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Operation
Totalize
"...On July 30, 1944, Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds summoned the senior officers
of 2nd Canadian Corps to his main headquarters at the chateau in Cairon,
northwest of Caen. There was complete silence as Simonds described the deeds
that had won the Victoria Cross for Major J. K. Mahoney of the Westminster
Regiment (Motor) in Italy just a couple of weeks before. Mahoney's company, with
a troop of light recce tanks from the Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians),
had seized a bridgehead across the Melfa River and held it against repeated
counterattacks. |
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Riding
in Kangaroos, men of the 4th Infantry Brigade await the signal to
start operation Totalize, August 7th, 1944.
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There was an edge to Simonds' voice as he spelled out "the points in this
episode" that he wanted "all officers to read and think about," and to discuss
with their troops. The Westminsters, Simonds noted, were in their first major
offensive action but fought like well-tried veterans. "There was no question of
giving in because they had lost touch with the rest of their battalion or were
cut off or under heavy fire. Under the leadership of Maj. Mahoney they fought,
confident that if they did their part the fight would swing in their favour and
the rest of the unit would get through to assist them."
The officers assembled at the chateau were unsure how they should react to
this lesson. Was Simonds implying that 2 Canadian Corps units had failed to meet the
standard set by the Westminsters in Italy? Did he really believe the units
overwhelmed by massive German firepower in Operation Spring had simply given in?
No one dared ask, and the room remained silent as the general began a review of
the progress of the Normandy Campaign to date. Simonds described Spring as
successful despite the loss of ground and heavy casualties because the primary
aim, holding German panzer divisions in the Caen sector, had been met. "It
should be stressed to the troops that their contribution made the American
success possible." However, the time had come to prepare for a major operation
to deliver a "knockout blow." Simonds warned, "No division will stop until every
reserve is employed."
Simonds was expressing the general belief that the American breakthrough at
Avranches had transformed the Battle of Normandy, ending the stalemate and
creating opportunities for mobile warfare. But much depended on the German
reaction. The Allied high command, including Eisenhower and Montgomery, assumed
the Germans would pivot on a series of hinge positions--Verrieres Ridge, Hill
112, Mont Pincon--and conduct a fighting retreat to the River Seine. This battle
picture led Montgomery to shift most of his British divisions to the west where
they could add their weight to the American offensive and drive the enemy out of
Normandy. The image was of pushing against a swinging door while avoiding the
hinges around Caen, which were too tough to break.
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A
British crew of a Sherman tank of 1st Northamptonshire Yeomanry receive rations before the start of Operation
Totalize. August 7, 1944. (Imperial War Museum)
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Operation Bluecoat began on the same day Simonds gave his pep talk in
Cairon.
It began well enough, but the arrival of German reinforcements and the hilly
terrain of the Suisse Normande soon checked the British advance. With three
panzer divisions committed against the British and four moving into position to
carry out Hitler�s counterattack at Mortain, only 12th SS was left in the Caen
sector to support the troops defending Verrieres Ridge. Montgomery therefore
ordered 2 Canadian Corps, reinforced by 51st Highland and 1st Polish Armoured
divisions, to "advance in the direction of Falaise" and force a withdrawal of
enemy units blocking the British advance. No one was yet planning to encircle
the German armies in Normandy, though the rapid advance of Patton�s 3rd Army
toward Le Mans was forcing a reconsideration of the overall strategy of the
campaign.
Despite the move of panzer divisions to the west, the defences in the Caen
sector were still very strong. Hitler had finally concluded that there would be
no second landing in the Pas de Calais and ordered the transfer of all 15th Army
mobile divisions to Normandy. The 89th Infantry Division arrived on Aug. 4 and
took over the defences of Verrieres Ridge the next night. Most accounts of the
Canadian battles of August 1944 ignored the role played by the 89th, and
scarcely mention the 85th which reached the battlefield on Aug. 10. Our
historians have been mesmerized by the self-serving accounts of Hitler Youth
commander Kurt Meyer, who claimed that his under-strength battle groups
outfought the Canadians virtually without assistance. The reality is that 89th
Div. was at full strength when it took over the defences south of Caen. With
12,000 men and its own artillery and anti-tank guns to add to the formidable
array of 88s controlled by the flak corps, plus scores of heavy mortars and
Nebelwerfers, the division presented a serious obstacle to the Canadian advance.
