THE DIGNIFIED RANT
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS MAY 2004 ARCHIVES
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“Memorial Day 2004” (Posted
Over the past year, we’ve seen hundreds of our soldiers and Marines (and others, of course) die fighting in Iraq to buy time for a new Iraqi government to take over the fight against the Baathists and their Islamists friends who specialize in the particularly gruesome bombings that target Iraqi civilians.
To my horror, our troops need to buy time against a segment of the American population that would just give up rather than see this war through to victory.
This is not a time to dwell on the perspective of our losses compared to past wars. Those Americans who have died have died for a good cause and deserve to be remembered as they died—not contrasted to past dead.
I thank their families and pray they draw strength and
comfort from the good they have done for
This is a day to remember the sacrifice that our volunteer military risks and endures to give us a good life.
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“African Security” (Posted
On top of earlier reports that we will assist in the
standing up of regional peacekeeping brigades in
Heads of state and government from at least eight African
countries were attending a ceremony to inaugurate the new PSC at the African
Participants at Tuesday's ceremony included the acting
president of the AU, Joaquim Chissano.
Officials have vowed that the new council will act to
intervene in African conflicts, setting the two-year-old AU apart from its
largely toothless predecessor, the Organisation of
African Unity.
"The AU has more mandate than before. We are going to
start intervening in conflicts in member states and this is prompted by the
1994 genocide in Rwanda, when the international community did nothing," AU
Peace and Security Commissioner Said Djinnit said
last month.
The 15-member PSC -- which in fact has been meeting
regularly since March -- is empowered to mandate peacekeeping missions in
conflict areas where ceasefire accords have been signed and to recommend to the
assembly of AU heads of state that troops be deployed uninvited in cases of
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.
It would be nice to have the leading edge of interventions
come from
Poverty may not cause terrorism, but all the above problems
create conditions where terrorists may move in, set up secure bases, and
recruit local cannon fodder. And even though
We already try to interdict Islamists fleeing to
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“Promoting Rivalry?” (Posted
So ABC reports:
The secretive
Task Force 121, charged with finding Osama bin Laden,
is now actively hunting for suspected terror leader Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi as well, intelligence sources tell ABC
News.
ABC News has learned the Office of Counterterrorism at the
State Department is going to recommend that the reward for his capture be increased
from $10 million to $25 million — the same amount offered for bin Laden.
U.S. officials believe that bin Laden is still the greatest
threat to the United States, but say they are now convinced that Zarqawi has global capability to match anyone's. U.S. intelligence officials say they have tracked Zarqawi cells operating not only in Iraq, but in Saudi
Arabia, Syria, Sudan, Iran, Turkey, Kuwait,
"He is foreign fighter enemy No. 1," said one
official.
So what’s up? Are we trying to make bin Laden jealous of Zarqawi? Could this new equality in our eyes get these guys to spend some time gunning for each other?
Just a hunch, but it is always good to sow divisions in the ranks of our enemies and equal rewards look like that effort to me.
Heck, bin Laden may come out of his deep bunker in
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“Iraqi Security Forces” (Posted
Iraqis must take over responsibility for defending their country.
The army is to be a three-division-sized force in the short run, if memory serves me. They will eventually be able to handle foreign threats as conventional units also able to work in counter-insurgency. The police, facility protection force, and border police make up the bulk of the security force and will provide more presence and guard important sites. The civil defense units—ICDC—will be the primary Iraqi offensive arm against the insurgency. The goal is to build 45 battalions. Although only about 500 troops each I’d guess, they represent 5 divisions’ worth of infantry.
And how are they doing?
This briefing explains their actions.
Out of 2,000
According to the briefer, not all are proficient or adequately equipped yet, but some can operate patrols of up to a reinforced platoon size (50 men). The goal:
But the bottom line is, the goal, as we move toward sovereignty here,
and as we transition into sovereignty as a partnership will be to continue to
work with the police force and the ICDC to get to where at least 50 percent,
working up to 100 percent, of our patrols are, in fact, joint. Where no patrol
goes out, no operation is conducted, without an Iraqi alongside of a coalition
member.
I’m very glad to see the emphasis on going out with Iraqis. It would be an error to think that we are so good that Iraqis just get in the way. No matter if it seems more difficult to operate with Iraqis, we must pull them along and eventually send them out on their own with American forces available for backup in case they get in trouble.
