On November 9, 1989, the Berlin Wall collapsed under the pressure of a popular protest movement in East Germany. Less than a year later, on October 3, 1990, Germany was reunited and a gigantic transformation project was launched which was intended to bring the former German Democratic Republic to West German standards within a short period of time. The political and legal aspects of this transformation worked out rather smoothly, yet economically the five new federal states are still lagging behind. However, what has given rise to a heated public debate about the success or failure of German unification is the alleged persistence of a distinct East German identity which is said to manifest itself in a ‘clinging on’ to values of the former collectivist socialist system which are incompatible with the new individualistic, democratic, and social market economy of the united Germany. I will argue in the following that what is often referred to as ‘Ostalgie’, namely the seemingly nostalgic glorification of the former East German society, is in fact one way chosen by many former East Germans to come to terms with, and to provide a certain continuity to, their individual and collective identities vis-à-vis of their socialization in the German Democratic Republic. However, as this happens in the light of the experiences they have had since unification, the attempts to acquire a new social competence appropriate for the conditions of the unified Germany express the claim of the former citizens of East Germany to be entitled to create these conditions alongside and together with West Germans.
Identity is a closely knit
set of values, norms, ideals, and interests which actors consciously share
and from which they derive their course of action. Identity is a
product of collective as well as individual historic and current experience
and, as such, it is equally rooted in public events and private experiences
and has to be re-constructed constantly according to such past and present
experiences and their interpretation. Identity provides controlling
guidelines for social behavior and it ensures behavioral coherence by systematically
structuring values and rational considerations (Pye 1965: 7). Any
individual or collective identity is always dependent upon, and changing
with, a concrete historical context in both a wider social and a narrower
individual sense. In turn, differences in identities, that is, differences
in values, norms, ideals, and interests, account for the fact that individual
and collective actors, although facing identical socio-economic and political-structural
conditions, make different choices and take different courses of action.
As such, identities also reflect the way in which actors come to terms
with their own biographies and their social environment and how they relate
self-expectations to social expectations (cf. Habermas 1975: 96).
This mutual relationship between actor and social environment is the place
where individual identities are negotiated and where collective identities
emerge as a blend between individual and cultural systems, that is, where
individual identities integrate into a group-specific concept distinct
from the perception of others and by others.
An individual as well as
a collective identity, then, is the mesh of all those specific values,
norms, ideals, and interests that allow individual and collective actors
to interpret, and assign meaning to events and processes in both normative
and pragmatic ways. Social movement theory refers to this as ‘frame’,
that is, an interpretative scheme that simplifies and condenses the social
environment outside the specific group by selectively highlighting and
interpreting objects, situations, actions, and events (Snow and Benford
1994: 137). Such frames tend to provide problem identification as
well as potential problem resolutions. A shared collective identity
provides leaders with three essential capabilities: first, the ability
to generate loyalty and commitment to the collectivity; second, the
ability to foster an awareness of problems and their potential resolutions;
and, based on this, third, the ability to create a readiness to engage
in collective action for the realization of collective goals. Participation
in such collective action offers the individual not only the potential
benefits implied in the resolution of the commonly identified problem,
but also an enhanced sense of identity through the public pronouncement
of his or her own status and affiliation with others (Friedman and McAdam
1994: 157). Thereby, the size of the respective collective can vary.
The following case study refers to two basic types of collectivities: small
circles of (intellectual) dissidents and a population majority outside
the political class and the opposition groups.
The major form of opposition
to the state socialist system in East Germany was emigration. All
those people who, for economic and/or political reasons, wanted to leave
the country, were thus expressing an individual dissatisfaction with East
German life opportunities and political conditions. This form of
opposition had existed since the state’s foundation in 1949, but became
an increasingly political issue after the 1961 construction of the Berlin
Wall. In focusing on the individual right to emigrate, it did not
amount to organized group activity and was, with few exceptions (most notably,
the Initiative Peace and Human Rights), not accepted by the opposition
groups as a legitimate form of opposition. These groups saw the decision
to leave the country as a personal choice and did not condemn it;
however, they considered it different from a political commitment to reform
East German society which presupposed physical presence in the GDR (Meckel
and Gutzeit 1994: 66). Thus, those who wanted to leave the country
because of their fundamental opposition to its political system gave no
significant input to the more organized opposition groups, which did not
oppose the socialist system in the GDR in general, but rather a number
of policies and conditions. Their general aim was the reform, not
destruction, of GDR socialism (Pollack 1994d: 14; Jander and Voß 1995:
902).
These reform-oriented opposition
groups began to emerge in the early 1960s. The first group of people
who joined together in their discontent with a particular policy were a
number of conscientious objectors, reacting to the 1962 introduction of
conscription in East Germany. Focusing on the individual right to
refuse military service and instead to do some sort of community or social
service, they were supported by the Protestant Church in efforts to achieve
legal reforms that would have allowed for conscientious objection.
