18/12/99
Originally a paper for International Law.
We are living in a unique time-time of great changes worldwide. Among other global problems, problems of States', peoples', ethnic and other groups' interaction are one of the firsts to demand urgent solution. While calls for human rights and rule of law are strengthening day by day the controversies and conflicts in the world become more and more anxious and disturbing. It has been calculated that 52 of the 309 land borders between countries-more than one in six- is currently in dispute(1) . Of these, some 40-or almost 80 % of all those disputes- are among the countries which emerged following the collapse of the Soviet Union, a pattern making this an especially key concern in that region(2) .
The purpose of this paper is to give a legal analysis to two conflicts in the territory of the former Soviet Union: the most protracted conflict in the region- the conflict over the territory of Mountainous Karabakh(3) and one of the most bloody conflicts in the same region- the war in Chechnya.
The International Legal Context of the Basic Terms Subject to������
the Topic.
Analysis of the conflicts is impossible without the analysis of the applicable norms and principles of international law. These conflicts are very important for the future shape of international law as they touch upon the very fundamentals of international law such as self-determination and territorial integrity.
The fundamental rights to self-determination has been codified in a number of international documents: in the first articles of the Charter of the United Nations (UN) and both International Covenants constituting the International Bill of Human Rights, in numerous other international documents where this right is given a great importance in the present and future shape of the world and described as a "measure to strengthen universal peace" (UN Charter Art 1 (2)).
UN SC Resolution 2625 (XXV) defines self-determination as following:
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined in the Charter of the UN, all peoples have the right freely to determine, without external interference, their political status and pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
Similar definitions were given in the Covenants of International Bill of Human Rights and other legal documents.
Another principle- territorial integrity is one of the fundamental and well-established principles of international law. Respecting the other states' territorial integrity is considered to be one of the primary means of maintaining peace and stability in the international community(4) . This principle was enshrined in Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and again in Article 2(4) of the Charter of the UN. According to this principle every State has the right to preserve its political and territorial unity and exclusive sovereignty over its territory.
There are two phenomenon - self-secession and irredentism- that contradicts to this principle and legality of which is hotly debated.
Self-secession occurs when part of an independent state or non-self-governing territory separates itself from the whole in order to become independent state (5).
. Irredentism involves advocating of the "acquisition of some region included in another country by reason of cultural, historical, ethnic, racial or other ties(6) .� Therefore seceding elements seeks not to become independent, but to be associated with or integrated into another state, usually because of an ethnic affinity with that state(7).
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Self-Determination and Territorial Integrity: Conflicting or Coinciding Principles.�
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Some international legalists suppose that there is a fundamental conflict between self-determination and territorial integrity, which definitely demands breach of one of these fundamental rights when dealing with them. Such approach also poses a question of predominance of one of these principles over another.
If to follow such approach it should be noted that in almost all international legal documents the right of peoples to self-determination follows with the clause strictly confirming the inviolability of territorial frontiers and territorial integrity of sovereign states. Here are some examples.
The General Assembly (GA) Resolution 1514 (XV) "The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples" -the most important GA resolution to associate the concepts of self-determination and decolonisation clearly declares in paragraph 6: "Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations".
The Helsinki Final Act of August 1, 1975 which constitutes the guidelines for the scope and procedure of the OSCE also frames self-determination in territorial limit. Principle VIII (Equal rights and self-determination of peoples) states:
"The participating States will respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination, acting in all the times in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with relevant norms of international law, including those relating to territorial integrity of States.
The commitments taken in this Document were fully reaffirmed later in Charter of Paris (1990), Lisbon Summit and in Charter for European Security recently adopted in Istanbul Summit of OSCE.
All of that allowed some legalists as well as states (e.g. India) argue that territorial integrity always prevails over self-determination. Moreover, some even claimed that the GA Resolution 1514 (XV) apply only to the "peoples under colonial rule". Pr.Gros Espiell writes: "The right [to self-determination of peoples] does not apply to peoples which are not under colonial or alien domination since Resolution 1514 (XV) or the other UN instruments condemn any attempt aimed against�territorial integrity of a country (8).