These forces will be able to fight the Baathists,
who I still think are the main threat in
Iraqis out fighting and patrolling will beat the Baathists. We have the numbers to fight an insurgency, we just have to get them out fighting.
And I’ll note that the President in his last speech at the
In time, we will be able to pull back into garrisons and support Iraqi security forces who will put down the Sunni/Islamist insurgency.
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“Just Win” (Posted
Hanson has an excellent
piece on winning the war in
It was Mr. Bush's tough but necessary decision to invade
Have we made mistakes? You bet as Hanson notes. But winning is what we are doing and victory is what we can achieve despite the panic of the war supporters and the fickleness of the lukewarm supporters:
How
does this acceptance of human nature as it is rather than as we wish it to be translate into the proper daily conduct of the war? Not in
the way that most think. The communis opinio goes something like this: too few troops, too
little planning, and dilatory democratic reform led us into the present
'quagmire' — as if our present problems were strategic rather than tactical
flaws or a condescending misreading of the Arab Street.
In
contrast, I think the military campaign was inspired, the proper number of
troops was subject for legitimate debate, and the plans to reconstruct
And in this good article, Hanson bolsters my contention that we are not short of troops. He says to ignore those calling for more troops. So few seem to agree with me, so it is nice to get the occasional bolstering of those I respect:
Small armies, whether those of Caesar, Alexander, or Hernan Cortés can defeat enormous
enemies and hold vast amounts of territory — but only if they are used
audaciously and establish the immediate reputation that they are lethal and
dangerous to confront. Deterrence, not numbers, creates tranquility and the two
are not always synonymous.
Just win. I don’t even care if Michael Moore or Al Gore attempt to take credit for the victory.
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“That Troublesome Cleric” (Posted
Sadr’s thugs continue to shoot at us. We continue to observe the so-called ceasefire:
Explosions could be heard near Kufa's
main mosque, where members of Muqtada al-Sadr's militia had taken up positions. Militia members
accused
Coalition officials said they were attacked by
rocket-propelled grenades and they responded by killing the attackers.
The main road leading to Kufa was
blocked by tires and concrete blocks, forcing cars to take back roads into the
city. Members of al-Sadr's militia, the al-Mahdi Army, set up checkpoints and roamed the streets
around the mosque carrying Kalashnikovs and rocket-propelled grenades.
Najaf's governor, Adnan al-Zurufi, complained that
al-Sadr was showing no signs of honoring the
agreement announced by Shiite leaders earlier this week to end fighting in the Najaf and Kufa areas.
"Unfortunately, there have been no positive
initiatives from the office of Mr. Muqtada al-Sadr so far," al-Zurufi
said. "Armed men are filling the streets and there have been number of
attacks on state employees in Kufa."
I remain skeptical of the agreement. Peters, too, questions our decision to hold back when we had Sadr on the ropes:
Sadr's insurrection
turned disastrous for him. His shabby legions are broken or dead, his influence
has fallen from minor to trivial status, and he could hear a slamming cell door
in his future (maybe those photos from Abu Ghraib had
an upside, after all). So, emulating the terrorists in Fallujah,
he struck a deal to save himself from our troops.
So much for our
refusal to negotiate with terrorists. Our diplomats and bureaucrats are tumbling
over each other to cut deals with those who kill our soldiers, slaughter
civilians and hope to derail the future of
I know that it would be a problem if a holy site is destroyed in fighting, but that argues for getting Sadr as soon as we can. Now that Sadr is violating the ceasefire, we should go after the Mahdi army and arrest Sadr. Kill his troops. Break them. If they want to parade with arms in a show of bravado—kill them. Hold Sadr until the turnover and then turn him over to the Iraqi police for trial. Resistance—even foolhardy and ineffective resistance—must have consequences.
Fallujah was a bad enough deal, and now we repeat it in part in the Shia areas. It’s not the same, of course, since we aren’t turning over the areas to a new and improved “friendly” Sadr militia, but we held back from winning.
Peters believes the diplomats over-ruled the military on these decisions. The military says these deals will work. I think we are kicking the can down the road and I worry that we are teaching our enemies to resist, our friends to worry, and push those neutral away from our side.
We’ll see. Maybe this route is better than just winning.