Simonds understood the hard realities confronting his corps when he planned
Operation Totalize. He told his hesitant commanders that while the ground was
"ideally suited to full exploitation by the enemy" because of the long range of
his anti-tank guns and mortars, there were ways of overcoming these advantages.
The corps would attack at night without any preliminary artillery program.
Instead, Bomber Command would lead the way to the first objectives, striking
villages on the flanks while the advance got under way. The artillery would
begin its fire tasks after the armoured columns crossed the start line. Once
begun, the barrage would reach a new level of intensity: 360 field and medium
guns were to fire 60,000 shells in the first hour! Artificial moonlight and
Bofors guns firing orange tracer would help the formation keep direction.
Simonds was also ready to deal with a problem that had plagued all major
operations in Normandy. Without close infantry support Allied armour could not
deal with German anti-tank defences, so somehow the infantry had to accompany
the tanks forward "in bullet- and splinter-proof vehicles." Other commanders
understood the problem; Simonds provided a solution. Artillery field regiments
were turning in their self-propelled Priest 105-mm guns for the more familiar
25-pounders. Seventy-six of these vehicles were quickly converted into
"unfrocked priests" or "kangaroos" by removing the gun and adding scrounged
armour plating. These would carry the assault companies forward with the tanks.
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A
German Tiger tank in Normandy
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Operation Totalize was one of the most innovative breakthrough operations of
the war. The Canadian, Scottish and Polish troops advanced eight miles in the
direction of Falaise, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy at a cost of 560
fatal casualties and 1,600 wounded. Canadian historians have long preferred a
different version of Totalize that emphasizes the failure to reach Falaise, but
before we consider what went wrong let us be un-Canadian and note all the things
that went right.
The 51st Highland Div., harshly criticized for its alleged failures in July,
captured Tilly-la-Campagne while advancing quickly to its first phase
objectives. The 2nd Canadian Infantry Div., which had suffered so heavily in the
attritional battles of July that it was still short 1,500 infantrymen, turned in
an extraordinary performance reaching all of its objectives and capturing
hundreds of prisoners. Individual battalions demonstrated remarkable resiliency.
The South Saskatchewan Regt., which had borne the brunt of the enemy
counterattack on July 20 and lost 13 officers and 209 men over several hours,
were able to "lean into the barrage" and seize Rocquancourt in a textbook
operation. Lieutenant-colonel F. A. Clift maintained control throughout the day
and provided two companies to assist 1st Hussars (6th Armd., Regt.) in an
armoured attack on Fontenay-le-Marmion. Fontenay and May-sur-Oriie held out
until late Aug. 8, but the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (MG) and the Fusiliers
Mont-Royal gained control of the two ruined villages--which had been so crucial
to the German defence of Verrieres Ridge--by nightfall.
The 4th Canadian
Armored Brigade, mounted in the improvised armored personnel
carriers, reached all its objectives by early morning and the battalions dug in
to meet the expected counterattacks. Meanwhile, 5th Brigade, waiting in reserve,
was able to reach Bretteville-sur-Laize, penetrating the enemy's artillery and
Nebelwerfer positions. The German defensive position south of Caen had been
shattered. Was it possible to turn a breakthrough into a breakout?
The original plan for Totalize had called for a step-by-step approach, but
the withdrawal of three panzer divisions from the Caen sector led Simonds to
order his two armored divisions, 4th Canadian and 1st Polish, to maintain momentum
by launching the second phase at 1:45 p.m. on the 8th. To assist them, the
United States Army Air Force was to employ its B-17 Flying Fortresses in a
daylight precision attack. Unfortunately, two 12-plane groups bombed short,
inflicting more than 300 casualties on the 1st Polish and several hundred more
on other units. The North Shore (N.B.) Regiment, well behind the lines in the
suburbs of Caen, lost almost 100 men and the 3rd Canadian Infantry Div. commander,
Major-General Rod Keller, was wounded.
This friendly fire and the continued resistance of 89th Div. would have been
sufficient to delay the advance without the intervention of the 12th SS, but the
arrival of battlegroups that included Tigers of 101st Heavy Tank Battalion
guaranteed that any advance would be sharply contested. By late afternoon,
German armor and long range anti-tank guns had regained control of the
battlefield in the wide-open country so ideally suited "to full exploitation by
the enemy's weapons."