In 1972, they founded the “Peace Seminar Königswalde” (named after a small
town in the GDR) and, by doing so, they introduced a very important organizational
form for opposition groups in future years (Franke 1994: 17). In
the late 1970s, another kind of opposition group developed from within
the Protestant church: peace and environmental activists that had
their roots in social work activities of the church in the early seventies
(Franke 1994: 18). Their concern was primarily with ‘global problems’
of war and peace and environmental destruction, rather than with ‘domestic’
necessities for political and social reform – although the 1978 introduction
of compulsory pre-military education in East German schools was among the
triggering events. Generally, the motivating factors for these groups
to organize did not come from inside the GDR, but were of a global, cross-bloc
nature. They included the accelerating arms race in the early eighties,
increasing cold war tensions (deployment of nuclear missiles in both East
and West Germany), and growing awareness of environmental problems (Club
of Rome Reports, Global 2000 Report) (cf. Jander and Voß 1995: 907).
Recognizing and accepting individual responsibility for (anonymous) collective
action, these groups and their members insisted on the individual right
to contribute to global causes (Bruckmeier 1993b: 19). Their dissatisfaction
with the politics of both Eastern and Western Germany led to a rejection
of claims to be a political opposition and prompted attempts to act as
mediators between the two political blocs. Even though they criticized
the militarization of East German society, they explained it in terms of
bloc confrontation, and they did not seek to change this militarization
process only within the GDR.
It was only in the early
eighties, and increasingly after the failure of the peace movement in 1985,
that a new approach was followed: a combination of demands for world
peace and domestic peace. Besides these topics, new political issues
appeared on the agenda of the opposition groups: focusing on internal
problems of the GDR, the problem of human rights, and the respect of those
rights by the state, became important. The opposition realized that
the guarantee of individual and political liberties was impossible without
a simultaneous democratization of society. The emerging identity
of the opposition groups was determined by specific aims and values which
each of the groups had adopted for itself in accordance with its primary
focus. Although before the mid-eighties these groups were mostly
apolitical and under-organized and did not effectively engage in networking
with one another, they had a number of common features that had developed
since the early 1960s. These eventually made it possible for them
to gain a common identity, although only for a brief period of time.
These common features were: a partial identification with certain actual
values of the political system in East Germany, such as social security,
social justice and equality, and anti-fascism; and an identification with
the proclaimed values of socialism, such as progress and continuation of
progressive traditions, citizen participation, peace, peaceful coexistence,
and solidarity. In addition to these ‘group-external’ (GDR-specific
as well as global) objectives, the groups also cultivated ‘group-internal’
goals. These, in turn, partly reflected external ambitions, such
as the longing for an ability to act in a wider social context, the introduction
of democratic procedures to activities and discussions within the group,
and a general openness towards new members and new ideas (Elvers and Findeis
1994: 99).
The explicitly left-wing,
reform-communist approach the groups favored was an expression of a predominant
political romanticism among them, which manifested itself in an escape
from political reality into inner emigration. They avoided any risk
of confrontation with the state by means of adjustment and compromise,
turning instead to the private sphere and neglecting the need to analyze
the ruling system critically (Jander and Voß 1995: 903). One of the
reasons political romanticism was so influential among these opposition
groups was the lack of a democratic national tradition in (East) Germany.
Another was the belief that socialism was a viable social system that,
even in its state-socialist form, was capable of reform. The Protestant
church applied a similar strategy (Bruckmeier 1993b: 17–19) with its orientation
towards communication and participation in public affairs, provided that
a minimum of organizational and theological independence could be preserved.
The focus on both communication and participation resulted in an identity
common to most of the opposition groups: they did not see themselves
as potential political parties but instead aimed at promoting a dialogue
between the state and a mobilized population willing to participate actively
in the democratic process yet to be established. These particular
features of the opposition groups’ identity became problematic when translated
into mobilization and action, and proved to be a difficult basis for acting
together. For a long time, individual group activity did not have
political intentions to reform society; rather, it was aimed at delivering
individual contributions to proclaimed values of the ideal of socialism
with which most of the groups identified. There was only joint and
nation-wide activity in response to state suppression of group activities.
Not only did the groups have shared interests that were based on the common
features of their identity, but they also acted in commonly accepted ways.
The major objectives of the groups included the goal to act within the
official legal boundaries and to appeal to proclaimed values and norms
of the GDR’s socialist society in order to ensure improvements of socialism,
rather than its overthrow. This commitment to socialism, however,
posed another difficulty for the groups’ ability to command a large portion
of the electorate beyond 1989 – none of them offered a potentially viable
social alternative to the existing system for the majority of adjusted
GDR-citizens, nor did they offer an alternative for those who identified
with West German consumer society, i.e., those wishing to leave the country.
By focusing on civic elements of political culture (such as public dialogue
and liberalization), the economic situation – and with it the living conditions
which most concerned the majority of the population – was almost entirely
neglected by the opposition groups. Thus, the identity of the opposition
groups increasingly distanced them from the victims of the social, economic,
and political developments in the GDR (cf. Klein 1995: 1063).
This identity of the various
opposition groups proved to be of little attraction to a majority of the
population. More generally, the status that came with this ‘opposition’
identity did not function as an incentive motivating widespread public
participation, let alone activism (cf. Friedman and McAdam 1992: 157).
