A. Consciousness

Chapter I.
Sense Certainty – This and Mean

[1. This]       [compare V.A.a. Observing Nature §1.1]

1.  The kind of knowledge we need to start with, our immediate object here, can be none other than immediate knowledge itself, knowledge of the immediate, of given being [Preface §27.2; V.C.b. Reason making law §§2-5].  2Our attitude must be no less immediate, receptive, making no changes to the object as it presents itself to us and, in our receiving, refraining from any attempt at conceptual comprehension.
2.  The concreteness of sense certainty's content suggests infinite riches, the richest knowledge of all.  Ranging out through it far and wide in space and time or digging ever deeper into whatever piece of it we choose to take from this abundance, there seems to be no limit to it all [II. Perception §2.3].  2Moreover, it appears to be the truest kind of knowledge for it leaves none of its object out, addressing it in its completeness.  3This certainty, in fact, reveals itself to be the most abstract, the poorest kind of truth [VI.B.II.a. Enlightenment's struggle §13.1 and §18.2-6.].  4All it says of what it knows is: it is.  Its truth contains only the being of the matter while consciousness in this certainty is reduced to a pure ego, I.  Ego here is a mere this just like the object: all we can call both of them is this.  5I/this am/is not certain of it/this because my ego/consciousness developed itself by thinking it over/through in various ways.  6Nor because that this of which I am certain is a profusion of relations among its many different features or a bundle of distinct relations to other things.  7Both would be irrelevant to sense certainty's truth.  Neither I/this nor it/this here signifies a diverse mediation.  I does not signify a plurality of mental images and thought processes, nor it a diversity of characteristics.  All we have is: something is and it is merely because it is.  It is; this is the essential thing for sensory knowledge and as such this pure being, simple immediacy, constitutes its truth.  8Certainty too, the relation between them, is just as immediate and pure.  Consciousness is ego and nothing more, a pure this.  A pure this, the given individual, knows purely this, the individual given.
3.  Taking a closer look at this pure being, the essence of this certainty, what it declares to be its truth, we find that a great deal more is in play.  2An actual sensory certainty is not only this kind of immediacy in general, but also a specific example of it, an instance.  3Everywhere among the uncountably many distinctions thrown up here, we encounter the principal distinction with the two sides identified above – this I and this it – emerging directly from that pure being.  4When we reflect on the distinction we see that neither the one nor the other is only immediate in sense certainty; they are also simultaneously mediated there.  I am certain by means of another: the something; likewise it exists with this certainty by means of another: I/me.
4.  Not only do we draw this distinction between essence and example, immediacy and mediation.  We find it present in sense certainty itself; and the distinction must be taken in the form in which it exists there, not as we have just drawn it above.  2Sense certainty features a simple, immediate given being, regarded as the essence.  This is the object.  There is also something inessential and mediated, not present in itself, but only by means of something else.  This ego, I, is now the knowledge that only knows the object because it is, whereas the knowledge itself may exist or not.  3The object, on the other hand, is and it is the truth, essence.  The object exists and is indifferent to whether it is known or not.  It remains even without being known, but there is no knowledge if there is no object.
5.  The object must now be scrutinized to determine whether it really is the kind of essence within sense certainty this claims; whether the object's concept, that of being essence, is the same as the manner in which it is present in sense certainty.  2To this end we may not reflect upon or ponder at length what the object might in truth be; we have only to consider it as sense certainty has it.
6.  The question must now be put to sense certainty: what is this?  2We take it in the double shape of its being: this here and this now, so the dialectic it has in that being acquires a form quite as accessible as it is itself.  3The question then is: what is now?  We could answer, for example: now is night.  4We can examine the truth of this sense certainty with a simple experiment.  5We write the truth down; a truth cannot lose anything by being written down, neither by being stored.  6Looking now at lunchtime once again at our written truth, we are forced to concede that it has gone stale.
7.  The now that is night is preserved, i.e. it is treated as if it were just what it claims to be, given being.  Turns out it's nothing of the kind.  2Now preserves itself perfectly well, only as something that is not night.  Then again it stands just as firmly against the daytime we have just now at lunch, as something that is also not day, as a negative.  3Hence this self-sustaining now is not immediate but mediated, for in persisting, in preserving itself, it depends crucially upon the fact that something else – day, night – is not.  4Still, it remains exactly and simply as before: now.  In its simplicity, its integrity, it remains indifferent to whatever may attach itself to it.  As little as night or day is its being, just so much is it both night and day.  It is not coloured by these instances, its own otherness, in any way.  5We have a name for something so simple, existing by means of negation, neither a this nor a that, a non-this, and with equal indifference just as readily a this or a that.  We call it a universal.  The universal is thus the real truth of sense certainty.