Such logic also allows to claim that since there is virtually no more colonies the importance of self-determination of peoples is gone. However, such interpretation of self-determination was rejected, as it would endanger the universality of the principle pointing out that according to paragraph 1 of the GA Resolution 2625 (XXV) self-determination constitutes the fundamental right of all peoples. Nevertheless self-determination has been framed by territorial integrity even in this document. Paragraph 7 of this resolution provided:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraph shall be construed as an authorizing or encouraging any action, which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political union of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or color.
This paragraph gives far-reaching results for interaction of principles of self-determination and territorial integrity. First of, all as we see, the territorial integrity under this clause is stipulated with the existence of representative government. Second, the existence of states able to preserve their territorial integrity and at the same time "conduct themselves in compliance with equal rights and self-determination of peoples" denies the existence of contradicting fundamental principles of international law.
International law despite all the statements about fundamental clash of principles of self-determination and territorial integrity have rather broad variety of means and instruments to solve such problems in many cases. Such statement can be implied with regard to the restrictions imposed against absolute understanding of both these principles and variety of possible options available thus fixing precisely defined legal basis for solution of the problems regarding to self-determination of peoples and territorial integrity of a State.
In addition to the provisions listed above regarding territorial integrity and imposing limitations to self-determination it should also be noted that not every group of people have right to self-determination. In absolutely all the legal documents the right to self-determination is granted only to peoples as such. Minorities (national, ethnic, linguistic, religious etc.) have no right to determine their political status.
Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and political Rights provides:
In those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language.
No right to self-determination is granted to minorities under the provisions of Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities adopted by GA Resolution 47/135 (Dec18, 1992) either.
Article 2 (1) of this declaration gives similar but a bit more precise definition to the rights of minorities stating:
Persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities (hereinafter minorities) have the right to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, and to use their own language, in private and in public, freely and without interference or any form of discrimination.
There is no mention of self-determination in this document. Moreover the penultimate Article 8 paragraph 4 of this declaration particularly notes:
Nothing in the present Declaration may be construed as permitting any activity contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, including sovereign equality, territorial integrity and political independence of States.
�� The 1991 Report of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on National Minorities also declares that national minorities form "an integral part of the society of the States in which they live" (9).
Such approach to minorities has been reaffirmed in the practice of the international institutions (UN, ICJ, OCSE etc.) and States too in number of cases.
In 1921 when solving the dispute of territorial integrity of Finns and claim to self-determination of Aaland Islanders, which were overwhelmingly Swedish, the Commission of Rapporteurs appointed by the League of Nations concluded that the Aaland Islanders, unlike Finns, were not a "people", but simply a "minority". Minorities, the Commission declared, could not be treated "in the same manner or on the same footing as a people as a whole", and in particular were not entitled to right to self-determination (10).
The principle of territorial integrity clearly prevailed over irredentist desires of Aaland islanders.��
� Another example from recent history could be found in Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission Opinion 2, which dealt with the Serbian population claims to self-determination in Croatia and Bosnia where they comprised approximately one third of total population. Claims of Serbian minority had been rejected.� In its Opinion 2 the Arbitration Commission held that "the Serbian population in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia must afforded every right accorded to minorities under international conventions as well as national and international guarantees consistent with the principles of international law�" (11).
Such distinction between peoples and national minorities raises new problems. Since only peoples are entitled to self-determination in contemporary international law, many ethnic groups, which are minorities also identify themselves as peoples and claim a right to self-determination (12). Moreover, if people can be defined as "nation", then ethnic groups may be able to claim to be a people (13). Such definition would endangered the principle of territorial integrity and therefore the peace and stability in the world. That's why there has been imposed number of limitations to the extent of self-determination.
First of all the means of obtaining independence via self-determination have been seriously restricted. The International law establishes the following modes of implementation of self-determination: free association or integration with an independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people. However, the international institutions and states rejected to recognize secession from an independent State as a mean to achieve self-determination.
The Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission Opinion 2 when solving a complicated dispute with regard to self-determination claims of Serbian population in Bosnia and Croatia proclaimed an explicit predominance of territorial integrity over self-determination. Paragraph 1of the opinion clearly formulates this:
It is well established that, whatever the circumstances, the right to self-determination must not involve changes of existing frontiers at the time of independence except where the states concerned agree otherwise.
