commitment to a false understanding of both reality and knowledge, yet he does not seem to recognize this. As a Christian, he clearly affirms the primacy of consciousness metaphysics, but most likely does not grasp what this means. In my analysis, I correct this error. Also, in regard to knowledge, Slick has clearly rejected the rational view of knowledge, having failed to take consistently into account the fact that knowledge is both contextual and hierarchical, and its standard can only be reason. Instead, Slick chooses as his ideal the notion of omniscience, a notion which denies both the contextual and hierarchical nature of knowledge. These points are made clear in the analysis which follows.

The portions of text which are not indented are my rebuttal comments which are newly published with this page.

Happy reading!

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In my essay Slick's Fuss: A Review of CARM's "Is Atheism Viable?" I wrote:

Slick responded:

Slick seems to have missed several points here.

For one, Slick's first statement here "Mr. Bethrick implies that mysticism cannot not rational," is incomplete and basically incoherent. This statement comes from the same person who exerted the effort to point out that he is leaving all of my "typo's and grammar errors intact."

If "mysticism" is "belief in realities or existences outside our perceptual and/or one's intellectual apprehension" [sic], by what means does one claim it as knowledge? Slick does not say, but seems to want to take it for granted that to do so is rationally justified, for he says asks "is it irrational to believe that there are things in existence beyond our apprehension?" He says "Of course not," but fails to recognize a crucial distinction between the recognition that there may be "things in existence beyond our apprehension," and the claim to have knowledge of those things, especially after admitting that they are "outside our perceptual… or… intellectual apprehension." Clearly it is not a means of reason by which he can know these things (since he's already cut reason out of the picture), so clearly the claim to such knowledge cannot, on Slick's own premises, be rational.

Next Slick complains that I have "not demonstrated why belief in God is not rational," when in fact the second footnote of my essay provides a link to an essay by CJ Holmes which does this for me. Slick seems unaware of what he's even saying. While Slick has copied the title of the link with the rest of my essay to his posting of it, he neglected to leave the hyperlink in tact, thus disabling his readers from accessing the essay in question to boot. When Slick says, "He just states that [mysticism] is not rational," he misses my original point. Indeed, in the paragraph to which he is reacting, I nowhere make the statement "mysticism is irrational." Rather, my comment is in regard to Slick's own attempts "to make mysticism seem rational." Slick seems to think I have begged the question. Yet this is an error of inference (perhaps Slick does not know this?), and I nowhere attempt to draw the conclusion that mysticism is irrational in the statement to which he has reacted. Indeed, I nowhere make the announcement that the purpose of my paper is to prove that atheism is true, which means that his statement "he assumes the thing true he is trying to prove" [sic] misses the point. Slick clearly disconnects himself from the content with which he pretends to interact multiple times in the first paragraph of his response. Let's see what else he had to say.

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I wrote:

Slick reacted:

In this paragraph, Morriston is interacting with statements made by Christian philosopher William Lane Craig, but refers to him simply as "Craig." Is Morriston then withholding respect to Craig by referring to him in this manner? Most likely, Slick will probably think so, since again the context is someone critiquing a mystic's position.

Slick complains that I have mentioned his name "84 times by itself in his response, not once with Mr. in front of it." Obviously it bothered him enough to do a count! On the contrary, Slick should be flattered that I took the time to respond to his apologetic morsel.

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I wrote:

Slick responded:

Slick is clearly desperate for any reason, no matter how feebleminded, to dismiss criticism against his confessional investments. By characterizing my position as "an opinion," Slick attempts to take a sigh of relief. Since I only think that god-belief is irrational, he apparently wants to dichotomize this from the position that I know that god-belief is irrational (a dichotomy he obviously intends here, but nowhere validates), even though I provided a link (in footnote 2) to an essay which accomplishes a full validation of this position already! The URL of that essay (by CJ Holmes) is:

I don't suppose we'll have Slick's response to the arguments which are presented in Holmes' paper.

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I wrote:

Slick remarks:

Slick seems to think that an "absence of evidence or convincing argument for the positive" is "a statement centered around subjectivity." Yet it is not clear what he means by this, since he nowhere identifies what he means by 'subjectivity', nor does he show how my point qualifies as such. Rather, he simply drops the charge and runs, crediting it to what he calls my "subjective atheistic presupposition," which he nowhere identifies. Rather than justify this charge, he merely asserts that this "subjective atheistic presupposition" is somewhere present and that it "does not allow [me] to view theistic arguments with any serious acumen because he has already stated that he believes that theism is irrational." That's odd. If it has been shown that god-belief is irrational (and it has - see CJ Holmes' essay linked above), why would I think otherwise? Slick's error here is obvious: He wants to characterize as a "presupposition" what he should recognize as a verdict substantiated by sound argument, an argument which he nowhere shows the willingness to engage (or even let his readers examine).

Slick then characterizes my position as stating, "by default, any argument proposed for the existence of God must be, according to his presupposition, irrational and invalid from the beginning." But if the belief that there are gods in existence is predicated upon the primacy of consciousness view of reality (and it is, as Holmes and other thinkers have clearly shown), then obviously any attempt to validate it will itself be invalid. Slick's error here, however, is that he wants to characterize this position as a matter of a priori default, as if it were my starting point. However, he nowhere shows this to be the case; rather, he simply makes the charge that this is the case, and then flees into rhetoric intended to dismiss my points, stating at the outset that "Mr. Bethrick's defense here is basically worthless," and leaves it at that. Perhaps he chooses this route because he cannot address the points which I made in the paragraph to which he reacts, since I find it doubtful that he believes in Zeus. Indeed, if Slick does not believe in Zeus, why does he not provide evidence for Zeus' non-existence? After all, that is what he demands from atheists.

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I wrote:

Slick reacted:

Now Slick wants the very consideration which so far he has denied to me: he states, "Elsewhere on CARM I present evidences for God's existence." Apparently he seems to think that my point that the "expectation that non-believers present 'evidence for the validity of atheism' is symptomatic of the intention to evade the onus of proving one's existentially positive claims," as such "misses he point." Perhaps a case could be made for this, but he does not present one. And to boot, where his essay "Is Atheism Viable?" does not even provide a link to any articles which indicate what these alleged "evidences for God's existence," while my essay does provide a link to an essay which proves that god-belief is invalid (a link which he neglected to import when he copied my essay to his website for the purpose of his rebuttal), it seems then that his own criticism here ("misses the point") goes doubly against him.

Clearly Slick does not recognize this, and proceeds to special plead his case that "if [I] had read more thoroughly, [his material] would negate his statement here about proving God's existence." Slick clearly assumes here that I have not examined his articles which he thinks provide "evidences… proving God's existence," yet nowhere even attempts to validate this assumption. So far as he knows, it may be the case that I reviewed some or all of the articles he has in mind, and found them to be unconvincing. Nothing Slick says here either a) shows that he's even aware of this possibility, let alone b) rules this possibility out.

In spite of his fussing about me supposedly missing the point, Slick then goes on to admit that "I never maintain that I can prove God exists." What, then, we must ask, is Slick's fuss to begin with? If he cannot prove X (e.g., "God exists!"), why would he consider non-acceptance of the claim that X is true, to be a problem? He seems cognizant of the fact that such a claim is unprovable and arbitrary, yet he is tortured by the fact that some people do not accept it as truth.

Slick then says that my "presupposition is that God does not exist," even though he can nowhere find where I make this claim. Here again he misses the grand point, which is that I hold that god-belief is irrational. Slick wants to equate this position with the claim "God does not exist" and then intimate (by labeling it a "presupposition") that this is the result of unjustified bias. Indeed, had he taken the time to read the essay by Holmes, to which I provided a link in footnote 2 of my review of his essay against atheism, Slick might recognize the uniqueness of my position: since god-belief assumes an invalid view of reality (known as the primacy of consciousness) - a fact which he seems unaware of - any argument proposed to validate god-belief amounts to an attempt to validate an invalid view of reality, which of course is irrational. That which is invalid by nature simply cannot be validated, no matter how much theists want it to be validated. Wishing doesn't make it so, that is why god-belief is invalid. It seems Slick should take his own advice and do a little more reading himself! It might help him avoid more embarrassment.

Slick continued:

Slick seems to think that my statement ("Clearly the default is not belief, but non-belief") "assumes too much." Precisely what excess does this statement assume? Slick does not say. He then says that this position is "nothing more than guesswork," and does not seem to recognize the point I am trying to make (which he attempts to dismiss by claiming it "assumes too much"). Here Slick exposes his reluctance to rely on rational principle. Is he intimating that he believes everything that is told to him indiscriminately? If I told Slick that I saw a cow jump over the moon, would he believe it? Does Slick think that belief (rather than non-belief) is the default? Well, after all, he's the one who believes that resurrected zombies rose out of their graves in 1^st century Jerusalem and "showed themselves unto many" (Matt. 27:52-53), even though it is curious what he would consider a rational justification of such a belief.

Slick states, "If he means that babies are born without belief in God, that is nothing more than a guess." How does he know this? Indeed, he nowhere substantiates his claim that this position could be "nothing more than a guess." Slick then asks "How does he know what is or is not in the mind of a baby?" yet I have not made any statement to the affect that I do know "what is or is not in the mind of a baby" (or even that what the baby possesses can be said to be a mind). These are all Slick's assumptions grabbed up out of desperation to rationalize his dismissal of my points of criticism, criticism which he nowhere takes on directly, and with which he seems quite unprepared to interact (which is why he seeks to dismiss them in the first place).

Slick then attempts to reason his way out of his own dilemma as follows:

Of course, it is the case that I have not been minutely specific on the matter of what I mean by the term 'belief' (and consequently by the term 'non-belief'). Indeed, it is for reasons such as this that interaction is so vital to the development of a position, and I am grateful to Slick for seizing on this part of the debate. While I have no idea what could be meant by "the presupposition that God exists due to some innate quality in a person" (a most vague idea if I've ever heard of one), I don't see any problem with loosely equating belief with "cognitive assent," which, to me, implies a conceptual process ("cognitive") in which one volitionally accepts a claim as true given the hierarchical context on which it stands ("assent"). And I see no evidence of this going on among infants, as Slick seems to agree. Thus, I could not accept either the view that babies are somehow in possession of "the presupposition that God exists due to some innate quality in a person," or that in any case babies are born with the belief that there is a god. But even if one could show that babies are born with such a belief, either "due to some innate quality in a person" or because of some other, unknown phenomenon, this alone would not be sufficient to prove that the claim that there is a god is true. Something is not true by virtue of the fact that people believe it!

Slick then says that "we cannot know the mind of infants," so we cannot authoritatively state which is the case." But how does he establish that "we cannot know the mind of infants"? Perhaps there is an article on the CARM.org site which makes this case? If so, I have not found it. It seems to be another universal negative premise recruited in defense of a position of ignorance which he wants to promote in defense of his god-belief. If ignorance is what his god-belief stands on (and I'm certainly willing to concede this point to Slick), then he is free to claim ignorance for his side all he desires.

