THE AIR CAMPAIGN
“Life is tough. It’s tougher if
you’re stupid.”
In the early hours of Jan. 17, Coalition air and naval forces
struck devastating blows against the Iraqi Air Force, air
defense, command, control, communications and intelligence
systems. The first day of war also exposed Iraqi ineptness as the
Iraqi response was uncoordinated and unsuccessful. Coalition air
strikes quickly gained air supremacy. The air campaign focused on
strategic targets, such as Iraq's nuclear, biological and
chemical capabilities, and operational targets, primarily Iraq's
Republican Guard heavy divisions. The air attacks continued for
39 days, making life tough for an army weakened by the UN
blockade and led by a demagogue like Saddam.
Much training occurred in the four weeks prior to movement to Forward Assembly Area (FAA) Garcia. The division maneuvered under a "crawl, walk, run" concept that progressed from leader walk-throughs to unit rehearsals at squad to brigade level. Training peaked with brigade maneuver of combat, combat support and combat service support elements over long distances. Firing at Eskey Range, by maneuver and fire support units, occurred regularly. Units focused on offensive tactics, including movement techniques, attack formations, actions on contact and breaching obstacles in stride. Combat service support units worked two missions simultaneously. They provided needed life support for the brigades and separate battalions and focused on desert fundamentals to support mobile armored warfare.
The VII Corps mission was to breach defensive positions in Iraq and set the stage for 1st AD's and 3rd AD's envelopment of the RGFC west of the breaching site. The plan's success depended on a successful air campaign, effective intelligence and a theater level deception plan. Prior to ground combat, the Coalition succeeded in attriting Iraqi tanks and fighting vehicles by at least 23 percent and artillery by 47 percent. Iraqi units in the KTO continued to take a tremendous beating. Front line infantry divisions were the worst equipped and least supported, and they suffered most from allied air. While mechanized and armor divisions serving as operational and strategic reserves also suffered from Coalition air, they were in much better shape and prepared to conduct combat operations.