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| 4 A Small Arms Control Regime: Reduction 4.1 Reduction and prevention, like many dimensions of the small arms problem, are closely related. Thus measures designed specifically to reduce existing stockpiles, which in effect is a form of prevention of future proliferation, overlap in some instances with measures noted previously. For instance, measures designed to stem illicit trafficking may in some instances identify extant stockpiles. In focusing on reduction, however, particularly in a post-conflict environment, specialized planning and doctrine spanning political, social, and economic factors, are required if such initiatives are to be effective. 4.2 Indicators of a surplus. As a first step, it should be clearly established that an arms surplus exists in a given locale. Several actions and indicators should be noted to provide the basis for definitive action. 4.2.1 A national determination. A formal declaration by the state in question is valuable to formalize the social and political consensus to take actions to reduce standing surpluses of arms. Prior to this declaration, several initiatives can be taken to provide the empirical foundation upon which such a declaration would be based. 4.2.2 High lethality rates resulting from SALW. Continued small arms related deaths and suffering provides ample evidence of an arms surplus. Clear articulation of the size and scope of the problem by publication of information on the widespread suffering caused by such arms is a viable means of contributing to consensus building for action. 4.2.3 Surplus weapons are not needed for national or internal defense. Particularly applicable following a major arms buildup or conflict, there will often be a major surplus of arms which played a role in the conflict or political economy of the conflict phase. Following termination of hostilities, it is sometimes the case that many more arms have been produced than are required for the altered threat environment. Large numbers of arms in circulation leftover from the Cold War are a strong case in point. 4.2.4 Legitimate buyers are difficult to find. If "legitimate" purchasers of arms cannot easily be found for existing weapons, then it seems clear that any legitimate market is saturated with arms. In such instance, the legitimacy of potential buyers must be scrutinized carefully, while the motivations of suppliers, who produce or maintain weapons stockpiles must similarly be scrutinized. When legitimate buyers are scarce, suppliers may be tempted to turn to less than legitimate buyers in grey markets. 4.3 Collection and Destruction of Small Arms and Light Weapons: Global/ regional incentive-based weapons collection programs. Ambassador Peggy Mason has established a set of solid guidelines for weapons management in a post-conflict environment generally, and incentive-based weapons collection programs specifically. The following section adopts approaches and priorities identified in her recent monograph "Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programmes in a Peace-Keeping Environment: Principles and Guidelines." 4.3.1 Purposes of Destruction. Complementing prevention measures in a post-conflict environment are incentive-based weapons collection and destruction programs. These programs can be grouped into the category of "disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration" (DD&R), and require a multifaceted, coordinated approach to deal with a range of post-conflict problems, including political and diplomatic, military, humanitarian, reintegration, and development dimensions. The DD&R process focuses on incentive-based weapons collections programs. Against the overall backdrop of a post-conflict settlement which includes at least the framework for a DD&R, the ultimate goal is to provide the foundation for a lasting peace by disarming and demobilizing former combatants, and destroying surplus weapons in circulation. 4.3.2 National and international experiences. Experience to date indicates that disarmament and weapons management should receive sufficient attention in (1) the design of DD&R plan; (2) negotiation of the peace agreement; (3) any UN Security Council mandate authorized to oversee a peace implementation process; (4) the mission planning process; (5) the post-implementation follow-up processes. 4.3.3 Options and methods. The emphasis in collection and destruction efforts should be on an incentive based system, which might include, but is no means limited to cash-based programs. In addition to formal demobilization processes for former combatants in military or paramilitary organizations, it is paramount that carefully planned and effective measures for voluntary disarmament outside the formal demobilization process. Any plan must take account of local circumstances, and draw as much as possible on community-level leadership. A key precondition concerns reducing the security value of weapons, and their relevance to an individual's economic prospects. This can be accomplished through establishment of a reasonably secure environment combined with humanitarian efforts to address basic needs. 4.3.4 Deactivating and decommissioning. In accordance with the agreed demobilization procedures, all groups subject to the formal demobilization process will be required to assemble at designated sites (Assembly Areas) en route to the locations (Encampments for opposition forces and Discharge Centers for government forces) where the formal demobilization and discharge processes will take place. To ensure that disarmament takes place as early as possible in the peace implementation process, every effort should be made to plan for the disarmament of all ex-combatants immediately upon their arrival at the designated Assembly Areas. Planning should proceed on the basis of phased arrivals, with lesser numbers initially and a gradual increase. Continued |