Slick then contests,

Again, look at my statement which provoked Slick's reaction here. I had written, "Pining as Slick does that he doesn't 'hear any evidence for the validity of atheism' simply misses the point.

Now let's look at the term 'pine'. My dictionary defines this term as "to yearn intensely and persistently esp. for something unattainable."

Given the statement I had made, it should be clear that the thing for which Slick yearns intensely and persistently" is "evidence for atheism," which he repeatedly calls for in his essay. Given my points of correction thus far, it should be clear that evidence is the wrong thing to ask for in the case of atheism. Indeed, since atheism is not a belief, but the absence of a particular kind of belief, atheism is the proper alternative to religious belief, since religious beliefs lack evidences. As Slick himself conceded at the outset of his rebuttal to my criticism of his attack against atheism, "Mysticism is a belief in realities or existences outside our perceptual and/or one's intellectual apprehension. This would include the idea that God exists." Something which is "outside our perceptual and/or intellectual apprehension," is clearly something for which it is conceded no evidence exists. Religionists claim that all manner of gods exist, yet none can produce evidence for the existence of their own gods at the exclusion of other gods.

Slick then states,

Indeed, a simplistic view of the world for the simpleminded, that is about the extent of the putative suitability of god-belief. Slick seems to think I fancy myself to be a "mind-reader," when it is not I who claims omniscience for myself (indeed, that is what religionists claim for their side of such debates). As to Slick's motives, it is obvious what they are: to vilify non-belief as such in an effort to evade the criticism of those who do not share Slick's god-belief. As for "errors of argumentation," I'm still waiting for him to find one among the many points I have made so far in my review of his short essay against atheism.

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I wrote:

Slick reacted:

How does this prove the claim that "there are no 'proofs' that God does not exist"? This is the claim which Slick makes in his original paper, yet does not validate. In fact, Slick was kind of enough to include that original paragraph in his rebuttal to my critique. Let's review it again:

Slick then makes the following correction of his original statement:

This is a delight to see: Slick here shows some willingness to learn from others, even though he disagrees fundamentally with their outlook on reality and life (even though he mistyped what he intended to say - it appears that he intended to say "there are no proofs of God's non-existence" - but either way his point concedes to my favor). I see this as a positive step forward for Slick. And he's right - the best he can really say is that "so far I have not seen any sufficient proof for God's non-existence," which corrects his earlier universal negative claim "there are not proofs that there is no God."

Yet still there is call for concern here. Slick still seems to assume a) that it is possible to prove a negative claim, and b) that such a proof would be necessary in the context of the claim that there is a god in order to justify non-belief in the existence of a god. So far, Slick does not seem to be aware that these assumptions are lurking in his position, and he nowhere shows these assumptions to be rationally plausible.

Since the concept 'proof' presupposes the concept 'evidence' (which may be either perceptual or conceptual in nature), and since the concept 'evidence' applies only to that which exists (we do not look for evidence for that which does not exist, for that would be a stolen concept), it is proper to call for proof only in regard to positive claims with respect to existential claims. In other words, if someone says that X exists, then he is rightly called to prove this claim by means of either perceptual or conceptual evidence which ultimately reduces to perceptual evidence. But if someone says, "You haven't proven that X exists, and I have no knowledge of any evidence, perceptual or conceptual, which could possibly serve to validate the claim that X exists, I cannot accept it as legitimately validated knowledge," he does not bear any onus to prove that X does not exist, for he was not the initiator of the existential claim in the first place. He is in full epistemological rights to say to those who claim that X exists, but fail to validate it, "Whatever!" and leave it at that; he is also right to point out why he does not accept the claim that X exists in the case of existential claims of an extraordinary or controversial nature, and one of those reasons would be to emphasize that he is under no obligation to present a proof that X does not exist. Again, these are epistemological principles which find their source in Rational philosophy, not in mysticism, where claims are taken on faith, not on reason.

Slick then makes the following qualification:

Even if it is the case that "the context [of the universal negative claim "there are no proofs that there is no God"] is dealing with the conversations I've had with atheists where I 'don't hear any evidence for the validity of atheism," then clearly (again!) the claim that "there are no proofs that there is no God" is unjustified. For the context on which Slick wants to base this claim clearly does not support it.

Slick then gives evidence that he still misses the point when he asks:

One does not have to prove that the non-existent does not exist. By definition, the non-existent does not exist, and one does not require a proof to show this. To ask for a proof that the non-existent does not exist is an arbitrary request.

Also, one can replace Slick's "God" with any other arbitrary term (such as Geusha, the supreme being of the Lahu tribesmen of northern Thailand) to show how arbitrary Slick's position is by way of substitutionary parallelism:

Does Slick believe that Geusha exists? It may be the case that Slick has never even heard of Geusha before, so it is likely the case that he has no Geusha-belief. And yet he has no Geusha-belief, but where's his proof that Geusha does not exist? Can it be the case that Slick is rationally justified in not believing the claim that Geusha exists, even though he has not provided a proof demonstrating that Geusha does not exist? This is a question which Slick needs to consider honestly, otherwise he will have to admit that his own criticism applies just as appropriately to himself as he thinks it applies to those who do not share his belief in the Christian god.

And besides, what does not seem to register with Slick, is the fact that I do not claim to have a proof that there are no gods. Again, as I have stated throughout, I have no god-belief. Slick is the one who claims that there is a god, not I. I simply point out that I have no god-belief, not that there are no gods. Slick clearly disregards this fundamental distinction in his desperate attempt to vilify atheism.

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I wrote:

Slick responded:

Slick accuses me of missing the point, but seems wholly unaware of where he is guilty of his own charge here. He seems to think that I am evading an issue by pointing out that I do not need to prove the non-existence of a god in order to be justified in not believing one exists. As we saw above, I also do not believe that Geusha, the supreme being of the Lahu tribesmen of northern Thailand, exists, yet readers should not expect me to provide proofs to the effect that this supreme being does not exist. And, as I surmised above, I would not be surprised if Slick himself does not believe that Geusha exists, yet I have not found any proofs anywhere on his website which argue to the conclusion that Geusha does not exist.

The point is, Slick clearly wants to special plead his god-belief. In other words, he holds to a double standard: while he thinks atheists are unjustified in not believing that the Christian god exists because they do not offer proofs for its non-existence, Slick himself lacks certain beliefs, just as atheists lack god-belief, but nowhere does he prove the universal negative claims that such things as Geusha or Allah et al. do not exist. This is known in logic as special pleading, an informal fallacy invalidating his epistemological ambitions here.

My parenthetical note that "I thought Christians believed that God exists 'beyond' the universe…" was intended to be ironic as well as attendant to a valid point. Christians have often told me that their god exists outside the universe. This would mean that god does not exist within the universe. And here Slick wants to challenge atheists to "prove [that] there is no God in the universe." But if Christians do not believe that god exists within the universe to begin with, why would they require that someone "prove [that] there is no God in the universe"? Slick seems to think that this parenthetical aside is a "non-sequitor" [sic], even though it was not offered as an inference to prior reasoning. Thus, his accusation of fallacy here fails.

Slick then makes the following recommendation:

If it is the case that "we Christians believe that God is also in the universe as well as outside of it," then I would suggest that it is not I who "needs to adjust his thinking," since it is not my claim that a god exists in the first place, whether within, outside or within and outside the universe. Instead, I would suggest that Christians need to hold council in order to hash this one out, since it is from other Christians (Slick is not the only one, and it is notoriously true that there are exceedingly numerous points on which various Christians sharply disagree), that I have fielded this claim "that God exists 'beyond' the universe." As I made clear in my parenthetical note, this is what I thought, and this thought is based on Christian testimony. If Slick thinks it is wrong, he shouldn't blame me, for I am not the author of the idea in the first place (again, I'm not the one who is claiming that a god exists in the first place - Slick seems to drop context rather carelessly).

But let's look at the idea which Slick does endorse: "that God is also in the universe as well as outside of it." What could it possibly mean to be "outside the universe"? Slick does not indicate. Rather, he allows this idea to stand without substantiation as if it were self-evidently true. Indeed, Slick nowhere states what he means by 'universe', which is essential to the meaning of the position he wants to endorse here. The universe is the totality of that which exists. This definition is supported by both the corpus of Objectivist philosophical literature (i.e., the Philosophy of Reason) as well as the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, which defines 'universe' as "the whole body of things and phenomena observed or postulated." Christians postulate the existence of a god. According to this definition, if such a thing exists, it would clearly have to exist within the universe, since, as a member of the class "things which exist" it necessarily is part of the totality of that which exists. To assert the idea of "outside the universe" disregards this fact, and thus commits the fallacy of context-dropping (consequently invalidating it). To assert that something exists implies the totality of everything which exists, entities both known and unknown, and by virtue of this fact it must exist within the universe (since by definition, there is no such thing as "outside the universe"). To say then, as Slick says Christians do, that "God is also in the universe as well as outside of it" (a claim which Christians do not prove, mind you - rather, they simply assert it), is essentially to say that god both exists and does not exist. Such duplicity of mind, if taken seriously and followed to its logical conclusion, will necessarily result in a form of schizophrenia known as religious fanaticism.

Slick then states:

He is reacting to the following statement which I made in my original critique:

And I stand by this intimation, namely that "Apparently, Slick thinks that god-belief - indeed, his god-belief - is true until proven false," for he still insists that atheists prove that his god does not exist. If we go by the law of the excluded middle, there is no legitimate position between god-belief and atheism: either you believe it, or you don't. Discussion of agnosticism, as some would clearly be wont to do here, would not validate a third position. Agnosticism is the position that no certainty is possible on the claim that a god exists. But this says nothing about whether the agnostic believes that god exists or not. While it is the case that the agnostic holds that rationally justifiable certainty on the question of the existence of gods is not possible, he may believe that there is a god, or he may not believe it. I have met agnostics of both persuasions, but I have never met an agnostic who has found some middle ground between believe and absence thereof. Indeed, the proof is in their actions, not in their words, for it is their actions which tell us what people really believe.

Since I am persuaded to hold that there are only two positions possible - belief or absence thereof - and since Slick seems to think that one must prove that there are no gods in order to be rationally justified in not holding a god-belief, it must be the case, then, that Slick things that his god-belief is true until proven false and that a proof for god's existence is simply not necessary.

Slick seems to think that this inference leads to straw-manning his position, yet I have read nothing either in his original essay, or in his reactions to my criticism of it, which could at all hopefully secure this accusation. Therefore, it should be clear given my substantiation of my position, that it prevails against his unsupported protestations.

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I wrote:

Slick rebutted:

Which atheists are those who make this claim? Slick does not indicate, but seems to intend that this statement applies generally to all atheists.

Again, Slick misses the point, which is: Evidence is the wrong thing to ask for in the case of atheism. Atheism is not a positive belief; it is simply the absence of a certain kind of belief (namely, the absence of god-belief). Because this is the case, the challenge to substantiate one's atheism with evidence, is invalid (since it misses the point!).