Such treatment of self-determination expresses the position of the majority of States willing to preserve their territorial integrity. Thus, as a rule, in the case of dispute between territorial integrity of independent State and self-determination of people living in its territory only internal aspect of self-determination is applicable under the provisions of international law. Claims that the legal principle of self-determination supports the secession of parts of an existing State also have generally been rejected (14). With the single exception of Bangladesh whose independence was due more to the Indian army than to the precepts of international law, no secessionist claim has been accepted by the international community since 1945 (15). But Bangladesh didn't become a precedent which states so feared. It was the fact of oppression, rather than fact that the Bengalis were linguistically, ethnically and culturally different and geographically very distant from other Pakistanis, which ultimately justified the creation of Bangladesh under the oppression theory (16) (it is estimated that some one million people were killed in the conflict).
The clear parameters of oppression allowing secession from an independent State have yet to be clarified. It is clear, however, that those parameters extend far beyond the
strict confines of paragraph 7 of Resolution 2625 (XXV) which emphasized on the internal aspect of self-determination and disallowed infringement of territorial integrity. But this is the last point the international community reached nowadays in definition of the circumstances allowing people or ethnic group to determine itself via obtaining independence. The claims of ethnic groups to self-determination have generally been rejected.
These limitations of both fundamental principles and particularly those of self-determination are viewed as the primary means to preserve peace and stability in the world, avoid it from splitting into numerous entities and in the same time assure basic rights and freedoms to every individual and group.
The Implementation of Fundamental Right to Self-Determination and the Fundamental Principle of Territorial Integrity in the Cases of Mountainous Karabakh and Chechnya. Drawing the line among self-determination, self-secession and irredentism in these cases.
Brief historical backgrounds of the conflicts.
a) Mountainous Karabakh
The beginning of the conflict in Mountainous Karabakh (hereinafter MK) dates back to February 1988 when large and well organized demonstrations in both Stepanakert (regional capital of MK, presently Khankendi) and Yerevan suddenly broke out demanding incorporation of MK with Armenian SSR. The Supreme Soviet (Parliament) of Armenian SSR quickly adopted the resolution for the "Reunification of the Armenian SSR and Nagorno Karabakh" on December 1, 1989 (17). Azerbaijan SSR Parliament rejected Armenian claims. Ethnic intolerance grew rapidly. Massive expulsion of both Azeris and Armenians from both Armenia and Azerbaijan only aggravated the situation further. The Attempts from Moscow to interfere didn't lead to significant positive results as both sides accused Kremlin in the policy of "double standards" and viewed it as an obstacle on their way to independence. The coup attempt in Moscow in August 1991 became the signal for most of the former Soviet Republics to secede from the agonizing Soviet Union and proclaim their independence. Azerbaijan proclaimed independence on August 30 1991, Armenia- September 23. By that time both countries were virtually in state of war, though active military action were held only in the area of Mountainous Karabakh.
On September 2, a session of the regional legislature proclaimed the former Soviet autonomous region the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijani representatives haven't participated in the event. On November 26, Azerbaijan responded by annulling the autonomous status of Nagorno-Karabakh. The self-proclaimed republic held an independence referendum on December 10, after parliamentary elections in late December, it declared its independence on January 6, 1992.
Virtually full scale war between Karabakh Armenian forces assisted largely by Armenia resulted in occupation of 20 % of Azerbaijan territory (MK autonomous Region constituted 10% of the territory of Azerbaijan and had no common border with Armenia), 1 million Azeri and 350.000 Armenian refugees and IDP's, at least 25 thousand lives from both sides and poverty (18).
b) Chechnya
The conflict in Chechnya began in 1988-89 when a widespread popular opposition to build a biochemical plant in the town of Gudermes quickly switched to dissatisfaction with central government and followed with demands for political sovereignty and later independence. The green flag of the protest movement, which firstly had merely ecological content, now was being symbolized with Islam and independence (19). From 1991 the country was virtually governed by the Chechen National Congress with Dudayev in the head. Russian proposals to grant Chechnya broad autonomy like the one Tatarstan has nowadays failed. Attempts to restore federal law by supporting Dudayev's political opponents also failed. In this situation Russia used the armed conflict inside Chechnya as a preposition to "restore constitutional law and order" in Chechnya even though by that time the Dudayev's forces have completely defeated pro-Russian combatants.
