One believer of qualia theory, a neuroscientist John Ratey explains how we see as follows: �The fovea (one

tiny pinhole region in the center of the eye) sees with absolute clarity only a thumbnail-size portion of a scene.

It sees only bits of shapes, portions of curves, sections edges, and parts of colors. It does not see whole

shapes or colors. The brain predicts final shapes from fragmented parts that fovea sees. Nerve impulses that

reflect fragments of images, movements, and wavelengths are sent to visual memory centers in the brain,

which contain permanently stored image patterns. If the fovea�s fragmented image can be matched to a pattern

stored in the memory center the object is recognized.�2 Hence scientific explanation supports qualia theory. It

justifies that we keep an image pattern so that when we encounter a similar or the same stimuli we seem to see

something white over there. 

So are we to accept the explanation of qualia theory that (1) �S seems to see something white iff S is

immediately inclined to believe that he sees a white physical object�


A question raised to this explanation is that how we can distinguish state of seeming to see hallucinations from

seeming to see real objects. Ratey goes on his explanations on this aspect and adds �The brain�s need to

predict, in order to fill the gaps between fragments of images we see, is also very reason we are prone to

visual illusions.�3 So it is what our brains do, and depending on the past data we create visual illusions. Hence

we see visual illusions again by what has been caused us to see (acquired) at first hand.  But still this theory

modeled upon thought as we take the explanation (1) and does not really tell us how we perceive since it uses a

propositional attitude: �belief�.



Unclear on the base of explanation how we perceive, nevertheless, some parts of the theory match with the

scientific data. Hence I believe we only need to formulate the theory better. I know that a lot of people are

disturbed with the thought of image pattern of something in the brain. But as Burge puts it another way, this is

only because we have incomplete understanding of image.4 Let�s look at Webster�s New World Dictionary for

the meaning of �image�: �4 a) a mental picture of something; conception; idea; impression�. Hence in the 4th

definition of the dictionary we understand that the image does not have to be like a real picture of something.

An event I have experienced might make the content more clear: When I   read �War and Peace� by Tolstoy in

high school, Peter as a character in the book was so real to me, once I told my mother upon encountering a

man in the street that how that man looked like Peter in �War and Peace� and she as once been a reader of

�War and Peace� also amazed and said he really looked like him. We both did not see a movie of the book

neither saw an illustration of the character but the character was so well described that we both have a similar

mental picture of him so to say.

One other objection for qualia theory is: If there were such a quality, it would not help us understand what

seeing white is. The mere occurrence of a quality isn�t enough. Sensing involves awareness. I agree with this

objection. Qualia theory does not have an explanation for awareness. Either it goes to infinite regress by saying

that awareness is another quality or it goes back to thoughts and propositions and says that awareness is a

belief about quality. Hence qualia theory lacks the explanatory power on what there is and fails to give an

account of perception without proposition �belief�.

Wittgenstein�s private language argument is raised as another objection for qualia theory. According to this

argument one cannot have a private language since language is a social thing. And if one has a private language

there is no way to tell she has it or what kind of a thing it is since there is no ostensive way to learn this

language and we acquire first knowledge ostensively. Hence the argument is we can never know if one has a

quality Q caused by stimuli S. Moreover one cannot even know she, herself, has the quality at all. I do not

quite agree with this objection. I�ll go back to Ratey�s book and use the example
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