Slick then accuses me of trying to wriggle out of what he considers to be my onus of proof, even though I have made no claim which needs to be defended. My claim is that I have no god-belief. I'm sure he is quite willing to take my word for the fact that I am atheist. If not, that is another matter. For if he disputes this, he would simply have to observe my choices and actions in life to note that they are not congruent with the belief in invisible magic beings. Yet, I doubt he is about to make such an investment, and I wouldn't blame him.

But clearly Slick resents being held to the onus of proving his claim that a god exists, which only goes to support one my prior points (namely that "It seems that he thinks a proof for God's existence is not necessary").

He then repeats his admission that he "may not be able to prove [that] God exists," which wholly concedes the debate to my side! But then he does say that he has "evidence (as given on CARM)," and that it is up to me "to examine it or not." And suppose I do examine this "evidence (as given on CARM)," yet still I am not persuaded? Humorously, Slick builds a psychological defense mechanism against this possibility into his position by announcing "given his atheistic presupposition, I am sure that all such evidences would be insufficient." This way, if I am not persuaded by the "evidences (as given on CARM)," he can take faith-protecting shelter in the pretended solace offered by the belief that my atheism is a consequence of hardhearted bias, even though he explicitly concedes that he "may not be able to prove [that] God exists"!

Slick then states:

Slick's statement here has hope in its structure, but only hopelessness in its content. To rectify it, I would suggest the following corrections (which appear in bold):

Slick then goes on to state:

Slick demonstrates here that he either has not read anything I stated in my criticism, or simply does not care to incorporate it into his reasoning. For here again, we have him expecting the non-believer to present a proof that there are no gods, when in fact this has been shown repeatedly to be an invalid challenge, and indeed Slick himself nowhere attempts to validate such a challenge (for it would only backfire on himself if he were to try this). Slick seems to be ignorant of the fact that proof applies to that which exists, not to that which does not exist. Beyond this, and even more importantly, he demonstrates no awareness for the issue of metaphysical primacy and the need to address this issue at the outset of one's cognition. For clearly Slick has settled for the primacy of consciousness view of reality, on which his god-belief depends, and which he affirms by holding to the view that a god exists. A comprehensive exposé of this has been prepared and published by Anton Thorn on the "Objectivist Atheology" website. The URL to his unassailable Argument from Existence is given below:

Clearly, the only reasonable conclusion to draw, given the fact that Slick himself concedes that he cannot prove that a god exists, is a) that Slick claims that a god exists because he wants one to exist (which is the nature of faith), and b) that his emotional life is so deeply invested into this desire, that he will latch onto the most desperate evasions and reversals in order to defend against criticism. Nothing he states in either his original essay, or in his response to my criticism so far, has called this conclusion into question.

Slick then stated:

Actually, to point out that Slick is incapable of presenting a proof of the existence of a god - an incapacity which he has conceded at least two times so far in his rebuttal - is not a shift from a legitimate topic of this discussion, to one which is outside it. The point which Slick seems to ignore is that, if he wants me to accept his god-belief, then he will have to honor his onus of presenting a proof for this claim, since it is his desire that I accept his claim. Failing to provide such a proof, he is not justified in saying I am not justified in my lack of such belief.

Does this at all demonstrate "the validity of [Slick's] premise that atheism exists in a theistic vacuum which it must construct by presupposing [that] God does not exist and then negating all proposed theistic proofs"? Clearly, if he wants to demonstrate what he takes to be the validity of this position, he will have to do more than merely assert it, which is all that he's done so far. Indeed, what precisely does he mean by "theistic vacuum"? Before he can claim validity for this premise, he should explain what this means. If by "theistic vacuum," one means "vacuum of theistic belief," how is this different from an absence of god-belief? Slick does not say. And how does Slick validate the intimation, clearly implicit in his statement here, that all atheists somehow need to "construct" this "theistic vacuum" (whatever he means by this) "by presupposing [that] God does not exist and then negating all proposed theistic proofs"? Is Slick saying here that one is still not justified in not believing that a god exists if, after a review of all known arguments for the existence of a god, he finds that those arguments are flawed? If so, then I would point to this attitude on Slick's part - if indeed it is his attitude - that he holds to god-belief because he wants a god to exist, not because he genuinely thinks it is a rational idea.

Slick writes:

Furthermore, since sound arguments have been provided to the conclusion that god-belief is irrational, atheism is consequently shown to be the only proper alternative to god-belief. Again, those arguments can be found at the following web addresses:

Slick needs to do his homework here, for clearly his position fails to take many issues into account (such as, for instance, the nature of atheism as the absence of a belief rather than a "belief system"). Even his own statement that atheism entails the lack of belief in a god, is inconsistent with his assumption that atheism is a "belief system."

_____________________________

I wrote:

Slick responded with the following:

For one thing, how does this constitute an admission that substantiating atheism is difficult? Slick blanks out on the fact that my comment about positional difficulty pertains to his expectations, not to the atheist. Slick apparently does not see how his own expectations are undermined by his own admissions.

The URL for this essay is given below:

The URL for this essay is given below:

The URL for this essay is given below:

The URL for this essay is given below:

One can simply point out the irrationality of believing the claim, found in Matthew 27:52-53, that an unspecified number of "saints" who were dead and buried suddenly "arose" out of their graves as if they had been sleeping, then "went into the holy city, and appeared unto many."

Or, one can point out that, since god-belief rests on faith, that this alone constitutes a breach of reason for, as Rand pointed out that, "Intellectually, to rest one's case on faith means to concede that reason is on the side of one's enemies - that one has no rational arguments to offer." Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, p. 197.

For those who believe in the existence of invisible magic beings to challenge those who have no such beliefs to provide a rational defense of their lack of such beliefs is, in itself, absurd!

Clearly, there is no difficulty in proving the rational propriety of atheism, contrary to what Slick wants to say here. It is because he wants to ignore the fact that it is easy to prove that god-belief is irrational that he prefers atheists to spend their time trying to prove that gods do not exist. Thus it is his own position (particularly his expectations, as the context of my statement had already made clear) which collapses under unbearable difficulties.

Slick goes on to say:

See what I mean? Slick's whole scheme is to execute a reversal, not only of the onus of proof, but also in characterizing one's overall philosophical predicament. Where my comments about difficulty of position applied to the expectations to which he stubbornly clings to, he clearly wanted to deflect this from himself and redirect it back at the atheist. However, it is obvious that this evasion fails, for I have shown above that it is not at all difficult to prove the rational propriety of atheism by showing why god-belief is irrational.

Here's the argument validating the rational propriety of atheism, in case Slick could not figure it out from what I've stated so far:

Premise 1: If god-belief is irrational, then atheism (defined as the absence of god-belief) is the rationally proper alternative to god-belief.

Premise 2: God-belief is irrational.

Conclusion: Therefore, atheism (defined as the absence of god-belief) is the rationally proper alternative to god-belief.

Certainly Slick can recognize the validity of this argument's form, for it clearly follows the modus ponens format.

There, that wasn't so hard.

Slick then writes:

If Slick construes that a validation of atheism must consist of proving that no gods exist, then even on his own admissions and concessions, this expectation is quite problematic, for reasons given above. Again, Slick wants to twist my statements to making a comment about the difficulties of my own position, and above I have corrected this erroneous reversal. There is no reason to offer a rebuttal to Slick's own concession to insurmountable difficulty. And indeed, like a child, his essay "Is Atheism Viable?" demonstrates the nature of the theist's distemper when it comes to understanding and engaging atheism.

If it can be said that it is I who has been making a fuss, then perhaps Slick thinks that offering a point-by-point correction to his attack against atheism is "something children are known to do," for clearly I have been "addressing the issue."

Slick then writes:

Notice that again Slick fails (indeed, perhaps deliberately!) to take into account any point which I have made. While he has admitted that proving a universal is not possible, he still persists in his expectation that atheists must prove a universal negative in order to justify their atheism. This is obtuse at best. He then says here that "If I see a proof that there is no God" - something which he has already conceded is the wrong thing to ask for - "I'll become an atheist. After all, proof is proof." So take note here: first he acknowledges that a proof of the non-existence of something is conceptually problematic, thus validating the conclusion that to ask for such a proof is an unwarranted expectation. Then he positions himself such that it would require such a proof for him to recognize the invalidity of his god-belief. In other words, like a hermit crab which secondhandedly takes over the discarded shell of a deceased gastropod, Slick intentionally socks himself away from rationality by cutting off all exits from his irrationality.

And note what really speaks louder than words, is Slick's own silence. For he passes his opportunity to address the question which I did ask, which was:

The only response which Slick gave to this question, was clear enough: for he states "I suggest that Mr. Bethrick stop holding his breath." This should tell us that no matter how securely a thinker will show his god-belief to be irrational, he will not relent from claiming it as truth.

Clearly it is not a desire for truth and rationality which drives a man like Matt Slick, but a desire to evade reality and choke his own mind on the conceptual permafrost of primitive philosophy, which is religion.

But Slick continues:

Then Slick comments:

Slick continues:

Slick's opinion is noted, but we must consider the source of that opinion to understand the fullness of its context. As a person who believes mystical claims about risen savior-gods, invisible magic beings, stories of miracles and other symptoms of primitive philosophy which must be accepted on faith, it is clear who is dispensing with reason. Christianity is open in its embrace of faith and its hatred for what Paul calls "men's wisdom," (I Cor. chap. 1 and 2). Mark 11:22 has Jesus say "Have faith in God"; it does not say "Use your reason, and pursue it to its logical conclusions." Rational inference was certainly not what the speeches attributed to Jesus either teach or model. In Mark 5:36, the following words are attributed to Jesus: "Be not afraid, only believe." In other words, believers are not to worry themselves about the facts; rather, they are expected simply to believe as gullible children. As Matthew 18:3 puts it, "Verily I say unto you, Except ye be converted, and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven." Obviously, that "wisdom" which won Paul's approval was not reason, nor was it rational. Instead, it was a fantasy in which believers are expected to immerse and invest themselves at all costs. In Christianity, the believer serves his worldview, as if the worldview could benefit from his sacrifices. In rational philosophy, the worldview serves Man.

As for Slick's suggestion that I "reread the paper and then address what it actually says," I have already done this, and I have already published a comprehensive response. So far, no point in my response to his paper "Is Atheism Viable?" has been rebutted, and this was precisely what I predicted would be the case. So far, I have not been disappointed.

_____________________________

I wrote:

Slick responded:

Again, Slick still clings to his arbitrary idea of what it means to be an atheist. Atheism is the absence of god-belief. It is valid because god-belief is invalid. Does he think that it would be valid to hold to an invalid worldview? If one can prove that god-belief is irrational and therefore cannot provide a valid worldview, then atheism is by default the only rationally proper alternative to god-belief, since atheism is the discarding of god-belief. A rational person discards that which is not rational. Slick has not dealt with this perspective anywhere in his rebuttal, and indeed shows no signs that he is willing to be aware of it.

