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| 3.1.4 International Code of Conduct. The transparency measures and export control policies and mechanisms described above form the foundation for the development of an internationally accepted set of norms dealing with the supply of licit weapons. An international code of conduct is interwoven among the initiatives and recommendations relating to transparency. Integral to responsible national export policies, an international code must promote national and multilateral responsibility, restraint, control and transparency. 3.2 Combating Illicit Trafficking in All its Aspects 3.2.1 Scope of the problem: combating illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons and its destabilizing accumulation globally and regionally with emphasis on the "hot bed" and "conflict areas." Illicit trafficking, as noted above, is linked in many ways to the licit trade. However, it is useful to distinguish them analytically, as tackling illicit trafficking will require solutions somewhat different in emphasis than those directed toward the licit trade. EPG's approach to combating illicit trafficking is to focus efforts on identifying key choke points in the illicit trade, such as brokering, financing, and transportation of small arms and light weapons (SALW), and directing energies to combat illicit trafficking at these choke points. 3.2.1.1 This question of state responsibility to "restrict" trade only to "authorized" producers and dealers goes to the heart of the debate on controlling international transfers of small arms since it necessitates the establishment of consistent mechanisms for the effective state regulation of the legal trade in those weapons and for increased transparency in such arms transfers. A number of states' representatives have already tried to downplay the de facto interrelationship between illicit trafficking, smuggling and the legal trade in small arms, arguing for a very narrow focus on apprehending "criminals." But the weight of empirical evidence on trafficking, if presented fairly, shows that the spread and abuse of small arms results primarily from the lack of state regulation and transparency. 3.2.1.2 Organized crime syndicates are certainly a major part of the problem, but much of the destructive effects of the proliferation and abuse of small arms can also be categorized as "illegal" even though this may be the result of activities by dealers acting with the approval, or at least acquiescence, of governments and their agencies. The Preparatory Committee was therefore careful in its final statement of the first session to identify the problem as "the illicit trade in and proliferation" of small arms. These were "the primary causes of violence and conflict in many countries and had hindered many development efforts, by undermining investor interest and causing the flight of capital and human resources. The increase in drug trafficking was also linked to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons." This formulation still allows for a creative negotiating process even though, as with the treaty on landmines, it is inevitable that certain states will try to block meaningful progress on any international agreements to restrict the transfer of small arms. 3.2.1.3 It is clear that there has been a large global increase in the number of small arms producers. This increase has taken place in a context where most countries' export and import regulatory regimes remain hopelessly weak and out of date. Anecdotal evidence on dealers and transfers suggests that these producers are relatively free to target international markets subject to little regulation based upon objective measures of the customers' legitimate needs. Recent research has identified how international arms brokers, shipping agents and other middlemen exploit such weaknesses and feed upon the intensified competition between the producers, pointing to a pattern of West European arms brokers sourcing supplies for poor countries from cheap stocks in mainly Eastern European countries. Such actors fuel the illicit trafficking of arms, especially small arms since these are easier to conceal and much in demand by dubious armies, warlords and crime syndicates. 3.2.1.4 A recent, and shocking, example of the magnitude of the problem of illicit trafficking is illustrated by documents from the military archives of the Rwandan regime that planned and carried out the genocide in Rwanda. These documents show that the main foreign brokers and shippers involved in arming the perpetrators of the 1994 genocide were based in the UK, France and South Africa. They employed networks of collaborators in other countries, including Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Italy, Israel, Seychelles, former Zaire, and various offshore financial centers. Interviews with some of those involved and evidence cited by the subsequent UN commission of inquiry corroborate the information contained in the Rwandan government documents. Similar multinational networks and techniques have been used with impunity to circumvent the UN sanctions against the Angolan rebel movement, UNITA. (reference: the FOWLER report) 3.2.2 Measures to prevent and combat illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons 3.2.2.1 National-Level Initiatives. At the national level, states may combat illicit trafficking by focusing on two key policy areas: national export controls and initiatives in law enforcement policy. 3.2.2.1.1 Strengthening of export control measures. As noted above with regard to improving regulation of the licit trade in arms, implementation of improved export control measures at the national level is likewise valuable in stemming the flow of arms from the licit to the illicit markets. Indeed, it is likely that a major portion of the illicit trade is possible simply due to lax, poorly enforced, or simply nonexistent national export control systems. A SACR could play a role in encouraging states to improve the quality of their export control systems more generally, and to coordinate attempts to develop international standards by which export controls might be measured. One such initiative, discussed below, concerns securing multilateral agreement to allow only authorized manufacturers or brokers to sell arms, and to restrict their sales to similarly authorized entities. As part of such initiatives and export control strengthening, documentation, end-user certification, and the conformity of national marking systems to the requirements of combating illicit trafficking in small arms will be critical measures to assure that national reforms contribute substantially to stemming the illicit trade in arms. 3.2.2.1.2 The second category of national-level action concerns measures which focus specifically on identifying flows of arms and uncovering and disposing of illegal stockpiles. These measures focus on improving national law enforcement and customs practices, and on making reducing or eliminating illicit flows a priority in national and local law enforcement communities. continued |
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