 |
| 3.1.2.2.6 Respect for the legitimate needs for security. At no level is the intent of the transparency regime to impinge upon the legitimate needs for national security of UN member States. 3.1.2.3 Transparency of production, licensing, and export regulations. Again, the first step is transparency. States should on a voluntary basis make public their relevant laws and regulations concerning the legal production, sales, and transfers of small arms. As before, transparency serves multiple functions. Other regime members can learn from this information what other states are doing to regulate their production, how they are ensuring that the sales are legitimate and that exports are directed to the appropriate end-user. Transparency also serves to highlight which states have both the most innovative and weakest rules, highlighting potential models and possible trouble sources. These measures also serve to foster cooperation and to build confidence. 3.1.2.4 Firearms Marking. As part of an international code of conduct, the marking of firearms for the purposes of identification and tracing is an important means to achieving transparency and accountability. This proposal is included in the draft Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts, Components, and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime Tracking, and hence forms part of the ongoing international discourse on small arms control measures. 3.1.2.4.1 Most arms producers already have systems for registering weapons, imprinting arms with a serial number at the point of manufacture. The problem is that these efforts are not always adequate and lack harmonization. There also remain large numbers of unmarked weapons. There is a need for the creation of a system of appropriate and reliable marking of all arms. There must also be a system for the timely and reliable tracing of lines of supply. Arms tracking, by means of marking, holds markets and governments to higher standards of accountability. It promotes international and domestic accountability and restraint. Key principles include the following: 3.1.2.4.2 Marking technologies. Current methods of marking weapons are often relatively easy to remove. A standard should be determined for reliable and cost effective marking that cannot be easily erased or falsified. One option is to use chemical tracers. Mechanisms should also be established to support implementation by all interested States. Another technical decision must be made as to what information to mark on the arms. The OAS calls for the name of manufacturer, place of manufacture, and serial number. The 1999 Report of the UN Group of Experts on Small Arms (A/54/258) suggests including the country of manufacture and manufacturer and serial number (so national authorities can identify the source). The goal is to ensure that the source of every weapon can be identified and increase the ability to trace its supply path. Providing standards for marking weapons will make tracing across numerous borders less of a "translation" problem. 3.1.2.4.3 Information-sharing on marked small arms. SACR can also help establish a contact point for accumulating information on the life of small arms. Records on small arms are often widely dispersed and time-consuming to access, and are occasionally lost. It is necessary to cooperate in efforts to identify and trace weapons. Governments should be encouraged to provide information in a timely manner that could facilitate arms tracking. Moreover, information that would be widely and repetitively accessed should already be available. Standard procedures for information access should also be outlined to make tracing across borders easier. It would also be helpful to determine what governments', manufacturers', and brokers' obligations are to cooperate fully with efforts to trace sources and lines of supply of illicit or suspect arms. 3.1.2.4.4 Marking newly produced weapons. Because a substantial portion of legally sold or transferred weapons end up being illicitly circulated, an international agreement should be reached on marking weapons produced for domestic consumption that strengthens the current OAS standard. 3.1.2.4.5 Goals of marking. First, marking acts as a deterrent against redirecting the weapon into illicit circles. There is no way to prevent the weapons from being redirected to the black market after the initial, legal sale and delivery has been verified. If the weapon can be identified, however, there is a greater likelihood that it can be traced, thus exposing the illicit broker to a greater possibility of prosecution. Similarly, similar logic will affect states redirecting licit weapons, discouraging them from undertaking this type of action. Second, marking allows future analysts to better track the flow of weapons, identifying the quantities of illicitly produced weapons, and inferring how licit weapons are introduced into the illicit realm. Third, marking the weapons makes it easier to track inventories and provide information supporting a small arms register, or other forms of weapon production transparency. This can also function as a certification tool: if marked weapons are legally sold or transferred to a specific recipient, and are later found to have been re-circulated on the black market, the recipient has to account for their redistribution activities or face weapon sales sanctions from regime members. 3.1.2.4.6 Delimitation of the purposes of marking. Marking weapons is not designed to be a process that tracks individual users to whom the weapons were legally sold. Such a database is both unnecessary and not feasible. None of the purposes listed above require that individual owners be tracked after they purchase weapons. Open declaration that such tracking will not be part of the regime will also help allay fears of firearm lobbies in democratic states. These lobbies pose difficult obstacles to ratifying regulations proposed by the regime and efforts to minimize the strength of their position, such as this declaration, should be employed whenever possible. 3.1.3 Strengthening national export controls. 3.1.3.1 National legislation on the manufacture, possession, use, trade, transport and circulation of small arms must be revised and reinforced. Export control norms must be set and concrete and practical measures supporting their implementation developed. Emphasis should be placed on the fact that any control regime must be developed by consensus and not through unilateral action. A comprehensive control regime should be agreed to in order to regulate the activities of national and international agents who engage in the business of brokering with respect to the manufacture, export, import or transfer of small arms. The goal would be to standardize norms for granting export licenses and focus on strengthening end-use controls. There should also be greater information sharing of the activities of suspicious small arms traders and brokers and certain prosecution of violators of export licensing agreements. Such an approach would help States avoid becoming unwitting parties to small arms trafficking. It would also aid verifying the accuracy of arms export applications both before and after export authorizations, prevent misuse and diversion, help identify and apprehend international criminals and ensure their prosecution to the fullest extent of the law. continue |
|