Slick asked:

No, it is not a double standard, for theism and atheism are not conceptually equivalent. To claim that there is a double standard in operation here can only be the result of a package-deal fallacy, which is the failure to distinguish between essentials. Theism asserts positive existential claims about reality. Thus, if those who endorse these claims desire that others accept them as viable beliefs about reality, then they must argue on behalf of them. This is the onus of proof principle, and it's clear that Slick would prefer to wriggle out of it. Atheism, on the other hand, is generally only a lack of a particular kind of belief. There is nothing to prove, since atheism is not making any positive existential claims.

If, however, I claim that atheism is the only rationally proper alternative to god-belief, then I am asserting a positive claim, and thus I bear the onus of proving it. And my proof is as follows:

This argument is clearly valid, for it follows the modus ponens format (If P, then Q/P/Therefore Q). Thus, if the premises are true, then the conclusion MUST be true.

How do we know that Premise 2 is true? This is easy to show. For god-belief assumes a false view of reality, which is known as the primacy of consciousness. Because god-belief assumes a false view of reality, it does not have a foundation built on fact, but on falsehood as such. Therefore, it cannot be rational, for that which is rational is built on a foundation of truth, not on falsehood.

The true view of reality which god-belief rejects is called the primacy of existence. This is the view that existence exists independent of consciousness. This principle is the foundation of truth, reason and logic. It is the principle which recognizes that wishing does not make something so. Yet clearly belief in the existence of gods is not compatible with this view, since this belief states that a form of consciousness was required for the existence of the universe - this is the Christian doctrine of "creation ex nihilo": the view that the universe was created by an act of will. This is indisputably compatible only with the primacy of consciousness view, which is false. The notion of miracles is also built on the primacy of consciousness: this is the belief that objects in reality conform to the dictates of consciousness. For instance, Jesus and Peter walk on water in Matt. 14 because they believe they can; Jesus turns water into wine in John 2:1-11 because he wants the water to become wine. The belief in the doctrine of creation and in the doctrine of miracles are clearly expressions of the desire to see reality conform to wishes, which is the primacy of consciousness view. Furthermore, in epistemology, men are expected to "believe" because they are told to believe. As Jesus says in Mark 5:36, "Be not afraid, only believe." Thus, the believer does not believe things because he can establish them on the basis of reason, but because he wants them to be true - i.e., for the believer wishing makes it so.

Given the evidences (the Christian doctrines of 'creation', 'miracles', and 'faith'), we see explicitly how the Christian god-belief is built squarely on the basis of the primacy of consciousness view. Thus, we can see how Christian theism as a whole is built on a false view of reality. Therefore, Christianity is an invalid worldview (since it assumes false premises), and consequently, the choice to ascribe to the Christian worldview is irrational.

Thus, Premise 2 is true.

And since Premise 2 ("god-belief is irrational") is true, it must logically follow that atheism (i.e., the discarding of god-belief) is the only rationally proper alternative to god-belief.

Hence, atheism is valid.

Slick then writes:

Now this mistaken view has been corrected. See to it that it is not endorsed again, for to commit oneself to a falsehood after it has been shown to be a falsehood, is folly.

Slick writes:

While it is true that the concept 'atheist' would not be necessary if no one held to a god-belief (since there would be no need for a term to distinguish those who hold to a god-belief from those who discard such primitive ideas), it does not follow from this that "Atheism… lives in a theistic vacuum." For if there were no people who held to a form of god-belief, then any people who are living would naturally be people who do not have a god-belief, thus they would be atheists. Only, the term would not be needed.

Consider for example the following. Let's make up a new deity's name (why not? they're a dime a dozen thanks to imaginative mystics). Let's call this new deity Shoshontz. Now, let's take for granted for the sake of argument that no human beings, past, present and future believe that Shoshontz exists. This means that all human beings do not hold to Shoshontz-belief. Thus it would be the case that all humans are a-Shoshontzist. Only, this term is not needed since there is no need to distinguish those who do believe in Shoshontz from those who do not so believe. But this does not overturn the fact that I have no Shoshontz-belief. Thus, my a-Shoshontzism (i.e., the absence of belief that Shoshontz exists) "lives in a [Shoshontzist] vacuum." Indeed, I am both a-Shoshontzist as well as atheist, and I live in reality, not in some vacuum of Matt Slick's imagination. Enough with the tiresome non sequiturs.

Slick writes:

While it's true that Slick has stated several times the claim that "the atheist has no proof that God does not exist," he has not proven this claim. He justifies this claim by saying, "because it is impossible to prove that in all the universe in all places and in all times God does not exist; at least, I don't see how it is possible."

But the same principle can be used against Slick's own claim: how can he know that "in all the universe in all places and all times" that no atheist has ever devised a "proof that God does not exist"?

Actually, that's not the case. My atheism is not a consequence of being able to prove that no gods exist, and I have nowhere claimed that it is. Rather, my atheism is a consequence of being able to prove that god-belief is irrational. I have presented that proof in full above. Slick will have to try to rebut it if he wants to claim or insinuate that my atheism is unjustified. But clearly, if a belief is shown to be irrational, then belief in it is also irrational, especially after the fact of that belief's irrationality has been made known.

Besides, why would one have to erect a proof to show that the non-existent does not exist? The non-existent by definition does not exist, so such a proof would be irrelevant.

Slick writes:

If by "atheism is provable" one means that he can show that atheism is the only rationally proper alternative to god-belief, then I have proven atheism. If by "atheism is intellectually viable" one means that he can show that atheism is the only rationally proper alternative to god-belief, then I have proven that atheism is intellectually viable.

If Slick does not agree with my terms, he is welcome to propose his preferred alternatives and argue for why they should be accepted in place of mine.

Slick says he has asked me this question, and says that I have not answered it. However, this is my first response to his rebuttal. So how can he say that I have not answered it?

He now has my answer, and he can no longer say that I have not answered it.

Slick writes:

If Slick acknowledges that "atheism is viable in one sense," namely that "it is simply a possibility," and I have shown that atheism is viable in an altogether more sophisticated sense, namely that atheism is the only rationally proper alternative to god-belief, then the answer to the question which heads his essay "Is Atheism Viable?" is a resounding: YES! Not only is atheism viable, but it is also the only rationally proper alternative to believing the claim that gods are real.

Only, Slick will not want to accept this (because he WANTS a god to exist), so he will attempt to find ways to knock it down. Only, he won't find one.

_____________________________

I wrote:

Slick responded:

Clearly, like so many other theists, Slick wants to characterize atheism as a matter of faith on the atheist's part. In his original essay, Slick wrote, "the atheist must hold his position by faith." The motivation behind saying this is obvious: to denigrate non-belief as such. But in so doing, he denigrates the very "faculty" by which Christians claim to know their religious "truths," which is 'faith'. Thus, he negates his own views by attempting to negate the views of those who do not believe in the existence of invisible magic beings.

Besides, Slick does not have to acknowledge this for it to be true. The truth of the fact that holding a position on the grounds of faith is philosophically suspicious, is not dependent upon his assent. Rather, it is a truth whether he assents to it or not. Faith is the determination that something is true because one wants it to be true. This is the elevation of one's hopes, desires, wishes and emotions over reason and in place of knowledge. It is not rational. Indeed, "philosophically suspicious" may be too tame an expression for the kind of evil the notion of 'faith' represents.

Wrong. I am not attempting to add to them. I am merely showing their logical conclusion if the ideas behind Slick's statements are followed consistently. The only other alternative open to Slick, if he does not like following ideas to their logical conclusion, is to special please his case (again!). This alternative would, in the context of the above matter, amount to the view that faith is proper for the theist's beliefs, but improper for the atheist's beliefs (assuming one could show that "the atheist must hold his position by faith" - which Slick nowhere proves).

Slick writes:

Wrong again. The atheist can prove that god-belief is irrational, as I have done.

Slick writes:

Indeed, "theistic proofs" negate themselves before they even get off the ground, for the assume a false view of reality. That which assumes a false view of reality cannot itself be true, and thus does not require someone else to come along and negate it.

Slick wrote:

When have I ever stated that I "hold [the] position that there is no God"? As I have corrected numerous times, my position is that god-belief is irrational. With regard to the non-existent, my position is that that which does not exist is that which does not exist.

Where has Slick established that my position is one which I hold "by faith"? Indeed, I already responded to this in my original review, and Slick has not interacted with the content of my response to this accusation.

Slick characterizes my position as one entailing the belief "that the future will not provide proof contrary to what [I] already believe." But what is it that I believe? Indeed, I hold that existence exists, that to exist is to be something (i.e., the law of identity), that existence exists independent of consciousness, and that the task of consciousness is to perceive existence, not create it. What could constitute "proof contrary" to these positions? If these are absolute truths (and they are), then the recognition that no new evidence could possibly call these truths into question is not a matter of faith, but of reason based on fact. To be honest, I don't think Slick has a very strong grasp of Rational Philosophy if he thinks that one must appeal to 'faith' in order to recognize such truths. Indeed, he would have to accept these truths in order to argue against them.

Slick writes:

This is where Slick errs. Atheism is not "a positive belie[f] system," and repeating the claim that it is such a system will not make this so.

Slick writes:

Slick continues:

This fact only serves as evidence against Slick's untenable assumption that atheism as such is "a positive belie[f] system." If "different atheists have different definitions of what atheism is," then obviously they are forming their concepts and definitions according to different philosophical principles. Hence, they ascribe to differing belief systems, not to the same one. Again, that someone is an atheist only tells us what he does not believe, not what he does believe. Atheism tells us what kind of worldview a person does not accept as true; it tells us nothing about what kind of philosophy a person does accept. While one atheist might hold that reality is a figment of his own imagination (as opposed to the Christian view, which holds that reality is an effect of God's imagination) and consequently that knowledge is whatever he wants it to be (cf. the Christian 'faculty' of 'faith'), another atheist may hold that reality is not a product of consciousness, but is a chaotic, materialistic realm of unconnected atoms constantly in flux and that consciousness is a myth (how's that for a stolen concept?) and consequently that knowledge of reality is impossible. And yet another atheist may hold, as do I, that existence exists, that consciousness is real, but that existence holds metaphysical primacy over consciousness, that to exist is to have identity, and that reason is the only source of knowledge. Clearly, these three atheists ascribe to three fundamentally different conceptions of reality, and in no way ascribe to the same worldview, which is what we would expect if Slick's assumption that "atheism is a positive belie[f] system." Again, Slick stumbles on his own slipperiness.

Slick writes:

Besides, I have not proposed the claim "God does not exist" as Slick seems to think. Indeed, he nowhere quotes where I attempt to defend this claim. Rather, my position has "consistently and in all practically" been god-belief is irrational.

Slick writes:

I do not claim that I "have no intellectual position or commitment concerning belief in God." As I've stated, I hold that god-belief is irrational. That is my position. Will Slick recognize and deal with this?

