Peace Pending in Nagorno-Karabagh:
Recommendations for the International Community
Blanka Hancilova
Blanka Hancilova is a Ph.D. candidate at Charles University in Prague. She
is currently a Fulbright Fellow at the Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy, researching the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict.
* * *
In the opening months of 2001, the Nagorno-Karabagh peace talks gained
significant momentum, culminating with the Key West summit (April 3-7), at
which the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia met for intensive negotiations
under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE). As Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, the United States,
Russia, and France were mediators at the talks. Over a million people have
lost their homes (800,000 Azerbaijanis; 300,000 Armenians), and tens of
thousands have died as a result of the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict, which has
waged between Azerbaijan and Armenia since 1988. A ceasefire has held since
1994.
At this stage, there is reasonable hope for a peaceful settlement in the
coming months, possibly by the end of July. However, any peace deal will
entail painful compromises by both Armenia and Azerbaijan, which will be
extremely contentious in both states. A peaceful settlement of the
Nagorno-Karabagh conflict could, given the right conditions, stabilize the
region, enable the reconstruction of war-damaged areas, and spur the
economic and political development of the whole South Caucasus, by allowing
both Azerbaijan and Armenia to focus fully on these processes. It would
strengthen them and therefore limit their vulnerability to foreign, most
importantly Russian, dictates.
In addition to bringing economic revival and other positive changes, an
agreement over Nagorno-Karabagh could serve as an incentive for other
breakaway regions, such as South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transdniestria, to
consider serious compromises in exchange for an end to war and the economic
assistance packages that could follow.
In order for the Nagorno-Karabagh settlement to have a reasonable chance of
success, it is necessary that immediate concrete results be realized,
illustrating the benefits of the peace arrangement to the public. One
potential concrete action would entail resettlement of Azerbaijani
internally displaced persons (IDPs) in some or all of the occupied
districts (raiony) that are outside of the disputed territory of
Nagorno-Karabagh, but today under Armenian occupation. Resettlement and
the overall reconstruction and development of Nagorno-Karabagh and the
adjacent occupied territories will require immediate and substantial
international assistance. An absence or delay of this assistance could
seriously hamper the peace settlement.
However, little indication has emerged that international organizations and
European states and organizations have produced plans or allocated funds
for these peace settlement projects. This brief will focus on
recommendations for the role of the international community in the creation
of a successful peace settlement between Azerbaijan and Armenia, should an
agreement between the sides be concluded.
Auspicious Conditions
Conditions have emerged which are conducive to a settlement between
Azerbaijan and Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict:
� The leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan no longer consider the status quo
viable for the future and consider final settlement of the conflict
possible and preferred.
� The United States and Russia have demonstrated a high level of
commitment, and are involved in the negotiation process at the
presidential level.
� Russia seems willing to work together with United States and other OSCE
members towards a peaceful settlement.
The newfound cooperation between Russia and the U.S. on this issue has
encouraged the perception by the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia that a
historic opportunity awaits. The opposing sides sense that they have no
option other than to negotiate, and that they cannot easily play Moscow and
Washington off each other. Thus a critical sense of
"ripeness" has emerged in the minds of the opposing sides, both among
decision-makers and the general public. Unfortunately, it nevertheless
seems that the presidents are very much ahead of their constituencies.
On the downside, failure of the negotiations to produce a settlement would
probably not result in a continuation of the current status quo; rather, it
is likely to generate an overwhelming negative momentum. The presidents
would be exposed to increased domestic pressure to seek a military solution
to the situation, which could lead to a renewal of armed hostilities
between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In fact, Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders
have mentioned the use of "means other than negotiation" as a possible
option if the negotiations do not lead to a settlement.1
Recommendations
The international community must bear in mind that the signature of a
settlement between the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan is only the
first step towards establishing a lasting peace in the region. The
agreement must then be implemented on the ground. Rehabilitation and
development programming should be immediate, efficient and designed in such
a way as to not discredit the peace process. The international community
must adequately recognize its responsibility in the peace process and act
accordingly in order to prevent the renewal of war.
The OSCE should carefully decide what information from the negotiations
should be shared with international organizations in order to allow for a
timely planning of their involvement. It should realize that the lack of
effective post-settlement humanitarian, reconstruction and rehabilitation
support might undermine the peace.
