The Great Debate

The following is a rough debate on the existence of Allah between one of the members of the Freethought Mecca, and the president of the Auckland University Islamic Society (AUIS). It began with a guestbook entry from the AUIS, which then moved to a discussion via their mailing list. The debate is rather long, and at times boring, but the Freethought Mecca seems to have defended itself rather well. We hope this will help us continue the great lie that is Atheism, and cover the truth that is Islam. Since we have not received a reply to our last contribution in September, we assume the debate is, for now, over. It is a great guide to the problems with the cosmological argument. For more on God's existence, also see The Logic of Allah's Existence. Also of interest might be Imran Aijaz' web site dedicated to the Kalam cosmological argument, which can be found at http://geocities.com/critical_discourse/

The Segments of the Debate:



Auckland University Islamic Society - 08/31/00 01:55:42
My URL: http://members.muslimsites.com/auckland-l/
My Email: [email protected]
Favorite Vice: Destroying measly atheists.
Favorite Backwards Dictatorship: None.

Comments:
Salaam. Heya Freethought man, I must say, I'm impressed with some of your stuff ... but bro, you can't just attack strawman, sure, there are a couple of pathetic Muslims out there, but surely, if you want to discredit Islam, you have to do it via a reason d argument. Look, tell you what, why don't you post some arguments to our newsgroup (I've given the address) and I wouldn't mind doing a formal debate with you over the internet. So whaddaya say? Are you in for it? Anyway, take care.


From: Denis Giron Al-Kaafir Al-Akbar 
Date: Tue Sep 5, 2000 2:21pm
Subject: Freethoughtmecca & Auckland University Islamic Society

Greetings students from the Auckland University Islamic Society (AUIS). This is in response to the post left by a student from AUIS in the Freethoughtmecca guestbook on August 31st. The FTMecca G-book can be found at http://geocities.com/freethoughtmecca/geobook.html

Regardless, here is my response to those whose favorite vice is "[d]estroying measly atheists."

AUIS wrote:
  Salaam. Heya Freethought man, I must say, I'm   impressed with some of your stuff...

Thank you, but please acknowledge that there is not just one man behind the Freethoughtmecca. Indeed all praise is due to Al-lat and her many incarnations, but the men and women (and at least one Eunich) on the ground who work hard to snuff out the light of Islam are several. Freethoughtmecca is put together by many people, from all over the world, which is why it is called a Global Conspiracy. I am just one kaafir of many. Consider me like the deputy Freethoughtmeccan; the khalifa of kufr.

Here's the current Knesset at FTMecca:

Sadiqi az-Zindiki  (Alaihee Salaam)
Ghazali Abd'Hubali ad-Dajjali Shabazz   (Razhi-ash-Shaytanu Anhu)
Tariq Munafiq
Salman Rushdie
Ehud Barak
Bill Clinton
Louis Farrakhan
Atal Vajpayee
Mushrik Kemal Ataturk Jr

but bro, you can't just attack strawman,

Actually, we can do just that. With all due respect, the attitude at the Freethoughtmecca is that, as has been said in the past, Islam is ridiculous; hence we ridicule Islam. All sarcasm aside, I'm constantly trading ideas with the aforementioned Sadiqi az-Zindiki on the possibility of creating a site that takes a serious stick to the head of Islam. Until then, there is the FTMecca, where satire is used as a weapon against truth; where fitna is seen as being superior to adab; where we make an effort to call the halal haram, and call the haram halal. If you;d like me to engage in serious debate with you, I'm more than willing, and we'll get the debate on FTMecca (assuming it is entertaining or of some educational value; and assuming you don't win).

 sure, there are a couple of pathetic Muslims out there,

Yeah, no kidding.

 but surely, if you want to discredit Islam, you have to do it via a reasoned argument.

I've been mocking Islam in this email, but for this part I'll be straight and serious. There has been no serious effort on the FTMecca site to discredit Islam. The webmaster(s) of the site and the site's supporters are mostly apostates from Islam. The rest are those who do not set their lives to revolve around belief in an ancient tribal superstition. There is no major effort to bring an intellectual criticism to the table; rather our attitude is simply to point and laugh.

Look, tell you what, why don't you post some   arguments to our newsgroup (I've given the address) and I wouldn't mind doing a formal debate with you over the internet. So whaddaya say? Are you in for it? Anyway, take care.

Fair enough. Though, is your newsgroup at [email protected] or http://members.muslimsites.com/auckland-l/ (I'm serious)? I'm very interested in a serious debate, as it will give some more exposure to the Freethoughtmecca. Inshal-lat, with enough exposure we will finally get noticed by our famous one-eyed Jewish hero: Sammy Davis Jr (did you think I was referring to the Dajjal?).

Sincerely,
          Dionisio (Denis) Giron

== FAQTULULLAH! If there was a God, I'd swear by His name that He didn't exist!


From: Imran Aijaz 
Date: Tue Sep 5, 2000 2:40pm
Subject: Re: Freethoughtmecca & Auckland University Islamic Society

Asalaamu'alaikum. Well, well, well ... if it isn't Denis Giron. I've been meaning to ask you a few questions about your page at the Internet Infidels site:

http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/theism/islam/

You article on "Islamic Science" is fatally flawed, but anyhow, we can debate about that later.

 I'm very interested in a serious debate, as it will give some more exposure
 to the Freethoughtmecca.

You've got me. Since you're "just one kaafir of many", I am willing to debate with you concerning the existence of God, since that seems to be the primary issue at the moment.

P.S - I don't think you're subscribed to the newsgroup (or are you?), but if you're not, then you won't receive this message via the egroups.com address, that's why I've sent you a CC to your personal e-mail address.

Anyway, waiting to hear from you.

Wasalaam,

Imran Aijaz
imran.aijaz@x...


From: Denis Giron al-Kaafir al-Akbar 
Date: Thu Sep 7, 2000 1:04pm
Subject: Joining the AUIS egroup

Greetings... I just sent an email to [email protected] attempting to subscribe to the group. I set up the email mulhid@i... as the email with which I subscribed, as I have plenty of space to recieve messages. However, I will most likely send my messages from kaafir@g..., and just recieve my messages at mulhid@i.... If it sounds confusing, I'm only doing this in this manner because kaafir@g... is a very crowded mailbox, while mulhid@i... is totally empty. However, sending emails from mulhiad@i... is very difficult, so it'll be easier if I just read my email from there, and send them from my godisdead account. Sorry if this bored you all; I'm just answering questions before they are even asked (in typical arrogant munafiq fashion).

Now, in an email, Imran Aijaz asked "how do you want to do the debate? What format do you suggest?" I dunno; does anyone else have any ideas? I'm pretty open to anything. As I understand it you want to discuss the existence of Allah/God in particular, and I assume the whole issue of Ilhad vs Islam. I guess if you have some arguments (such as proofs of the existence of God), present them here, and I'll give my reply. If you have a different idea, please let me know.

Jazakal-uzza khair wa shukran for inviting me.

Sincerely,
          Denis Giron al-Kaafir al-Akbar


From: Imran Aijaz 
Date: Thu Sep 7, 2000 1:20pm
Subject: Re: Joining the AUIS egroup

Asalaamu'alaikum.

OK Denis, I will be doing a cosmological defense for the existence of a Personal Creator of the universe, viz., the Kalam Cosmological Argument for the existence of God as was initially defined by Imam al-Ghazali. The basic syllogism presented by al-Ghazali was:

1. Whatever begins to exist, has a cause for it's existence.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause for it's existence.

Now, this is the skeletal formation of the proof, I will unpack the support for the premises as the dialogue progresses, in light of whatever objections you may have. So until I hear from you, I leave you with this to think about.

Oh, just one more thing, since this is a newsgroup, there are some basic and simple rules to abide by. I'll be re-posting a version of the FAQ to you, so you can familiarize yourself with the few regulations that we have.

Wasalaam,

Imran Aijaz
imran.aijaz@x...


From: Denis Giron Al-Kaafir Al-Akbar 
Date: Thu Sep 7, 2000 3:19pm
Subject: The Great Debate

Before I begin, I want to ask Imran Aijaz if I am yet a member of the group. I wonder because Mr. Aijaz sent his last email to both the group, and my email address (mulhid@i...). However, for some reason, I only got one copy when I should have gotten two! Should I resubscribe? Am I subscribed to the list yet?

Moving on with the debate, Imran Aijaz wrote:
OK Denis, I will be doing a cosmological defense for the existence of a Personal Creator of the universe, viz., the Kalam Cosmological Argument for the existence of God as was initially defined by Imam al-Ghazali. The basic syllogism presented by al-Ghazali was:
1. Whatever begins to exist, has a cause for it's existence.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause for it's existence.

Okay, I'm going to look up some stuff on the Cosmological argument tonight when I get home. Until then, I'll just comment on a flaw I feel is present in the set up of the above skeletal proof. To begin with, one might argue that God must've had a beginning. Undoubtedly, the response would be that premise one explicitly refers to objects that began to exist, and from there the Muslim could assert that God has no beginning (without proof).

To follow in those steps, the Atheist could deny the validity of premise 2, and assert that the universe had no beginning. Any reference to the big bang would be a bit fallacious, as this is merely a theory with regards to the matter within the universe (i.e. the stars, planets, moons, debris, et cetera), but not the actual open space itself.

Furthermore, many Atheists/Naturalists would dispute the idea that anything that has a beginning has a cause (premise 1). Please consider the writings of Richard Dawkins ("Blind Watchmaker," "River out of Eden," et cetera). This is not something that has been proven; rather it is an assertion. It would seem that in order for me to accept this proof, I would have to first believe that objects with a beginning have a cause; something I don't actually believe. It seems that the proof is built on a questionable premise, where it is "proven" that the universe has a cause simply by stating that it has a cause. Indeed, you are begging the question.

I'm curious as to your thoughts on this.

-Dionisio (Denis) Giron

P.S.: I have not recieved any mail directly from the AUIS egroup, thus I assume I am not yet a member.

== FAQTULULLAH! If there was a God, I'd swear by His name that He didn't exist!


From: Imran Aijaz 
Date: Thu Sep 7, 2000 4:01pm
Subject: Re: The Great Debate

Asalaamu'alaikum. OK Denis. I'll make sure you're on the list by adding you via the egroups website. So that's taken care of. Now, moving on to some of your comments:

 Okay, I'm going to look up some stuff on the Cosmological argument tonight when I get home. Until then, I'll just comment on a flaw I feel is present in the set up of the above skeletal proof. To begin with, one might argue that God must've had a beginning. Undoubtedly, the response would be that premise one explicitly refers to objects that began to exist, and from there the Muslim could assert that God has no beginning (without proof).

My response is as follows:

1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause, since God did not begin to exist, He does not have a cause.

2. An infinite regress of causes is impossible.

3. Even if, for arguments sake, I grant that God has a cause, it still is a fatal blow to atheism because there is a Supernatural Deity of somekind, irrespective of the possibility that this Deity is caused or not, you cannot be an atheist by definition, even if that objection is valid.

Again, these are comments, I will unpack more details as we go along.

 To follow in those steps, the Atheist could deny the validity of premise 2, and assert that the universe had no beginning. Any reference to the big bang would be a bit fallacious, as this is merely a theory with regards to the matter within the universe (i.e. the stars, planets, moons, debris, et cetera), but not the actual open space itself.

I agree, refuting the second premise would put the argument into academic arrest. Nevertheless, I believe it is much, much more plausible to think that the universe began to exist in the light of two arguments:

1. Empirical confirmation which supports the Big Bang theory.

2. The impossibility of an infinite regression of temporal events.

 Furthermore, many Atheists/Naturalists would dispute the idea that anything that has a beginning has a cause (premise 1). Please consider the writings of Richard Dawkins ("Blind Watchmaker," "River out of Eden," et cetera).

An appeal to authority does not constitute a refutation of that proof. I can, in a similar fashion, refer to David Hume, who stated "But allow me to tell you that I never asserted so absurd a Proposition as that anything might arise without cause: I only maintain'd, that our Certainty of the Falshood of that Proposition proceeded neither from Intuition nor Demonstration; but from another Source." This, he wrote in a letter to John Stewart. Also, John Locke once said, "...man knows, by an intuitive certainty, that bare nothing can no more produce any real being, than it can be equal to two right angles."

We can support this premise, as follows: since nothing does not exist, nothing is completely lacking in qualities. Nothing, then, cannot have any causal power – the ability to be a cause producing some thing, hence nothing cannot be the cause of anything. The denial of the causal principle, that something can come from nothing, is equivalent to the claim that something can be caused by something that completely lacks causal power, i.e., by something that cannot be a cause, which is logically inconsistent. Hence, the denial of this principle leaves you with a contradiction.

An indirect proof which takes the form of a reductio ad absurdum can be employed to support the causal premise, like the one above.

 This is not something that has been proven; rather it is an assertion. It

See my comments above.

 would seem that in order for me to accept this proof, I would have to first believe that objects with a beginning have a cause; something I don't actually believe. It seems that the proof is built on a on a questionable premise, where it is "proven" that the universe has a cause simply by stating that it has a cause. Indeed, you are begging the question.

No, it is proven that the universe had a cause by the deductive syllogism that I presented. In deductive arguments, if the premises are true, then, the conclusion must be true. So, IF, you accept the two premises of the argument, you cannot reject the conclusion. Now with respect to supporting the causal premise, I've commented briefly above. I am not assuming that which I set out to prove, if I did, then yes, it would be question-begging, but I gave an argument to believe the causal premise (see above).

Once your responses are more detailed, I can proceed further.

P.S - I'll make sure you're on the group, so keep an eye out.

Wasalaam,

Imran Aijaz
imran.aijaz@x...


From: Denis Giron Al-Kaafir Al-Akbar 
Date: Fri Sep 8, 2000 1:55pm
Subject: The Great Debate pt 2

Imran and the students at AUIS, here is my second installment as part of the great debate.

