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| 3.1.3.2 Export permits of limited duration should be granted on a case-by-case basis and, consistent with international agreements, arms control initiatives and possibly existent UN embargoes, should be guided by weighing the risk of adverse economic, political, or social impact within the recipient nation, as well as the human rights, terrorism, and proliferation records of the State in question. Governments should be encouraged to exercise unilateral restraint where such action is effective and not impeded by overriding national interests. Restraint must apply to the transfer of "surplus" weapons as well. Controls on ammunition are much needed. Since ammunition is consumed quickly during conflict, it has a dramatically shorter life-span than small arms. EPG believes that limiting access to ammunition under the same guidelines as small arms control policy would be a means of addressing recycling and circulation of small arms. (reference: Report of the Group of Experts on the problem of ammunition and explosives, A/54/155) 3.1.3.3 End-use controls should be revised and implemented with greater stringency. One of the keys to an effective policy is standardization of controls and information sharing. There is a need to coordinate export control policy so no supplier has a competitive advantage. A �best- practice� and minimum standard should be established for all countries. Export licenses should be conditional on agreement to provide data on end-use when requested and to cooperate with follow-up checks. Export license recipients must agree to inform export control authorities in the supplier state if the transferred weapons are re-exported or diverted to alternative uses. The goal should be to establish a right to information on end-uses or re-export. It is crucial for States to exchange information on instances where end-use assurances appear to have been broken or recipients or traders are found to have abrogated end-use commitments. 3.1.3.4 A new emphasis must be placed on enforcement at both, the national and regional level, especially in order to confront the globalization of the black market in small arms and new operational linkages between political and criminal groups. Practical control measures must be enhanced at national and international levels, such as police and customs cooperation must be strengthened and border patrols improved. Model regulations on small arms transfers should be developed to confront new transnational threats, including the production, distribution, and abuse of narcotics, illegal arms trafficking and terrorism. Internationally operating criminals, the "merchants of death," must be identified, apprehended and prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. 3.1.3.4.1 States must be supported in their serious efforts to restrict the flows of small arms into their countries and sub-regions. Partnerships could be developed to improve the capacity of law enforcement, customs and border patrols to monitor and control arms flows and accumulations. International assistance to help develop national and community capacity to combat illicit trafficking in arms is essential. Towards this end, States could create a new international body or delegate authority to the UN. At this stage, it seems wisest to ensourage INTERPOL to build up its information systems and to make that information available to States, so that they can, if they so desire to use their sovereign power under international law, check shipping entering their territorial waters or aircraft entering their airspace for the illegal carrying of small arms.There is a need to standardize the penalties for export license violators. Individuals or companies found to be involved in illicit arms trading should be consistently tried and punished. There should also be a coordination of restrictions and sanctions against them. Authorizing systems must be established for small arms manufacturers, dealers and, in particular, brokers. Increasingly, as controls on arms brokering are weak in many countries, brokering agents are found responsible for a majority of "illicit" arms shipments into regions of conflict. Too often, efforts to control arms brokering are undermined by brokering agents moving offshore, where controls are less stringent or even absent. One option is to require government licensing and registration of all small arms traders and brokers. Then if traders are found to provide misleading or false end-use statements or otherwise violate export license conditions, they could be de-registered without needing to be convicted in court. Governments would be discouraged from granting licenses to traders and brokers who are not registered. In addition, corporations and individuals should be subject to national jurisdiction for their worldwide arms brokering activities. 3.1.3.5 Since licit weapons frequently become illicit, a mechanism for reducing licit weapon production and transfers must also be part of the regime's efforts. This is much more difficult area to work within because of the legitimate resistance that exporting states will have to regulate legal economic activities. The small arms producers and exporters are the going to have to be willing to curtail legal activity for the greater good of reducing supply. Convincing these states to undertake such restraint is going to be difficult. Therefore, it must be approached tactfully and progressively, using the same type of step-by-step plan as the regulation of illicit supply. 3.1.3.6 An interesting concept at present in its formative stages is obligatory third-party liability insurance, which could be required for every small arm produced or traded. Commercial manufacturers must be held liable for the damages incurred by their small arms during the illicit phase of their life cycle. It would be irrelevant that the damaging act itself is, by whatever reason, perpetrated by a third person. Such liability insurance exists in many States in other fields. It would force commercial small arms producers and dealers to act more responsibly in their transactions. It would need to exclude weapons explicitly manufactured by or for UN member States. continued |
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