Since the OSCE is likely to be the leading agency in the post-conflict
period, it should make a particular effort to be well prepared for the
challenges of another mission. In the past, the OSCE has repeatedly
suffered from understaffing, and in some cases (Bosnia, Kosovo) the quality
of deployed personnel was not on par with the high demands of the job. The
OSCE should therefore encourage member states to identify (well in advance)
their citizens who are qualified and willing to serve on a field mission
and to hire appropriate experts on the open market.
Similarly, the UN needs to decide which of its agencies will take the lead
role. Once designated, this agency should develop a clear contingency plan
that will allow for a timely response. It is especially important that the
agency or agencies identify a sufficient number of motivated and
well-qualified workers for the mission.
As part of international settlement efforts, the involved sides should
strive for sustained cooperation and coordination. In this framework:
� International organizations should coordinate future rehabilitation
programs. There is a need to decide on the lead agency or agencies for
rehabilitation and development projects and to secure joint preliminary
planning with clearly delimited responsibilities.
� The U.S. and France should try to ensure the continued participation of
Russia. The U.S. should use the positive dynamics of cooperation with
Russia to make the decisive breakthrough. The current cooperative
position of Russia should be appraised, while at the same time
contingency planning should be carried out in case Russia's policies in
the region change.
� In order to help President Aliyev promote a peace settlement in
Azerbaijan, the U.S. Congress should cancel Section 907 (a) of the
Freedom Support Act.2 In the interim, the Executive should waive or
reinterpret the limitations to the extent that is legally possible.
Recommended actions on the ground
The international community should be ready to address the following issues
on the ground: return of internally displaced persons (IDPs), minefields,
and infrastructure.
It can be assumed that the withdrawal of the Armenian forces from occupied
territories will take place within a relatively short period (weeks) after
the conclusion of peace. This withdrawal is likely to be followed (again,
within weeks) by the return of the first Azerbaijani IDPs to their places
of origin. The international community should be ready to provide
effective assistance to these returning people.
Two issues are of utmost importance to facilitate and make safe this
return.
1. Minefields: Parts of the occupied territories are mined, but many of the
minefields are not properly documented. The international community should
assist Azerbaijan in the speedy marking of the minefields, followed by
de-mining. Countries with expertise in this field should be sought out and
encouraged to contribute to this humanitarian effort.
2. Infrastructure (roads): It will be necessary to repair and rebuild at
least the land communication links between Azerbaijan and what are today
the occupied territories so that the return of IDPs and economic revival
can proceed.
As the cases of Kosovo, East Timor and others have shown, due to the
inefficiency and slowness of deployment, UN and OSCE missions (partly due
to financing issues; partly to a personnel system that delays contracts and
therefore deployments; and partly due to poor organization on the ground)
often miss the window of opportunity that exists in the short time after
agreements are reached. By the time of deployment, not only has the reality
on the ground changed, but also the momentum created by the agreement in
terms of the political will of the parties has slowed, stopped or even
reversed.
Moreover, the UN and the OSCE need to improve the caliber of specialists
who occupy operational posts, perhaps by recruiting some experts from
outside their organizations' framework. To date, appointments of leading
personnel have often been plagued by inter-state politics, where candidates
have been chosen by citizenship before any other quality.
An effort should be made not to repeat this situation in Nagorno-Karabagh.
After a decade of intensive peace operations, a cadre of candidates could
be identified to staff what could be the highest quality mission to date,
tailored to meet the real needs of the situation on the ground, as required
by the parties and guaranteed by interested states.
Burden-sharing in reconstruction and rehabilitation
International agencies await a clear signal from the OSCE that a settlement
is likely to materialize before they launch needs assessment missions, and
thus have not conducted formal estimates. The World Bank should take the
lead and provide direct access to funding for Azerbaijan and Armenia, as
well as mobilize additional financial resources and seek to attract private
investors.
Unfortunately, at this point the World Bank has not conducted any
comprehensive or partial needs assessment. Many of the international
humanitarian and reconstruction agencies do not have a comprehensive enough
idea of the financial and other implications of the reconstruction of the
occupied territories and Nagorno-Karabagh. Under the coordinated leadership
of the OSCE, the international agencies should start working out the
responsibility sharing strategies in financing and implementation of the
rehabilitation and development programs.
Ms. Hancilova would like to thank Jarat Chopra (Peace Maintenance
International) and Jaba Devdariani (United Nations Association Georgia) for
their contributions to this policy brief.
