Chapter Eight. Put down the manifesto, and step away




Irene: Still, it seems to me that you're being a little harsh. It's almost as if you're saying that we should go for blood, if somebody says something stupid.


T : No, of course not. That's a dangerous practice, and one that we shouldn't be reinforcing as a societal norm. It is far too easy for mob rule to intrude if we make that option socially permissible. Unpopular ideas will simply be relabeled as being stupid ideas, by an increasingly closeminded, dogmatic mass of people, who will then harass those supporting them, into silence. This is the sort of thing that will tend to snowball. As people get used to seeing the arguments that support such viewpoints cut off, they will become more and more comfortable with the expectation that there will not be a discussion, about such points of view, and that they may be driven from consideration by group whim.

People, by and large, are a cowardly lot. Once something has become expected, they will often adjust their conceptions of right and wrong to rationalise it. Frequently, they will go as far as to argue that the fact that something is expected, makes it right, not merely allowing their cowardice to show, but openly enshrining it as a cornerstone of their philosophy. Having come to expect that an unpopular view will be dismissed without discussion, most will come to think that this is how such a view should be approached.

They will be ever more reluctant to initiate that internal process of discussion, that is the careful consideration of the points for and against an argument - which is to say, that they will be less and less willing to truly listen to an unpopular argument - as that expectation grows stronger. This, in removing that nagging voice of doubt, that what they are supporting could possibly not be right, makes it ever easier for them to accept the silencing of arguments to the contrary, and strengthens the expectation that such a silencing will occur. If they never think about the arguments they accept the silencing of, it becomes easier for them to accept any unwarranted label attached to it.

There is no bottoming out to this process. The very counterbalancing mechanism that one might hope would intrude - the realisation of the growing absurdity of the points that one is arguing - vanishes. Consider the logic of the expectation accepted. The popular consensus is to be hostily defended. Well, the more absurd it begins to appear, the more threatened it will be by further discussion. Thus, if one implicitly accepts this position, in that it finds expression in one's actions, then as that which one has allowed oneself to feel called to defend, is more and more threatened, the logical consequence of this reality is that the fanaticism of one's defense of it will increase. Contrary evidence and inconvenient counterarguments will be more shrilly, and even violently suppressed, the more convincing that they might appear to be.

The point of the discussion, to one such as this, is not the search for the truth. Indeed, those of this inclination are notorious for often denying the very existence of the truth, arguing that reality is personal - a convenient point of view for someone maintaining a dubious position. To those who have gone down this road, a discussion is a turf battle - a matter of defense, nothing more.


Irene: Oddly enough, I agree with you. I suspect, though, that you don't agree with yourself. Your reaction to Robert doesn't seem to square with the pious sentiments just expressed.


T : On the contrary, they square perfectly. My issue with Robert wasn't the stupidity of his remarks, but the insincerity behind him. Were Robert more stupid than he actually is, I'd probably respect him more than I do now.


Irene: That sounds like anti-intellectualism to me.


T : No, it is a recognition that a good character is a sounder cause for respect than the presence of ability. If Robert was a man of low intellect, as opposed to one of low character, then I could believe that the gaps in his reasoning were simply a reflection of his inability to understand the logical implications of what he was saying. Perhaps, he would merely be parotting what another was saying, without understanding what he was saying. But, Robert is too bright for that to be plausible. What I see in Robert is not the total absence of ability, but rather the willingness to put that ability present in him, to bad use - to lead others astray.


Irene: So the censorious pack of sheep that you imagine the great unwashed to be, instead of labeling unpopular ideas as being "stupid" to excuse their desire to stifle any attempt to support them, will simply relabel them as being "insincere", as you have done. What's the difference?


T : The fact that I didn't affix the label to Robert through an assessment of the merits of his ideas, but rather recognised that Robert had affixed the label to himself through his actions, as he declined to put his ideas into consistent practice when he was asked if he would apply them to himself.

Nor, for that matter, did I silence Robert. I simply refused to listen to him myself. But, if Robert wishes to find another group to discuss his idiocy with, or if members of this group wish to go off and take part in this discussion (as Jack did), I will make no effort to prevent this.


Irene: How can you say this? You've painted the man as being a half witted hypocrite.