Denis:
    Okay, I'm going to look up some stuff on the Cosmological argument tonight when I get home. Until then, I'll just comment on a flaw I feel is present in the set up of the above skeletal proof. To begin with, one might argue that God must've had a beginning. Undoubtedly, the   response would be that premise one explicitly refers to objects that began to exist, and from there the Muslim could assert that God has no   beginning (without proof).

Imran:
  My response is as follows:

1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause, since God did not begin to exist, He does not have a cause.

You have only made me look like a psychic by doing exatcly what I predicted you would do (i.e. you "assert[ed] that God has no beginning"). This is something that you have merely stated rather than proved (though I acknowledged that proving such a claim is highly difficult; still, that's your problem, not mine). You're trying to prove that God exists, and you start by telling me about God, and your definition, without justifying any of it. In short, you've assumed his existence to prove his existence. That is indeed fallacious.

  2. An infinite regress of causes is impossible.

With all due respect, you should consider (or reconsider) first year calculus and an introduction to modern set theory. There, concepts of the infinitely large and infinitely small are routinely handled.   As are also the ideas of infinite series, sets with infinite numbers of members, infinite regression, infinite recursion, potential infinity, actual infinity, infinite orders of infinities, etc. Furthermore, in light of the previous statement, also going back to your original premise ("Whatever begins to exist, has a cause for it's existence."), one would argue that you're getting involved in special pleading. A relative question that illustrates this special pleading would be: How is it that you claim that 'God' could exist 'forever',   but the "regress of causes" cannot stretch back endlessly? In short, one might argue that anything that's eternal -- e.g. "God" -- is by definition an "iinfinite regress of causes" if you assume that the thing obeys the laws of causality.

  3. Even if, for arguments sake, I grant that God has a cause, it still is a fatal blow to atheism because there is a Supernatural Deity of somekind, irrespective of the possibility that this Deity is caused or not, you cannot be an atheist by   definition, even if that objection is valid.

Actually, the idea of claiming that God had a beginning was to illustrate the flimsyness of the argument. You claim that God is uncaused; if I so chose, I could argue that "God" had a cause. It was just an exercise to show that we can launch unsupported assertions all day. However, if we're going to accept either side as true, somebody has to present some proof. Do I believe God is caused? I don't even believe God exists. If you're going to claim he is uncaused, you have to explain this somehow.

  Again, these are comments, I will unpack more details as we go along.

Ditto akhi, ditto. =)

Denis:
 To follow in those steps, the Atheist could deny the validity of premise 2, and assert that the   universe had no beginning. Any reference to the big bang would be a bit fallacious, as this is merely a theory with regards to the matter within   the universe (i.e. the stars, planets, moons, debris, et cetera), but not the actual open space itself.

Imran:
  I agree, refuting the second premise would put the argument into academic arrest. Nevertheless, I believe it is much, much more plausible to think that the universe began to exist in the light of two arguments:

1. Empirical confirmation which supports the Big Bang theory.

Yes, there is an identifiable t = 0. But one cannot claim that the universe "began" to exist at that point, because of the first law of thermodynamics. This law actually bars the possibility of creation ex nihilo, as you're insinuating. There are theories that there was a universe before the big bang, that collapsed and formed the "material" for this big bang. Furthermore, any "causing" of the Big Bang would have to have occurred when t was negative. But t cannot be negative if we are going to hold to your idea that this was the beginning. While the Universe itself came into being, you have not shown that the "pointmass" which exploded into time and space had to have come into being. Basically, alll this means is that the universe *as we know it* came into being at the Big Bang, according to the Theory.   Whether there was a universe before hand for said explosion to come from is, as of yet, unknown (despite the aforementioned theory about a previous universe that collapsed).

  2. The impossibility of an infinite regression of temporal events.

This begs the question "is an infinite regression of temporal events possible?"   You've assumed an answer, yet there is no evidence to that affect.

  An appeal to authority does not constitute a refutation of that proof.

Agreed, though I was merely pointing you in the direction of some writers who present interesting thoughts on all this.

  We can support this premise, as follows: since nothing does not exist, nothing is completely lacking in qualities. Nothing, then, cannot have any causal power – the ability to be a cause producing some thing, hence nothing cannot be the cause of anything.

Agreed, this is the parmenides argument, but then if this is the case the concept of creation ex nihilo goes out the window. Furthermore, you're still committing the "special pleading" fallacy by asserting that such rules do NOT apply to your unsupported explaination for the cause of the big bang. Understand?

Denis:
    would seem that in order for me to accept this proof, I would have to first believe that objects with a beginning have a cause; something I don't actually believe. It seems that the proof is built on a on a questionable premise, where it is "proven" that the universe has a cause simply by stating that it has a cause. Indeed, you are begging the question.

Imran:
  No, it is proven that the universe had a cause by the deductive syllogism that I presented. In deductive arguments, if the premises are true, then, the conclusion must be true.

Agreed, although you have not shown that the premises in your argument were true; rather you only asserted such. Let me give you an example of an argument that is sound, but equally ambiguous:

(1) IPU is the only being that has the power of UPI. (2) A tree can only come into existence after being created by a being that has the power of UPI. (3) Therefore, all trees were created by IPU.

This argument is sound, but there are all kinds of unsupported claims and ambiguous terms in there, thus making it IMPOSSIBLE to decide whether or not the premises are true. While this analogy may seem absurd to you, it relates to your argument. You tell me that certain things are impossible without proving it. You seek to prove the existence of a being represented by an ambiguous word: "God," then you go on to tell me about "God" with out supporting these claims.

These are the flaws in your argument. Regardless, I have a question for you. Judging by what I have just written, you may argue that it is now impossible to go any further with this argument (at least until you present some evidence for some of your claims). If this is the case, I'm willing to assume, for argument's sake, that you did prove that the universe is caused. If that has been proven, what does this mean? How do you go on to prove that God, rather than 3 green elves from dimension X, is the cause of this big bang? I'm sincerely curious.

-Denis Giron

http://www.geocities.com/freethoughtmecca

P.S.: I have yet to get any messages via the auis egroup... are you sure I'm on it now? I'll keep you posted; please do the same.

== FAQTULULLAH! If there was a God, I'd swear by His name that He didn't exist!


From: Imran Aijaz 
Date: Fri Sep 8, 2000 10:10pm
Subject: The Great Debate - II (A Defense Of The Kalam Cosmological Argument)

Asalaamu'alaikum.

DENIS
 You have only made me look like a psychic by doing exatcly what I predicted  you would do (i.e. you "assert[ed] that God has no beginning"). This is  something that you have merely stated rather than proved (though I  acknowledged that proving such a claim is highly difficult; still, that's  your problem, not mine). You're trying to prove that God exists, and you  start by telling me about God, and your definition, without justifying any of it. In short, you've assumed his existence to prove his existence. That is indeed fallacious.

IMRAN
At the moment, I only commented that the theist could easily reply by stating that God did not begin to exist, therefore, it follows that He does not have a cause for His existence. Note that this is just a comment, not a proof. I would argue that since an infinite regression of causes is impossible, the regress must be finite, and one which stops at the first cause which is uncaused itself. At this point, it's important to understand that I am not even talking about God, my aim is to establish that the
universe has a cause for it's existence. Once this is done, we can proceed further and analyze what kind of a cause it is.

Why do I reject the possibility of an infinite regression of causes? OK, now's the time to explain. We'll start with C: Suppose the cause of my existence is contingent. Then it will itself require a cause. If that cause in turn is contingent, then it will need a cause, and so on for every contingent cause we come to. Thus begins the regress, a chain of contingent causes that either goes on to infinity or else stops at a non-contingent first cause. Simple.

Personally, I don't see any great difficulty in stopping a temporal infinite regress. Consider, then: If there is an infinite regress of causes operating in time, then an infinite amount of time preceded (and presumably will follow as well) the present. This seems clearly true, since an infinite series of causal events would require an infinite amount of time to occur in. But if an infinite amount of time preceded the present, then we are currently at the end of an infinite amount of time; this follows as a trivial analytic point. Yet it presents a conflict because what it means for a sequence to be infinite is for it to be without end, and the actuality of an infinite regress seems to entail the existence of an infinite sequence with an end. Therefore we are led to reject the possibility of an infinite regress because it implies something obviously false, in the inference pattern known as Modus Tollens. We can only conclude that there is a non-contingent first cause which is the ultimate cause of everything else in
the regress. So we here discharge our assumption of C with the result that, if the cause of my existence is contingent, then there exists a non-contingent first cause.

DENIS
 With all due respect, you should consider (or reconsider) first year calculus and an introduction to modern set theory. There, concepts of the

IMRAN
You've gone ahead and assumed I have no knowledge of calculus and infinity. Not only have I done calculus and set theory, I have studied the concept of infinity in great depth. The concept of the infinite that is taught in first year calculus is of a potential infinite, and such a collection is increasing *towards* infinity as a limit, but it never gets there, hence, a more appropriate term would be indefinite and not infinite. If you have studied calculus, you probably will know that when drawing graphs of limits which tend towards infinity, the curve (asymptote) will never touch the axis, it will get closer and closer to it, but there will never be a time, when the line crosses the axis on the graph. For example, we have the function:

f(x) = 1/x; if you increase x indefinitely, you are increasing it without limit, and as x becomes very large, the function f(x) becomes very small. The graph of the function (a hyperbola) gives us a straight line which is tangential to the curve at infinity, nevertheless, this will never be actualized, it will never be the case.

Aristotle argued greatly that no actual infinite can exist, but he believed that the universe was eternal. When the great Arab Philosopher, Abu Yusuf al-Kindi came along, he turned Aristotle's concept of infinity against him, and was among the first people who argued for creation, ex nihilo.

Al-Kindi's argument for a finite universe was based on the impossibility of an actual infinite. Modern proponents of the argument like William Lane Craig present the following reasoning:

(1) An actual infinite cannot exist.
(2) An infinite temporal regress of events is an actual infinite.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
(3) Therefore, an infinite temporal regress of events cannot exist.

Until Cantor's work in set theory, mathematicians rejected the existence of an actual infinite as a mathematical concept. But Cantor himself denied the existential possibility of the actual infinite. Another famous mathematician and expert in set theory, David Hilbert, wrote: "... the [actual] infinite
is nowhere to be found in reality. It neither exists in nature nor provides a legitimate basis for rational thought ..."

To avoid getting too detailed, I will leave it at this and wait for possible objections ...

DENIS
 infinitely large and infinitely small are routinely handled.  As are also the ideas of infinite series, sets with infinite numbers of members, infinite regression, infinite recursion, potential infinity, actual infinity, infinite orders of infinities, etc. Furthermore, in light of the

IMRAN
Mathematically speaking, infinity as a concept is not a problem, but even Cantor's actual infinite (designated by aleph null) began to spawn all sorts of problems. Al-Kindi and other proponents of the Kalam argument claimed that an *actual* infinite cannot exist in *reality*, in the world of stars,
rocks, trees and men. I agree. Zeno's paradoxes also give weight to the impossibility of an infinite regression of events. But that's for another posting.

DENIS
 previous statement, also going back to your original premise ("Whatever begins to exist, has a cause for it's existence."), one would argue that you're getting involved in special pleading. A relative question that

IMRAN
I have not assumed the existence of God at that stage. I am not saying, "Look, everything except God has a cause of it's existence!" The premise I have stated which does not involve God at this point, is:

1. Whatever begins to exist, has a cause of it's existence.

Or, in other words,

1. For all x, if x exists contingently, then x has a cause of its existence.

The only time I will begin to consider the cause of the universe to be God is once we agree the universe has a cause of it's existence.

DENIS
 illustrates this special pleading would be: How is it that you claim that  'God' could exist 'forever',  but the "regress of causes" cannot stretch back endlessly? In short, one might argue that anything that's eternal -- e.g. "God" -- is by definition an "infinite regress of causes" if you assume that the thing obeys the laws of causality.

IMRAN
There is no difficulty in stating that the regress of causes is finite, but that the first cause is eternal. I do not see any logical difficulties with such an assertion. Your argument:

~ If x is eternal, x is an infinite regress of causes ~

is simply a non sequitur. How you derive that conclusion is beyond me. Please explain.

DENIS
 Actually, the idea of claiming that God had a beginning was to illustrate  the flimsyness of the argument. You claim that God is uncaused; if I so chose, I could argue that "God" had a cause. It was just an exercise to show that we can launch unsupported assertions all day. However, if we're going to accept either side as true, somebody has to present some proof.

IMRAN
These are common atheist objections but are fatally flawed.

The "Who made God?" question is a textbook example of the compound question fallacy. A fallacious compound question occurs when one ignores questions that should be asked first. For example, "have you stopped beating your wife?" is fallacious when it is has not been established that one has ever beaten one's spouse. Likewise, "Who made God?" presupposes the prior question "Is God a created being?"

DENIS
Do I believe God is caused? I don't even believe God exists. If you're going to claim he is uncaused, you have to explain this somehow.

IMRAN
See my logical dismissal of an infinite regression of causes above.

DENIS
 Yes, there is an identifiable t = 0. But one cannot claim that the universe "began" to exist at that point, because of the first law of thermodynamics.

IMRAN
How does the FIRST law of thermodynamics support this?

DENIS
 This law actually bars the possibility of creation ex nihilo, as you're insinuating. There are theories that there was a universe before the big  bang, that collapsed and formed the "material" for this big bang.

IMRAN
The thermodynamic properties of an oscillating model are such that the universe expands farther and farther with each successive cycle. Therefore, as one traces the expansions back in time, they grow smaller and smaller. The oscillating model of the universe thus still requires an origin of the universe prior to the smallest cycle.

And furthermore, my a priori arguments against infinite regression still stand. They are independent of empirical confirmation.