[2.  Mean ]

8.  We express what is sensuous in universals.  When we say: this, what we have here is the universal this in the pattern it is, or being as such.  2Of course, what we picture in our heads is not a universal this or being as such, but what we utter is the universal.  We don't say it as we mean it in this sense certainty.  3We see, however, that language is more truthful; in language we immediately refute our opinion, our meaning.  Now, since the universal is the truth of sense certainty and language expresses only this truth, it is completely impossible for us ever to utter the sensuous being we mean.
9.  This all applies equally well to the other form of this, here.  2Here is, for instance, a tree.  3I turn around and this truth disappears and turns into something opposite: not a tree; here is a house.  4Again, here itself does not disappear, but persists through the disappearance of the house, the tree and so on, remaining indifferent to being house, tree, or whatever.  5Here too this reveals itself to be mediated simplicity, universality.
10.  Pure being remains the essence of sense certainty even as it demonstrates within itself that the universal is the truth of its object.  Only now this pure being is not immediate anymore; now negation and mediation are essential to it.  It is no longer what we normally mean when we talk of being.  Now it is being with the definition of abstraction, the pure universal.  And nothing remains confronting our opinion, the meaning we intend – for which the truth of sense certainty is not the universal – but that empty, indifferent here and now.
11.  Let us now compare the relation in which knowledge and the object first appeared with how it stands in this result.  Everything's turned around!  2The object, then supposedly essential, is now inessential to sense certainty.  For the universal, into which the object has turned, is no longer the kind of thing the object was essentially supposed to be for sense certainty, itself now lying on the opposite side, in knowledge, which was formerly inessential.  3Sense certainty's truth now only lies in the object because it is my object, my meaning.  This object exists because I know of it.  4Sense certainty has been driven out of that object, but not thereby overcome, eliminated, just pushed back into the ego.  We now have to consider what experience tells us about all this, about sense certainty's reality.
12.  The force of sense certainty's truth now lies in the ego, I, in the immediacy of my seeing, hearing, etc.  The disappearance of those individual here's and now's we mean is halted because I hold them fast.  2Now it is day because I see daylight; here is a tree by the same token.  3Sense certainty experiences in this scenario the same dialectic operating within it as before in this.  4I/this see/s the/this tree and declare/s: the tree is here.  Another individual/this sees a this/house and declares: here is not a tree but a house.  5Both truths are confirmed in the same way by the immediacy of sight and their insistence, the confidence of both individuals in their knowledge.  Unfortunately, however, each truth disappears in the other. 
13.  What does not disappear is the I, a universal whose sight is neither the sight of the tree nor of the house, but simply sight as such.  Sight, mediated by the negation of this house, this tree, remains just as simple and just as indifferent to whatever else comes along as it is to the tree or the house.  2I is merely a universal, like here, now, this.  What I mean is to be sure a specific, individual ego; but just as I cannot say what I mean with words like now or here, so neither with I.  3When I say: this here, now, individual, I in fact say all here's, now's, individuals; and when I say: I, this individual I, that too really says all I's; each is what I say: I, this, individual, I.  4When science is confronted with a litmus test it cannot pass, namely to deduce a so-called this thing or this person, to construct it or to find it a priori, or whatever formulation is preferred, then it is reasonable to demand that the test question state which this thing or person it means, but that is precisely what is impossible.