Slick writes:

Well, it couldn't because their positions are continually being misrepresented by theists, could it? To be honest, I can't speak for the purposes and motivations of other atheists, I don't care what they could be, and I don't know why it would bother Slick that some atheists do this. Indeed, for every atheist whom he has encountered putting out "such a long and arduous effort to denounce and disprove theistic proofs as well as refute papers attacking atheism," imagine how many atheists he hasn't heard from! That is, unless Slick thinks that all atheists do this.

Slick writes:

No, in writing to correct Slick's many, many errors of atheological pertinence, I am behaving in a manner consistent with the fact that I have no god-belief and that I think god-belief is irrational and dangerous to man.

Slick writes:

The hint of truth here the nature of which Slick does not grasp is the fact that atheists (i.e., individuals who have no god-belief) have positive beliefs about reality. This does not in any way confirm his assertion that "atheism is a positive belief," for he fails to distinguish between a positive belief and a lack of a belief. Thus he tries to package-deal them together as if there were no distinction between positive beliefs and the lack of a belief.

Rather than confirming his view that "atheism is a positive belief," Slick's recognition that atheists hold positive beliefs on various matters is evidence which confirms the fact that man requires a philosophy in order to live. This is a fact which Rational Philosophy identifies and accounts for. It is not something which Christianity enables its believers to understand. Indeed, they have to seek for principles outside their religion in order to comprehend the proper nature of philosophy and the reasons why man requires it.

Slick writes:

Of course my behavior is consistent with my beliefs. And in the context of my interaction with Slick's flawed arguments and mischaracterization of atheism my behavior is consistent with my commitment to reason as the only valid means of knowledge. However, it does not follow from these points, as Slick would have it, that atheism "is a positive belief system." This is simply another non sequitur.

Slick writes:

How does Slick know what I have and have not read? I know that as a Christian he claims omniscience for his side of the debate. But is he now claiming to be omniscient himself?

Slick writes:

Will he allow his readers to access these papers? This is a choice which Slick must decide for himself if he responds to my response to his rebuttal.

_____________________________

I wrote:

Slick writes:

That Slick disagrees with this is clear. Whether his reasons for disagreeing are good, however, is a different matter. So far I don't think he's shown that he has good reasons for disagreeing.

Slick writes:

Again, Slick sees what he wants to see. That a person acts as if there are no gods does not mean that he has claimed "There is no god." Such an inference would require more evidence (such as a recording of the individual making such a claim). Indeed, it is difficult to draw many conclusions about someone's declared beliefs purely from their behavior. For I have known both many Christians and many atheists, and many Christians I know act no differently from many of the atheists whom I've known. Does this tell me that the Christians in question "the particular belief system they adhere to is one that says 'I believe there is no God'"? I doubt those Christians would accept this, even if I claimed that the evidence of their behavior "forced" me to conclude this.

Indeed, does Slick think that the claim "there are no gods" is identical to the claim that "god-belief is irrational"? If Slick does not take the distinctions between the claim which he wants to say atheism must affirm (namely "there are no gods") and the claim which provides the foundation of my atheism (namely "god-belief is irrational"), then clearly he is destined for misrepresenting my view. He would only do himself an injustice here, for he would neglect the opportunity to interact with a new form of criticism, one with which he seems quite unprepared to face.

Slick writes:

Slick of course is wrong. The term 'god' is literally meaningless to me. I do not say that a god does not exist, because, if there are no gods, then I bear no onus to validate such a claim. The non-existent by definition does not exist, and it does not take an argument to prove this.

Rather, my actions reflect my position that god-belief is irrational. Big difference. And indeed, since I am an atheist, it would only be logical that my actions and choices reflect the fact that I have no god-belief.

Slick writes:

_____________________________

I wrote:

Slick responded:

Indeed, there is no content in such an idea to like. It is an empty idea. It is literally the enshrinement of a zero. The term 'god' has no reference to reality. It has no meaning. It is literally nonsense.

Slick writes:

This may very well be the case for some atheists. But regardless of Slick's experiences with atheists, what individual atheists like or dislike is irrelevant.

Slick writes:

This of course depends on what their presuppositions are. If they are not rational, then of course they are vulnerable to the risk of falling prey for clever arguments whose intentions are to disable reason, not invigorate it. One way to goad atheists into such traps is by challenging them to prove that there are no gods, a challenge which Slick continually repeats has gone unmet. And indeed, I do not claim to prove that either the Christian god or Zeus do not exist, yet I believe in neither. Does Slick believe in Zeus? If not, where is his proof that Zeus does not exist? See, he doesn't like it when the arbitrary is placed on his foot.

Slick writes:

I do not claim to be any different, since I do not know the general identity of the atheists he has in mind. Like me, I'm willing to bet all of them breathe air and sleep on a more or less regular basis. Slick's point here is of course irrelevant.

Slick writes:

But the rational basis of our beliefs is precisely what is at issue. This is what Slick himself is intimating when he says that "the real issue" is "the lack of intellectual viability in atheism." Essentially, he's attacking the rational basis for not believing that gods exist, and takes exception when attention is focused on questioning the validity of the foundations of god-belief. He says that focusing attention on this matter is an attempt to "sidestep" the real issue. But clearly, the "real issue" is the foundation of our respective positions. Since I have already responded to the claim that atheism is a position (indeed, it is a negation in my case), and have clarified for the record that my position is that god-belief is irrational, Slick must now focus his attention on "the real issue" at hand in regard to my position, which is my argument to the effect that god-belief is irrational. Until he does so, he is the one who is sidestepping, not I.

Slick writes:

Again, irrelevant.

Slick writes:

Indeed, the validity of atheism has not been attacked. Consequently, there is no need for a defense of atheism. One does not need to defend the decision to reject the irrational.

Slick writes:

It is incorrect. And I have shown this.

Slick writes:

Again, Slick fails to take into account the fact that footnote #2 of my essay provided a link to CJ Holmes' essay proving that god-belief is irrational. Since Slick has chosen to overlook this, he drops a relevant contextual detail in the matter of my rejection of god-belief. It's as if he were claiming that one should still be a theist even though he has concluded that god-belief is irrational.

_____________________________

I wrote:

Slick responded:

Not in my experience.

Slick writes:

Again, these are points which Slick himself has not been able to validate. If he cannot validate these points, then he cannot validly claim that I am missing the point. For missing the point only occurs when a point which has been validated has been missed. Slick would have to validate the following points even to have a prayer of laying this charge against me:

1. "atheism has no proof that God does not exist"
2. atheism "can only exist in an evidential and theistic vacuum"
3. atheism "has not refuted all evidences"
4. atheism "must be held, at least to some [unspecified?] degree, by faith"

Slick has attempted to pass off all these views as legitimately valid, but throughout his rebuttal they have been encountered, refuted and corrected. For him to assert them afresh without dealing with the points raised against them is simply an expression of stubborn-headedness, not of reason.

Slick writes:

Slick clearly thinks he has evidence for the supposed truth of the Christian view, but how would he answer his own question about examining said evidence objectively? What precisely is Slick's understanding of the concept 'objective'? Does he have a rational understanding of objectivity?

The concept 'objectivity' pertains to the proper relationship between consciousness and its objects. According to the principle of objectivity, existence holds metaphysical primacy over the faculty of awareness (consciousness). When one investigates a matter objectively, he consistently observes the proper relationship between his consciousness and the objects of his consciousness. He recognizes that the objects do not conform to his consciousness, that the task of his consciousness is not to create or give identity to the objects of his awareness, but to discover and identify what those objects which exist independent of his consciousness are. Clearly, then, the principle of objectivity is rooted in the primacy of existence metaphysics, which theism rejects at its very foundations.

In place of the primacy of existence metaphysics, theism is built on the primacy of consciousness metaphysics. As evidence for this, we have the Christian doctrines of creation, miracles and faith, which are obvious expressions of the primacy of consciousness view of reality. According to the doctrine of creation, existence (i.e., the universe) was created by an act of will. Thus, existence is thought to be a product of consciousness (i.e., of a will), which means consciousness holds metaphysical primacy over existence.

According to the doctrine of miracles, the objects of consciousness are subject to revision according to the dictates of consciousness. For instance, in Exodus chapter 3 we read of a bush which speaks human words while it burns and yet is not consumed by fire. According to a primacy of existence view of reality, a bush clearly does not speak in human voices, and if it burns it will be destroyed. But on a primacy of consciousness view, anything can happen which the ruling consciousness wants to happen. In other words, reality conforms to someone's consciousness. Similarly, in Matthew chapter 14, we read of Jesus and Peter walking on unfrozen water. Now, on a primacy of existence view of reality, human beings do not walk on unfrozen water, since their natures will not allow this. One can test this by going to a nearby lake and stepping off the end of a pier. But on a primacy of consciousness view of reality, anything can happen so long as consciousness desires it to happen - i.e., reality conforms to consciousness. That this is the case according to the story is made clear when, as Peter is beginning to sink in the water (as we would expect on a primacy of existence view), Jesus says "O thou of little faith, wherefore didst thou doubt?" (Matt. 14:31), meaning that, had Peter believed (i.e., an act of consciousness), then he would not sink in the water (a primacy of existence reality), but would instead have successfully walked on it as Jesus had (i.e., reality conforms to conscious dictates). Further examples of how the doctrine of miracles presupposes the primacy of consciousness view of reality abound throughout the pages of the Bible, but the dependence of this doctrine on this false view of reality should be clear.

According to the doctrine of faith, reality conforms to the conscious desires of those who believe the right things (as we saw in the example of Peter walking on water above), and knowledge of reality depends on one's hopes. Thus, something is true because someone wants it to be true; i.e., wishing makes it so. As Jesus says in Mark 5:36, "Be not afraid, only believe." In other words, have no concern for the constraints of a rational view of knowledge in which claims must be tested for their validity. "Just believe," and everything will be all the better. That faith is dependent on one's hopes is made clear in various New Testament passages (cf. Romans 8:24-25; Heb. 11:1, et al.). Clearly one's hopes, desires, wishes and whims are the final arbiter of truth (i.e., consciousness dictates what is true), not reason (i.e., consciousness discovers what is true).

Thus, if one claims to have "evidences" which confirm a philosophy which is so clearly and unmistakably rooted in the primacy of consciousness view (as Christianity surely is), then that evidence can be anything one wants it to be, without concern for the proper relationship between consciousness and existence (i.e., without concern for the principle of objectivity).

Clearly then we should take Slick's advice and consider the validity of our "presuppositions" by identifying what they are and testing them for objectivity. But we should not take Slick's presuppositions as a model for our own, for clearly they are rooted in the primacy of consciousness view (since he affirms the doctrines of creation, miracles and faith, which are obviously expressions of the primacy of consciousness view), for such presuppositions are incompatible with a rational understanding of the principle of objectivity. In other words, we must ask:

1. what are those presuppositions? and
2. are those presuppositions rooted in the metaphysical primacy of existence, as in the case of rational philosophy, or are they rooted in the primacy of consciousness, as in the case of Christian theism?