DENIS
 Furthermore, any "causing" of the Big Bang would have to have occurred when it was negative. But t cannot be negative if we are going to hold to your idea that this was the beginning. While the Universe itself came into being,

IMRAN
The traditional theist view is that God is timeless, He is outside of time. The Creator may be conceived to be causally, but not temporally, prior to the origin of the universe, such that the act of causing the universe to begin to exist is simultaneous with its beginning to exist. And I agree with people like Hawking who write that to ask what happened before the universe began is like asking for a point on the Earth at 91 north latitude! On the creationist theory under discussion, the Creator sans the world would exist changelessly and, given some relational view of time, therefore timelessly and at the Big Bang singularity create both the universe and, concomitantly, time. For the Creator sans the universe, there simply is no time because there are no events; time begins with the first event, not only for the
universe, but also for God, in virtue of His real relation to the universe. The act of creation is thus simultaneous, or coincident, with the origination of the universe.

DENIS
 you have not shown that the "pointmass" which exploded into time and space  had to have come into being. Basically, alll this means is that the universe *as we know it* came into being at the Big Bang, according to the Theory.

IMRAN
Theoretically speaking, empirical confirmation takes you back to a single mathematical point, a singularity of infinite density. But, as Fred Hoyle points out, there can be no object of infinite density, therefore, what the big bang theory requires, really, is the creation of matter out of nothing.

DENIS
 Whether there was a universe before hand for said explosion to come from is, as of yet, unknown (despite the aforementioned theory about a previous universe that collapsed).

IMRAN
Empirical confirmation points extremely strongly towards the finitude of the universe. And whats more, if you think otherwise, you will have to refute my a priori arguments against an infinite regress of temporal events as stated above.

IMRAN
 2. The impossibility of an infinite regression of  temporal events.

DENIS
 This begs the question "is an infinite regression of temporal events possible?"  You've assumed an answer, yet there is no evidence to that affect.

IMRAN
I was simply commenting, I have gone into some more detail above.

IMRAN
An appeal to authority does not constitute a refutation of that proof.

DENIS
 Agreed, though I was merely pointing you in the direction of some writers  who present interesting thoughts on all this.

IMRAN
Fair enough.

IMRAN
We can support this premise, as follows: since nothing does not exist, nothing is completely lacking in qualities. Nothing, then, cannot have any causal power – the ability to be a cause producing some thing, hence nothing cannot be the cause of anything.

DENIS
 Agreed, this is the parmenides argument, but then if this is the case the concept of creation ex nihilo goes out the window. Furthermore, you're still committing the "special pleading" fallacy by asserting that such rules do NOT apply to your unsupported explaination for the cause of the big bang. Understand?

IMRAN
Ah, this is where you commit the fallacy of equivocation. I state that ex nihilo nihil fit, that is, out of nothing, nothing comes. Nothing cannot be the cause of anything. However, a totally different meaning of "nothing" is implied when creationists use locutions like "The universe came into being out of nothing," they mean, not that there was a state of nothingness temporally prior to the origin of the universe, but simply that the universe lacks a prior material cause, that it is false that the universe was made out of anything.

DENIS
 Agreed, although you have not shown that the premises in your argument were  true; rather you only asserted such. Let me give you an example of an  argument that is sound, but equally ambiguous:

IMRAN
You have agreed with my causal premise ... but you have not accepted the second premise. If you will not accept it, then you must show me that:

(i)  Empirical confirmation suggests that it is more plausible to believe in an eternal universe than a finite one.

(ii) Refute my a priori arguments against an infinite temporal regression of past events.

Until you do that, I shall consider my two premises to be true which brings me to the sound conclusion that the universe has a cause of it's existence.

DENIS
(1) IPU is the only being that has the power of UPI.
(2) A tree can only come into existence after being created by a being that has the power of UPI.
(3) Therefore, all trees were created by IPU.

IMRAN
I do not see how this applies at all to my deductive syllogism.

DENIS
 This argument is sound, but there are all kinds of unsupported claims and ambiguous terms in there, thus making it IMPOSSIBLE to decide whether or not the premises are true. While this analogy may seem absurd to you, it relates

IMRAN
You are correct. It seems absurd, but I fail to see how this relates to my syllogism. The premises are straight-foward and clear enough, at least I think so.

DENIS
to your argument. You tell me that certain things are impossible without proving it. You seek to prove the existence of a being represented by an

IMRAN
I was initially commenting on the proofs for the premises being true, now, I think I have given you sufficient points to consider.

DENIS
ambiguous word: "God," then you go on to tell me about "God" with out  supporting these claims.

IMRAN
Again, I am merely stating what the theist would say, my first obstacle is to convince you that the universe has a cause of it's existence. One you accept that, then we can go ahead and talk about "God" ...

DENIS
 These are the flaws in your argument. Regardless, I have a question for you.

IMRAN
Hardly. Go over the responses I have given.

DENIS
Judging by what I have just written, you may argue that it is now impossible to go any further with this argument (at least until you present some evidence for some of your claims). If this is the case, I'm willing to assume, for argument's sake, that you did prove that the universe is caused.

IMRAN
I have given support to support my premises while you have yet to provide refutations or decent counter-arguments.

DENIS
 If that has been proven, what does this mean? How do you go on to prove that God, rather than 3 green elves from dimension X, is the cause of this big bang? I'm sincerely curious.

IMRAN
Simple. We analyze the cause. And I am wholeheartedly convinced that this cause is God. But I shall not comment on this yet. If you agree with the conclusion that the universe has a cause of it's existence, then we can proceed.

DENIS
 P.S.: I have yet to get any messages via the auis egroup... are you sure I'm on it now? I'll keep you posted; please do the same.

IMRAN
You should be ... if not, visit this link and add yourself:

http://members.muslimsites.com/auckland-l/ngroup.htm

Just to make sure, I have sent you a CC of this posting.

Wasalaam,

Imran Aijaz


From: FreethoughtMecca Debate Team 
Date: Thu Sep 14, 2000 7:30am
Subject: The Great Debate - III (definition of terms)

To Imran, and the entire AUIS. First, I apologize for taking so long to respond. I'm sure you're all involved in school as well, thus I assume you understand that sometimes a person can get a bit tied down. I promise, however, that I'll always try to respond within the week that I get the message. :)

Okay, now, before I get to your points, I have one major question: what do you mean when you say that the universe has a cause? I attacked this conclusion without really considering the various possible meanings. For example, do you mean a conscious or deliberate cause, or a natural cause? The way I see it, rain has a cause, or to be more specific, rain is caused by something (this "something" being heat which causes the water to evaporate and collect in the sky, et cetera). I would definitely agree that
rain has a cause, but I would see this as something natural not conscious (see Aristophanes' argument for why the rain is not caused by Zeus). Thus, it is very possible that the big bang (not necessarily the universe) had a cause. Regardless, please define what you mean by "cause".

That abstract point aside, let's bring on the debate...

IMRAN
At the moment, I only commented that the theist could easily reply by stating that God did not begin to exist, therefore, it follows that He does not have a cause for His existence. Note that this is just a comment, not a proof.

I'm glad we agree that this is not a proof, and furthermore that there is no proof for this comment. :)

I would argue that since an infinite regression of causes is impossible, the regress must be finite, and one which stops at the first cause which is uncaused itself.

Consider the sequence of negative integers ending at 0:

      ...,-3,-2,-1,0

This sequence is unbounded on the left, going to minus infinity.  But it is bounded on the right by 0.  This infinite sequence "ends," so your insinuation above that there is no such infinite sequence is false.

Analogously, consider the infinite sequence of times t(n), n = -1, -2, ... where our current time is t(0) = 0:

...,t(-3),t(-2),t(-1),t(0) t(n-1) < t(n) for n = 0,-1,-2,...

Same principle.  Unbounded on the left, "regressing" toward t = minus infinity, but bounded ("ending") on the right by t(0) = 0, our present time. Each t can represent a causal event.  The infinite sequence represents an infinite regression of causal events.

Also, an infinite regress of causes does not imply an infinite amount of time since the time intervals between the causes may have a finite sum. Even if this sum is unbounded, there would be no event X in the past such that an infinite time has passed from X until now. There is no "first" event in this
infinite chain.

Considering your argument, the sequence of fractions

... 1/6, 1/5, 1/4, 1/3, 1/2, 1

would perhaps be more appropriate.  The sequence is infinite to the left, corresponding to an infinite sequence of events, but is also bounded at the left by 0, corresponding to a finite time in which those events can occur. This disproves the statement "an infinite series of causal events would require an infinite amount of time to occur in" (which is insinuated above, and found elsewhere in your post).

In short, the argument that an infinite regression is impossible is a big point of contention here; and as long as you're allowing for uncaused things (like God) to exist, I think that arguments requiring the universe to be caused are going to fall flat, as it seems like an obvious case of special pleading.

Also, I have another question. Who is to say that the cause of the universe is the first cause? Even if an infinite regress is impossible (which it is not), there is still the possibility that the cause of the universe is itself caused. Would you agree that saying that "the cause of the universe is the first cause" is to make a leap in logic?

At this point, it's important to understand that I am not even talking about God, my aim is to establish that the universe has a cause for it's existence. Once this is done, we can proceed further and analyze what kind of a cause it is.

Excellent point, and I apologize for jumping the gun by attacking your belief in God when it was not part of the discussion at this time. You may very well have proven that the universe is "caused," though that depends in what sense you mean. I would only agree with that in the sense that there was a cause for the Big Bang (but this was not proven, rather I just believe this).

However, before you jump on the opportunity of the fact that I believe the universe has a sort of "cause," it is important to acknowledge that in Quantum Mechanics, many things are considered uncaused, including the big bang. I had a Physics professor try to explain this to me once. I came out on the stupid end of the stick, because philosophical and logical points don't necessarily translate into mathematical and scientific points. This is something both of us need to learn, and also this is why the philosophical conclusions of Arab thinkers from Baghdad don't always result in empirical truth. Quantum Mechanics, which scientists almost unanamously agree is currently the most accurate predictive theory in the history of physics, is based on uncaused events and all the evidence they have currently points to the idea that events at very small distances or over very short periods of time, can routinely be and in fact must be uncaused. If you want to know more, I'll try to get some books on it, but please realize that these concepts are difficult and counterinutitive and may take quite a bit to understand. Furthermore, I can't really say that I understand them that well. So if you want to avoid the QM issue, that's fine. I agree to the possibility that the universe may have a cause (though I want you to define "cause"), but we must both acknowledge that we are throwing QM out the window.

Why do I reject the possibility of an infinite regression of causes? OK, now's the time to explain. We'll start with C: Suppose the cause of my existence is contingent. Then it will itself require a cause. If that cause in turn is contingent, then it  will need a cause, and so on for every contingent cause we come to. Thus begins the regress, a chain of contingent causes that either goes on to infinity or else stops at a non-contingent first cause. Simple.

Agreed. The possibile worlds are either one that has an endless chain going into infinity, or one where the chain stops at a first cause which is eternal. Philosophically speaking, this is given.

Personally, I don't see any great difficulty in stopping a temporal infinite regress. Consider, then: If there is an infinite regress of causes operating in time, then an infinite amount of time preceded (and presumably will follow as well) the present. This seems clearly true, since an infinite series of causal events would require an infinite amount of time to occur in.

Please refer to what I wrote above regarding infinity. I say this, because this seems clearly false.  When you are talking about time, the analogy to keep in mind here is either the real numbers or a subset thereof (if time is continuous) or the integers or a subset thereof (if time is discrete).

Ignoring quibbles about the existence of foliations in spacetime, let's assume that we can label each spacetime event uniquely with a number which is its "time".  For instance, if the universe is eternal, then we might model time as t taking any values in (-infinity,+infinity). Or if the universe had a beginning at t=0, we could model it as the interval [0,+infinity).

However, consider the case where t takes values in (0,infinity) -- i.e., t>0.  In that case, for any time t there is always some time t' that comes before it (t'But if an infinite amount of time preceded the present, then we are currently at the end of an infinite amount of time; this follows as a trivial analytic point.

No, that is not true.  This is why I suggested that you study transfinite set theory.  You are treating infinity as an number here which may serve as a well-defined boundary to a set.  But infinity is not a number.  If you consider the set of all real numbers, it does NOT have a boundary at +infinity or -infinity.  It does not have an end. Likewise, a subset of that interval, say (-infinity,T) where T is some real number is also an OPEN set, that does not have an upper bound. I'm a novice in mathematics, but even I know this (no offense).

Yet it presents a conflict because what it means for a sequence to be infinite is for it to be without end,

Not necessarily.  The set [0,1] is bounded above and below, but contains infinitely many events. Please refer to all that is mentioned above.

and the actuality of an infinite regress seems to entail the existence of an infinite sequence with an end.

No.  If you apply your same arguments to the real numbers, then you would be able to (incorrectly) conclude that it's impossible for the real numbers to exist!  After all, given any real number T, there is an infinite regress of real numbers that precede it.  Continuing your logic, you would say that T is at the end of an infinite number of real numbers, and thus there cannot be an infinity of real numbers.  But the sets (-infinity,T), (infinity,T], and (-infinity,infinity) are all infinite sets of real numbers.

The thing to keep in mind here:  make sure your arguments about infintie sets of events apply equally to infinite sets of numbers.

Therefore we are led to reject the possibility of an infinite regress because it implies something obviously false, in the inference pattern known as Modus Tollens.

I would disagree strongly, for reasons which you can see above. With all due respect, it's a bit premature to start referring to inference patterns when you premises are trivially flawed.

We can only conclude that there is a non-contingent first cause which is the ultimate cause of everything else in the regress. So we here discharge our assumption of C with the result that, if the cause of my existence is contingent, then there exists a non-contingent first cause.

This is something you have not shown. I apologize if I sound as though I am repeating myself, but you totally mistreated the concept of infinity, thus your conclusion does not stand.

IMRAN
You've gone ahead and assumed I have no knowledge of calculus and infinity.

I myself am a novice in calculus and other fields of mathematics (in fact, I hate mathematics). I apologize for jumping the gun then, but now I am more convinced that your understanding of infinity is rather poor.

