In later of November, Zhukov told to Stalin that the only possibility for the VI Army was an action from the south, with the target of to connect with the thickness of German armies. The Manstein's presence was a problem.

The Manstein's plan was a big attack from two flanks: one from to south and another one from the point closer to VI Army. Although, the continuous soviet attacks make impossible the second option. For Manstein the operation was for rescue, for Hitler was a second chance to conquer the Volga

 

 

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During the following hours to the Soviet offensive, the general Von Paulus and his General Staff were discussed the bitter situation in which the VI Army had remained itself. Hitler had ordered Paulus to assume the control of the troops of 4th Army Panzer who were to the south of Stalingrad and the remains of the Rumanian Armies. The principal plan that the control of the VI Army had, it was an assault to the south of Stalingrad and that the trapped troops, were fleeing towards sure zone in the Don; though this retreat would mean that more than 10.000 injured men and the thickness of the heavy weapon and vehicles would have be left behind due to the lack of fuel and of horses. Nevertheless, Hitler refused in roundly to any retreat, he had found the solution. The Field Marshall Erich Von Manstein would direct a rescue's Army Corp, but Manstein and the his troops were fighting in Leningrad. What would happen with the VI Army while Manstein was moving to the zone and was taking measurements?

The officials of Paulus's intendency had indicated that to support the VI Army would be needed 700 tons of daily material that should be transported for the Luftwaffe. Goering, Reich Marshall and Chief of the Luftwaffe, assembled his officials of transport and said to them that would be necessary daily 500 tons, they answered that the maximum thing it would be 350 tons and only during a short period of time. Nevertheless, the latter estimation was ignoring the condition of the weather, the possible breakdowns of the planes or the assaults of the enemy aviation. Goering, needed of gaining points after the fail of the Battle of England, assured to Hitler that the Luftwaffe might support the VI Army in Stalingrad. On 24th of November, Hitler was ordering Paulus that the positions in the Volga must be defended anyone they were the consequences, "Fortress of Stalingrad" towards its appearance.

This 24th of November, Manstein was coming to the headquarters of the Army Group B, where the general Von Weichs informed him of the gravity of the situation, that in spite of all 240 km that they were separating to Paulus's troops of the German lines. The Soviet weren't conscious in this moment of the size of the army caught in Stalingrad; some estimation was calculating that existed around 86.000 men. Nevertheless, the number that more approaches would be that of 290.000 men between Germans, allies and hiwis (Soviet soldiers went over to the Germans).

In the first days of December, the Red Army realized several assaults with the aim to debilitate and to divide the VI Army. Paulus's troops, with a serious lack of fuel and ammunitions, weren't prepared for the defensive combat and though they suffered many losses, the Soviet Control had to admit that the Germans weren't defeated. The morality of the VI Army was kept very solid during the first part of December, in spite of the hard conditions of life. The shares were reduced but the officials entrusted insuring to the troop that the situation would be temporary, the Luftwaffe would supply them and the general Von Manstein would extract of the fence.

The Luftwaffe's officials in Stalingrad's area were conscious of the reality. It was totally impossible to realize daily 300 flights that the troops caught in Stalingrad needed for his provisioning, and this without counting that the Soviet pilots had improved very much and that the Soviet batteries were a hard test for the German planes of provisioning. Pitomnik's airport to the west of Stalingrad, turned into the principal point by which the VI army was supplied, around him the material, injured men, fuel, etc, were accumulated, so soon it turned into the principal target for the Soviet aviation.

The troop began to suffer for the hunger, though the majority they were not conscious of the problem of provisioning that had the VI Army. During the first week of December, the flights didn't come to thirty daily, while Hitler had promised hundred planes. The air bridge didn't come to 300promised tons daily, only 350 tons came that week and only 14 were food for 275.000 men; the majority of the load was fuel which great part was for the fighters parked in Pitomnik that had to protect to the load airplanes. As the time was spending the situation was become furthermore dramatic, owed fundamentally to the losses of planes for action of the Soviets. The shares were diminishing increasingly.

Meanwhile, the Stavka was prepared to finish off the task and to destroy the Caucasus German Army. The Operation Saturn was consisting of an offensive from the fronts of the Southwest and of Voronezh, exceeding 8. º Italian Army, who was defending this zone, already to advance towards the south up to Rostov. Taken the city of Rostov, the whole German position of the zone of the Don, as well as the armies of the Caucasus zone would remain awkward. But before there was another worry in Stalin's heads and Zhukov, what was happening with Manstein and the new Army Corp created in the Don?

 

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