Peace, Force & Joy

| Prologue | Chapter One | Chapter Two | Chapter Three |

CHAPTER TWO

The Past Viewed without Temporal Foundation

1. Conceptions of History

Since a few centuries back, a reason or a system of laws which explain the development of historical facts has been sought, but without considering the nature if the facts themselves. These authors have attempted not simply to relate events but to establish a rhythm or a form that can be applied to those events. Many also have discussed about the historical subject, and once isolated they have tried to locate the engine of the facts in it. They have dealt with the human being, Nature, or God, but no one has explained what change or historical movement is. The question has been seen in itself but in relation to certain substantiality in question. From all this, a kind of childish "jigsaw puzzle" has resulted, forcing the pieces that did not fit so they could enter the game.

In many systems where a rudiment of Historiology appears, the entire effort seems to focus on justifying datability, the accepted calendar moment, examining how things occurred in minute detail, why they occurred, or how things must have occurred, without considering what "occurrence" itself is, how it is possible, in general, that something occurs. We call this way of proceeding in historiological matters "history without temporality". Here are some cases that present those characteristics.

That Vico13 contributed a new point of view in the treatment of history and that he became, in some way, the initiator of what later would be known as "Historiography", does not say much about the grounding of that science in him. Thus, despite the fact that he points out the difference between "consciousness of existence" and "science of existence", and in his reaction to Descartes, he raises historical knowledge, he has not succeeded in explaining the historical fact as such. Doubtless, his great contribution lies in trying to establish: 1) a general idea about the form of historical development; 2) a set of axioms; and 3) a method ("metaphysical" and philological).14 On the other hand, he defines: "The science must be a demonstration, so to speak, of the Providence's historical fact, so it must a history of the orders given by him to the great city of the human genre, with neither precaution nor any human decision and, most often, against man's own aims. Therefore, even if this world has been created at a particular time, the laws that Providence has placed in it are universal and eternal."15 With it Vico establishes that "This Science must be civil theology reasoned out by Divine Providence"16, and not a science of historical fact as such.

Affected by Plato and Augustine (in his conception of a history that partakes of the eternal), Vico anticipates many themes of Romanticism.17 Not knowing the orderly capacity of "clear and distinct" thinking, he attempts to penetrate the apparent chaos of history. His interpretation - revolving around course and recourse based on a law of development of three ages: divine (where senses dominate), heroic (fantasy) and human (reason) - would exert a strong influence in the formation of philosophy of history. The nexus uniting Vico and Herder18 has not been pointed out sufficiently, but if here we recognize the birth of philosophy of history19 and not simply historical or its direct influence over the rise of this discipline. Herder would say: "...if everything in the world has its philosophy and its science, why does the history of humanity, what we touch more directly, not also have a philosophy and a science?" On the other hand, the three laws of development established by Herder do not coincide with those enunciated by Vico, but the idea of human evolution (starting from its genus of life and its natural environment), in which different stages pass until it reaches a society based on reason and justice, reminds us of the voice of the Neapolitan thinker.

With Comte20, philosophy of history assumes a social dimension and explains the human fact. His law of three stages (theological, metaphysical and positive) echoes Vico's conception. Comte is not specially preoccupied with clarifying the nature of "stages" but, once established, they are especially useful for comprehending the march of Humanity and it's direction, that is, the meaning of History: "On peut assurer aujourd'hui que la doctrine qui aura suffisamment explique l'emsemble du passe obtiendra inevitablement, par suite de cette epreuve, la presidence mentale de l'avenir."21 Clearly History would serve as a tool for action within the scheme of the practical destiny of knowledge, within "voir pour prevoir".

2. History as Form

As in Comte, in Spengler22 an undissimulated practical interest for historical foresight appears. At least, such foresight seems possible to him. Thus: "For the first time, the intent to predict history is undertaken in this book. It attempts to glimpse the destiny of a culture, the only one on earth today that finds itself on the road of fulfilment: the culture of America and Western Europe. It attempts, I say, to pursue in those stages of its development that still have not transpired."23 Regarding practical interest, he urges the new generations to dedicate themselves to certain activities, such as engineering, architecture, medicine, abandoning all philosophy and abstract thinking that are already entering their "Stage of decline". He also has other interests, indicating a type of history (in the specific as well as the broader sense) that must correspond with the precise and immediate moment right after the culture in which he writes.24

For Comte history can still be comprehended on a human scale. His law of three stages is valid for both humanity and the individual in his development. For Spengler, history is de-

humanized and converted into a universal biographical proto-form that deals only with biological man (like animals and plants), inasmuch as in its birth, youth, maturity and death occur.

The Spengler version of "civilization" as the ultimate moment of culture has not stopped Toynbee25 from taking civilization as a unit of investigation. In fact, in the introduction of his Study of History, Toynbee discusses the problem of minimum historical unit, and he points out that "national history" is isolated and not real, because it involves multiple entities encompassing a wider region. For him, what is important is, above all, the comparative study of civilizations. But the concept "society" is frequently used in place of "civilization". What is most important (for our ends) is the interpretation of the historical process. The subject of history is not anymore a biological being, marked by destiny, but an entity guided by impulses or delays between the open and the closed. A sort of retro-response takes the social movement into account. But impulse is not taken in the strict Bergsonian sense, and the concept of retro-response is not a simple transposal of the idea of stimulus-response, or reflex, as in Pavlov. Finally, according to their own opinion, great religions transcend the disintegration of civilizations, and this allows us to intuit a "plan" and a "purpose" in history. But their model's accommodation to a certain historical form puts them outside the field of temporality.

| Prologue | Chapter One | Chapter Two | Chapter Three |

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