On December 11, 1994 Russian troops entered Chechnya. Chechen combatants under Dudayev's leadership who just before the Russian invasion was elected the President managed to render a firm resistance to Russian forces. Heavy casualties from both sides forced parties to negotiations. A peace treaty was signed in May 1997. However the treaty didn't provide clear basis for further solution.
Recently the relations between Russia and rebellious republic escalated again as Moscow accused some Chechen field commanders in bombardments of Moscow apartment buildings and in direct involvement in the Islamic mutiny in Dagestan although
Russian party presented no serious evidence for that and Chechen party rejected accusations. The so called "buffering operation" which began in the beginning of October and when federal forces declared that they would create a security buffer zone inside to the territory of Chechnya grew to a large-scale war not different than the previous war of 1994-96.
Legal aspects of the conflicts
The rebel parties in both MK and Chechnya emphasize on several points which, as they claim, justifies their struggle. Both rebel parties demand the right to self-determination, consider the state structures they have established legitimate as they have been established based on elections and referendums that were held, they also point to large scale of discrimination against them during the Soviet period.
In their turn, both Azerbaijan and Russia insist on their territorial integrity declaring simultaneously that they are ready to give high status of autonomy to secessionist regions.
a) In Mountainous Karabakh
Substantiating the legitimacy of the ethnic referendum in MK held on December 10, 1991 which led to the declaration of independence in the early 1992 the Armenian party points to the USSR law "On the Procedure for Solving Issues of Secession of a Soviet republic from the USSR" adopted on April 3, 1990 (near the end of Soviet Union). Based on Leninist notion of self-determination which favored self-determination in absolute meaning granting this right not only to peoples but to ethnic groups as well (20), Article 3 of this law provided autonomous regions within the Soviet republics with the right to self-determine independently (21). But Armenian claims to the legitimacy of referendum for independence held in MK has grounds neither in domestic nor in international law. There is one thing that Armenian party omits: by the time the referendum was being held (December 10, 1991) Azerbaijan was already independent (from August 30, 1991), therefore this law of agonizing Empire had no legal power for independent Azerbaijan and its territory.
Secondly, Armenian party cannot claim the legitimatization of secession under the "oppression theory" due to the discrimination of Armenian population in MK. It's obvious that, even if discrimination would have taken place, which is simply not true, the power in former USSR was highly centralized and local governments were totally dependent on the instructions from Kremlin. Therefore, alleged discrimination of Armenian population in MK by Azerbaijani Soviet government has no grounds. Moreover, Armenian population in MK had common government with Azeri population(25%of total population of the region in 1989-(22))� with the person of Armenian nationality in the head, there were schools in Armenian language, level of welfare was higher than that in the total territory of Azerbaijan (23).
The referendum was not legitimate from the perspective of the existing norms of international law either. The referendum was held without consent of the government of sovereign Azerbaijan and was held solely on ethnic basis. The ethnic principle of self-determination has never been seriously considered by the international community to be sole factor in assessing claims to statehood (24). Moreover, ethnic principle of self-determination cannot be legitimate without the consent of all parties involved, as the self-determination on this basis becomes discriminatory in nature and should not be considered to be a human right.��
But the most important argument in favor of Azerbaijan is the fact that ethnic Armenians in MK are not a distinct people. They are essentially Armenians of the same origin, nationality, and culture as the Armenians in the Republic of Armenia. Hence, they are national minority- "integral part" of the society they live (formulation by the CSCE Meeting of Experts on National Minorities. See footnote #9) and should be treated as such with respect to the applicable norms of international law. One more point: albeit the abolition of autonomy in MK was, to my opinion, a strategic mistake of Azerbaijani government no doubt, Azerbaijan as a sovereign state had right to do that as it had technically no legal obligation to preserve autonomy before neither Armenian community of MK, nor any other party. Doing so Azerbaijan government didn't breach any international or domestic law. But still it should be noted, that abolishing autonomy of MK Azerbaijan acted contrary to the soul of the Declaration on the rights of minorities as this action can with, good reason, be considered as an action not matching the Article 1 of the Declaration where States in which minorities exist take obligation to protect and promote the identity of minorities and to adopt appropriate legislative and other measures to achieve those ends even though nothing about creation of autonomy for minorities is directly mentioned in the Declaration.