Slick writes:

Here is a good example of what I mean. Slick claims that I have "no evidence or logical proofs for [my] atheism," yet he has nowhere proven this. But in spite of the fact that he has not proven this (i.e., has not shown this to be the case within the constraints of a rational view of knowledge), he proceeds to exclaim it because he wants it to be true, just as he wants it to be true that gods exist. This is the primacy of consciousness view of reality applied to debate, and it is clearly empty and void of conviction, but rife with desperation. How does Slick know that I have "no evidence or logical proofs" for atheism? Blank out.

Slick writes:

But I have. The evidence I have provided is found in footnote #2 of my review. Slick has clearly chosen to ignore it.

_____________________________

I wrote:

Slick responded:

Clearly Slick wants to find me guilty of some fallacy. But it is not a fallacy to enlarge the discussion of an issue of the newly introduced information is not irrelevant to the topic at hand. I his essay "Is Atheism Viable?" Slick lays down the accusation that "atheists must go on the attack and negate any evidences presented for God's existence…" Since this accusation does not say "some atheists" or "those atheists whom I've encountered…," it is clear that he intended this charge to apply to atheists generally, i.e., universally. But what evidence does Slick present on behalf of this charge? Indeed, he provides none, and apparently assumes that its supposed truth can be taken at face value.

In response to this universal accusation, an accusation which is apparently intended to apply to all atheists, I then asked, appropriately, "Exactly who is 'on the attack'?" I then point out the historical context which is clearly relevant to an examination of the truth value of Slick's wholesale accusation against atheists, noting that atheists are clearly a minority in a society whose culture is heavily influenced by mysticism, as is the case in the west. Indeed, Christian believers think that they are expected to obey the orders of the "Great Mission," which is the instruction to take "the gospel" to the far reaches of the world and convert as many people to their primitive views as will do so, and the rest can go to hell. This is clearly what Christianity teaches. In Mark 16:15-16, we read the following words attributed to Jesus:

Clearly, as atheists (by definition, those who do not believe) are to be considered "damned" according to Christianity's cultic leader himself. Those who are considered "damned" are clearly the "unchosen," and as such not members of the religious fellowship club. The "damned" then are outsiders who are to be marginalized, to be scorned, to be attacked for their unbelief.

This is why I asked above, "Exactly who is 'on the attack'?" Well, historically, who has needed to defend himself? Clearly the individual freethinker who does not conform to the herd mentality of religion has historically been vilified, persecuted, condemned, excised, and in some cases, imprisoned and even tortured and executed. History thus shows that those who follow reason (as opposed to those who follow faith) have been the subject of religious attack. This is why it is so ironic that Christians refer to their convoluted, mind-negating, herd-mentality argument schemes as a "defense," and the atheist's criticism of those argument schemes an "attack." What an Orwellian nightmare of doublespeak!

Are these points "something off-topic"? Given Slick's universal accusation that atheists are "on the attack," obviously not. They are only irrelevant in Slick's mind because he wants them to be irrelevant, not because he can show them to be irrelevant according to the constraints of reason. And since these points are clearly relevant to a proper response to Slick's accusation, I commit no red herring in bringing them to his attention. Perhaps Slick's resentment of this fact is what motivates his charge of fallacy here.

Slick continues:

If the atheist's purpose is "to give intellectual credence to their position," as Slick admits, then clearly the atheists who do so are attempting to defend their position from the attacks of those who want to vilify it. So here we see how Slick's own accusation depends on a reversal: he wants to portray the atheist as "attacking" religious evangelists (whose stated purpose is "Go ye into the world, and preach the gospel to every creature") when they attempt to proselytize him! What Slick here considers to be an "attack" against Christians is most likely the expressions of reason which atheists are likely to have in their favor (since they discard the primitivism of god-belief).

Furthermore, if Slick does not want to be attacked for his religious positions, perhaps he should remove his website from the internet. For by presenting his religious opinions to the public in such a manner, he is essentially announcing that he is open season to any criticism which one might take the time to craft. And this is what he considers an "attack": arguments of rebuttal and the submission of responses to his arguments. If those constitute "attacks" against Christians, what does he consider the torture and execution of heretics and infidels which has soiled the hands of Christian mysticism with the blood of many innocents?

Slick continues:

Here Slick reveals that a raw nerve has been hit, for his reaction to the points which I have introduced, he admits, is predominantly emotional in nature, not intellectual. He thus assumes that my intention in introducing them was to pitch the tide of debate to an appeal to emotion, which should be clear is not the case, given what I have written above in response to his charge that I have committed a fallacy. Can Slick deal with these matters on an intellectual level? If so, he needs to recognize the nature of the beast of Christianity, a primitive worldview bent on world domination in which believers are commanded to "Go into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature."

Slick writes:

How this constitutes an ad hominem is not explained by Slick. Instead, he simply asserts it on the basis of his feelings, which, he admits, he thinks are the focus of my point. But now that this error has been corrected and it has been shown that the atheist is actually and historically on the defense (rather than "on the attack" as he wants to think), we should not hear this charge from Slick again.

Slick writes:

Slick now states that he does "not consider it a personal affront when someone does not believe in God," and even states that he has "friends who are atheists" and is "not offended by their atheism." Then why the universal accusation against atheists in the first place? Does Slick not realize that it may very well be the case that many atheists are simply tired of being hounded by mystic missionaries all over the place? They're told that they need to pray in public schools, that they must swear an oath to an invisible magic being in the Pledge of Allegiance, and are virtually accosted by Mormons, Jehovah's Witnesses, Christians, and other cultists upon exiting bus stations, grocery stores, libraries, office buildings and shopping malls on a regular basis? Given such assaults on their intellect, I can hardly blame some atheists for wanting to speak their mind out. Perhaps Slick thinks atheists should be seen and not heard? Well, good luck, for it is not likely that the atheist adopts the idea that he must be as a little child in order to receive divine favors.

Slick writes:

I'll let the reader judge whether Slick's statement here is true or false.

Slick writes:

Slick's opinion is noted. It is my hope that he takes what I have presented above in response to his charge of fallacy, and informs this opinion with additional data which he obviously did not take into account when he formed it.

I asked:

Unfortunately, Slick does not answer this question.

I asked:

And he doesn't answer this one either. Why not?

I asked:

Slick responded:

Indeed, I have done this. And I doubt Slick will be surprised that his "proofs for God's existence" are quite inadequate. My responses to two of his arguments are now a matter of published record.

In the presentation of his version of "TAG," Slick opens with the following statement:

The errors here abound (and I should know, I am an atheist!). First of all, what exactly is "the atheistic worldview"? This implies that there is only one such worldview, which in fact is more of a statement on Slick's ignorance than anything else. Indeed, there are many worldviews which dispense with theism, and they are not all the same. Slick needs to take a philosophy course if this is what he really thinks. Thus, the question "Can the atheistic worldview present a logical reason why its worldview can account for the abstract laws of logic?" is misleading and dishonest. Slick's opinion that he does not think that "the atheistic worldview" can present such reasons, has about as much value as a donut hole. Indeed, he does not ask the question "Can the Objectivist worldview present a logical reason why its worldview can account for the abstract laws of logic?" and this does not surprise me.

He then states that "the Christian world view can" present such reasons. But alas, is it really a question of whether competing worldviews are able to present reasons to "account for the abstract laws of logic," or whether the reasons given are true? To say that the atheist worldview cannot present such reasons while the Christian worldview can almost sounds like a play-yard heckle chant: "My worldview is better than your worldview!"

Slick then states, "Atheism maintains that physical laws are properties of matter, and that truth and logic are relative conventions (agreed upon principles)." It does? Where does "atheism" maintain this? Indeed, this is what some philosophies teach, but atheism as such is not a philosophy, contrary to what Slick would like his readers to believe. Again, Slick should take an introductory philosophy course and attempt to grasp some basics here. Does Slick think, for instance, that all atheists then think that "physical laws are properties of matter, and that truth and logic are relative conventions (agreed upon principles)?" Indeed, does agreement upon principles make those principles "relative conventions"? Slick's efforts throughout this paper are as unimpressive as his opening lines.

The same kind of poor reasoning afflicts Slick's attempt to rescue "TAG" from the devastating pen of Martin. For instance, Slick admits that "We do not know all the laws of the universe," but then states, "God does [know them all], since He brought the universe into existence." But the existence of a god is precisely what is in question. In other words, the only way Slick can rebut Martin's critique of "TAG" is by begging the very question at issue. At another point, Slick writes, "Mr. Martin uses the phrase 'objective morality'. that phrase in itself is worthy of a long discussion. nevertheless, I see no reason to state that moral obligation being dependent upon the will of God is incompatible with objective morality." This is simply an argument from ignorance, and also shows his conception of morality is nothing more than the fulfillment of someone else's dictates (which would make Slick an ideal subject for a dictatorship).

I think the best responses to "TAG" which I have heard include the following:

Slick writes:

I'll let readers decide who they think is "more educated." But while they're making this assessment, it is curious that Slick would make this statement, since one of his primary criticisms about my response to his "Is Atheism Valid?" is that he found it "condescending."

Slick writes:

First of all, my point about the "moon made of green cheese" was not a comment, but a question. Here it is again:

I notice that Slick does not answer it, but accuses that it "does not logically follow." It was not intended to be a conclusion of an argument. From what precisely was it suppose to "follow"? Perhaps Slick has difficulty in distinguishing between an argument and a question? Again, why doesn't he answer it?

Slick writes:

To say that Isaiah 1:18's exhortation ("let us reason together") constitutes an instance of advocating rationality is, at the very least, a most superficial and desperate stretch. And to insinuate that I am ignorant of this passage is simply to cast aspersions for the fun of it. Indeed, where does the Bible define 'rationality'? Can one learn from reading the pages of the Bible that "reason deals with logic" or that "God wants us to be logical"? Did God want Abraham to be logical when He commanded him to prepare his son as a sacrifice? Were Jesus' answers to Pilate a model of "logic"? Are any of Paul's contorted, vapid and contentless arguments truly "logical"? Slick of course would say yes, but clearly because he is motivated to defend a confessional investment. I.e., he wants these things to be true.

Since rationality is the commitment to reason as one's only means of knowledge, then obviously the Bible, which advocates 'faith' from Genesis to Revelation, does not advocate anything remotely resembling reason. Jesus says in Mark 5:36, "just believe!" (NIV) Those who advocate reason and rationality, do not tell us to "just believe," because they recognize that knowledge requires a process of validation, not mere acceptance on the basis of hopes, fears, wishes or threats.

_____________________________

I wrote:

Slick responded:

This assumes that the only way to go about demonstrating the irrationality of god-belief is to question those evidences proposed on its behalf. But of course, this is not the only way to accomplish this end. Rather, there is a much cleaner, more direct route to this, and that's by going to the very root of god-belief itself, which is the assumption that the primacy of consciousness view of reality is valid. All god-belief must assume this, for that is the substance of god-belief - the view that consciousness holds metaphysical primacy over existence, that a consciousness can create the universe and its contents, manipulate its objects and conform reality to its dictates and whims. Christianity is pure, 100% primacy of consciousness philosophy.