Not only have I done calculus and set theory, I have studied the concept of infinity in great depth. The concept of the infinite that is taught in first year calculus is of a potential infinite,

I don't know what a "potential infinite" is.  "Potential infinitity" sounds like something you'd debate in a philosophy class, not study in a math class.  Mathematics is not concerned with things that "potentially exist" (or for that matter, with "existence" at all, as far as physical existence goes at any rate).  In mathematics, infinity is a lot more closely related to boundedness.  If for every number T you can find a number T' that comes after it, then you can say inductively that there are infinitely many numbers. Or, if you are trying to claim that there is no such thing as infinity, let me just recommend that you write the largest possible number on paper. What would stop you from adding +1 to it?

and such a collection is increasing *towards* infinity as a limit, but it never gets there, hence, a more appropriate term would be indefinite and not infinite.

Once again, infinity isn't a number.  Strictly speaking, you don't say that things are "increasing towards infinity" (as if infinity was a number you can get closer and closer to), you say that things are "increasing without bound".  If you want to use the term infinity precisely, you use it to refer to _cardinality_ (e.g., the cardinality of this set is uncountably infinite).

Aristotle argued greatly that no actual infinite can exist, but he believed that the universe was eternal.

There is certainly no NUMBER that is equal to "infinity".  (Well, unless you're pulling tricks with topology.) Regardless, this is not a contradiction, of course.  There is no real number that is equal to infinity, but that doesn't mean that the set of real numbers is finite.

When the great Arab Philosopher, Abu Yusuf al-Kindi came along, he turned Aristotle's concept of infinity against him, and was among the first people who argued for creation, ex nihilo.

Al-Kindi's argument for a finite universe was based on the impossibility of an actual infinite. Modern proponents of the argument like William Lane Craig present the following reasoning:

(1) An actual infinite cannot exist.
(2) An infinite temporal regress of events is an actual infinite.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
(3) Therefore, an infinite temporal regress of events cannot exist.

Well, whether "an infinite temporal regress of events" or "an infinite ordinal regress of real numbers" is to be considered an "actual infinite" is merely semantics.  But insofar as it is true, (1) is false, since I can with complete logical consistency construct the real numbers, and can further argue for a one-to-one correspondence between temporal events and a subset of the real numbers. Furthermore, Craig's spin on the cosmological argument was thoroughly refuted by Michael Martin in the latter's book, "Atheism: A Philosophical Justification." I'm more than willing to type it up if you're interested.

Until Cantor's work in set theory, mathematicians rejected the existence of an actual infinite as a mathematical concept. But Cantor himself denied the existential possibility of the actual infinite. Another famous mathematician and expert in set theory, David Hilbert, wrote: "... the [actual] infinite is nowhere to be found in reality. It neither exists in nature nor provides a legitimate basis for rational thought ..."

That hardly constitutes a proof.

Much of this weaselling is likely due to a lack of definition for "an actual infinite".  I would say that, from context, an "actual infinite" is what you get if you try to treat infinity like a NUMBER. For instance, suppose we take some physical field, like "temperature at a given point in space".  I would argue that it is meaningless to claim that it's possible for the temperature at a point to be equal to a "number" called "infinity".  However, there is no problem in claiming that, say, if you go in some direction the temperature increases without bound.

Likewise, I certainly wouldn't say that time could have begun at some time in the past labelled "infinity", but I would say that time could have extended indefinitely without bound into the past.  And THAT is what people mean when they talk about the universe being "infinitely old".

IMRAN
Mathematically speaking, infinity as a concept is not a problem, but even Cantor's actual infinite (designated by aleph null) began to spawn all sorts of problems.

Like what?  It's only a problem if you try to pretend it's a number. But as the cardinality of a set, there's no problem.

Al-Kindi and other proponents of the Kalam argument claimed that an *actual* infinite cannot exist in *reality*, in the world of stars, rocks, trees and men. I agree.

That's nice.  But it's nowhere near a proof, let alone something that most people will agree with.

I want an actual physical argument, based on empirical evidence, that temporal ordering cannot be described by the real numbers. Navel contemplation doesn't count.  Sitting around insisting "it can't exist" doesn't count.  Some of the Greek philosphers were real good at constructing "proofs" of "how the universe `must' be" based on "self-evident truths", but they were empricially WRONG. Thus citing Arab Philosophers who read these Greek texts at the Bayt al-Hikma in Baghdad does not make them any more true.

Failing a physical argument, I want a mathematical argument that leads to internal self-contradiction.  (However, make very sure that you understand the concept of "infinity" in mathematics before attempting this.  Make sure you don't "disprove" the construction of the real numbers, for instance.)

Zeno's paradoxes also give weight to the impossibility of an infinite regression of events. But that's for another posting.

Zeno's "paradoxes" were slain when calculus was invented.

Now, I do not want to assume the existence of God at this stage. I am not saying, "Look, everything except God has a cause of it's existence!"

Fine, that is understood, but eventually you will need to change the words to something else.  You will still have to justify why SOME THING (the thing that caused the universe) doesn't need a cause, but the universe does.

IMRAN
There is no difficulty in stating that the regress of causes is finite, but that the first cause is eternal. I do not see any logical difficulties with such an assertion. Your argument:

~ If x is eternal, x is an infinite regress of causes ~

is simply a non sequitur. How you derive that conclusion is beyond me. Please explain.

Simple.  You first assume that this thing obeys the laws of causality. i.e., that it can itself be described as a sequence of causes and effects. Then if that thing is eternal, then *by definition* it is an infinite sequence of causes and effects.

Now, you could argue that God is atemporal and acausal, but then you'd have to argue how this can give rise to the illusion of God causing things to happen.  And then you'd have to justify why the same reasoning can't be applied to the universe being atemporal and acausal but with the illusion of causality.  (Substitute "God" with "causal agent of the universe" if you like.) Regardless, this argument is getting far too mathematical, and far too redundant. (no offense)

IMRAN
These are common atheist objections but are fatally flawed.

This isn't a fatal flaw, it's a rhetorical question pointing out a flaw in common arguments for the necessity of God.  If you argue that the universe requires a "maker", then you have to either explain (a) what made the maker or (b) why the arguments in favor of requiring a maker for the universe don't apply to the maker itself.

The "Who made God?" question is a textbook example of the compound question fallacy. A fallacious compound question occurs when one ignores questions that should be asked first. For example, "have you stopped beating your wife?" is fallacious when it is has not been established that one has ever beaten one's spouse. Likewise, "Who made God?" presupposes the prior question "Is God a created being?"

Atheists who ask you "Who made God?" in response to your arguments aren't _assuming_ that God is a created being.  Rather, they're trying to adopt YOUR assumption (that the universe was created) and asking you to justify why your assumption doesn't apply to the universe's creator. Like I said, it's a RHETORICAL question.

I have no problem with the possibility of God not being created, but I have a problem with claiming that the universe HAS to have been created but turning around and claming that God didn't have to be created.

IMRAN
The thermodynamic properties of an oscillating model are such that the universe expands farther and farther witheach successive cycle.

That depends on what you mean by an "oscillating model".  If you're talking about some kind of "bounce" model where the universe contracts to a very small (but nonsingular) state and re-expands, then possibly. However, we can't say *anything* about what would happen if the universe actually crunched to a singularity.  It's possible that it could re-expand into a new universe in a repeatable way.  Or it might not.

And furthermore, my a priori arguments against infinite regression still stand. They are independent of empirical confirmation.

Heh.  Arguments "from pure reason" are rather dangerous, since people don't have to agree with your base assumptions. However, it seems when we are discussing an ambiguous concept like God, this is all we have. Regardless, all this math is making this debate terribley boring. (again, no offense)

IMRAN
The traditional theist view is that God is timeless, He is outside of time. The Creator may be conceived to be causally, but not temporally, prior to the origin of the universe, such that the act of causing the universe to begin to exist is simultaneous with its beginning to exist.

Explain the difference between "causality" and "temporality". Explain how an atemporal being can have a temporal or causal effect. For that matter, prove that our universe is not atemporal.  (This is not self-evident, and depends in detail upon what one means by "temporal". See for instance Barbour's attempts to formulate the laws of physics in an inherently atemporal way, or the atemporal aspects of the Big Bang in the Hartle-Hawking no-boundary proposal coming from the Euclidean metric.)

And I agree with people like Hawking who write that to ask what happened before the universe began is like asking for a point on the Earth at 91 north latitude! On the creationist theory under discussion, the Creator sans the world would exist changelessly and, given some relational view of time, therefore timelessly and at the Big Bang singularity create both the universe and, concomitantly, time. For the Creator sans the universe, there simply is no time because there are no events; time begins with the first event, not only for the universe, but also for God, in virtue of His real relation to the universe. The act of creation is thus simultaneous, or coincident, with the origination of the universe.

No offense, but that sounds like the biggest load of meaningless philosophical B.S. I've seen in some time.  What does it mean? You're saying that the Creator "caused" the universe but didn't exist before the universe?  Or that the Creator existed before the universe but no time passed "until" the universe was create?  What does "until" mean?  What does "simultaneous" mean when you're talking about something atemporal?  Was the Creator atemporal but "became" temporal when the universe came into existence?  What does "became" mean in the absence of temporality?

Trying to explain how the illusion of temporality might arise from an inherently atemporal system might work, but trying to mix temporality and atemporality is quite another thing.

Probably none of these questions really get at what you're saying because what you're saying doesn't seem to actually mean anything.  It sounds like you're throwing a bunch of words at the issue in order to evade the question of "If the universe had to have a Creator then why didn't the Creator have to have a Creator?"

IMRAN
Theoretically speaking, empirical confirmation takes you back to a single mathematical point, a singularity of infinite density. But, as Fred Hoyle points out, there can be no object of infinite density, therefore, what the big bang theory requires, really, is the creation of matter out of nothing.

You're mistaken.

First, singularities aren't mathematically "objects of infinite density". Mathematically, what happens is the density increases without bound as you approach the singularity.  For that reason, one naively takes the limit and says that the density becomes infinite as you reach the singularity. But the singularity isn't even a place in spacetime -- it's like a "hole" in spacetime -- so it's impossible to define a field (such as density field) that describes anything physical there.  It's like trying to take the limit of 1/x as x->0 when 1/x is only defined on the interval (0,infinity) -- the limit doesn't exist, not becausee the function blows up at 0, but because 0 isn't part of the domain of the function.  In short, *general relativity can make no physical predictions about singularities* -- physical quantitites like density are simply undefined.

Second, Big Bang cosmology doesn't require a singularity.  In general relativity, that's what you get, but everyone expects general relativity to fail at high curvatures before you get there.  What is expected is that "something different" will happen at high curvatures that can't be described by classical geometry, and that it will later lead to the classical GR picture of an expanding universe.  In short, *general relativity can make no statements about whether the universe had a beginning*.

Third, even if the universe _did_ have a beginning, this does not imply the creation of matter out of "nothing".  It's not like the universe was empty and suddenly matter appeared within it.  It's not even like "suddenly the universe appeared" -- in order for that sentence to even make sense, you have to assume that there was a moment of time in which the universe didn't exist followed by a moment of time in which it did. What it's like is "the universe -- including time -- had a beginning", in the sense that there is no time that precedes some given time in the universe.

(Of course, another possiblity is one that I raised earlier:  time could be analogous to the interval (0,infinity), in which the universe is finitely old at any given time but _didn't_ have a beginning, because for any time there was some time before it.)

e mpirical confirmation points extremely strongly towards the finitude of the universe.

It's not clear whether you mean finitude in time, or space, but you are wrong either way. As for finitude in space, it's true that we can only observe a finite amount of space, but we have no reason to believe that this implies that space is finite.  Even if it were infinite, in an expanding universe we would only be able to see a finite amount of it at any time. As for finitude in time, the recent "accelerating expansion" results suggest that the universe will continue to expand forever (according to general relativity).  That covers empirical support for infinity into the future.  For infinity into the past, if you extrapolate GR backwards you of course get a finite age for the universe, but like I said, GR is expected to be WRONG before you get back that far.

And whats more, if you think otherwise, you will have to refute my a priori arguments against an infinite regress of temporal events as stated above.

Any mathematician who believes it's possible to do mathematics using the real numbers or even the integers will contest your "argument".

but you have not accepted the second premise. If you will not accept it, then you must show me that:

(i)  Empirical confirmation suggests that it is more plausible to believe in an eternal universe than a finite one.

No, we don't have to show that.  The point is to show that your argument is invalid.  Which conclusion is "more plausible" doesn't enter into it.

(ii) Refute my a priori arguments against an infinite temporal regression of past events.

Done.

Until you do that, I shall consider my two premises to be true

What empirical evidence supports your premises?

All in all, this debate is getting to the point where the public will suffer a headache while reading it. :(

Do you want to continue, or just move on with the assumption (which is outside the realm of modern science) that the big bang had a cause?

-Dionisio (Denis) Giron


From: Imran Aijaz 
Date: Sun Sep 17, 2000 2:42pm
Subject: The Great Debate III - The Kalam Cosmological Argument (1) - Whatever Begins To Exist Has A Cause..
 

Asalaamu'alaikum. The debate has gotten quite large, thus I am going to split
it into separate sections that cover the specific premises for sake of clarity
and ease in reading.

This part of my rejoinder will cover the causal premise, viz., that whatever
begins to exist has a cause of it's existence.

DENIS
> Okay, now, before I get to your points, I have one major question: what do
> you mean when you say that the universe has a cause? I attacked this
> conclusion without really considering the various possible meanings. For
> example, do you mean a conscious or deliberate cause, or a natural cause?
> The way I see it, rain has a cause, or to be more specific, rain is caused
> by something (this "something" being heat which causes the water to
> evaporate and collect in the sky, et cetera). I would definitely agree that
> rain has a cause, but I would see this as something natural not conscious
> (see Aristophanes' argument for why the rain is not caused by Zeus). Thus,
> it is very possible that the big bang (not necessarily the universe) had a
> cause. Regardless, please define what you mean by "cause".