The sincerity of Karabakh Armenians when they express their desire to achieve independence via self-determination should be treated with suspicion as well as their eligibility to claim self-determination. Even a brief look at history of conflict reveals that the independence was not an ideal ethnic Armenians in MK tried to achieve at first. The idea was the unification of Mountainous Karabakh with Republic of Armenia. Armenian party changed its tactics in 1991 making stake at self-determination. In fact, the ultimate goal which Armenian party doesn't even try to hide is to unify with Armenia. There are lots of facts� confirming that irredentism is the very heart of Armenian claims in this conflict as both Armenians in Karabakh and Armenia associate themselves with the same nation as they are. The appointment in 1993- in the very height of the conflict- of Serzh Sarkissian previously " Nagorno Karabakh Republic's" (NKR) Defence Minister as Defence Minister of Armenia, election in March 1998 Robert Kocharyan who was previously NKR's President as a president of Armenia despite the fact that Kocharyan (and Sarkissian as well) was technically Azerbaijan citizen, resolution of Armenian Parliament to annex MK in the very beginning of conflict which is ironically haven't been rescinded since then and technically is still on book, Armenian participation in the conflict and many more arguments allow to say synonymously that this conflict is essentially the conflict of territorial integrity and irredentism.�
Azerbaijan deems its territory to be occupied primarily by Armenia. It considers Armenia aggressor and rejects to negotiate with MK Armenians. Armenia denies it's direct involvement in the conflict and states that it is an only "interested party". However, the facts overweigh these denials. Many reports on participation of Armenian regular army forces in the military operations in Karabakh have been fixed by both Azerbaijani eyewitnesses- IDP's from occupied lands in most cases and international observers. Just a few examples: on a single day, Sunday, April 17, 1994 (during a big Armenian offensive operation just not long before the declaration of truce) HRW/Helsinki counted five "Ikarus" buses full Armenian Army soldiers entering Nagorno-Karabakh, holding an estimated 300 men in all (25). Other Western journalists leaving Karabakh later in the week reported seeing eight buses full of Armenian Army soldiers entering Karabakh from Armenia and received similar information talking with these soldiers (26). There were many facts of capturing Armenian regular army soldiers during the conflict in the territory of MK and later interviewing of them by international observers and journalists with subsequent confirmation of Republic of Armenian participation in the conflict.
������� Another sad evidence of Republic of Armenian direct participation in the conflict: when HRW observers visited an Armenian cemetery in Yerevan in early April 1994 they found out that 420 military men were buried there. A second visit to the same cemetery ten days later unfortunately revealed about thirty new graves (27).�
All the examples above show that Armenia acted as an aggressor during the active military actions under the Article 1 of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) (Definition of Aggression) and is an explicit violator of all international legal documents concerning the territorial integrity and sovereignty of State. It also failed to comply with the UN SC Resolutions 822, 853, 874, 884 (1993) demanding "immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of all occupying forces involved from�occupied areas of Azerbaijan Republic". As a matter of law, Armenian army troop involvement in Azerbaijan makes the war an international armed conflict, as between the government of Armenia and Azerbaijan (28).�
b) In Chechnya
Like in Karabakh conflict the Chechens claim their right to self-determination and insist on full exercise of self-determination- independence arguing the historical struggle of Chechens to Russian invasion, brutal discrimination against them during all the history of Chechen dependence on Russia noting especially the deportation by Stalin of all Chechen and Ingush population from their lands to Kazakhstan during the World War II and also showing the present consequences of war. There could be arguments on whether Chechens a people or an ethnic group. I am not an expert to answer to that for sure. But the peoples have the right to struggle for their self-determination and "since only "peoples" are entitled to self-determination in contemporary international law, minorities must demonstrate that they are "peoples" in order to qualify for self-determination"(29).� Though this harsh statement cannot be considered as a rule it sometimes works.