At this point Simonds ought to have paused and regrouped for another
set-piece attack with a carefully coordinated fire plan, the kind of operation
his divisions were trained for. But like all Allied commanders he desperately
wanted to escape the limitations imposed by the vulnerability of his armour and
his tank-mounted guns. He ordered 4th Armored Division to form two battle groups to
press the attack "while we still have surprise." Halpenny Force, composed of the
Canadian Grenadier Guards and the Lake Superior Regiment, was to attack
Bretteville-le-Rabet;
Lieut.-Col. Don Worthington and the British Columbia Regiment
were to bypass enemy resistance and reach the Point 195 part of the ridge that
guarded the Laison River valley.
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A
British Cromwell tank and jeep pass an abandoned German PAK gun during Operation
Totalize; August 8, 1944. (Imperial War Museum)
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The
BCRs, with
three companies of the Algonquin Regiment riding on the tanks,
set off at 2 a.m. on Aug. 9. Enemy fire seems to have forced them to veer to the
east, and when dawn broke they headed for the high ground they hoped was Point
195. They were, in fact, some four miles east of their objective and within
1,000 yards of a 12th SS battle group equipped with Tigers and Panthers. A
German lieutenant captured by the BCRs provided this graphic description of what
it was like to be in the Canadian position: "Tigers and Panthers advanced in
order to encircle the positions on the hill. One Canadian tank after another was
knocked out and ended up in smoke and flame. Some crews...tried to reach a small
woods close by. They took me along. Soon after the wood came under sustained
attack from fighter bombers."
Historians have emphasized the faulty navigation of the BCRs without
exploring more fundamental problems. By late July the Americans, aware of the
difficulties in coordinating ground-air operations, had revised their air
doctrine to create Armoured Column Cover. This provided for direct VHF radio
contact between an air force officer with the armoured unit and the aircraft
overhead. This system was one of the crucial methods used by the Americans in
exploiting their breakthrough after July 25. If such an arrangement had existed
with the Royal Air Force on Aug. 9, Worthington would have been in constant
touch with the fighterbombers, avoiding friendly fire and directing Typhoons
onto the enemy. The BCR-Algonquin force had breached a position the enemy was
trying desperately to hold until the newly arrived 85th Divivision could be deployed
in depth. If reinforcements had arrived from the 1st Polish--which was less than
a mile away--a very different situation would have developed. As it was,
Worthington and many of his force were killed or captured.
This spring, the two regiments rebuilt and rededicated the memorial situated
above the Laison Valley. The Canadian flag, which can be seen at a great
distance in this open, rolling country, flies proudly, marking an extraordinary
moment in our history. Everyone who visits Normandy should go there.
The story of Worthington Force is one of great tragedy, but there are more
stories of great triumph to tell. When Simonds learned that Point 195 was still
in enemy hands he demanded that a new effort be made. Lt.-Col. Dave Stewart�s
Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada were told to take the hill. Stewart
was one of a number of absolutely outstanding battalion commanders with which
the Canadian Army was blessed in the war. Jack Harper, then a captain, remembers
the almost-instant rapport Stewart established with officers and men: "He
commanded by earning respect." Stewart received his orders late on the afternoon
of the 10th, and led the scout platoon to recce the route he had chosen from a
map. "On the way back," he recalled, in a reminiscence published in the
magnificent new Argylls history Black Yesterdays, "I left members of the scout
platoon at strategic points to guide the battalion." That night the Argylls,
with perfect confidence in their leadership, moved single file through enemy
lines towards the high ground. Stewart was up front because "you can't win
battles from behind," and supervised placement. When a battery of 17-pounder
anti-tank guns arrived, he sited them to control the approaches from the west
and settled in to wait for the inevitable counterattack. The Lincoln and Welland
Regiment had moved on a parallel course to secure the right flank, so the 12th SS
was faced with a real dilemma. German doctrine required immediate counterattacks
but the Argylls met each one with devastating fire.
Totalize ended that day in a costly attempt to capture Quesnay Wood, the
focal point of German resistance north of Falaise. Simonds decided to reorganize
and mount another large-scale deliberate attack. The decision to regroup came
just as Montgomery was awakening to the possibility of encircling the German
armies in what would soon become known as the Falaise Pocket. On Aug. 11, he
ordered both First Canadian and Second British Army to capture Falaise, "then
operate. with strong armored and mobile forces to secure Argentan." The
Canadians responded by ordering 2nd Div. to make a wide right hook around the
main German defenses, approaching Falaise from the west..."
Originally
published in Legion, September/October 1999 Author: Terry Copp
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NAVIGATION:
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Authie
& Buron
- Operation
Goodwood - Carpiquet
- Verrieres
Ridge - Caen
- Operation
Totalize |
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