[3.  Whole and point ]

14.  Experience thus teaches sense certainty that its essence lies neither in the object nor in the ego and that its immediacy is neither an immediacy of the one nor of the other.  For in both, what I mean is in fact something inessential; object and I are universals in which the kind of here and now and I that I mean do not persist and quite simply are not.  2Through all this we come to understand that sense certainty as a whole is its own essence, no longer just one of its moments as in both the cases we have considered.  First, object in its opposition to ego was supposed to be the reality of sense certainty; and then we tried the ego itself.  3In fact, only the whole sense certainty itself stands firm within it with an immediacy excluding all the oppositions we considered above.
15.  This pure immediacy is no longer concerned with otherness like that of a here, tree, transiting into a here, not a tree, or of a now, day, transiting into a now, night; nor with another I taking something else as its object.  2Its truth sustains itself as a self-identical relation making no distinction between the ego and the object as to which is essential and which inessential.  Consequently, no distinction whatsoever can penetrate into this relation.  3I/this claim/s here/this is a tree and do/es not turn round to find that this/here would not be a tree.  Neither do I take any notice when another ego finds that for it here is not a tree or that at another time I myself observe here is not a tree or now is not day, for I am pure intuition, gaze.  Personally, I insist: now it is day, or: here is a tree, without comparing here and now with each other.  I insist on just one immediate relation: now it is day, and stay with that.
16.  This certainty is clearly not inclined to go along when we draw its attention away to a now that is night or an I for whom it is night.  Let us instead follow it and let it show us the now of its claim.  2We have to let it point it out to us, to let it meet our gaze, for the truth of this immediate relation is the truth of this I, which confines itself to a here or a now.  3Moving away from this truth and regarding it at a distance or taking it up later would render it completely meaningless, for in both cases we would overcome the immediacy essential to it, in both moves we would eliminate that immediacy.  4No, we must enter into the same point in space or time and let it be pointed out to us, i.e. let ourselves be made over into that same this I, the certainly knowing one.  5So how does this immediate look as it is shown to us?
17.  Now is pointed out to us; this now.  2Now?  But it ceases to exist just as it is being indicated.  It is now, which is already something other than the now just presented to us.  But wait!  Here we notice that this is exactly what now is: in being, already ceasing to be.  Just as it is, so it is not!  3This now shown to us is a has-been and that is its truth; it does not possess the truth of being.  4One thing is indeed true: it has been.  5What has been is in fact not essence; it IS not and being is what we were looking for.
18.  In all this indicating what we find is just a movement with the following course: 1. I point out what is now and in doing so assert it to be what is true.  However, as I show it, it is already a has-been, something overcome.  I have overcome the first truth and 2. claim as the second truth: that now has been; it is overcome.  23. But what has been is not; I overcome the second truth, what already has been overcome.  This negates the negation of the now thus returning to the first claim: it is now.  3Now and pointing now out are thus both so constituted that neither of them is immediate or simple, integral.  Each is a motion composed of distinct moments.  This is asserted, which is rather the assertion of something other [its instance cf. §7.4, §15.1 above] negating, overcoming this.  The otherness [instance] overcoming the first assertion is itself overcome, negated, resulting in a return to the first assertion.  4The first assertion is reflected back into itself and is thus not exactly what it was at first; it is no longer immediate.  Reflected into itself, it is something simple that preserves its integrity, remaining just what it is within otherness [Preface (5. Element of knowledge) §26.1, (10b. Against schematizing formalism) §54.8; III. Force and Understanding �33.8].  A now that is absolutely many now's.  This is the true now: the simple day containing many now's, hours.  Such a now, an hour, is similarly many minutes, each of which is itself many and so on. 
– 5Indication is thus itself the motion that asserts what now is in truth: a result, the summation of a plurality of now's [§19.3, §21.10 below; II. Perception §3.8]; and the act of indication, pointing out, is about experiencing that now is a universal.
19.  The indicated here I hold fast to is likewise a this here, which again is not that at all so much as an in front and a behind, above and below, right and left.  2Above is itself also a multitude of otherness in above's and below's and so on.  3The here that was supposed to be pointed out disappears into other here's, which themselves similarly disappear.  What is held firmly and persists in what is indicated is a negative this, which is only that because the here's are taken as they should be while overcoming each other in this.  It is a simple complex of many here's [II. Perception §3.8].  4The here meant would be a point; but that is not; for in the act of indicating it as something existing, indication reveals itself to be not immediate knowledge at all, but a motion from the meant here through the many here's into the universal here.  Just as the day is a simple, integral multitude of now's, the universal here is an integral multitude of here's.

