Mental States
�zge Ekin
January 9, 2004
In this paper I intend to give analysis of mental states that involve qualitative aspect and propositional content.
My aim is first to formulate mental states that involve qualitative aspect and then define �qualia theory� which
has been developed for explaining sensory qualities of mental states. I will also point out some problematic
issues with qualia theory and conclude that even though this theory brought up more problems than solutions to
the subject it is widely accepted by philosophers and scientists. In the second half of this paper I will try to
give analysis of propositional attitude sentences having the thought that p or believing that p etc. Finally I will
try to analyze mental phenomena that do not involve directedness such as feeling of joy, pain and feeling
depressed.
I
1. Mental States that Involve a Qualitative Aspect and On What There Is
These mental states involve mental phenomena directed to physical presentations represented by linguistic
expressions such as �I see something red�, �I hear Bach�, � I taste an apple�, � I feel an itch on my stomach�, �I
smell onions� etc. As one notices all thosemental states related to bodily senses. Then we can ask, �What is it
to have mental states that caused by sensations of bodily senses?� First of all there is a stimulus in all these
cases and there is a response. But what is in between? Some philosophers believe that there is nothing in
between, moreover it does not matter if these referred physical entities existed. As for example Quine argues
over and over that ��the points of condensation in the primordial conceptual scheme are things glimpsed, not
glimpses.�1 According to Quine we know physical things only through their effects on our bodies, and this is
the qualification of empirical meaning of our talks about physical things. We do not question the reference
(physical things). Moreover Quine and some distinguished philosophers believe that science will resolve all
these talks about mental phenomena and there will be no need for a philosophical theory of mind. On the
contrary some philosophers like Sellars and Nagel argue that mind exists and even science gives an explanation
about mental phenomena we will still need philosophical theory of mind and science itself will not resolve all
this tangled subject.
I believe, we, human beings have minds and these mental states we experience are not only a linguistic
activity. As Putnam points it out; pain is realized, in its intrinsic nature in many physically different ways; and
we can build machines that realize pain software pattern and have many different physical realization but
would this be equivalent to pain? C fiber stimulation of pain is not itself pain. We still do not have clear
explanation of pain, or what it is to be in pain even we have explanation of pain in scientific terms. So I believe
there is a mystery going beyond the physical and this mystery is hidden in our minds.
2. Qualia Theory and Sensations:
Now, let�s go back to our question: �What is it to have mental states that caused by sensations of bodily
senses?� In particular , let�s consider the case �What is it to be in a mental state seeming to see something
white.�
According to qualia theorists for a being to seem to see or in general seem to perceive something F is to have a
mental state that is modified by a certain quality (a quale). So according to this theory for each person there
might exist set of qualities (Q1, Q2,..) associated with colors (C1, C2, �) and if I seem to see something C1
my experience will be Q1 but on the other hand if I seem to see C1 my experience may well be Q2 too. Hence
unlike functionalist theory suggested there need not be isomorphic structure between causal patterns and
mental states.