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“UN Detour—Clarification” (Posted
I should add one thing. I don’t think that yet another UN
resolution is worthless. Just that we should not take our eye
off the objectives of turning over an
On the other hand, if the French and Germans finally wish to step up and put boots on the ground fighting with us and our Iraqi friends, then fine—get the right words. And let them have some economic rewards, too (but reserve the good jobs for those with us from the beginning to reward friendly behavior properly).
But if our allies aren’t willing to stand
shoulder-to-shoulder with us, a mere piece of paper is not worth the effort.
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“Steady, Lads” (Posted
We may be lucky that we are working toward Iraqi democracy
and the defeat of the Baathists just as we recall
World War II with the dedication of the WW II Memorial in
Max Boot reminds us of losses in past wars:
The panic gripping
Boot concludes:
I don't mean to imply that everything is going great in
His comparison of casualties is useful to remember:
Percentages
of personnel injured or killed among the totals that served in major American
conflicts (in descending order):
Civil
War (Union forces): 29%
Mexican
War: 22%
War
of
Korean
War: 7.8%
World
War I: 6.8%
World
War II: 6.6%
Vietnam
War: 6.2%
Philippine
War: 5.6%
War
of 1812: 2.3%
Spanish-American
War: 1.3%
1991
Persian Gulf War: 0.14%
And it would be useful to remember that we did not fight
Steady on the line. Pick your targets and fire on command. Trust your buddies on your left and right. And stop asking when the French will come to help—we don’t know what side they’d help anyway.
We need to win this war. It’s up to us. And we can do it. Our soldiers are good enough to win this. Honor our dead this Memorial Day. They are no less worthy of our respect because more have died in past wars. But their sacrifice and the pain their families endure must not be for nothing. We seek a valuable goal and let’s not allow the opponents of the war undermine our goal.
The stalwart supporters of the war will remain stalwart. The opponents of the war from the beginning will never be quiet until we win. And the lukewarm supporters of the war who are wavering with the drumbeat of bad news spread by the press will return to support when we win.
Just stop this unseemly panic and attempts to appeal to the lukewarm and anti-war.
Just win.
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“Another UN Detour” (Posted
So After We Modify Our Submitted UNSC resolution just so to satisfy the international community’s worthy representatives, foreign troops will pour in, right?
Well right off, we really don’t want the Russians or Chinese given their methods of dealing with insurgents, their supporters, and jay walkers.
But our allies can be counted on once the official English and French versions are perfected?
What have our allies not in
[German
President] Schroeder, who ruled out
any role for German troops in
But surely, getting the UN’s approval (or rather, recent approval, given the past ink spilled
on
France repeated its staunch refusal to ever
send in soldiers, a decision likely influenced by
"This is out of the question today and
tomorrow," Foreign Ministry spokesman Herve Ladsous said.
They won’t ever send troops. They stand by their defense of Saddam’s regime.
But that doesn’t mean that
"But
They’re so far gone that they don’t even realize how they
sound any more.
The first article helpfully recalls
Germany and France, which opposed the war in Iraq, tied up
NATO for weeks in February 2003 with their refusal to go along with sending
AWACS planes and other defensive measures to fellow ally
The second article reminds us of what allies do:
Denmark will keep its nearly 500 soldiers in southern Iraq
for another six months, rather than end the deployment on June 30 as planned.
And keep those US-funded contracts for
And most importantly, don’t sell the farm to get the right adjective in the resolution. We already know who we can count on and we already have as much from our so-called allies as we are going to get. Playing their game will only give them a stage on which to prance and strut.
Just win.
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"One Example: Two Bad Ideas"
(Posted
I remain skeptical that the
ceasefire in Fallujah is a good idea. While in theory
getting the enemy to defect to your side and suppress remaining enemy is a good
idea, I suspect that Fallujah is merely relatively
quiet and not pacified. So for this worry, I am not
comforted by this:
With
Plus, I suspect Fallujah is still a sanctuary for attacks
against our people in the region.
We need to go block by block
to sift the military-age men still in Fallujah and
search every mosque in the city for arms. If the Fallujans
resist, then we should smash them militarily. I dare say the Sadr-friendly Shias will stay
quiet as we go after the enemy in Fallujah. Sadr's inept militia died in huge numbers the last three
weeks fighting the US Army, with nary a peep of sympathy heard from the Sunnis
and their Baathist and Islamist buddies in the Sunni
Triangle.