The groups’ political romanticism resulted in a general lack of trust in
their competence to bring about any change that would materially benefit
the average GDR citizen, and the groups’ ideas had very little impact (Pollack
1994d: 14; Jander and Voß 1995: 901). The emphasis on communication
(between state and citizen) and participation (of the citizens in the political
process) instead of withdrawal into privacy or emigration (Jander and Voß
1995: 905) did not resonate with a politically apathetic population that
was guaranteed social security by the state in exchange for a minimum of
demonstrated political compliance. Although the opposition groups
and major parts of the population identified partly with the GDR, they
did so for different reasons and this resulted in an even wider gap between
them. The opposition groups, with their mostly reform communist approach,
identified with those socialist values and ideals that had already been
realized and believed in the possibility of reform within the socialist
system in order to realize more of these values and ideals. The majority
of the population, however, had adjusted to the system because they appreciated
the social security provided by the state and identified with those aspects
of society that provided for a more or less comfortable life and allowed
for retreat to the private sphere.
The identity of the opposition
groups, thus, did not correspond to the collective identity of a majority
of GDR citizens, which was characterized by several factors: political
compliance up to the degree necessary to be able to enjoy both social security
and privacy; passivity in contributing to the political process in
support of, or in opposition to, the system; an interest in an increased
living standard measured against West Germany which was hoped the state
could provide without necessitating any active involvement on the part
of the citizens; and a strong feeling of solidarity and community.
As part of this collective identity, identification with the state, as
such, was only partially in national terms. The continuing attraction
of West Germany, especially in terms of its average living standard, had
a strong impact on East German identity, one which blended what was appreciated
in the GDR and what was lacking in one German state but apparently possible
in the other. Towards the end of the 1980s, something like a target
identity came into being which expressed the growing economic and political
disaffection with the East German situation and was strongly oriented towards
the West (Köhler 1995: 1668). However, this did not result in an
increasing desire for unification, let alone belief in the possibility
of such a development. Until late 1989 and early 1990, improvement
of life opportunities was sought within an East German state which was
due to the, if only partial, identification with this state rather than
the West German state.
Throughout the existence
of East Germany until 1989, the level of collective political agency among
the population had remained extremely low – with the exception of the events
on June 17, 1953. The tacit agreement between the communist rulers
and their population was that political involvement was restricted to periodical
ritual acclamations of the regime in exchange for a secured living standard.
In addition, East German experiences with collective political agency in
the GDR (June 17, 1953) as well as those of other countries in the East
Bloc (Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968, Poland 1980 onwards) did not encourage
hopes for similar attempts at regime change.
Towards the end of the 1980s,
the GDR was threatened by three simultaneous, self-intensifying crises
(Bruckmeier 1993b: 26ff): a political crisis, an economic crisis,
and a social crisis. The political crisis was the result of a general
unwillingness and inability to allow for reforms, which the population
had hoped for in the light of Gorbachev’s policies, and of the simultaneously
decreasing ability to manage an ever more complex and differentiated society
as a single organization (Pollack 1994d: 14). These crises became
most apparent in the 1989 local elections. The opposition groups,
which had long been concerned about the lack of democracy and public communication,
took this event as an opportunity to become actively politically engaged.
After an attempt to nominate independent candidates failed, the groups
organized a nationwide control of the vote counting and reported election
frauds to public prosecutors, though without any success at the time (Jander
and Voß 1995: 908). By doing so, they continued to contrast proclaimed
ideals to GDR reality, but this time on a national level and not within
the geographical limits of single group activity. This commitment
and the repressive response by the state organs increased widespread politicization
and led, during the summer of 1989, to the emergence of political platforms
of opposition groups who were urging more vehemently than ever for public
communication and citizen participation. The economic crisis manifested
itself in the decreasing ability of the state to keep its promise of a
continuing increase in the living standard among the population.
Simultaneously, the destruction of the environment obviously increased.
Both issues negatively affected the GDR citizens’ quality of life.
The economic crisis was closely linked to the social crisis of increasing
disaffection with a socialist system: it was unable to satisfy popular
demands for higher living standards and the freedom to travel.
All three crises meant that
the collective identity of political passivity and complacency, which the
majority of East Germans had adopted, began to become less and less attractive
as the state was ever less able to deliver the promised rewards.
As a result, when the opportunity presented by the opening of the Austrian–Hungarian
border for East Germans arose, a massive wave of emigration shook East
German society. With the party remaining silent in face of increasing
confusion and unrest among the wider population, the opposition groups,
the activities of which had been monitored by West German media for a long
time (Heinze and Pollack 1994: 89) were seen as an alternative source of
information or even an alternative public. Thus, the population initially
turned to the opposition groups and made their pre-’Wende’ existence and
activities a symbol of popular protest (Pollack 1994b: 277). The
groups themselves made no attempt to mobilize the public; on the
contrary, as they were afraid of being made accountable for a potential
violent escalation of the mass protests, the opposition groups withdrew
from the public, media-effective participation in the mass demonstrations.
