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| 3.2.2.2.8.3.2 To register with the country of nationality and with the country where the negotiations or arrangements referred to above are made; and 3.2.2.2.8.3.3 To obtain for each transaction a licence or authorization from the country of nationality and country where the negotiations or arrangements are made. 3.2.2.2.8.3.4 The inclusion of this provision would require other aspects of the draft protocol to be made consistent, especially Articles 2 and 5. In addition, Article 6 on Jurisdiction would have to be revised to include a provision to maintain jurisdiction over nationals who commit no offence in their country of nationality but engage in illicit firearms trafficking abroad. 3.2.2.2.9 UN Conference on Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. Meanwhile, another international negotiation has become a key forum for the discussion of the need to register and regulate small arms manufacturers and dealers. A Preparatory Committee was established by the General Assembly to decide on the dates, venue and agenda of the 2001 United Nations Conference on Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, as well as on the dates and venue of its subsequent sessions. The Committee was requested to make recommendations to the Conference on all relevant matters, including the objective, a draft agenda, draft rules of procedure and draft final documents, which will include a program of action, and to decide on background documents to be made available in advance of the Conference. It was also mandated to take a decision on the modalities of attendance by non- governmental organizations at its sessions. 3.2.2.2.10 Many difficult issues arising in the 2001 Preparatory Committee sessions and Conference will be similar to those in the UN Firearms Protocol negotiations. It is therefore significant that, after its first meeting at the end of February, the Preparatory Committee requested the UN's planned study on "the feasibility of restricting the manufacture and trade of such weapons (small arms and light weapons) to the manufacturers and dealers authorized by States, which would cover the brokering activities, particularly illicit activities, related to small arms and light weapons, including transportation agents and financial transactions," as well as the views of UN Member States on the study. 3.3 Confidence-Building and Transparency Measures 3.3.1 Information exchanges on regional brokers and shippers of small arms and light weapons. Linked to, yet analytically separable from, the regional coordinative measures enumerated above is the issue of information sharing on arms brokers and shippers. Under the general rubric of transparency, information sharing on such activities heightens the degree of general awareness of the activity of arms brokers, and assuring that all interested parties may track small-arms related actions closely. 3.3.2 Information exchanges on proven facts of illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons, as well as on the number of seized small arms and light weapons units. If law enforcement officials in one or more states possess, singly (or together, hence the need for law-enforcement information exchanges) sufficient evidence of illegal small arms activities, sharing this information is an inexpensive way to broaden awareness of offenders and brokers, increasing level of knowledge about those responsible and creating disincentives to smugglers simply by making their lives more difficult. With information on those sought for offenses widely available, the ability of smugglers to move about freely is significantly reduced. Sharing information on seizures of small arms and light weapons allows for better accounting at the regional level of arms taken out of circulation, and may allow for some observation of trends in terms of illicit arms activity. For instance, if the frequency of seizure of one particular type of weapon suddenly increases, uncovering and mapping the network which is channeling the arm may become simpler. 3.3.3 Information exchanges on the number of destroyed and decommissioned small arms and light weapons. The collection and sharing of this information improves the general level of knowledge about international small arms events. Collection and dissemination of careful accounting statistics on destroyed and decommissioned arms has thus far been relatively rare. Also, by checking the street price of arms after major seizures, destructions or decommissioning, economic analysis may allow, over time, better estimates of the actual size of the illicit market in a given region. 3.3.4 Finally, an area to which a SACR should lend its support is the inclusion into an international code of conduct a measure to limit trade in small arms and light weapons to dealers authorized by the relevant state. 3.4 Post-Conflict Stabilization 3.4.1 Measures to promote confidence in the security sector. 3.4.1.1 Before, during, and after intra and inter-state conflicts restoring the overall confidence of the security sector of involved statesBmilitary, police, or other armed forcesBis imperative. If the security sector of a state suspects or knows that arms are accumulating at an alarming rate in the hands of unauthorized or unfriendly groups the likelihood of aggressive action or retaliation may increase. Assisting such states in providing a dispassionate security assessment which decreases the level of uncertainty surrounding arms accumulations can determine whether any action is justified. Identification of a destabilizing accumulation contributes to early warning of conflict, and may allow multilateral action to restore confidence and decrease the likelihood of conflict. 3.4.1.2 Following major conflicts it is also worthwhile to review national legislation to assure that measures to combat illicit trafficking or reduce destabilizing accumulation of small arms are in-place. 3.4.1.3 Review and strengthening of enforcement agencies can be another important tool in stabilizing a fragile post-conflict situation. Restoration of public confidence in the capabilities, credibility, and fidelity of law enforcement agencies is critical to reducing popular tension and the likelihood of resort of violent conflict. Continued |
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