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| 3.4.2 There are a series of measures which can contribute to the demobilization and reintegration of combatants, an absolutely critical aspect of post-conflict stabilization. The presence of large numbers of former combatants whose only livelihood has been through military or paramilitary activities is a recipe for major problems. Such individuals, suddenly finding that they are no longer needed or wanted, may turn to mercenary activities, may simply resell military materiel available to them, or engage in criminal activities. Hence there are a number of prudent measures to assure that reintegration of former combatants is as smooth as possible. 3.4.2.1 First, while upholding the need for war crimes and crimes against humanity to be prosecuted, especially with respect to key decisionmakers, the promotion of amnesties for former combatants will make it easier for such combatants to re-enter the political and social fabric of a state or region. If such individuals fear retribution or sanction, they are more likely to remain outside of such structures, and thus outside of the system of social norms which, one hopes, opposes the resort to violence. There are potential implications for and contradictions in the manner in which the War Crimes Tribunals were established in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and for the establishment of the International Criminal Court. Further urgent study is warranted on these matters. 3.4.2.2 Second, inclusion of weapons decommissioning and collection and destruction programs in peace-keeping and/or post-conflict mandates allows the implementation of a multi-pronged approach to restoring stability in a conflict-ridden and arms-ridden zone. Along with other measures, building decommissioning and weapons collection and destruction programs directly into post-conflict settlements and multilateral programs is a useful way to increase their likelihood of implementation. 3.4.2.3 Third, co-operation with neighboring states to prevent resupply through illicit trafficking should be increased, if possible, in a post-conflict phase. Such cooperation, obviously, may not be practical. However, insofar as is possible, it should be a priority. 3.4.2.4 Fourth, international monitoring of implementation of a post-conflict settlement or peace agreement provides a means to enhance the credibility of attempts to re-integrate and demobilize former combatants. In the case of a post-conflict adjustment phase such international visibility and attention may be crucial. 3.4.3 Public awareness programs. In some regions which have experienced prolonged conflict there have emerged cultures of violence and of the gun. These normative structures, which value violence as a means of problem resolution and weapons as sources of certainty in an uncertain world, often reinforce conflict and violence. Reversing or minimizing these cultures through public awareness programs and public information campaigns should be a key priority in any post-conflict setting. It is evident that eliminating such cultures which propagate violence and uncertainty is daunting at best. Yet, until individuals are able to reconstitute their social identify, the cycle of violence will not be broken. More concretely, measures to sustain peaceful development, such as retraining programs for former combatants, can play an important role in reconstituting social identities by assuring that these individuals have market-valuable skills. 3.4.4 Role of NGOs. It is a sad reality of power politics, which still divides the Security Council on small arms nonproliferation, that at present some permanent members are opposed to a number of the suggestions set forth in this consultative document. While some of their objections may be settled in discussion and negotiation, others will remain in dispute. It is, therefore, essential that, in its initial stages, any small arms control regime rely on voluntary action undertaken by member States in response to legitimnate pressures by NGOs and civil society at-large. 3.4.5 Role of the UN. The UN, through its relevant institutions, has a critical role to play in supporting post-conflict adjustment with regard to the small arms question. The UN will be invaluable in bringing its expertise to bear in implementing practical measures at the local level. However, it is also true that the UN role should be seen as complementing and contributing to regional organizations and regional solutions. Thus, while the UN must bring its institutional force to bear to facilitate peaceful solutions, ultimately, leadership and the will to create lasting peace must come from the local and regional levels, and be tailored to regional concerns and characteristics. Continued |
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