IMRAN
When I speak of cause as related to al-Ghazali's syllogistic argument, I am
referring to a creating cause. As I said before, my sole aim with the
argument at this stage is to demonstrate that the universe has a cause which
brought it into existence. That's all. Whether it's a conscious or natural
one is irrelevant at this point in the debate. So I am arguing that it is
true that the universe has a productive cause, which is something that you
already believe (please confirm). Nevertheless, you have accepted the causal
premise that:

1. Whatever begins to exist, has a cause of it's existence.

as stated in your previous posting. I stated how the denial of this
principle would evoke a contradiction which you agreed with.

So, avoiding unnecessary comments on this any longer, I shall take it for
granted that you have accepted this principle to be true, and move on to
cover the second premise, which is more controversial.

--
Wasalaam,

Imran Aijaz

================================================

From: Imran Aijaz 
Date: Sun Sep 17, 2000 2:55pm
Subject: The Great Debate III - The Kalam Cosmological Argument (2a) - The Universe Began To Exist.
 

Asalaamu'alaikum.

In this posting, I shall give "a priori" arguments to support the premise that
the universe began to exist, and I shall also answer (and refute where
necessary) you comments and/or replies. Be forwarned everyone, that this
composition gets highly mathematical, so unless you are convinced that the
universe is eternal (or extremely interested!) I would suggest that you skip
this posting :-)

Basically, the reasoning employs a form of a reductio ad absurdum (reduction
to absurdity) to demonstrate the impossibility of an eternal universe. The
argument which I shall state and defend in this particular composition is as
follows:

  (i) If the series of past events is beginningless, then it constitutes
      either a simultaneously existing actual infinite or a series formed by
      successive addition.
 (ii) It cannot be a simultaneously existing actual infinite (first KCA).
(iii) It cannot be a series formed by successive addition (second KCA).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 (iv) Therefore, the series of events is not beginningless.

If we postulate an eternal universe, that means the number of temporal
events preceding the current moment (where we are now) is infinite in
magnitude. We can demonstrate this in a brief statement as follows:

{infinity <-- ... -3,-2,-1, 0} ['0' is the current moment]

Two points follow from such a postulation (of an eternal universe):

(x) The number of temporal events is an actual infinite collection.

(y) We are at the end of the sequence of events, in other words, we have
    crossed, or traversed an infinite regression of events.

To demonstrate the beginning of the universe via indirect proof, one would
need to reduce these derived propositions from our postulation of an
eternal/infinite universe to absurdity, and that is what I shall do :-)

o The Argument From The Impossibility Of An Actual Infinite
-----------------------------------------------------------

Using your terminology, let us label sequences of time as t(n), where the
letter n = -1, -2, -3, ... denotes specific 'moments' going back in time,
thus, our current time is t(0) = 0. So if the universe is eternal, we have
a completed set that is actually infinite. Let's get into some mental
gymnastics now ...

To illustrate why an actual infinite set cannot exist, I am going to resort
to Zeno's (Zeno of Elea) paradoxes ...

Zeno asked us to imagine a race where Achilles and a tortoise are going to
compete. Achilles, being the sportsman that he is, grants the tortoise a
head start. But when Achilles begins his run after the tortoise has reached
a certain distance then the supposition that a straight line on the
racetrack has an infinite number of points promotes a paradox. Zeno shows
that Achilles, in order to catch up to his opponent, must first arrive at
the point where the tortoise was. In so doing, the tortoise naturally has
advanced to another point on this racing line. Even if the tortoise only
moves a relatively short distance, Achilles still has the task of reaching
that point before proceeding any further. But, again, the tortoise has
already moved on to another point on the line. On the surface, Achilles
seems to be closing in on the tortoise, but since he must first traverse the
same points already covered by the tortoise then he will never overtake his
opponent.

In order for Achilles to catch up to the tortoise he must approach those
points already traveled by the tortoise. But when Achilles makes his move
the tortoise is also moving toward additional points on the race line. And
Achilles must reach those points before he can at least catch up to his
opponent. But since the tortoise is obviously not going to stop but keep
running, then Achilles still has the task of reaching those same points that
the tortoise has already covered. So,

If (t) is at 2 then (A) must traverse 1 to catch up.

If (t) is at 3 then (A) must traverse 2 to catch up.

If (t) is at 4 then (A) must traverse 3 to catch up.

If (t) is at 5 then (A) must traverse 5 to catch up ...

No matter how fast the turtle travels it seems assured that Achilles will
never catch up. The tortoise still retains victory since he knows that
Achilles must reach those same points before he can catch up. The tortoise
need only advance one more point, no matter how short a distance, in order
to ensure that Achilles could never catch up. The fact that a line contains
an infinite number of points entails that the tortoise can go as slow as he
wants and never lose a race with even the quickest opponent, so long as the
tortoise can begin the race with at least a one point handicap over his
opponent.

With this illustration in mind, consider the mathematical formula expressing
the impossibility of reaching the destination on an infinite line:

4 - 1 = 4

Because there are an infinite number of bisections that can obtain by
dividing some whole number an infinite number of times then there are an
actually infinite number of midpoints between two whole numbers. It seems
that we could multiply any whole number with an infinite number of divided
fractions and never achieve a result equaling the next whole number. This
seems to show that an infinite number of midpoints can never be achieved.

Is it true, then, that Achilles can never catch up with the tortoise as long
as the tortoise keeps moving? Of course he can. The problem with Zeno's
paradox is that there is no such thing as an actually infinite number of
midpoints. Instead, we see the number of times a whole number can be divided
as indefinite (or potentially infinite). Given the finitude of the real
points on the racetrack where Achilles and the tortoise are racing, Achilles
need only cover more finite points per every set of points covered by the
tortoise. This is what we call rate.

d = rt

Given a certain finite distance (d) to be traversed in some length of time
(t), then we can calculate how long it would take for the tortoise to cover
(d):

r = d/t

So, in order for Achilles to win the gold medal, he must have a rate (r2)
exceeding the tortoise's:

r2 > r

Given this, it is impossible to see how the tortoise could win the race as
long as the rate is within the bounds of the time allotted.

Therefore, if an actually infinite number of things really exists then such
a number results in self-contradictory answers. Zeno's paradox shows that
there cannot really be an actual infinite since this would imply that a
lagging racer could never reach his winning opponent no matter how long he
has and how slow the winner moves. These considerations rationally force us
to suppose that an actual infinite is just an idea in the mind and not
something that exists as a property in reality. Since time itself is a set
of discrete members partitioned by seconds, days, years, and so on, then
time must be a finite set of members.

Another one of my favourite paradoxes is that of Hilbert's Hotel. Craig
writes his own summary as follows:

"Let us imagine a hotel with a finite number of rooms. Suppose, furthermore,
that all the rooms are full. When a new guest arrives asking for a room, the
proprietor apologizes, "Sorry, all the rooms are full." But now let us
imagine a hotel with an infinite number of rooms and suppose once more that
all the rooms are full. There is not a single vacant room throughout the
entire infinite hotel. Now suppose a new guest shows up, asking for a room.
"But of course!" says the proprietor, and he immediately shifts the person
in room #1 into room #2, the person in room #2 into room #3, the person in
room #3 into room #4 and so on, out to infinity. As a result of these room
changes, room #1 now becomes vacant and the new guest gratefully checks in.
But remember, before he arrived, all the rooms were full! Equally curious,
according to the mathematicians, there are now no more persons in the hotel
than there were before: the number is just infinite. But how can this be? The
proprietor just added the new guest's name to the register and gave him his
keys-how can there not be one more person in the hotel than before? But the
situation becomes even stranger. For suppose an infinity of new guests show
up the desk, asking for a room. "Of course, of course!" says the proprietor,
and he proceeds to shift the person in room #1 into room #2, the person in
room #2 into room #4, the person in room #3 into room #6, and so on out to
infinity, always putting each former occupant into the room number twice his
own. As a result, all the odd numbered rooms become vacant, and the infinity
of new guests is easily accommodated. And yet, before they came, all the
rooms were full! And again, strangely enough, the number of guests in the
hotel is the same after the infinity of new guests check in as before, even
though there were as many new guests as old guests. In fact, the proprietor
could repeat this process infinitely many times and yet there would never be
one single person more in the hotel than before.

But Hilbert's Hotel is even stranger than the German mathematician gave it
out to be. For suppose some of the guests start to check out. Suppose the
guest in room #1 departs. Is there not now one less person in the hotel? Not
according to the mathematicians-but just ask the woman who makes the beds!
Suppose the guests  in room numbers 1, 3, 5, . . . check out. In this case
an infinite number of  people have left the hotel, but according to the
mathematicians there are no less people in the hotel-but don't talk to that
laundry woman! In fact, we could have every  other guest check out of the
hotel and repeat this process infinitely many  times, and yet there would
never be any less people in the hotel. But  suppose instead the persons in
room number 4, 5, 6, . . . checked out. At a single stroke the hotel would
be virtually emptied, the guest register reduced to three names, and the
infinite converted to finitude. And yet it would remain true that the same
number of guests checked out this time as when the guests in room numbers 1,
3, 5, . . . checked out. Can anyone sincerely believe that such a hotel
could exist in reality? These sorts of absurdities illustrate the
impossibility of the existence of an actually infinite number of things."

For further details, see:

http://www.newscientist.com/ns/990102/hilberts.html

Well, dunno about you, but I'm convinced :-)

o The Argument From The Impossibility Of Traversing The Infinite.
-----------------------------------------------------------------

Now comes a totally separate argument. Even if I grant that an actual
infinite can exist, it is still impossible to reach one through addition.
Remember, preceding the current moment (the end of the sequence of infinite
temporal events, t(0) = 0) there is an actual infinite set of temporal
events, in other words, we have crossed, or traversed the infinite. Can this
be possible? Certainly not.

In an attempt to demonstrate the difference between the reality of an
infinite and the idea of an infinite, Aristotle had suggested the terms
actual infinite (the completed whole value of infinity) and potential
infinite (an indefinite count susceptible to infinite addition).

For the sake of our discussion here, it will be necessary to elucidate the
concepts of set and subset, for the benefit and clarity of those who haven't
got a clue as to what I'm on about at the moment! The famous mathematician
Georg Cantor developed a system of categorizing groups of numbers as members
of a collective. This systematic arrangement is identified as set theory. A
mathematical set is a collection of mathematical members. We can label,
manipulate, and compare members of a set to another value, set, or whatever
a mathematician can come up with. For example, suppose that we wanted to
talk about a small group of friends whose names are Joe, Frank, and Wendy.
We can call this group set A:

A = {Joe, Frank, Wendy}

Within set A (the set that includes a closed circle of friends) are three
friends. This total number of friends is called the cardinal number. In this
example the cardinal number of friends we have is three. But what if we
wanted to talk about only two of the three friends? How would we categorize
them mathematically? When we begin pointing to members within a set, we call
this reference a subset or proper subset depending on how we do this. But a
subset to our example may include just Joe and Wendy. So, if A1 represented
the two friends we wished to discuss then:

A1 = {Joe, Wendy}

As you can see, set A has three members while subset A1 only has two
members. With this example in mind we can now graduate to a more abstract
usage of set theory. Consider the following:

A = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}

We can clearly see that any subset extracted from set A would have a
cardinal number no greater than five (A1 5). We could make A1 stand for {1,
3, 5} or {2, 4}. As long as our imagination is free to wander, we can come
up with any number of combinations. If we begin comparing two sets then we
can begin to see how mathematics begins to work its arithmetical magic.
Suppose subsets A1 and A2 are compared with set A:

 A = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
A1 = {1, 3, 5}
A2 = {2, 4}

We see that according to the principle that the "whole is greater than its
parts" we can never have a situation where a subset of A can be larger than
the original set A (remember the rule about cardinal numbers?). So, no
matter how we formulate a subset, it must always conform to this principle.
But when we repose the simple realm of finite numbers into the realm of
transfinite numbers, our world principle begins to break down. Sure, one
could easily look at this and say that this principle works with finite
numbers but not with transfinite numbers and avoid the complications
altogether. But I see this response unwarranted and arbitrary. It supposes
that transfinite mathematics can be categorized apart from finite mathematics.
This means that if I count to the highest finite number then the rule that
the "whole is greater than its parts" applies. This implies that if I count
one more number then the rule breaks down. So:

0, 1, 2 . . . finite n

0, 1, 2, . . . finite n + 1

But why should one more number make any difference to the rest of the set?
The truth is, it only works in the mental world of mathematics. But more
fundamentally, this is why the finite/transfinite distinction exists in the
first place.

Regarding the achievement of infinity by successive addition, Bertrand
Russell believed that an actual infinite could be accomplished as long as
the counter possessed an actually infinite number of years to complete the
task. In the example given in Sterne's novel, we have the example of
Tristram Shandy. Sterne writes about Tristram Shandy as an extraordinarily
slow individual committed to writing an autobiography. However, he is so
slow that it takes him one year of writing in order to complete only one day
of his personal history. This means that the most recent event that could be
recorded is the day that occurred only one year ago. As Shandy writes an
additional day, it takes him an additional year to complete the events of
that day. Russell uses this example and believes that an actual infinite can
be achieved through successive addition only if Shandy has an infinite
number of days to complete it.

Bertrand Russell suspected that a true life Tristram Shandy paradox could be
solved. For Russell, it is the individual who possesses an infinite number
of days. Of course mortal individuals possess merely a finite number of
days. According to Russell, this is the key to solving the apparent problem.
The paradox posits an autobiographer who writes on every day passed. Since
it takes Shandy one year (=365 days) to complete one day, then in terms of a
one-to-one correspondence with temporal history it would appear to be futile
on a finite level:

Observed History: 1 day, 2 days, 3 days, 4 days, 5 days, ...
Recorded History: 365 days, 730 days, 1095 days, 1460 days, 1825 days, ...

