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| 3.2.2.2 International-Level Initiatives. 3.2.2.2.1 For instance, SACR could facilitate information exchange on procedures and national practices, facilitating the development of a standard of minimal required measures to regulate the arms trade. Similarly, many states do presently maintain relatively rigorous control mechanisms regulating brokering and other arms-related activities. Analysis of these systems with an eye to generalizable lessons could be a fundamental way in which a SACR could contribute to curbing the illicit trade. 3.2.2.2.2 Additionally, based on the results of these analyses SACR could facilitate or create incentives for states to harmonize national procedures in the regulation of arms, moving toward regional and global standards with regards to appropriate arms control measures. States which already meet or exceed minimal required standards could participate in regional joint training programs between law enforcement and/or customs officials of various countries whereby knowledge of and experience with international "best practices" could be disseminated. 3.2.2.2.3 With regional joint training programs establishing patterns and precedents of cooperation, the next logical step is the establishment of formal co-operation between law-enforcement, customs, border and licensing services. By initiating joint programs and measures, clusters of states could increase their leverage at the regional level in dealing with flows of illicit arms. 3.2.2.2.4 In some cases, there may be warning signs that events and conditions in a given state or region may be conducive to proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Hence, adoption of a set of transparency and monitoring measures and standards, as noted above, whereby such conditions might be identified early and with haste, would allow SACR and other relevant bodies to bring to bear the weight and force of international public opinion and to encourage diplomatic pressure opposed to such proliferation. Most usefully, such early warning could allow time for the building of consensus necessary to mobilize resources which might pre-empt such proliferation before it occurs. 3.2.2.2.5 Not to be underestimated, increased coordination between and, where practical, harmonization of legal standards regarding the issue of arms brokering, export controls, and other regulatory measures is another area in which action at the international level could significantly decrease illicit trafficking. For instance, a major impediment to prosecution of international arms smugglers is the extraterritorial nature of the crime. A network of bilateral reciprocal legal agreements by which ex-patriots may be held liable to regulations in their country of origin could begin to limit the freedom of movement of many would-be smugglers. More generally, coordination of legal measures simply decreases effective areas of operation for such individuals. 3.2.2.2.6 A Global Convention on Combating Illicit Trafficking in SALW. The restriction by states of trade in small arms and light weapons to entities authorized by and registered with the state represents a potentially viable supply-side initiative to reducing illicit trafficking in arms. Whether this regime would form part of the SACR, or whether it would emerge more directly from current multilateral negotiations, such an approach is worth further exploration and development. 3.2.2.2.7 UN Firearms Protocol. In April 1998, the ECOSOC Crime Commission set up an ad hoc committee to negotiate a "legally binding international instrument" to combat trafficking in firearms - now commonly known as the UN Firearms Protocol because it is intended as a protocol to the forthcoming UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime. The Protocol may be signed later this year and, if agreed, will become the first legally binding global mechanism to regulate international transfers of small arms and light weapons. 3.2.2.2.8 While the purpose of the UN Firearms Protocol is to prevent, combat and eradicate illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms - using common standards for the import, export and in-transit movement of weapons and hopefully establishing international co-operation and information exchange - a number of States continue to propose optional text which could either strengthen or weaken the measures contained within the Protocol. Some of the key provisions will affect the degree to which States will register small arms manufacturers and dealers, namely: 3.2.2.2.8.1 Definition of firearms: There is no consensus around the range of weapons that will be controlled by the Protocol. In early drafts of the agreement, firearms were defined broadly, covering many categories of small arms and light weapons. If a broad definition were retained, the Protocol would have a far-reaching effect on combating trafficking of weapons to both individuals involved in criminal activities and to conflict regions. However, some delegations are calling for a more narrow definition of firearms. 3.2.2.2.8.2 Scope of controls: The controls outlined so far in the draft Protocol only cover commercial transactions. State-to-state transfers and transfers for "the purposes of national security" are exempt. However, many of the measures included in the Protocol could and should be applied to all weapons transfers. For example, it is as important to mark state owned weapons as weapons destined for the civilian market. Currently, there is no consensus as to whether state transfers should be controlled within the remit of the Protocol. However, to combat the illicit manufacture and trade in weapons, it is vital to determine what is a legal transfer and what is an illicit transfer. For instance, as discussed below with regard to reduction-side measures, a considerable proportion of weapons have been diverted from state arsenals to the illicit market as a result of loss, theft or corruption. Therefore, it is vital to apply the same standards of marking, tracing and record keeping to both state and non-state transfers. 3.2.2.2.8.3 Inclusion of brokering and shipping agents: An extremely welcome proposal within the Protocol is a new provision to control firearms brokers within the remit of the agreement. The proposed article on brokers is currently under Article 18 of the UN Firearms Protocol, but should be widened to include Registration and licensing of brokers, retailers and transportation agents. The text in the article should read: 3.2.2.2.8.3.1 States that have not done so shall take steps to require brokers, retailers and transport agents, who act on behalf of others, in return for a fee or other consideration, in negotiating or arranging transactions involving the international export or import of firearms, their parts and components or ammunition: continued |
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