They also preferred to act as mediators in a society-wide dialogue, a position
they did not want to endanger (Pollack 1990: 301ff). Moreover, this
reluctance of the opposition groups to participate in the mass movement
explains why Berlin remains the center of group activity throughout the
‘Wende’, not only detached geographically from Leipzig (and to a lesser
degree Dresden) but also in terms of organized protest (Bruckmeier 1993a:
60). The protest movement emerged spontaneously as a result of the
power balance in East Germany: as soon as the crisis was full-blown
and it became obvious that the political system was unable to fulfill its
promises, the almighty political leadership could be held responsible for
the situation and all blame directed at it (Pollack 1990: 276ff).
While the small number of
opposition groups had been active for some years already, mass political
activities were a new phenomenon in East Germany. Since the workers’
protests in 1953 no widespread popular movement had challenged the state
and the ruling communist party. Although dissatisfied with a variety
of living conditions in the GDR, a majority of the population had adjusted
to the political system and its economic conditions. Until the end
of the 1970s, the percentage of people regarding the living conditions
as good or very good had, on average, been twice as high as those regarding
them as poor, and always more than 50 percent regarding them as mediocre.
(For these and the following figures see Köhler 1995: 1655ff.) After
1979 these figures were turned upside down. Despite a slight improvement
in 1986–87, by 1989 almost three times more people were dissatisfied than
satisfied. A similar development could be observed for attitudes
towards the political system. Until 1978 the number of supporters
was higher than that of opponents, with again about half of the population
indifferent; this changed in 1979, and by 1989 almost four times
more people considered themselves opponents than supporters of the political
system. Thus, 1989 marks the year when both political as well as
economic dissatisfaction reached record highs and eventually resulted in
collective action against these conditions. The population only gradually
became politicized against the political system of the GDR despite the
fact that orientation towards political and economic conditions in West
Germany had been consistently high.1 It was only in 1989 that the
yardstick ‘living conditions in West Germany’ was translated into political
action as a result of the changed opportunity structure presented by policy
changes in the Soviet Union and the examples set by Poland and Hungary.
As a result, a wide-spread shift in one decisive feature of identity occurred:
a shift away from passivity and retreat into privacy toward active and
public political participation. This political activity, however,
was still aimed at an improvement of living conditions within the GDR.
The mass protests already
signal the emergence of a new political identity: GDR citizens started
to see themselves as sovereign and masters of their own destiny.
This identity gradually shifted its focus from reforms in the GDR (in order
to approximate West German living standards) to German unification.
The mass movement in Leipzig – the most active and conscious expression
of political identity among the population during the ‘Wende’ – with its
increasing support for German unification is the most obvious manifestation
of this. Although initially a rather spontaneous movement, it soon
came to carry all the characteristic features of conscious collective agency.
It had clear and unifying objectives, namely an improvement in living conditions,
an increase in political liberties, and the overthrow of the corrupt political
leadership. Its course of action was through peaceful demonstrations
involving ever greater numbers of people. The increasing attention
to German unification clearly shows the impact of identity and historical
contingency on collective agency: the choices made by the population
were a specific response to the opportunity of German unification against
the background of a particular structure of their identity shaped under
the conditions of their socialization in East Germany. This identity
involved a certain material orientation, the desire for political passivity
in exchange for secured living conditions, and the inclination to accept
the care-taking role of a political system endowed with the competence
and legitimacy provided by forty years of successful political and economic
development. The East German Christian Democrats together with two
former opposition groups – the Demokratischer Aufbruch (Democratic Renewal)
and the Christian Social Union – seemed to be more trustworthy representatives
of the continuity with this tradition than the Social Democrats.
This widespread perception among the East German population explains the
more or less unexpected election victory of the Christian Democrats, the
defeat of the Social Democrats alongside with other former opposition groups,
and the growing enthusiasm for German unification.
This development of the
population’s collective identity was very different from that of the opposition
groups, and these differences explain why the former opposition groups
were unable to command higher support during the elections. These
differences in identity also reflect the difference in responses under
the same political structural conditions. The objectives of the opposition
groups were to establish a society-wide dialogue about the current crisis,
to create opportunities for widespread popular participation in social
reforms, and to introduce political and individual liberties and their
constitutional guarantees within a reformed socialist society in the GDR
(Rein 1989: 15–16; 34–37; 106–109; etc.). The opposition groups,
due to their higher degree of organization compared to the rest of the
population, were the nuclei around which popular protest could build and
with the help of which it could be articulated (Bruckmeier 1993a: 42; Heinze
and Pollack 1994: 89). This does not mean that the aims of the opposition
groups and those of the majority of the population coincided. While
the primary aim of the majority within the oppositional groups was still
the establishment of a sphere of communication between state and population,
the majority of the population were most interested in an improvement of
the ever worsening economic situation in which they found themselves (Pollack
1994d: 14).
There was, however, a minimal
consensus between the opposition groups and the population condemning the
current situation and, above all, a consensus against the hegemonic rule
of the communist party. The opposition groups were seen, and used,
as facilitators of a dialogue between a declining political system and
its representatives and a deeply dissatisfied population. The particular
position of the opposition groups as neither leaders nor representatives
of the masses (even though they were used to articulate protest and communicate
with the ruling party) as well as their own view of their role, prevented
them from actively struggling for power and a position of political influence
(the most notable exception here being the later Social Democratic Party).