On the surface it would seem mathematically impossible for Shandy to
complete writing on all the days passed. Since each day yields an additional
365 days to write then it would seem that the longer Shandy wrote the
further behind he would get. Russell solves this mathematical problem by
suggesting an actually infinite number of years as the required antecedent
for finishing the task (and to be sure it is certainly a necessary
antecedent). The symbol often used to refer to a mathematical infinite is
the Aleph Null (which I shall label as '!0' since it does not appear in
plain ASCII text on my keyboard). As one observes the following equation, it
appears to suggest something not true of usual, finite numbers.

!0 + 1 = !0

The implication here is that since any number added to infinity is still
infinity, then the principle that the whole is greater than the parts does
not apply here. One component of the equation (!0) is quantitatively equal
to the sum of both components (!0 and 1). This is a good mathematical
illustration with the problem of the reality of an actual infinite we
already looked at. But concerning the adding of individual discrete parts to
total an infinite set, Russell asserts that given an infinite number of
years to write plus the infinite number of days written about results in an
infinite amount of time actually transpired. Thus, the amount of time to
write (if obtained) would be equal to the amount of time given to write
about. Therefore (Let d = days to write on; y = years to complete; t = time
obtained):

y(!0) + d(!0) = !0(t)

Russell believed that when the presence of infinity is seen all at once,
then the concept of infinity is something that can exist as a quantitative
property in the real world (he does not mean exist in the Platonic sense).

At this time I will briefly present two opposing views on Russell's
assessment of the Tristram Shandy paradox and the problem with an actual
infinite through successive addition.

Atheist philosopher Quentin Smith presents the Tristram Shandy paradox in
his essay on the existence of infinity in the past. His purpose is to show
that it is feasible to exist in a universe that does not have a beginning
(this is in contrast to the theistic belief that the universe began to
exist). Smith, with regard to Russell, makes this observation:

"the number of past days written about is a proper subset of the infinite
set of past days, and a proper subset of an infinite set can be numerically
equivalent to the set even though there are members of the set that are not
members of the proper subset. Just as the infinite set of natural numbers
has the same number of members as its proper subset of equal numbers, yet
has members that are not members of this proper subset (these members being
the odd numbers); so the infinite set of past days has the same number of
members as its proper subset of days written about, yet has members that are
not members of this proper subset (these members being the days unwritten
about)."

Smith maintains that the Tristram Shandy paradox is internally consistent in
the light of sets and proper subsets. If it is true that

 A = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, . . . !0
A1 = 2, 4, 6, 8, . . .!0
A2 = 1, 3, 5, 7, . . . .!0

then:

(1) The total numbers of proper subset A1 = The total numbers of set A.

(2) But, proper subset A1 does not contain the numbers of proper subset A2.

(3) Therefore, proper subset A1 contains the same numbers as set A while at the
    same time not possessing numbers found in proper subset A2.

Smith shows that set theory validates the Tristram Shandy story and shows
that the completion of his autobiography is ultimately possible.

Theistic philosopher William Lane Craig, in response to Smith, asserts that
both Russell and Smith have missed the real issue involved in the paradox.
Craig responds to Russell that

"the problem with this argument seems to be that while an infinite number of
years is a necessary condition of recording an infinite number of days at
the rate of one day per year, it is not a sufficient condition. What is also
needed is that the days and years be arranged in a certain way such that
every day is succeeded by a year in which to record it. But then it will be
seen that Tristram Shandy's task is inherently paradoxical; the absurdity
lies not in the infinity of the past but in the task itself."

Craig claims that instead of Shandy writing forever and catching up on
history, he would eventually be infinitely far behind. Craig further points
out that the picture Russell paints entails a beginningless task. That is,
if one were to ask "Where in the temporal series of events are the days
recorded by Tristram Shandy at any given point?" then, according to Craig,
one could only answer that the days are infinitely distant from the present.
It appears that for every day Shandy is writing, there is an infinite
distance from that day to the last recorded day. Craig shares with his
critics that Russell's assessment fails to consider the real problem of
consecutively counting to infinity.

On the question of an actual infinite, my sympathies are with Craig. I think
both Russell and Smith have failed to convince me otherwise. At this point I
will limit my response to Bertrand Russell's view of the Tristram Shandy
paradox. My observation of the matter seems to yield two problems with
Russell's justification.

First, if we observe what is really going on in the paradox then it becomes
apparent that it is logically unsolvable and not merely epistemologically
unsolvable. When we see that for each day there are 365 subsequent days of
writing, then I fail to see how Shandy "catches up" on the autobiography.
Mere comparisons of infinite sets and subsets bespeak the paradox's lesson.
It is precisely because an infinite proper subset equals an infinite set why
successive addition fails to obtain. It appears, then, that we are
discussing two different worlds: the finite and the infinite. So, if we
uphold the principle of correspondence then it would appear that Tristram
Shandy falls behind with each additional day he must write on. This makes
the task unending.

Second, if we grant Russell's solution by granting immortality to Shandy,
then it would appear that the problem is merely extended instead of solved.
In other words, there is no reason to adhere to an actual infinite via
successive addition by simply pushing back the length of the task to the
time of the task. The question now becomes, "Will temporal segments of
duration through successive addition arrive at an actual infinite?" Would we
not still be dealing with successive addition to the infinite? At this point
it would be absurd to respond by suggesting that such an achievement is
based on finite time because the argument now concerns time itself.
Therefore, it would be question-begging to merely extend the problem.

Having seen Bertrand Russell's attempt to prove the real possibility of
achieving an actual infinite through successive addition, we know a few
things. Even though the Tristram Shandy paradox of the slow autobiographer
was designed to show why such a successive addition is not possible, Russell
believed that the solution required Shandy to have an infinite number of
days to complete his task. Quentin Smith agreed with Russell's contention
and suggested the notion of sets and proper subsets to prove the point.
William Lane Craig suggested that Russell had focused on the wrong issue and
that the problem rested not in the necessary time to complete it but,
rather, on the sufficiency of consecutive counting. I concluded with two
reasons why Russell had failed to solve the puzzle. I had suggested that
Russell's solution actually increased the problem and then extended it to
successive segments of time.

These reasons constitute why an actual infinite cannot truly be achieved by
successive addition.

Sooooo ... ... where does this leave us?

The original format of the argument I gave at the start of this posting was
as follows:

1. If X, then either A or B.
2. Not A.
3. Not B.
----------------------------
4. Therefore, not X

In other words, our presumptive hypothesis of a past that is beginningless
is false, and has been refuted by demonstrating the falsity of the
postulated axioms which are derived from an eternal past, viz., an infinite
set of temporal events.

o Comments/Replies/Refutations Of Your Post
-------------------------------------------

DENIS
> Consider the sequence of negative integers ending at 0:
>
>      ...,-3,-2,-1,0
>
> This sequence is unbounded on the left, going to minus infinity.  But it is
> bounded on the right by 0.  This infinite sequence "ends," so your
> insinuation above that there is no such infinite sequence is false.

IMRAN
You've completely missed what I said. I am attempting a reductio ad
absurdum on the set {... -3, -2, -1, 0} and what I am asserting is that you
may be able to construct such a set hypothetically speaking, nevertheless,
it fails in it's applications as I have demonstrated via various paradoxical
illustrations, such as Zeno's Paradoxes, Hilbert's Hotel and Tristram Shandy,
which spawn all sorts of counter-intuitive absurdities.

DENIS
> Analogously, consider the infinite sequence of times t(n), n = -1, -2, ...
> where our current time is t(0) = 0:
>
> ...,t(-3),t(-2),t(-1),t(0) t(n-1) < t(n) for n = 0,-1,-2,...
>
> Same principle.  Unbounded on the left, "regressing" toward t = minus
> infinity, but bounded ("ending") on the right by t(0) = 0, our present time.
> Each t can represent a causal event.  The infinite sequence represents an
> infinite regression of causal events.

IMRAN
The concept of a finite series of causes and effects is logically
consistent. To see this, consider 100 dominos set up in line so that as one
domino falls, it strikes the next one, which falls and strikes the next, and
so on. If we push the first domino, we start a finite chain of causes and
effects that ends when domino number 100 falls. If there is no outside
interference (such as your cat jumping on the table where you have so
carefully constructed this experiment), then before domino number 100 can
fall, dominos 1 through 99 must fall. This is both logical, and what we
would expect to see.

On the other hand, the concept of an infinite series of causes and effects
is logically flawed. Consider again our row of dominos, except now it
extends off into infinity. There is no beginning, no domino number 1. For a
given domino in the line, let's call it domino A, we can ask the following
question: Will domino A ever fall? Before domino A can fall, all the dominos
in the sequence before it must fall. In the finite series of 100 dominos
mentioned above, this meant that dominos 1 through 99 must fall before
domino 100 could be reached.

For an infinite sequence, this means that an infinite number of dominos must
fall before domino A can even be reached. The problem is that an infinite
number of dominos will never finish falling, even if given an infinite
amount of time (i.e., forever). This is because no matter how many dominos
have already fallen, there would always be an infinite number remaining to
fall before domino A is reached. For domino A to fall would require an
infinite sequence be completed, something which by definition is impossible.

Hence, your holding onto the possibility of an infinite sequence of causes
preceding the current moment is fallacious.

DENIS
> Also, an infinite regress of causes does not imply an infinite amount of
> time since the time intervals between the causes may have a finite sum. Even
> if this sum is unbounded, there would be no event X in the past such that an
> infinite time has passed from X until now. There is no "first" event in this
> infinite chain.

If c(n), represents a cause, where n = -1, -2, -3 is the antecedent cause of
each contingent entity, you have a chain:

... c(-3) --> c(-2) --> c(-1) --> c(0)

where you may substitute your own existence for c(0). If, there is an
infinite regress of causes in time, then you, viz., c(0) would never
actuate, you would never come into existence because the infinite cannot be
traversed. And bear in mind this has nothing to do with the amount of time.

If we postulate an infinite regress of causes

{...c(-3), c(-2), c(-1), c(0)}

The only way the atheist has a way out of this is to say the universe is
eternal, to say, however, as you are saying, that an infinite regress of
causes is possible in a finite amount of time is sheer nonsense.
Nevertheless, I am not interested in time so much, my only comment on that
was that it is a possible exit for the atheist to state that the universe is
eternal, but this has already been dismissed, alongside further arguments
which have refuted the possibility of an infinite regress of temporal events.

Part 2a follows ...

--
Wasalaam,

Imran Aijaz

===========================================================

From: Imran Aijaz 
Date: Tue Sep 19, 2000 3:38am
Subject: The Great Debate III - Another KCA For FTMecca.
 

Asalaamu'alaikum. In this posting, I shall cover another version of the   Kal? argument for the existence of God, which avoids (partly) some of the   complex issues that were raised previously in our debate. I'm still going   through writing up responses to the remainder of your post, and that will   come out sometime later this week, as long as no major calamity (such as my   remembering of a due assignment!) comes up. Anyway, seeing how Auckland has   been under the spotlight regarding alleged terrorist activites recently, the   spirit of jihad has been aroused, hence I am engaging in cyber-jihad against   ye kuff? ... the haywan? of the AUAC (Auckland University Atheists Club)   and the NZARH (New Zealand Association of Rationalists & Humanists - the   Bait-ul-Iblis on 64 Symonds St, for those who are considering launching a   bomb attack) are presently hibernating - boredom being one of the reasons I   am launching yet another torpedo of kal? wizardry towards your group of   zan?iqah ... All?u Akbar! ... Let the battle begin ... @:-)
 

The form of this argument is concerned with existence in esse, in other   words, what I shall be discussing is simultaneous existence, and not causal   regression into the past as we are presently debating. We can schematize the   argument as follows:
 

Existence:
 
 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
 
 

1. Impossible.
2. Possible.
   2.1 Self-caused.
   2.2 Caused.
   2.3 Uncaused.
3. Necessary.

(a) There is existence:
 
 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
 

There is existence. This is undeniable, because one must exist in order to   deny that existence. Descartes "cogito ergo sum" is as far as I shall take   it with the defense of this premise, as I do not really have respect for   those who deny existence (such as some candidates for chronic dementia   treatment within the Auckland University Atheists Club and the NZARH)
 

(b) There is possible existence:
 
 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
 

Reality, I would argue, can be exhaustively classified into three types of   being, which is what the defenders of this argument asserted:
 
 

   (i) Impossible.
(ii) Possible. (iii) Necessary.
 
 

An impossible being cannot exist because it's attributes are logically   contradictory (i.e. square circles). A necessary being cannot not exist, in   other words, it must exist. A possible being has the possibility for   existence and non-existence. So far, so good ...
 

To see why there are possible beings, one must understand what a necessary   being would be, if, in fact, it did exist. Since it is impossible for a   necessary being not to exist, it cannot have any potentiality with regard to   existence. If it did, then its non-existence would be possible. But necessary existence cannot be this way.
 

Thus, a necessary being can have no potentiality with regard to existence.   Its existence is (1) pure actuality. Further, a necessary being must be (2)   immutable [unchanging]; obviously, for change to exist, there must be the   potentiality for change. However, a purely actual existence has no   potentiality with regard to its actuality. Therefore, a necessary being must   be unchanging. Notably, the attribute of (3) timelessness logically follows   from immutability because if there is no change, then there is no time.   Also, such a being must be (4) infinite [unlimited]. Only that which has   potentiality can be limited. But pure actuality does not have any potential;   so necessary existence is not limited, but unlimited. Furthermore, where   there is multiplicity, there is also limitation and potentiality. But since   a necessary being involves none of the latter, there can be no multiplicity   in its being; it must be completely (5) one. Lastly, necessary existence   must be (6) uncaused. Caused beings are moved from potentiality to actuality   and, therefore, change. But there is no change in an unchanging being.   Hence, a necessary being is uncaused.
 