Slick writes:

How does he show that I have missed this? Obviously I'm quite aware that this is essentially the only card in his deck. I have pointed to other cards which come prior to the card he's holding, and yet he has dismissed those cards as "irrelevant.

Slick writes:

Again, Slick should have looked at the footnotes in my essay. Particular footnote #2.

_____________________________

I wrote:

Slick responded:

One does not need to declare this as his modus operandi for it to be his m. o. in effect.

Slick writes:

Actually, that is not true. I have taken the articles in the atheism section as well as the apologetics section of the CARM site into account. I have only briefly looked over the Bible section, because there are far more sophisticated Bible arguments presented on other sites. But clearly it is not the case that I have failed to take into account other essays by Matt Slick. I have responded to other essays, in fact:

_____________________________

I wrote:

Slick responds:

Wrong. Slick has made this assumption, only he does not recognize it. This primacy of consciousness view is the very root of his god-belief. Remove this root, and you remove god-belief with it.

Slick continues:

Slick repeats his error: atheism is a negation, not a position. My position is that god-belief is irrational. And I have validated it. Slick simply does not want to admit this.

Slick writes:

What Slick is calling "irrelevant material" is indeed the heart of the matter, namely the issue of metaphysical primacy. Slick chooses to call it "irrelevant" because either a) he does not recognize its relevance, b) he does not want to deal with it, or c) both a) and b). If there is an alternative additional to these, Slick should point it out. But clearly, the issue of metaphysical primacy, since it lies at the foundation of all worldviews, is the most relevant issue of them all.

_____________________________

I wrote:

Slick writes:

Wrong. Atheism is the absence of a claim. It is not a belief, it is the absence of a belief. It is what results when one discards a claim found to be unfit for acceptance as knowledge.

Slick writes:

Atheism is a negation.

Slick writes:

Belief takes up space in the mind. Not having that belief leaves that space free for other beliefs.

Slick writes:

My atheism requires no defense. My atheism results from the determination that the claim "god exists" is unworthy of acceptance as knowledge, and must be discarded.

But my claim that god-belief is irrational is a position which I hold, and I have shown that I am willing and capable of defending it.

Slick writes:

Slick resents the fact that I do not accept his terms and arbitrary standards. Consequently, he accuses me of "dodging the real issue." And indeed, it is because the original paper fails to inform a view consistent with contradictory positions which it assumes, that they need to be identified and discussed. Slick does not seem willing to do so, but I certainly am.

Slick writes:

Slick claims to believe that an invisible magic being created the universe and directs its history. This is the Christian god-belief in essential terms. Since Slick has identified himself as defender of Christianity, then it is not unrealistic for me to know what he believes and assumes.

Slick writes:

Feeling the heat of scrutiny, Slick takes a cheap opportunity to try to catch a sigh of relief in accusing me of subjectivity.

Subjectivity in metaphysics is the view that existence finds its source in a form of consciousness. This is the primacy of consciousness view of reality. I do not affirm it.

Subjectivity in epistemology is the view that something is true because one wants it to be true. This is the basic nature of faith. I do not affirm it.

Where have I "admitted some subjectivity"?

_____________________________

I wrote:

Slick writes:

Amusement is good. And to be honest, I'm amused at how well they do serve as an illustration against Slick's position.

Slick writes:

Slick supposes that the belief that an fictional ice cream factory exists on Jupiter in his example is analogous to atheism? That's odd. I see it as wholly analogous to his god-belief. Funny he doesn't see this.

Slick writes:

How does Slick show that it is possible for an ice cream factory to exist on Jupiter? Is he saying it is possible to build an ice cream factory on Jupiter? If he thinks so, what substantiates this opinion? Interesting. Why not build one closer to earth?

Slick writes:

Slick writes:

Here Slick presents a universally negative claim. How does he justify it? Indeed, it falls for the very reason why he says atheism itself falls! He says that atheism falls because one cannot prove that there are no gods, and one cannot prove there are no gods essentially because proving universal negative claims is impossible. But here he asserts a universal negative claim against atheism. Thus, like a dog chasing his own tail, Slick spirals into a circle of self-refutation which swallows his position in sum. That's what some might call a slick move.

Slick writes:

Slick writes:

This is essentially the claim that it has no attempts to establish itself in other ways. How does Slick know this? He has not shown how he can conclude this; rather, he merely asserts it.

Slick writes:

In claiming that atheism is wrong or invalid because he thinks that atheists cannot prove that no gods exist, Slick merely shows how empty and anti-intellectual his god-belief really is. He is basically saying, "Well, I can't prove that there are no gods, so I might as well believe in one." It does not matter to him that god-belief has been proven to be both irrational and dangerous to man. In spite of this, he wants to seek shelter in it any way.

As for the supposed "problems" which he thinks result from "trying to claim 'non belief' or 'lack of belief' concerning God," they have been examined and refuted in spades. He will need an act of God to resurrect them.

Slick writes:

I have already reviewed this article and shown why Slick's attempts to establish his desired conclusion fail. My review can be found at the following web address:

http://www.geocities.com/intellectoasis/Slicks_Folly.htm

_____________________________

I wrote:

Slick responded:

The "intellectual viability of atheism" would only need to be demonstrated if there were any hope of presenting a sound argument concluding that a god exists. Yet Slick himself admitted earlier that he could not prove that there is a god. So why bother? Besides, if by "intellectual viability of atheism" one means proving that atheism is the only rationally proper alternative to god-belief, then obviously I have done this by proving that god-belief is irrational. Slick has nowhere demonstrated awareness of this argument, let alone answer it, even though this argument was at his fingertips in my footnote #2 had he honestly wanted an answer to the question titling his essay "Is Atheism Viable?" However, it is pretty clear that he does not honestly want an answer.

Slick writes:

If by presenting a proof that god-belief is irrational, then yes, I have. Of course, Slick has ignored it in order to claim that I have not refuted his original paper. More dishonesty.

Slick writes:

Yes, he did. Only he does not recognize it, even though I pointed it out.

Slick writes:

Indeed, an argument which has little content and zero inferential value is weak enough; it does not need anyone to show its weaknesses, but to correct its mistakes, which I have done. Slick just does not want to learn.

Slick writes:

Clearly, naming the identity of the "uncaused cause" which he thinks he proves to be real in his argument as "the God of the Bible" is based on his desires. He could have chosen any deity, and it would still have been a choice. Thus, far from being "innuendo without substantiation," my identification of the fact that it is wishes, not reason and informed logic, which compel Slick to think that his god-belief is valid.

Slick writes:

Slick writes:

Sure he does. He believes that some man was executed and three days later rose from the dead, walked around in a desert community, preached and then ('tween 10 and 40 days later) wafted up to heaven in a cloud. Indeed, this same preacher says to the doubting Thomas type in John 20:29 "…because thou hast seen me, though has believed: blessed are they that have not seen, and yet have believed." Thus Jesus' followers are praised for rejecting the need for evidence in believing his arbitrary claims. Again, Jesus, we learn in Mark 5:36, wants his followers to "just believe." (NIV) This is not rationality.

Slick writes:

Why would it be up to me to "admit" this? Indeed, he's the Christian who's supposed to take every word attributed to Jesus in the New Testament (including Mark 5:36 and John 20:29) as "gospel." The Bible's very clear about its antagonism to the need for evidence and rationality.

Slick writes:

Would Slick consider it virtuous if I endorsed a definition which did not agree with my premises?

Slick writes:

Slick has not shown the definition in question to be faulty. And indeed, I have shown both where the Bible endorses such a view, and where Slick has admitted to it in his own argument for the existence of a god! What more does he need? Of course, he's again acting on faith: just as he accepts the Bible's claims because he wants them to be true, now he rejects validated identifications because he wants them not to be true. Well, at least he's consistent!

Slick writes:

Indeed, I shall leave it to the reader to judge for himself as well. For it certainly does not take a mind-reader to recognize this.

_____________________________

I wrote:

Slick writes:

Slick writes:

Does it follow from the fact that apologist Matt Slick "cannot see how offering an intellectual proof that God does not exist is possible," that in fact such a proof is not possible?

But I don't need to prove that the non-existent does not exist. That which is non-existent by definition does not exist.

Rather, I present the argument to the fact that god-belief is irrational. Will Slick be "happy to examine it"? I'm standing by.

Slick writes:

Notice Slick's reasoning here, and ask if he would accept the identical course of reasoning for the non-existence of gods from atheists. Consider the following parallel argument:

Now, would Slick accept this? It is precisely the very reasoning which he presents to the conclusion "that no proof for God's non existence exists."

Slick writes:

Why doesn't Slick accept the argument which I recast above? After all, it's the very same reasoning which he presents for his position that "no proof for God's non existence exists." If Slick's "argument" qualifies as an acceptable proof for the non-existence of something (namely the non-existence of a proof that no gods exists), then why does he not accept the same course of reasoning when the conclusion is discordant with his desires?

And, what if I have proof that there are no gods, but decide to withhold it? Of course, Slick will want to dismiss it somehow. Why? Because he wants a god to exist. That's all.

Slick points out the following:

Clearly such an attempt as this would have to be predicated upon the assumption that a lack of belief is equivalent to a belief (for instance, the belief that something is not the case). A belief takes up space in someone's mind; the absence of a belief does not.

In dropping the crucial distinction between belief and absence of belief, and in failing to recognize that atheism is the rationally proper alternative to god-belief given the fact that god-belief is irrational, Slick attempts to focus discussion on the deity which he imagines exists, rather than on his belief that this deity exists. In other words, he is attempting to evade scrutiny of the foundations of his beliefs by trying to refocus that scrutiny on a construct of his own imagination.

Slick continued:

Indeed. This is why one does not need to defend his atheism. But when one presents a positive attribution, as I do when I claim that god-belief is irrational, then of course I am called to defend that position, which I have done. I think Slick finally gets it!

Slick then writes:

Slick again fails to recognize that I have a position which I have asserted and which I am willing to defend, which is, namely, that god-belief is irrational. Just when Slick seemed to be sensing his way to the sunlight, he crawled back into the darkness of his misrepresentations.

_____________________________

I wrote:

I'm not exactly sure what Slick was trying to say here. Perhaps he could rephrase it for clarity's sake.

Slick writes:

Again, this statement has seemed to gotten muddled, and is consequently not very clear. He could have done some editing perhaps before he pasted his rebuttal to his website.

Slick writes:

It's certainly clear that this is what Slick thinks. Indeed, it is frustrating for him as an apologist because it is impossible for him to attack. That's why he wants so desperately to characterize atheism as necessarily entailing the "belief" that "no gods exist." When atheists recognize that the fact which makes them atheists is that they do not have a god-belief, they also recognize that they don't have to play the apologist's little games. This really annoys apologists to no end, which is why we see Slick going to such lengths to reverse the truth. Clearly he wants atheism to be wrong. But reality does not follow anyone's whims, human or divine.