Even after the Round Table was set up in December, 1989, the grass-roots
democratic popular movement’s concept of political participation prevailed
among most groups, adhering to the concept of the round table as an alternative
way to conduct the political process by means of reconciling adverse, antagonistic
positions (Maaz 1991: 112).
The reformed former bloc
parties (Christian Democrats, Liberal Democrats, and National Democrats,
who had, together with the communist party, formed the so-called democratic
bloc in Eastern Germany after 1945), in contrast, maintained their party-political
identity. In the eyes of the GDR population, they managed to overcome the
general competence deficit characteristic of almost all East German political
actors, as they were adopted by their West German sister parties.
The newly formed Social Democratic Party in the GDR and a minor conservative
party, the DSU (German Social Union) were soon to enjoy this advantage
as well. With the sudden possibility of German unification and, as
a consequence, with the potential of satisfying demands for improved life
opportunities, the population began to withdraw its initial support from
the less coherently acting former opposition groups and turned to more
promising political actors – the reformed former bloc parties, the new
liberal and conservative parties, and the new Social Democratic Party.
These parties were entrusted with the legitimacy and competence of their
West German sister parties and their impressive and seemingly trustworthy
leaders, such as chancellor Helmut Kohl and foreign minister Hans-Dietrich
Genscher. They also seemed to be able to statisfy the increasing hope among
a majority of East Germans that someone else would improve their living
conditions for them. The possibility of participating actively in
the project of social reform seemed a more attractive perspective than
what the opposition groups had to offer, and consequently, support for
the opposition groups decreased. In an opinion poll carried out at
the Leipzig Monday demonstrations, the support figures for the Neues Forum
dropped from 70 percent in November, 1989 to only 47 percent in February,
1990, not to speak of the disappointing 1990 election results of the Alliance
90 (the election alliance of three of the opposition groups) of only 2.9
percent of the overall vote (Haufe 1993: 120).
At a time when almost all
achievements and values linked to the still existing GDR were being devalued
and increasingly meaningless in the eyes of a population majority looking
forward to a rapid unification and the promise of ‘blooming landscapes’
in Eastern Germany, the argument by the opposition groups for reforms within
an independent GDR was a very obvious minority position. The possibility
to regain the initiative and act jointly – which had been briefly achieved
after October 4, 1989, with the foundation of the contact group of all
opposition groups – was also diminished by arguments about the organizational
structure and a lack of leadership (Heinze and Pollack 1994: 90).
With the resulting increase in political and organizational differentiation
among the opposition groups and German unification becoming the pre-dominant
election campaign issue, the initial advantages of the citizens’ movement
(loose framework of goals, dialogue orientated, grass-roots democratic
approach) became a decisive disadvantage for their performance in the election:
the lack of a comprehensive political program, the lack of charismatic
leadership, and the lack of legitimacy and competence in the eyes of the
electorate accounted for the defeat in the election in March, 1990.
After the tearing down of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, the opposition
groups had been confronted with an entirely different situation dominated
by national issues and reunification, which they were not prepared to handle
from either an organizational or programmatic point of view (Bruckmeier
1993a: 52). The very general demands of the opposition groups served
as a framework in which a wide range of interests could be incorporated.
With the realization of these interests, however, such generality turned
out to become a decisive disadvantage in its lack of political vision and
concrete social alternatives for identification and consequently for mobilization
and action.
DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE UNIFICATION
Despite the fact that former
East Germans have had very different individual experiences since October
3, 1990, I contend that it is nevertheless possible to reconstruct a specific
East German identity, defined as an identity regionally and historically
distinct from that in former West Germany, on the basis of collective experience
prior to, and after, unification.
The transformation process
in the former GDR in the course of which the legal, political, economic,
and social systems of former West Germany were introduced to the East,
led to a serious identity crisis. Some examples of this transformation
process include: the devaluation of all personal and social achievements
in the former GDR; the biased approach to personal biographies and
GDR history on the part of political actors from the West and the instrumentalisation
of this history; the economic transformation and crisis resulting
in high unemployment rates and a devaluation of work as part of a person’s
identity; the deconstruction of social relationships (increased individualization,
different life styles, and increased social and economic competition);
the disappointment following the artificially raised high expectations
about German unification; the wide range of theoretically possible
choices, which were practically limited by material and informational constraints;
the complexity of the new society and of social, administrative and political
processes; and the inability to appreciate and embrace the majority
of values offered from the ‘new’ society. Social competence was lost
for the time being and with it the ability to interpret comprehensively
and assign meaning to a wide variety of social and economic processes and
political events. This identity crisis produced a number of compensation
modes: first, an initial resignation and apathy, and in extreme cases
even suicide; second, the attempt to identify completely with all
new values, norms, and ideals, and the rejection of anything even remotely
GDR-related; and third and most common, the examination of one’s
self and one’s past in the GDR and the GDR in general with approaches ranging
from critical evaluation to nostalgic appreciation of the past. This
latter approach has generated a heated debate about the alleged glorification
of the GDR, oftentimes termed ‘Ostalgie’. With the actual unification
in October, 1990, the core interests which prompted the drive to unification
and which were derived from the desire for improved living conditions and
increased life opportunities, had been satisfied for the moment, while
at the same time only remotely familiar values of a liberal democracy (social
market economy, party competition, high degree of individual liberty, independence
and responsibility) were adopted. These immediate interests, once
satisfied, ceased to function as cornerstones for identification and left
behind them a vacuum which could not be easily filled by those new values,
norms, ideals, and interests that the united Germany offered by way of
introducing the West German model to the East.