In sum, a necessary existence must be:
 

(1) pure actuality
 

(2) immutable [unchanging]
 

(3) timeless [unbound by time]
 

(4) infinite [unlimited]
 

(5) one [without multiplicity]
 

(6) uncaused
 

Now it is known that reality can be categorized into three groups:   impossible, possible, and necessary. Impossible existence is eliminated   immediately because such cannot exist. So, if something exists at all, it   must be either a possible existence or a necessary existence. Thus, it   logically follows that whatever lacks the attributes of a necessary being   [#1 - #6 above] must be a possible being. But is there existence that lacks   the attributes of a necessary being? The answer to this question is   undeniably yes. First, the statement "there is no change" is self-refuting   because the very utterance must begin and then cease to exist (which implies   change). Second, matter is in constant fluctuation and can be separated into   parts (it has multiplicity with regard to being). Third, there are beings   that increase in age and are, therefore, limited and temporal. Hence, since   there is existence that lacks the attributes of a necessary being, there   must be possible existence.
 

(c) Possible existence is caused:
 
 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
 

There are three options with regard to the nature of possible existence: it   is either self-caused, caused, or uncaused. Self-causation is impossible;   for a being to be self-caused, it must be in potentiality so its actuality   can be caused. Further, it must be actual for it to cause its own existence.   Therefore, a self-caused being must be both in potentiality and actuality at   the same time, which is impossible. Also, a possible being cannot be   uncaused: I have already commented that the actuality of a possible being is only potential at every moment.
 

Thus, if possible beings are uncaused (no cause), then the actuality of   every possible being would be derived from possibility alone. If something   moves from potentiality to actuality without the causal action of another   being, and that something is actual, then mere potentiality (or possibility)   was the ground for that actuality. But that is absurd. Glasses have the   possibility to be filled with water, but the mere possibility for the glass   to be filled cannot actually fill the glass. Further, if mere possibility   makes things actual, then we would see every possibility being actualized.
 

But this is clearly false: possible beings like flying pigs and unicorns do   not exist. Thus, possibility does not ground actuality. Possible beings, at   every moment, must be moved from possibility to actuality by some other   actuality and cannot, therefore, be uncaused. Now, if possible existence is   neither self-caused or uncaused, it logically follows that such existence is   caused to be (in esse) by some actuality other than itself.
 

At this point, a summary of the argument's progress is crucial. First, it   has been demonstrated that something exists and that there is possible   existence [the fact that there is change, temporality, multiplicity, and   limitation shows that there are possible beings]. Second, it has been shown   that possible beings require a cause for moment-by-moment existence. Of   course, the question remains as to whether a necessary being actually exists, and that's what I'm going to cover now ...
 

(d) There is necessary existence:
 
 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
 

To see why there is necessary existence, we must examine the nature of   possible existence. It has been demonstrated above that the actuality of   every possible being is only potential at every moment. That is, at every   moment, all possible beings must be moved from potentiality to actuality in   order to exist.
 

Now, let it be assumed that no necessary being exists, that only possible   beings exist. Given this scenario, everything (all at the same time) would   need to be moved form potentiality to actuality in order exist. But, if   everything is in a simultaneous state of potentiality with regard to being,   there would be no actualization of being; whatever is in potential with   regard to its own existence cannot actualize the existence of another   (because to one must already be actual in order to actualize something else)   So, if possible existence is the only type of being, there would be no   actualization of being, and therefore, everything would cease to be. But   things do exist! (as was demonstrated above). So, possible existence is not   the only type of existence. But whatever exists is either possible or   necessary. Hence, there is necessary existence. This Necessary Being is   purely actual, immutable, timeless, infinite, one, and uncaused.
 

Now perhaps you will object here and say we do not need a Necessary Being.   There could be an endless chain of things mutually keeping each other in   being. This is wrong, because an endless chain of possible beings does not   ground the existence of anything. (Keep in mind, we are discussing current   moment-by-moment existence here, not casual regression into the past) In   this case, every member of the chain would simultaneously be in a state of   potentiality with regard to its own being, and yet be the cause of another.   But whatever causes the existence of another must already be actual. So,   granted this scenario, things would be in both a state of potentiality and   actuality at the same time, which is logically impossible. Consequently,   there would be no causation within the chain and, hence, everything would   cease to exist. But things do exist. So, even an infinite chain of possible   beings does not solve the problem.
 

This variation of the Cosmological Argument demonstrates that all possible   beings depend on a Necessary Being for their existence. This Being is purely   actual, immutable, timeless, infinite, one, and uncaused. Thus, we are left   with a Being who is:
 

(1) Purely Actual.
 

(2) Immutable.
 

(3) Timeless.
 

(4) Infinite.
 

(5) One.
 

(6) Uncaused.
 

Therefore, in light of the fore-going argument, I conclude it is rational to   believe God, as understood through the aforementioned attributes, exists.
 

--
Wasalaam,
 

Imran Aijaz


From: FreethoughtMecca Debate Team 
Date: Sat Sep 30, 2000 11:18pm
Subject: The Great Debate IV
 

Imran and the AUIS,
                  Sorry I took two weeks to reply... I was very busy with school and life, but I will now answer your three emails with regards to the "Great Debate."

> When I speak of cause as related to al-Ghazali's syllogistic
> argument, I am referring to a creating cause.

Well a conscious and creative cause is something you have not proven.

> As I said before, my sole aim with the argument at this stage is
> to demonstrate that the universe has a cause which
> brought it into existence. That's all. Whether it's a conscious
> or natural one is irrelevant at this point in the debate.

Fair enough.

> Nevertheless, you have accepted the causal
> premise that:
>
> 1. Whatever begins to exist, has a cause of it's existence.

Correction: I've agreed to accept that the Universe may have had a beginning, or been caused, but we have to both acknowledge that if we are going to accept this, we are throwing Quantum Mechanics out the window. Neither one of us have a major degree in Physics, and this is important, as siding with this point means we are rejecting major scientific theories. This is important.

> I stated how the denial of this principle would evoke a
> contradiction which you agreed with.

What? Did I? I don't recall that. The major contradiction has been with regard to saying that one thing cannot be eternal, but another can. We'll get into that as my reply goes on.

[...]

> Basically, the reasoning employs a form of a reductio ad absurdum
> (reduction to absurdity) to demonstrate the impossibility of an
> eternal universe. The argument which I shall state and defend in
> this particular composition is as follows:
>
> (i) If the series of past events is beginningless, then it
>  constitutes either a simultaneously existing actual infinite
>  or a series formed by successive addition.
> (ii) It cannot be a simultaneously existing actual infinite
>  (first KCA).

This has been the major flaw in your argument. You have not shown this to be true, rather you have merely asserted such, quite possibly due to a poor understanding of the concept of infinity
 

> (iii) It cannot be a series formed by successive addition
>  (second KCA).
> ----------------------------------------------------------------
> (iv) Therefore, the series of events is not beginningless.

Considering that this hinges on point two, and that point two is unproven, you have not formed a sound argument.

[...]

> The Argument From The Impossibility Of An Actual Infinite
> ----------------------------------------------------------
> Using your terminology, let us label sequences of time as
> t(n), where the letter n = -1, -2, -3, ... denotes specific
> 'moments' going back in time, thus, our current time is
> t(0) = 0. So if the universe is eternal, we have a completed
> set that is actually infinite. Let's get into some mental
> gymnastics now ...
>
> To illustrate why an actual infinite set cannot exist, I am
> going to resort to Zeno's (Zeno of Elea) paradoxes ...

I already told you that Zeno's paradox is considered a dead issue since Calculus (and even modern set theory). I'll try to show the problem here.

> Zeno asked us to imagine a race where Achilles and a tortoise
> are going to compete. Achilles, being the sportsman that he is,
> grants the tortoise a head start. But when Achilles begins his
> run after the tortoise has reached a certain distance then the
> supposition that a straight line on the racetrack has an infinite
> number of points promotes a paradox. Zeno shows that Achilles,
> in order to catch up to his opponent, must first arrive at
> the point where the tortoise was. In so doing, the tortoise
> naturally has advanced to another point on this racing line.
> Even if the tortoise only moves a relatively short distance,
> Achilles still has the task of reaching that point before
> proceeding any further. But, again, the tortoise has
> already moved on to another point on the line. On the surface,
> Achilles seems to be closing in on the tortoise, but since he
> must first traverse the same points already covered by the
> tortoise then he will never overtake his opponent.

Are you serious? You mean to tell me that you don't see the flaw in this analogy? Yes there is an infinite number of points on a given line of the track, but that does not mean Achilles cannot catch up. If they are gowing the same speed, then they will be covering the same units of space (e.g. 1 inch per second), and in that case, Achilles will never catch up. However, if the Tortoise is moving at one speed (1 inch per second) and Achilles is cover a faster speed (20 inches per second), he will draw closer and closer, and eventually pass him. The points the Tortoise will cover, will be covered at a greater speed by Achilles, understand? Therefore, this anaology does not dispute the fact that there is an infinite number of points on a line (furthermore, this seems strikingly unrelated to the discussion).

> No matter how fast the turtle travels it seems assured that
> Achilles will never catch up. The tortoise still retains
> victory since he knows that Achilles must reach those same
> points before he can catch up.

Why is that? What if Achilles is covering those points at a greater speed? did you even think this one out? The problem with the analogy is that it assumes that the two racers will cover the same distance in each stride. If Achilles is moving faster, he's covering the points at a greater rate. Also, in a given stride, each contestant will cover a limited amount of space, but on that line of space, there is an infinite amount of points. If Achilles covers a one-foot long space, you can divide that space up infinitely. There are 10 tenths of a foot, 5o fiftieths of a foot, and so on... 1/2, 1/3, 1/4, 1/5, et cetera. I can't believe that you actually think that this analogy refutes the fact that there is an infinite number of points on a line. You do realize that Mathematics has made alot of progress since Zeno's time (490 BCE), don't you?  The fallacy revolves around Zeno not ascribing an equal point unit to each racer. Achilles may cover 1/2 of a given amount of space, while the Tortoise only covered 1/5 of an equal amount of space.

> It seems that we could multiply any whole number with an
> infinite number of divided fractions and never achieve a
> result equaling the next whole number. This seems to show
> that an infinite number of midpoints can never be achieved.

Why do I get the feeling that you are still treating infinity as a number? You do not achieve infinity, please get that idea out of your head.

> Therefore, if an actually infinite number of things really
> exists then such a number results in self-contradictory
> answers.

And why is that? Draw a line that is four inches long. The line is four inches, but within that line there are an infinite number of points. Do you understand?

> Zeno's paradox shows that there cannot really be an actual
> infinite since this would imply that a lagging racer could
> never reach his winning opponent no matter how long he
> has and how slow the winner moves.

This is only assuming they are moving at the same speed. How can you not see this?

> Another one of my favourite paradoxes is that of
> Hilbert's Hotel.

Which happens to be another poor analogy. No offense, but it seems Hilbert, Craig, and yourself, all make the error of treating infinity as a given number.

> "Let us imagine a hotel with a finite number of rooms.
> Suppose, furthermore, that all the rooms are full. When
> a new guest arrives asking for a room, the
> proprietor apologizes, "Sorry, all the rooms are full."
> But now let us imagine a hotel with an infinite number
> of rooms and suppose once more that all the rooms are full.
> There is not a single vacant room throughout the
> entire infinite hotel.

You've committed a fallacy. You're trying to redefine "infinity" to fit your analogy. If all the rooms are full, i.e. if every last one is occupied, then there is a given and finite number of rooms. Understand? How would you know that the rooms are all full unless you knew the exact number of rooms, and the exact number of people? You're treating infinity as a number, thus your whole analogy falls apart right here. Your methodology is highly erroneous. If anything, you merely proved something that I already believed: that a hotel with an infinite number of rooms cannot exist. There is a limited amount of space on earth, and a limited amount of building materials, therefore, no matter how many rooms you add on, the number will always be finite. However, there is the potential to add an infinite number of rooms. Infinity does not exist with physical objects (or beings), but it does exist with measurements. Time is a measurement, therefore you can count backwards or forwards into infinity. What was the minute before time t? And the minute before that? and the minute before that? And so on, and so on.

> The Argument From The Impossibility Of Traversing The Infinite.
> ------------------------------------------------------
> Now comes a totally separate argument. Even if I grant that
> an actual infinite can exist, it is still impossible to reach
> one through addition.

Ummm, that's because infinity is not a number. you do not "reach infinity" or anything like that. You need to learn that infinity is NOT a number, though you continually treat it as such. this has been the major problem with the debate: you continuously treat infinity as a given (i.e. finite) number, and that is a contradiction.

> Remember, preceding the current moment (the end of the sequence
> of infinite temporal events, t(0) = 0) there is an actual
> infinite set of temporal events, in other words, we have
> crossed, or traversed the infinite. Can this
> be possible? Certainly not.

You have not proved this, rather you're just asserting it. If that were true, it would right here and now eliminate the possibility for the existence of your infinite being: God. Was God here 1 million years ago? Was He here ten billion years ago? What about ten billion times that; was He present that many years ago? That many centuries ago? Time is merely a measurement, not something physical, and you can count backwards infinitely.

> So, no matter how we formulate a subset, it must always
> conform to this principle. But when we repose the simple
> realm of finite numbers into the realm of transfinite
> numbers, our world principle begins to break down. Sure, one
> could easily look at this and say that this principle works
> with finite numbers but not with transfinite numbers and
> avoid the complications altogether. But I see this response
> unwarranted and arbitrary. It supposes that transfinite
> mathematics can be categorized apart from finite mathematics.
> This means that if I count to the highest finite number then
> the rule that the "whole is greater than its parts" applies.
> This implies that if I count one more number then the rule
> breaks down.

Here we go again. Please inform me as to what the "highest finite number" is. Does this exist? It does not. There is no such thing as "the highest finite number." Furthermore, even if there was such a thing as "the highest finite number," there is a contradiction in what you are saying. If such a thing existed you would not be able to count one more. If you were able to count one more, than OBVIOUSLY you were NOT at "the highest finite number." This next number you reach is one higher than the previous one, therefore the previous one was not the highest. Understand?