Slick writes:

And if they simply say that they do not have a god-belief, then the claim that "they would be at a great loss to prove their position" would be ill-suited as an apologetic goal. Too bad for Slick that this is the case.

Slick writes:

I believe that god-belief is irrational. This certainly opens me up to cross-examination. If Slick disagrees, he's certainly free to bring it on.

Slick writes:

_____________________________

I wrote:

Slick responded:

Actually, an atheist who is informed of Rational Philosophy can say much more than this. For Rational Philosophy tells us just why god-belief is irrational, and, because of this, no evidences can legitimately serve to defend it from scrutiny. Slick himself does not seem to be aware of this fact, as he wants to keep the discussion on his terms. However, his terms have been shown to be arbitrary and built on sand.

Slick writes:

But clearly it is not necessarily the case that all atheists are also agnostics. For I am an atheist, and I do not claim a position of uncertainty or unknowability. I am fully confident in the verdict that god-belief is irrational, and I am certain that god-belief is dangerous to man. So there is no "degree of agnosticism" in this atheist.

Slick writes:

Essentially, Slick wants to hold the ideal of omniscience rather than reason as his standard of determining what is and what is not the case. It may be the case (i.e., a possibility) that there are in existence numerous proofs for all sorts of claims which I do not accept. If we take omniscience to be our ideal, then, since we will never achieve omniscience (we must act in order to achieve our knowledge by discovering and validating it, and I do not think that anyone will ever live long enough to discover and validate all the knowledge there is to be had out there), we must adopt a position of perpetual uncertainty on virtually all matters (for one could always counter any claim to certainty with the supposed possibility that there are proofs to the contrary in existence but outside our knowledge). But if we take reason to be our guide, then we recognize that knowledge of the world is contextual, and that in order to claim knowledge about something, we need contextual support which reduces ultimately to our perceptual level of consciousness (our "first contact" with reality).

So, if we accept the supposed (but unconfirmed) possibility that there exist proofs antithetical to our claims to certainty on various matters, we still have to go with the verdicts which the context of our knowledge does support, not with the hypothetical verdicts which that context does not support.

The context of my knowledge does not and cannot support the belief that there is a god or gods. This is because at the basis of my knowledge context is the principle of the primacy of existence. This principle tells us that existence exists independent of consciousness, that the task of consciousness is not to create and manipulate reality to conform to its dictates (as god is supposed to be able to do), but to discover and identify what reality is for the purpose of meeting our living needs. In order to accept the claim that there are gods as knowledge, I would have to betray this foundation and contradict it, which would be irrational. Hence, I discard the claim that there are gods, and consequently have no god-belief.

Slick writes:

But clearly, if Slick will read the last few paragraphs which I have written, he will see that the matter is not so simple as he would like to assume. Again, he drones on and on about atheists who "cannot know that there is no god," but again it is not the atheist's claim that there is a god in the first place. This is the theist's claim, and he must provide good reasons to accept it as legitimate knowledge, otherwise those who do not make this assertion are free to ignore it or discard it, and move on with their lives without its obvious burdens.

Besides, I know for sure that god-belief is irrational and dangerous to man. Nothing Slick has stated anywhere in his rebuttal to my paper has effectively called this conclusion into question. However, if he wants to show that atheism is not "viable," this is the area where he will have to focus his efforts.

Slick writes:

My choice is to discard god-belief because of its irrationality.

Slick writes:

That is because Slick takes as his standard of knowledge the omniscience which he will never achieve, and thus is forced to enshrine uncertainty as an epistemological end in itself. Since he embraces the form of logic without its content (which reason supplies), this is the only orientation towards knowledge open to him. By neglecting the need for content, the theist ignores the need to identify his conceptual starting point and the means by which he is aware of it. He ignores this because he ignores the fact that knowledge is hierarchical in nature, a fact which the omniscience view of knowledge denies. And indeed, the "knowledge" possessed by an omniscient being would neither be contextual nor hierarchical, and a proof of this would be the fact (assuming omniscience were possible) that the omniscient mind would have no need to validate new knowledge by integrating it with previously validated knowledge. This is why Slick's entire focus is on whether or not the atheist can prove that gods do not exist, rather than on what are his starting points and what are the means by which he validates them. Thus he ignores the needs to identify the foundations of his knowledge in terms of fundamentals, and treats all his knowledge claims as if they had no hierarchical or contextual relationship to each other (and in the case of arbitrary claims like "god exists" and "Jesus rose from the dead," there are no such relationships). It is because of this false view of knowledge, which Slick probably does not even realize he embraces, that he does not care to engage the proof that god-belief is irrational, to which I alluded in my initial critique. Quite simply, it's beyond his comprehension.

I had written:

Slick responded:

Slick accuses me of the fallacy of begging the question for not presenting an argument to the conclusion that god-belief is irrational, but assert its conclusion anyway. But Slick fails to take into account that in footnote #2 of my essay (http://www.geocities.com/intellectoasis/Slicks_Fuss.htm) I provided a link to an article which presents this argument, thus alleviating me of the need to repeat it in my review of Slick's article. Indeed, the purpose of my review of Slick's article was to present a comprehensive review of it, not present the argument showing why god-belief is irrational. That argument already exists in another page, but clearly Slick has not chosen to respond to it. Interested readers will find that article here:

Thus, the premise of my argument is not unsubstantiated, and Slick had access to its substantiation all the while. He simply chose to ignore it. That he would then accuse me of begging the question simply shows how desperate he is to find a flaw in my position. Quite humorous.

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I wrote:

Slick responds:

One atheist can hardly speak for the motivations and ambitions of another atheist, or of all atheists. I cannot speak for other atheists whom Slick has encountered in his quest for taking his belief in invisible magic beings to the world. But one thing is clear: religious persons who are commanded to go out and proselytize the world do represent a threat to the civilized human race. If the attacks against American citizens by religious zealots on September 11, 2001 are not taken as evidence for this, I do not know what will. The religious mind is a primitive mind, the mind of a child desperate for a father figure who will take control of him, and of those whom he encounters. The Bible, for instance, is explicit in its expectation that believers come to their religious beliefs with the gullibility and naivete of a child.

For instance, Mark's gospel has Jesus say, "Verily I say unto you, Whosoever shall not receive the kingdom of God as a little child, he shall not enter therein" (10:15). Matthew's gospel has Jesus repeat essentially the same thing: "Verily I say unto you, Except ye be converted, and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven" (18:3). Similar verses can be found elsewhere, but clearly the evangelists have seen it fit to emphasize its desired demeanor for those who would surrender their minds in exchange for the fantasy of "the mind of Christ" (I Cor. 2:16), and their will for the whims of some invisible magic being (cf. Mark 14:36 and parallels) which they claim exists, but can never produce.

Even today Christianity continues to pump out armies of evangelists and proselytizers bent on world domination, the ranks of whom would make the priests of the Dark Ages proud. They spread a gospel of hatred for man and resentment for liberty, a liturgy of intolerance and a canon of fear. A few quotes from some of these Witch Doctors should suffice to demonstrate that they are serious in their ambition to divide men along religious lines, to cleave mankind into two collectives - the chosen versus the damned, where whim is the standard, not reality, where fear is the currency, not values, where mysticism is the key to truth, not reason:

The threat is clear. Those who intend to defend their value of a nation of free individuals, where one's conscience can enjoy the liberty needed to guide his choices and actions by reason instead of priestly wishes, will recognize the threat to their values no matter what form they take. Why do other atheists make a stink about the religious anti-mentality which is choking the world? I cannot answer for them. I can only answer for myself. There's too much at stake to sit by and let the Witch Doctors - the mystics of spirit - continually try to retake the world. Faith and force are always corollaries - the one always necessitates the other. Both deny reason, and it is because they deny reason that they must resort to force when dealing with others, either physical or psychological. Evil only happens when those who know to act in order to prevent it, fail to act and allow it to happen. We are watching religion unleash its hate and savagery on the civilized world all over the globe. Today our leaders are saying that a retreat to faith is the answer to our failing security. Indeed, it is not faith which will save us - it is faith which is destroying us. We do not hear our leaders extolling the virtues of reason, and like cockroaches rising through the floorboards the religious zombies are threshing the harvest, separating the wheat from the chaff, recruiting the latter and persecuting the former. "Believe, or go to hell" - those are the priest's terms. He does not deal with reality, he deals only with whim, and he intends to do so at the expense of those who will not bow. History is repeating itself, but men like Matt Slick would prefer that we bury our heads in the sand like ostriches and take no notice of the men of the white robes coming to lynch our minds. Indeed, he seeks to be one of them!

Slick writes:

The ambitions and motivations of the religious mind are not difficult to detect or identify. Indeed, a quick read of the statements by some of today's religious leaders (see above) is sufficient to see what they are. Slick seems to think that he needs to announce this at the top of his voice for others to recognize it, but he's sorely wrong.

Slick makes the following suggestion:

By 'rationality' I mean "the recognition and acceptance of reason as one's only source of knowledge, one's only judge of values and one's only guide to action." (Ayn Rand, "The Objectivist Ethics," The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 28.) By this understanding of rationality, we can readily see that god-belief, which is a mystical idea, and which is based on faith, not on reason, cannot be rational. The claim that in spite of this fact that god-belief is true, and the decision to cling to it emotionally regardless of the innumerable points against its presumed validity, are themselves irrational.

Notice again that Slick wants to equivocate my position. My position has consistently been that god-belief is irrational. But here Slick wants to mischaracterize my position as saying that God is irrational. But if I do not accept the claim that there is a god, then clearly this cannot be my position. Again, Slick wants to shift the terms of debate off his beliefs and any justification he might try to muster up in their defense, and refocus it to the construct of his imagination, the deity which he wants to exist.

Slick rightly acknowledges that "by claiming that belief in God is irrational, he must by necessity also condemn to the ranks of irrationality the likes of Einstein, Galileo, Isaac Newton, Pascal, etc. who all believed in God." And of course, to the extent that these individuals did hold to a god-belief, the same extent I hold that these individuals, and those like them, were irrational in this regard. This is of course irrelevant, and it is certainly not an argument which can salvage the claim to validity which Slick wants his readers to take for granted.

Slick then asks:

Mr. Bethrick is a man just like Matt Slick. In Mr. Bethrick's case, he is a man who holds that principled thought is the key to rationality, where other men hold that their emotions and the consequences which threaten their emotions are the key to their escape from rationality.

Like Matt Slick, I face a fundamental choice: to think, or to evade thinking. I have chosen to think. I intend only to deal with the real world, while Slick wants to hide in a world of make-belief, a realm of invisible magic beings and miraculous fables handed down from the ages and mistaken for truth and substituted for rational principle. While I have summoned the courage to question authorities, Slick surrendered to the first passer-by who claimed authority over him, and hasn't questioned since. Sadly, he does not want to admit this to himself, and when difficult questions arise he hides under the skirt of the arbitrary to protect his enshrinement of whim where he can coddle his guilt under the guise of piety.

Slick concludes:

Slick's final comment was:

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