Like in the Karabakh conflict the legitimacy of elected authorities in Chechnya is one of the major points both parties argue about. Russia claims, based on the same arguments as Azerbaijan makes with regard the legitimacy of Karabakh Armenian authorities, that the elections were void, therefore claims of the Chechen party that the declaration of independence in late 1991 and elections held were legitimate as by that time Chechnya was sovereign country. Chechnya's sovereignty was really declared in November 1990 by Chechen National Congress with the support of Chairman of the Chechen Supreme Soviet- the first head of Autonomous Republic of Chechen nationality to be elected due to the perestroika period. Chechnya in accordance with the soul of document Checheno-Ingush Republic (Ingushetia later decided to stay in the federation)� was a part of neither Russian Federation nor Soviet Union. It, as it was formulated in the declaration, "can negotiate with other States or group of states simultaneously preserving all the completeness in its territory" (30). Sovereign Republic of Chechnya, as it was proclaimed, intended to sign the union and federal treaties on the same level as Ukraine, Estonia, etc.(31) . This decision didn't cause particular concern in Russia despite the implicit upgrade in the status of the country as by that time many republics have declared sovereignty. But from that time the Chechens assumed virtually independence while Russia continued to consider Chechnya its integral territory. By the way, if Chechnya claims the legitimacy of its secession under the provisions of the law on "On the Procedure for Solving Issues of Secession of a Soviet republic from the USSR" mentioned above it seems to me that their claim would be more understandable as by the time it proclaimed sovereignty USSR still existed, hence, this law was in force. But I must confess that I'm not sure whether this law of agonizing Empire which by allowing the autonomous regions to secede without consent of the all parties involved can be a sole basis for secession.
Regarding the invasion of Russian troops of Chechnya it should be noted that there
was no legal obligation from Russian party not to locate troops in Chechnya. Russia didn't recognize Chechnya's independence and due to its domestic law had all the rights to enter there by troops though Russian authorities probably knew that this invasion would lead to bloodshed.
Paragraph 7 of the UN GA Resolution 2625 (XXV) appears to sanction secession in the case of sovereign and independent states if part of a state's population is not represented in the state's government (32). To advocates of more extensive "oppression theory", this resolution represents only one aspect of a wider rationale for secession. Therefore, even if the criteria of paragraph 7 are not strictly satisfied, secession can be legitimate if there has been other serious violations of human rights (33).
The oppression theory has been already exercised by recognition of Bangladesh, it is on process in the case of Kosovo though this case is not so explicit and clear one as the case of Bangladesh.
The "oppression theory" is presently the biggest threat to the territorial integrity of Russian Federation as the facts of atrocities and gross human suffering were widely reported during the conflict 1994-96 and is being reported now.� Casualties in the conflict of 1994-96 are estimated to be at least 80.000 (34). There have been reported massive killings of civil population due to the indiscriminate bombings and shooting, looting and destroying the villages and massive repression against civilians in so called "filtration camps". Russian army is also is reported to hinder civil population to leave the battle area. Both Russian and foreign observers have reported about all these incidents. Most grievous facts inform that there were massacres of civil populations in number of cases.
One of such events- the massacre in Chechen village of Samashki in April 1996 when more than 600 civilians are reported to be killed (35)..
The actions on the territory of the Chechen Republic grossly violated and continue to violate the norms of international law, and in particular, the June 8, 1977 Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 which relates to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts (36). The voices of dissatisfaction is already rising in international community. President of the USA has already unusually strictly criticized Russian government for its actions in Chechnya in his speech on December 6 by saying that Russia may "pay a heavy price [for its actions in Chechnya] with each passing day, sinking more deeply into a morass that will intensify extremism and diminish its own standing in the world" (RFE/RL Newsline Vol. 3, No 236, December 7, 1999). European leaders, meeting in Helsinki on 10-11 December issued a statement describing Russia's campaign in Chechnya as "totally unacceptable" and calling Russia to start "political dialogue" with the elected Chechen authorities (37). Differently from Karabakh conflict, which is as was explained before, is an international conflict the conflict in Chechnya is still considered to be an internal conflict of Russia. Despite the criticism from abroad most of the countries still recognize the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Russian Federation, and the conflict in Chechnya a domestic affair of Russia, a subject within the domestic legislature of Russian Federation. Nevertheless in light of recent events- resuming hostilities gross violations of humanitarian law- this position can change.
At present it is not clear whether Russian brutalities in Chechnya give enough basis for the legitimization of secession of Chechnya. Besides the legal basis for such process has not established yet. But it is for sure that continuation of such acts will lead Russia's alienation from the international community and recognition legitimacy of Chechen struggle for independence via secession.
Conclusion.
Finally it can be concluded that both these conflicts demand urgent solution and involvement of international community, as they pose a threat to the peace and stability in the region and because too much human suffering have taken place in both conflicts.