[4.  Reception becomes perception ]

20.  Clearly, the sense-certainty dialectic is nothing other than the simple history of its motion, of its experience.  Indeed, sense certainty itself is nothing other than this history.  2That's why natural consciousness itself moves constantly forward to this result, to what is true in it, and goes through this experience, but then just as constantly forgets it all, always restarting the motion from the beginning.  3It is astonishing that against this experience, the claim is made as a universal experience, even a philosophical claim – one of scepticism's results, if you please! – that the reality or the being of these, sensuous, external things has absolute truth for consciousness.  Such a claim does not know what it is saying, doesn't realize it is stating the opposite of what it wants to say.  4The truth of the sensuous this for consciousness is supposed to be universal experience.  On the contrary!  The universal experience is that every consciousness overcomes such truth – here is a tree, now it is midday – and asserts the opposite: here is not a tree, but a house.  This is also how consciousness immediately overcomes what there is of a sensuous this in the statement overcoming the first one.  All sense certainty is in truth the experience of what we have seen, namely that this is a universal, quite the opposite of what that supposedly philosophical claim assures us is universal experience. 
– 5The appeal to universal experience makes this perhaps a good point to anticipate consideration of practical issues.  6Those who claim truth and certainty for the reality of sensuous objects should be told to go back and take another look at the first, most basic school of wisdom, the ancient Eleusinian mysteries of Ceres and Bacchus [VII.B.b. Living artwork §5 M].  They have yet to learn the secret of eating the bread and drinking the wine.  For the initiate in these secrets does not simply come to doubt the being of sensuous things, but to despair of it [Introduction §6.9], partly accomplishing their nullification within them himself, partly watching as they do it to themselves.  7Even the animals are not excluded from this wisdom.  They turn out to be initiated into it at the deepest level, for they do not stop in awe of sensuous objects as if they possessed intrinsic being; rather, despairing of this reality and fully certain of its nullity [IV. Truth of Self-Certainty §9.2] they grab what they can and gobble it up.  And all creation celebrates with them these revealed mysteries that teach us what the truth of sensuous things really is.
21.  As we have seen, those who make such claims say exactly the opposite of what they think they mean – a phenomenon perhaps best suited to inspire some serious thinking about the nature of sense certainty.  2They talk of the existence of external objects, which can be variously characterized as actual; absolutely unique; very personal, individual things; none of which can be matched with another absolutely identical to it.  This form of existence is supposed to have absolute certainty and truth.  3They mean this piece of paper on which I write this, or rather have just written it; but what they mean is not what they say.  4They really want to say the piece of paper they mean, the piece they see before them, no doubt about it; but this is impossible.  For the sensuous this they mean lies beyond the reach of language, belonging as it does to consciousness, which is inherently universal.  5Their this would decay and disappear during any serious attempt to state it; those who begin to describe it would not be able to complete their description and would have to leave it to others, who would themselves concede that they speak of a thing that is not.  6For they really mean this sheet of paper here, which is quite different from this one above.  But they say real things, external or sensuous objects, absolutely unique beings etc.  The point is, they say of them only what is universal; which is why what is called the unutterable is indeed nothing other than the untrue, irrational, merely meant.
– 7When nothing more is said of something other than that it is an actual thing, an external object, what we have here is only the most universal aspect of it, expressing its identity with everything else rather than its difference.  8If I say a single thing, in fact I am referring to it as something wholly universal, for all things are single things.  Thus, this thing is anything and everything one wants it to be.  9More precisely, for this piece of paper any and all pieces of paper will do and I have still only uttered the universal.  10Speech has the divine nature of immediately inverting the opinion, the meaning, of turning it into something else and thus of not letting that meaning get into the words at all.  I can use my finger to come to the aid of speech by pointing out this piece of paper.  This is how I get the experience of what the truth of sense certainty really is.  I point it out; a here: a here of other here's, inherently a simple collection of many here's [§19.3 above], i.e. a universal.  Instead of simply knowing immediately – receiving it as it is in truth – I perceive.

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