Within this process, there
seems to be hardly any room for the former opposition groups, which have
become marginalized in the transformation process and now command only
an insignificant proportion of the vote in East Germany above the local
level. The gap between collective identity among the majority of
former East Germans and the political identity of the former opposition
groups has, if anything, become wider. The issues that the Alliance
90/The Greens (the party that emerged from the unification between the
West German Green Party and the East German election alliance) stand for
are far from popular in the East: neither is environmental protection
seen as a priority in a situation where unemployment has reached an average
level of about 20 percent in 1997, nor is the issue of the Stasi (former
East German secret police) highly popular among a population that resents
the fact that the public discourse about the GDR past in all its aspects
has been, and still is, dominated by West Germans.
The more general problems
the opposition groups encountered during the transformation process were
similar to those that had become obvious as early as the run-up to the
elections in March, 1990. Most goals they had were aimed at, and
had been developed under, GDR conditions, and there were hardly any concepts
related specifically to the time after the election. With goals either
fulfilled or irrelevant, an important part of their identity was lost –
lost not only for the opposition groups themselves, but also lost as a
potential basis for identification on the part of supporters and subsequent
mobilization. Apart from that, the consequences of the peaceful revolution
of 1989–90 were different than those aimed at initially. The belated
distancing of the opposition groups from socialism and its being discredited
in the unification euphoria in 1990 deprived the opposition groups of an
essential part of their legitimacy (Pollack 1994c: 270f). While before
1990, developments in other East European countries, especially in Hungary
and Poland, demonstrated the possibility of democratization under socialist
conditions, this source of legitimization for the East German opposition
groups ceased to exist. In addition, the political situation in the
totalitarian GDR system allowed a quantitatively small minority to achieve
political attention by symbolic action; the political system of united
Germany, in contrast, is a system of party competition where much depends
on the resources each party commands to present itself as being the most
attractive among a broad range of political choices. The opposition
groups lacked these resources both in terms of personnel and in terms of
finances. While it was possible for the individual to feel superior
vis-à-vis the rather simple, ineffective, and immobile system of the GDR,
the highly complex political system of West Germany produced a feeling
of inferiority. This experience influences the preparedness to engage
in political activities as the potential impact of a citizens movement
is considered low (Pollack 1994b: 283). And, finally, the members
of the former opposition groups experienced the same social insecurity
as the majority of former East Germans. For many, political activities
could not remain a priority when jobs were threatened and rents rose.
Many of the former activists, therefore, resigned from active politics,
thus further increasing the lack of personnel (cf. Pollack 1994a: 303).
At the same time, the former
East German population, including the former opposition groups and their
members, faced, and still faces, a biased Western German approach towards
the GDR and the role of the individual citizen within it, condemning the
GDR and likewise everyone who finds anything good about it. Although
there are certainly uncritical, whole-sale appraisals of the GDR and also
significant political and economic interests involved, the above mentioned
‘Ostalgie’ is more properly described as an attempt to review the GDR past
critically and, seeking historical continuity, to incorporate life histories
and socialization experience in the GDR into a new identity within the
united Germany. At close examination, it turns out that those issues
and aspects of GDR life with which former East German citizens identified
already before 1989, and which were part of the identity of the opposition
groups as well, are among the core values named first by East Germans when
asked about their nostalgic feelings. In 1990, 87 percent of East
Germans assumed that the then still existing GDR was, compared to West
Germany, superior in terms of women’s rights, 65 percent said the same
about social security, and 62 percent were of that opinion in terms of
protection from crime. By 1995, these figures had changed as follows:
women’s rights superiority – 67 percent, social security – 92 percent,
protection from crime – 88 percent (cf. Der Spiegel 1996: 64–70).
In addition, an increasing number of people claimed in 1995 that the former
GDR had provided better services in several areas, including professional
and vocational training (70 percent in 1995 and 33 percent in 1990), education
(64 percent and 28 percent), availability of aparments (53 percent and
27 percent), and health care (57 percent and 18 percent) (cf. Berliner
Zeitung 1995). This does not express the desire for a restoration
of GDR conditions at large; it symbolizes instead a longing for a
particular life quality that people enjoyed in East Germany. It was characterized
primarily by secure living standard and wide ranging social equality with
a limited number of choices which were available to all, and a general
feeling of social justice and solidarity among people. Before 1989,
these were the conditions under which a specifically East German identity
had developed. This identity had represented an appreciation of such
values as equality, justice, security, and solidarity and it had brought
about typical behavioral patterns to cope with the shortcomings of a society
that provided an institutionalization of these values but demanded a certain
political complacency.