I suppose, the Karabakh conflict is more negotiable, as it is an international conflict- subject to the existing norms and principles of international law and international community can use its levers of pressure to draw parties to peace more influentially. In this conflict the predominance of territorial integrity is obvious due to the reasons explained above. Besides the "oppression theory" cannot be a threat to territorial integrity of Azerbaijan either as it is Azerbaijan to face occupation and ethnic cleansing in 20% of its territory.
The threat of loosing real power in Karabakh is however real due to the so called proposal of "common state". However, it is obvious that establishing a federation of 8 million Azerbaijanis with 150.000 ethnic Armenian minority is not real and contrary to the international law.
The case of Chechnya is more complicate, as it is essentially an internal conflict, hence it is still under the domestic jurisdiction of Russian Federation. Chechnya conflict similarly to the case of Kosovo represents a true clash of fundamental principles: self-determination versus territorial integrity. Whatever the solution to this conflict may be one thing is obvious, that the solution must take into account the interests of all parties involved, be based on norms and principles of international law, primarily regarding territorial integrity and self-determination and the exercise of full self-determination should be considered as a last resort in achieving the solution in Chechnya.
References.
1. P.Goble. When borders change. Azeri News Distribution List Mon.6, Dec. 1999, referred from RFE/RL
2. Id.
3. Albeit in international legal documents Mountainous (sometimes also referred as Upland) Karabakh is referred as Nagorno Karabakh, which is the Russian translation of Azeri name Dagligh Qarabagh, in this paper the easy clarity of such address is sacrificed to the English translation of the commonly applied name to the region- Mountainous Karabakh in the name of justice and rightness.
4. Musgrave, 180
5. Id., 181
6.The Random House Dictionary of the English Language RHDEL Random House/New York. See "irredentist"
7. Musgrave. footnote 5, 181
8. Hannum, 48�
9. (1991) 30 ILM 1692, 1694 or Musgrave, 147
10. The Aaland Island Question, 28 or Musgrave, 36
11. 31 ILM 1497 (1992) paragraph 2
12. Musgrave, 168
13. Id.
14. Janis & Noyes footnote 1, 414
15. Hannum, 46
16. Musgrave, 192
17. Not having opportunity to dive into history now I must say that it's totally a fiction. The territory of MK had never been a part of Armenian state.
18. Statistics from Azerbaijan and Armenian Human Development Reports of 1996 and 1995 respectively
19. S. Asuyev, Kak eto bylo. www.kavkaz.org/history/history.html in Russian.
20. see Musgrave, 106-7
21. Armenian Assembly of America http://aaainc.org/armenia-nkr/nkr-history.htm
22. Azerbaijan HRW/Helsinki.
23. In the same time, Azeris in Armenia (were more than 200.000) who outnumbered Armenians in MK had no autonomy and one could also claim they have been prosecuted.
24. Hannum, 7
25. HRW/Helsinki, 72
26. Id.
27. Id., 73
28. Id.
29. Musgrave, 170
30. S. Asuyev. Kak eto bylo�in Russian URL: http://www.kavkaz.org/istoriya/istoriya1.htm
31. Todd L. Hicks Dr. Nina Efimov RUW 5559 21 April 1999 Chechnya: Republic in Conflict. http://garnet.acns.fsu.edu/~tlh3307/papers/chechnya.html 1111
32. Musgrave, 188
33. Id., 189
34. OSCE Review Conference. Vienna. 1996. Report by the International Helsinki Federation of Human Rights URL: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/ihf/vienna96/08.htm
35. The Warsaw Voice - News, March 31, 1996 No 13 (388) URL: http://www.warsawvoice.com.pl/v388/NewsInBrief.html
36. Andrei Sakharov Foundation URL: http://www.wdn.com/asf/
37. RFE/RL Newsline Vol. 3, No 240, November 13, 1999; the term "elected" was in news itself
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���� Autonomy, sovereignty and self-determination: the accomodation of conflicting rights. Un. of Pennsylvania Press. Philadelphia 1990.
3) Human Rights Watch/Helsinki
��� Azerbaijan: Seven Years of conflict in Nagorno Karabakh
���� HRW 1994
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��� Cases and commentary on international law
��� West publishing Co. St. Paul Minn. 1997
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��� Oxford University Press 1995
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