> Regarding the achievement of infinity by successive addition,
> Bertrand Russell believed that an actual infinite could be
> accomplished as long as the counter possessed an actually
> infinite number of years to complete the task.

And I agree 100%. However, we do not live infinitely.

> In the example given in Sterne's novel, we have the example of
> Tristram Shandy. Sterne writes about Tristram Shandy as an
> extraordinarily slow individual committed to writing an
> autobiography. However, he is so slow that it takes him one
> year of writing in order to complete only one day of his
> personal history. This means that the most recent event that
> could be recorded is the day that occurred only one year ago.
> As Shandy writes an additional day, it takes him an additional
> year to complete the events of that day. Russell uses this
> example and believes that an actual infinite can be achieved
> through successive addition only if Shandy has an infinite
> number of days to complete it.

Well, obviously, if it takes him a year to write a day, he'll continuously be behind (and that gap will continuously grow). So no, Shandy could not finish the book, that is unless he agreed to stop at a given point.

> As one observes the following equation, it appears to suggest
> something not true of usual, finite numbers.
> !0 + 1 = !0

Agreed, though I think you are confusing yourself into actually believing that "!0" is a real number.

> The implication here is that since any number added to
> infinity is still infinity, then the principle that the
> whole is greater than the parts does not apply here.

You're still treating infinity as a number. If you add 1 to something,  you are going to end up 1 more than your previous number, therefore your previous number was finite. Infinity is the ability to continuously add on, or take away from, endlessly.

> Atheist philosopher Quentin Smith presents the Tristram
> Shandy paradox in his essay on the existence of infinity
> in the past.

Quick note: much of Smith's writings (including his arguments that blow the cosmological argument out the water) can be found at the following URL:

http://infidels.org/library/modern/quentin_smith/

> Craig claims that instead of Shandy writing forever and
> catching up on history, he would eventually be infinitely
> far behind.

And I agree with Craig on this point. This is because time is elapsing faster than Shandy is able to cover it.

> On the question of an actual infinite, my sympathies are
> with Craig. I think both Russell and Smith have failed to
> convince me otherwise. At this point I will limit my
> response to Bertrand Russell's view of the Tristram Shandy
> paradox.

And I also agree that Shandy would never catch up, considering that time is, as I just said, elapsing fatser than he can record it. So, this makes me wonder who you are arguing with? Are you debating the Freethoughtmecca, or Bertrand Russell? Red herring? Strawman?

> The question now becomes, "Will temporal segments of
> duration through successive addition arrive at an
> actual infinite?"

I agree that the hypothetical Tristan Shandy will never catch up. However, in the above you are STILL treating infinity as a number. I thought you said you took modern set theory. You cannot reach, arrive at, or even approach infinity because infinity is not a number.

> Having seen Bertrand Russell's attempt to prove the real
> possibility of achieving an actual infinite through
> successive addition, we know a few things. Even though the
> Tristram Shandy paradox of the slow autobiographer
> was designed to show why such a successive addition is not
> possible, Russell believed that the solution required Shandy
> to have an infinite number of days to complete his task.

Regardless of time, the only way Shandy, or anyone else, could write such a biography, is if they were able to record information before it happens, i.e. write it faster than time is moving. so Russell was wrong; I agree with you. What's your point?

> Quentin Smith agreed with Russell's contention and suggested
> the notion of sets and proper subsets to prove the point.
> William Lane Craig suggested that Russell had focused on the
> wrong issue and that the problem rested not in the necessary
> time to complete it but, rather, on the sufficiency of
> consecutive counting. I concluded with two reasons why Russell
> had failed to solve the puzzle. I had suggested that
> Russell's solution actually increased the problem and then
> extended it to successive segments of time.
>
> These reasons constitute why an actual infinite cannot truly
> be achieved by successive addition.

You have not shown this at all, nor has your analogy. You are still treating infinity as a number, when it is not (to say infinity is a number is to say it is afinite, and that would be a contradiction). You showed that Russell and Smith was wrong, but you have not shown anything with regards to the existence of infinity. You cannot "achieve" infinity, but you can add into infinity, i.e. you can add an infinite amount of additions.

> Sooooo ... ... where does this leave us?
> The original format of the argument I gave at the start of this
> posting was as follows:
>
> 1. If X, then either A or B.
> 2. Not A.
> 3. Not B.
> ----------------------------
> 4. Therefore, not X

> In other words, our presumptive hypothesis of a past that is
> beginningless is false, and has been refuted by demonstrating
> the falsity of the postulated axioms which are derived from
> an eternal past, viz., an infinite set of temporal events.

Umm, excuse me, you have not shown this. You have put forth some totally unrelated analogies, and as I showed, they fall apart before you can even apply them simply because you continuously insist on treating infinity as a number.

> I am attempting a reductio ad absurdum on the set
> {... -3, -2, -1, 0} and what I am asserting is that you
> may be able to construct such a set hypothetically speaking,
> nevertheless, it fails in it's applications as I have
> demonstrated via various paradoxical illustrations, such as
> Zeno's Paradoxes, Hilbert's Hotel and Tristram Shandy,
> which spawn all sorts of counter-intuitive absurdities.

You did not demonstrate this. Zeno's paradox doesn't relate as it can only work if we force the assumption that Achilles and the tortoise are moving at the same speed (if not, we need to ascribe different point units to each racer). Hilbert's hotel goes out the window right away considering that it treats infinity as a finite number, thus the argument contradicts itself. The Tristan Shandy story does not apply because obviously Shandy will not catch up as time is moving faster than he is recording it. It's more an issue of his slowness, and his continuous lagging resulting in him being left further and further behind; this is not necessarily an issue with regard to infinity (except for the fact that no matter how much time Shandy has, he'll never catch up). In short, you have not shown that infinity does not exist. I would agree that it does not exist physically, as all things are finite, but with regards to measurements it does exist. Time is measurement, thus you can count backwards in time infinitely, therefore an infinite regress is very possible. Now for your domino analogy:

> On the other hand, the concept of an infinite series of causes
> and effects is logically flawed. Consider again our row of
> dominos, except now it extends off into infinity. There is no
> beginning, no domino number 1. For a given domino in the line,
> let's call it domino A, we can ask the following question: Will
> domino A ever fall? Before domino A can fall, all the dominos
> in the sequence before it must fall. In the finite series of
> 100 dominos mentioned above, this meant that dominos 1 through
> 99 must fall before domino 100 could be reached.
> For an infinite sequence, this means that an infinite number
> of dominos must fall before domino A can even be reached. The
> problem is that an infinite number of dominos will never finish
> falling, even if given an infinite amount of time (i.e.,
> forever). This is because no matter how many dominos
> have already fallen, there would always be an infinite number
> remaining to fall before domino A is reached. For domino A to
> fall would require an infinite sequence be completed, something
> which by definition is impossible.

This is a bit like asking which comes first in an infinite regress. What if it is understood that the dominoes were always falling, thus the one you saw just fall, was dropped by one previous, and so forth. Just the same, it applies to time. Before this minute, there was a minute before it, before that there was a minute before that, and before that there was a minute before that (such as 60 seconds before minute X took place). Something always precedes X, and something always comes after, and X is just a given point in infinity. This has already been covered. As was already said in my previous contribution to the debate, if you apply your same arguments to the real numbers, then you would be able to (incorrectly) conclude that it's impossible for the real numbers to exist!  After all, given any real number T, there is an infinite regress of real numbers that precede it.  Continuing your logic, you would say that T is at the end of an infinite number of real numbers, and thus there cannot be an infinity of real numbers.  But the sets (-infinity,T), (infinity,T], and (-infinity,infinity) are all infinite sets of real numbers. The thing to keep in mind here:  make sure your arguments about infintie sets of events apply equally to infinite sets of numbers. Also, with regard to dominoes, if we get to the first domino, that does not mean the domino did not have a cause; it could be caused by a finger, and the finger caused by something else, et cetera.

> Hence, your holding onto the possibility of an infinite
> sequence of causes preceding the current moment is fallacious.

You have not shown this, and I don't think, with all due respect, you can say this considering how poor your concept of infinity is. Your analogies have been mostly unrelated; the best analogy was the domino one, but this already appeared in a previous post from you, in a different form (minus the dominos), and it was already answered, and I answered it again above (there's a flaw in your logic that does not apply). This analogy actually appears a third time, in a third form, in the following from you:

> If c(n), represents a cause, where n = -1, -2, -3 is the
> antecedent cause of each contingent entity, you have a chain:
> ... c(-3) --> c(-2) --> c(-1) --> c(0)
> where you may substitute your own existence for c(0). If,
> there is an infinite regress of causes in time, then you,
> viz., c(0) would never actuate, you would never come into
> existence because the infinite cannot be traversed. And bear
> in mind this has nothing to do with the amount of time.
> If we postulate an infinite regress of causes
> {...c(-3), c(-2), c(-1), c(0)}

I've said it before, and I said it a second time above, and now I will say it for the third time: If you apply your same arguments to the real numbers, then you would be able to (incorrectly) conclude that it's impossible for the real numbers to exist! However, these points do exist within an infinite realm. your logic is flawed; I'm sorry. Furthermore, not only could such flawed logic discredit the existence of real numbers, but also the existence of God. God is allegedly infinite, i.e. he was always here. But by your logic His curent point in time could not be reached because there was an infinite number of minutes of existence prior. Theists try to say "God is outside of time," but that is absurd considering that time is simply a measurement, not a realm you can step outside of. Just the same, by your logic it could be argued that any point in time could not exist, as there were an infinite number of minutes that preceded it. In reality, all points are within the realm (or set) of infinity.

> The only way the atheist has a way out of this is to say the
> universe is eternal, to say, however, as you are saying, that
> an infinite regress of causes is possible in a finite amount
> of time is sheer nonsense. Nevertheless, I am not interested
> in time so much, my only comment on that was that it is a
> possible exit for the atheist to state that the universe is
> eternal, but this has already been dismissed, alongside further
> arguments which have refuted the possibility of an infinite
> regress of temporal events.

You have refuted nothing. Nothing has been dismissed, and you have done nothing but put forth faulty logic, unrelated analogies, and repeated cases of special pleading. I've shown that in this email.

Now we move onto your third and final email ("The Great Debate III - Another KCA For FTMecca." from Monday Sept 18).

> Existence:
> ----------
> 1. Impossible.
> 2. Possible.
>    2.1 Self-caused.
>    2.2 Caused.
>    2.3 Uncaused.
> 3. Necessary.
[...]
> To see why there are possible beings, one must understand
> what a necessary being would be, if, in fact, it did exist.
> Since it is impossible for a necessary being not to exist,
> it cannot have any potentiality with regard to existence.

This smells of the ontological fallacy (er, I mean argument). It sort of insinuates a circular logic, where one argues that "it cannot not exist because it must exist." However, I'll let you build on this, as I realize this is merely a point being made IF such a thing existed.

> Further, a necessary being must be (2) immutable [unchanging];
> obviously, for change to exist, there must be the potentiality
> for change. However, a purely actual existence has no
> potentiality with regard to its actuality. Therefore, a necessary
> being must be unchanging.

This doesn't necessarily follow. First of all, if the being does not change at all, it simply does not live it would seem. There is no interaction with the universe, because interaction involves some sort of change (thus, if you plan on saying that God is this necessary being, God cannot interact with people, i.e. send scripture, tell some savage Yahoodis to stone some poor sharmoota who cheated on her husband, et cetera). Furthermore, on what grounds do we assume that a potential being cannot change into a necessary being, and thus other potential beings rely on it. Or that a necessary beign changes into potential, et cetera.

> Notably, the attribute of (3) timelessness logically follows
> from immutability because if there is no change, then there
> is no time.

Now you're simply babbling. Nothing can be outside time. Every action has a beginning and an end, and an amount of time elapses between those two points. Time is simply a measurement. Being X was alive at 5:00, and being X was still alive at 6:00, therefore we have documented and measured a part of being X's life, and shown that being X is within time.

> Also, such a being must be (4) infinite [unlimited]. Only that
> which has potentiality can be limited. But pure actuality does
> not have any potential; so necessary existence is not limited,
> but unlimited.

Now you're starting to toe the line of contradiction. How can a living being be unlimited? Ulimited in what scope? Could we say unlimited in creative power? If so, then your previous assertion that impossible objects cannot exist goes out the window, as a being with unlimited power should be able to create a round square or a four sided triangle, else He/She/It is limited in what it can create. Maybe you should define "unlimited." All things are possible with regard to "omnipotence" and unlimited power.

> Furthermore, where there is multiplicity, there is also
> limitation and potentiality. But since a necessary being
> involves none of the latter, there can be no multiplicity
> in its being; it must be completely (5) one.

Oh please! Stop trying to sell your Jewish philosophy here. The Jews came up with this silly concept that the Mighty Phantasm that pushes people around can only be one (based on numerous absurd ideas) and we, living in a western society, actually swallow this nonsense because we are conditioned to believe it. Sunni crypto-Jews have not proven that Tawheed is a fact, rather this is an assertion rooted in patriarchal Jewish thinking put forth by a bunch of Yahoodi goat herders 2,000 years ago (which was adopted by Greeks in the 1st century, Romans in the third, and Arabs in the seventh). This is the whole, one dictator, one chieftan, one father, one husband logic, thus one mighty phantasm ruling on high from his cosmic throne. You should consider the book "Ahteism: A Philosophical Justification" pp. 101-106, where Michael Martin confronts William Craig's version of the cosmological argument. As Martin puts it, "at most [assuming we accept it is valid,] the Kalam argument shows that some personal agent or agents created the universe. Craig cannot validly conclude that a single agent is the creator. On the contrary, for all the argument shows, there may have been trillions of personal agenst involved in creation." Your idea that this being is one is based on your assertion that it must be unlimited (not explaining what that means), thus you cannot claim such at this time. In short, without further debate, I think I've shown the weakness of your arguments.


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