The insistence on a number
of values that do not have the same status in the eyes of former West Germans
is not only a natural attempt to maintain a certain life-historical continuity
as part of one’s individual identity. It should also be seen, and
appreciated, as an attempt to re-construct and re-define individual and
collective identities among a population that had been socialized under
dramatically different economic, political, and social conditions and now
has to cope with severe changes in its living environment for which an
entirely new social competence is needed. This social competence
cannot be established without a self-assurance regarding one’s individual
and collective identity. As a complex, regionally specific, and historically
and politically conditioned phenomenon, ‘Ostalgie’ is not simply an aspect
of consumer politics favoring East German products or of identity politics
preferring the particular party or candidate that best expresses the alleged
ethno-cultural distinctiveness of East Germans. It is also an attempt
to resist the biased discourses about the GDR-past that are cultivated
by both the extreme left in the former East Germany and the whole specter
of political parties in the former West Germany.
Many political and economic
actors try to exploit the phenomenon of ‘Ostalgie’ but they are not really
able to control the process. Different value priorities among East
and West Germans do not so much result from political manipulation of the
electorate, but rather from distinct socialization patterns in East and
West before unification (cf. Schmidt 1995: 10; Noelle-Neumann 1995:
27; Der Spiegel 1996: 64–70). Against this background, it is
quite obvious that the values attached to social security and solidarity
rank much higher among East Germans than the values of traditional political
liberty. This pattern has been persistent in surveys since April
1990 when East Germans for the first time encountered the actual availability
of political liberties but contrasted those against fears of possible unemployment
(85 percent), increasing crime (83 percent), increasing egoism and social
competition (78 percent), and rising prices (69 percent) (Förster and Roski
1990: 86; for later surveys see especially Noelle-Neumann 1995: 27
and Der Spiegel 1996: 64–70). This does not mean that East Germans
do not value the liberties they are now able to enjoy, it simply means
that their value priorities are influenced by the socialization processes
they underwent in the GDR which have had a significant impact on their
identity.
However, these value priorities
are also influenced by the experiences East Germans have had since the
unification of Germany: experiences of subordination and, to a lesser
degree, neglect, at the hands of West Germans. This status contrasts
sharply with the ability to be the master of one’s own destiny in a living
environment in which one is socially competent to act, as experienced during
the peaceful revolution. It is also in contrast to the expectations
raised about German unification and to socialization patterns in the GDR,
where the state actively portrayed itself as performing the role of a father,
taking care of the needs of its obedient children. This desire for
political passivity under more or less secured living conditions, which
the West German welfare state is still able to provide and the lack of
leaders charismatic and legitimate enough to mobilize the dissatisfied,
explains why – despite the enormous demands vis-à-vis East Germans in the
transformation process and a widespread dissatisfaction with its economic
and social outcomes so far – collective agency among East Germans is, if
anything, expressed in protest voting and abstention rather than in a new
protest movement. This shows, at the same time, an appreciation of
democratic values and opportunities, such as articulating discontent by
means of voting and abstention, but it also shows that East Germans are
disillusioned about their own ability to influence political decisions
actively as a ‘minority’. Most importantly, all the above described developments
in the identity of former East Germans signify that what is referred to
as ‘Ostalgie’, namely the nostalgic feeling for the GDR past, is actually
something completely different: East Germans are standing up for
their individual and collective past, that is, their socialization in a
politically different system with all its consequences, in order to be
able to re-construct and re-define their particular East(ern) German identity.
This is not just a backward feeling of nostalgia, but more importantly
a future-oriented self-assurance that implies the claim for self-determination
within a united Germany.
REFERENCES CITED
Berliner Zeitung (1995):
Egozentrik setzt sich durch. In Nationale Identität, Heinz Engelstädter
et al. eds., 16. Berlin: dip. (Reprint of an article in Berliner
Zeitung, 1/8/95).
Bruckmeier, Karl (1993a):
Die Bürgerbewegungen der DDR im Herbst 1989. In Die Bürgerbewegungen
in der DDR und den ostdeutschen Bundesländern. Gerda Haufe and Karl Bruckmeier
eds., 29–77. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
Bruckmeier, Karl (1993b):
Oppositionsgruppen in den achtziger Jahren. In Die Bürgerbewegungen
in der DDR und den ostdeutschen Bundesländern. Gerda Haufe and Karl Bruckmeier
eds., 9–28. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
Der Spiegel (1996):
Der Geschmack der Freiheit. In Der Spiegel, 1996(45): 64–70.
Elvers, Wolfgang and Hagen
Findeis (1994): Die politisch alternativen Gruppen im gesellschaftlichen
Wandel. In Leipzig im Oktober. Wolf-Jürgen Grabner et al. eds.,
97–111. Berlin: Wichern.
Förster, Peter and Günter
Roski (1990): DDR zwischen Wende und Wahl. Berlin: Linksdruck.
Franke, Ulrike (1994):
Geschichte der politische alternativen Gruppen in der DDR. In Die
Entzauberung des Politischen. Detlef Pollack et al. eds., 14–34.
Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt.
Friedman, Debra and Doug
McAdam (1992): Collective Identity and Activism. In Frontiers
of Social Movement Theory. Aldon D. Morris and Carrol McClurg-Mueller eds.,
156–173. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Habermas, Jürgen (1975):
Können komplexe Gesellschaften eine vernünftige Identität ausbilden?
In Zur Rekonstruktion des Historischen Materialismus, 92–126. Frankfurt
am Main: Suhrkamp.
Haufe, Gerda (1993):
Die Bürgerbewegungen im Jahr 1990. In Die Bürgerbewegungen in der
DDR und den ostdeutschen Bundesländern. Gerda Haufe and Karl Bruckmeier
eds., 78–158. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
Heinze, Christiane and Detlef
Pollack (1994): Zur Funktion der politisch alternativen Gruppen im
Prozeá des gesellschaftlichen Umbruchs in der DDR. In Leipzig im
Oktober. Wolf-Jürgen Grabner et al. eds., 82–90. Berlin: Wichern.
Jander, Martin and Thomas
Voß (1995): Die besondere Rolle des politischen Selbstverständnisses
bei der Herausbildung einer politischen Opposition in der DDR auáerhalb
der SED und ihrer Massenorganisationen seit den siebziger Jahren.
In Materialien der Enquete-Kommission Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und Folgen
der SED-Diktatur in Deutschland. Deutscher Bundestag (12. Wahlperiode des
Deutschen Bundestages), 7(1): 897–986. Baden-Baden: Nomos and Frankfurt
am Main: Suhrkamp.
Klein, Thomas (1995):
Widerspruch und abweichendes Verhalten in der SED. In Materialien
der Enquete-Kommission Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und Folgen der SED-Diktatur
in Deutschland. Deutscher Bundestag (12. Wahlperiode des Deutschen Bundestages),
7(1): 1031–1079. Baden-Baden: Nomos and Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Köhler, Anne (1995):
Nationalbewuátsein und Identitätsgefühl der Bürger de DDR unter besonderer
Berücksichtigung der deutschen Frage. In Materialien der Enquete-Kommission
Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und Folgen der SED-Diktatur in Deutschland.
Deutscher Bundestag (12. Wahlperiode des Deutschen Bundestages), 5(2):
1636–1675. Baden-Baden: Nomos and Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Maaz, Hans-Joachim (1991):
Das gestürzte Volk oder Die unglückliche Einheit. Berlin: Argon.
Meckel, Markus and Martin
Gutzeit (1994): Opposition in der DDR. Köln: Bund-Verlag.
Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth
(1995): Kein Schutz, keine Gleichheit, keine Gerechtigkeit.
In Nationale Identität. Heinz Engelstädter et al. eds., 27. Berlin:
dip. (Reprint of an article in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 8/3/95)
Pollack, Detlef (1990):
Das Ende einer Organisationsgesellschaft. In Zeitschrift für Soziologie,
19(4): 292–307.
Pollack, Detlef (1994a):
Einstellungswandlungen der Gruppenvertreter nach der Wende. In Die
Entzauberung des Politischen. Detlef Pollack et al. eds., 286–304.
Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt.
Pollack, Detlef (1994b):
Strukturwandlungen der Gruppen, Bürgerinitiativen und Bürgerbewegungen
nach der Wende. In Die Entzauberung des Politischen. Detlef Pollack
et al. eds., 274–285. Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt.
Pollack, Detlef (1994c):
Umstellungsprobleme. In Die Entzauberung des Politischen. Detlef
Pollack et al. eds., 269–273. Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt.
Pollack, Detlef (1994d):
Ursachen des gesellschaftlichen Umbruchs in der DDR aus systemtheoretischer
Perpektive. In Leipzig im Oktober. Wolf-Jürgen Grabner et al. eds.,
12–23. Berlin: Wichern.
Pye, Lucian (1965):
Introduction: Political Culture and Political Development. In Political
Culture and Political Development, Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba eds., 3–26.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Rein, Gerhard (1989):
Die Opposition in der DDR. Entwürfe für einen anderen Sozialismus.
Berlin: Wichern.
Schmidt, Golo (1995):
Trotz Differenzen – Deutsche wachsen zusammen. In Nationale Identität.
Heinz Engelstädter et al. eds., 10. Berlin: dip. (Reprint of
an article in Berliner Zeitung, 17/1/95)
Snow, David A. and Robert
D. Benford (1992): Master Frames and Cycles of Protest. In
Frontiers of Social Movement Theory. Aldon D. Morris and Carrol McClurg-Mueller
eds., 133–156. New Haven: Yale University Press.
1 Those indifferent towards the GDR’s political system decreased by half, from 67 percent in 1973 to 32 percent in 1989, and of these, the overwhelming majority regarded the living conditions in West Germany to be better than in the GDR. At the same time, the number of people who had strong political interests but hardly identified themselves with East Germany rose from 19 percent in 1973 to 59 percent in 1989, while those politically interested and did identify themselves with East Germany, decreased from around 15 percent in the late seventies to nine percent in 1989.
back to Avez-vous Bourbon?
home to Reisen durch die Vergangenheit