T : I would disagree with the halfwitted part, though if you mean to apply the label to Robert's ideas, rather than to Robert, I might concede the point, without apology. But at no point did I hint that I would shun another, or try to get others to shun him, were he to discuss matters with Robert. The choice to share my assessment of Robert and his argument has been left a purely individual one.


Irene: But you speak of social realities, as things that must be factored into the assessment of one's actions, when determining what it is that one has actually done. The reality is, that in fostering the notion that Robert is babbling, you will leave others more inclined to think far less of those who would discuss this issue with Robert. If someone is thought of as an idiot, others will be more likely to shun him. So, aren't you doing the exact same thing in a roundabout fashion?


T : What do you propose as an alternative? That foolish ideas never be challenged because their makers might be thought of as foolish? Or that insincerity never be recognised for what it is?


Irene: Maybe Robert thinks that you are being insincere.


T : Irene, this begins to border on "intellectual nullification".


Irene: Huh? What do you mean by that?


T : It is a term you heard my brother Antonio coin once. In juror nullifaction, a jury that knows full well that the accused is guilty, refuses to admit it, and acquits him because its members feel like it. In intellectual nullification, someone who doesn't like the implications of a particular point, simply refuses to acknowledge its validity.


Irene: Maybe that's what I think you're doing.


T : And maybe this is a childish and petulant response on your part. Why should I take it seriously, or you, should you persist in it?


Irene: Well, why should I take you seriously?


T : Is that all that you're going to do from now on? Repeat my sentences back to me? Because I outgrew that game when I was two, and I have better things to do with my time then listen to someone who is leaving her emotional maturity subject to serious doubt.


Irene: Don't get snippy about it, I'm making a point.


T : Well, let's hear it.


Irene: You're taking your own point of view as a given, and ignoring the fact that there may be others. You're setting yourself up as the sole arbitrer for determining who is making sense, and who isn't.


T : Translation : I'm thinking for myself. How dare I do such a thing? What happened to all of YOUR pious concern for freedom of thought?


Irene: I think that you're missing my point ...


T : No, you don't, and I'm not. I'm getting your point far more clearly than you want me to, and the only thing that I'm 'failing' to do, is to allow myself to be taken in by an attempt at spin doctoring.

Robert is still free to argue his point. Yes, Irene, he is. I hardly have people snapping to attention as I speak, and that splattering of him you witnessed a while back won't keep him from finding an audience, as you yourself have acknowledged. As I've consistently argued against using social sanctions to keep others from speaking to someone, I've certainly done my part to prevent that sort of indirect shunning that you refer to. After a certain point, you do have to recognise that people are responsible for their own reactions. If you don't like the reactions they persist in, even after they've been spoken to about the customs they take for granted, and they've been given a real chance to think about it, then take it up with them, it's not my responsibility or concern. For me to allow it to become so, would be for me to give others the power to deprive me of my freedom of expression, merely by insisting on remaining obtuse, and I'm entitled to that freedom.

Again, as you yourself have admitted, it would seem. What happened to the comment that we are all entitled to our opinions? Does it only apply to those who you would care to defend, or to those factions in a disagreement which you feel are too large or too stubborn to be as easily silenced?


Irene: But you called Robert a hypocrite, which really doesn't sound like support for his freedom to speak.

T : At most, I suggested that Robert should elect, on his own, to refrain from arguing points that he did not truly believe in. Did I back up that suggestion with any degree of force, or did I leave it for Robert to act on himself? And unlike you, I placed all of my arguments out in the open for examination, not seeking to undermine anyone's freedom of choice, through manipulation.

When I argue that Robert is being a hypocrite, and is not to be taken seriously, I express my view, and my view alone. Others are, as a matter of practice, free to accept or reject the arguments they hear - the rightness of these choices are another matter. In effect, what you are arguing, when you suggest that I shouldn't firmly argue such an opinion, as long as others express disagreement with it, is that I should be basing my opinions on what others say, instead of on my own thoughts (and assessment of the validity of what it is that I hear) - or at least that I should be pretending to do so, whenever I speak. If you feel otherwise, be so good as to explain to me how the two positions are operationally different. How would the behavior dictated by acquiescence to the two demands differ? They don't. They're simply two different ways of saying the same thing, posturing to the contrary notwithstanding.


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