More broadly, what is going
on in Fallujah shows why we cannot just wash our
hands of
And they'll not be content to
silently suffer in their oil-less rump state. They'll work to disrupt and take
over the Shia and Kurd areas in order to bring back
the glory days of Sunni neck stomping fun.
In ten years, we might work
up the nerve to invade the Sunni heartland again. And one of these days, the Baathists might learn to fight us smart.
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"Nuanced Connections" (Posted
I know this is something that
can't exist—like chemical weapons in
Coalition forces have
found--literally--millions of documents. These papers are still being sorted,
translated and absorbed, but they are already turning up new facts about
Saddam's links to terrorism
The opposition to the war in
Along with the claim by war
opponents that Saddam was clean on chemical weapons, the no terror link
requires a lot of faith that more searching of documents and deserts won't
reveal more damning information.
When terrorists linked to al Qaeda try to detonate a chemical
shell in
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"Read Peters" (Posted
Now. Just do it.
I'm still nervous about
fighting around
the Islamic holy places, however.
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"
Dan Froomkin
addresses the President's speech at the
Trying
to think why the
The
college served as a dandy backdrop for the commander in chief, with its
audience of several hundred Army leaders there to learn about strategy,
military science and other aspects of defense.
But
the college made big news in January when it published a scathing report saying
Bush's war in
In
his
Here's
the full
text of that report.
<sigh>
Jeffrey Record authored a report critical of the war, and Froomkin
perpetuates the myth that this represents the
No. Wrong. You'd think the
enthusiastic applause by the audience (or any
military audience) for the President would kind of indicate that line of attack
as wrong. Record wrote a piece indicating his opinion and the
For the record, please note
the disclaimer on Record's report:
The views expressed in this report are
those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or
position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the
Clear enough yet? Yes, the
press won't believe it but the military is not a solid phalanx of automatons.
Pity the media isn't as intellectually curious.
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“Stone Cold Stupidity” (Posted
Ok, I don’t expect much of reporters. I know they are mostly clueless about military manners. If it’s green it’s a tank. If somebody wears green, they’re killers. The ignorance of those who cover the war is stunning. I mean, the Mahdi Army incompetents might have an excuse for not knowing what war means, but shouldn’t reporters at least develop some idea of the basics?
Mark Stone of ABC should get a prize for his question in the last CPA press conference. In asking about the so-called wedding strike (where we nailed a safe house for infiltrators as our evidence seems to indicate), Stone had the following gem:
And secondly, if I could just ask, we've seen drugs in those photographs,
we've seen some weapons. Was it -- is it -- I mean, I don't know, is it really
necessary to kill 40 people for what seems to be a very small amount of money,
not too many weapons, and some narcotics?
Oh no, Mark, it is far better to let them infiltrate into
The total lack of a semblance of a clue is amazing. We are at war. We get to kill the enemy. And we don’t need to ensure a fair fight—or are suicide bombings and decapitations suddenly part of a fair fight?
Enemies are dangerous—not weapons. Not money. Not narcotics. In whatever the quantities we found. The insurgents came to kill us and our Iraqi friends. I’m damn glad we killed them and I hope we kill even more. Yes, it actually is necessary to kill them.
I admire Kimmitt’s ability to refrain from slapping this guy for gross stupidity and instead actually answer the question.
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“Mahdi Army
Broken?” (Posted
Our slow offensive against Sadr was careful enough to make me happy we were not going to alienate the Shias but slow enough that I worried that something might go wrong. I never thought much of the fighting abilities of his militia.
And now we may
have broken the SOB. In
The Sadr people appear to be perplexed that our forces are killing them:
"It was possible to solve it all peacefully, but the other side
refuses," said Mohammad Taqi Modarresi,
a cleric and an ally of Sadr in
If people weren’t dying because of this kind of idiocy it would be funny. Modarresi thought this was a game or something. A bunch of ill-trained idiots thought they could descend on a city and somehow they’d gain power or go home with no consequences after failing?
The enemy in the Shia south seems to be gaining the profound knowledge that we are out to kill our enemies and not read them their rights and send them home with a slap on the wrist. That must be very disturbing to them.
We appear to be in the home stretch to capture or kill Sadr himself. His militia had best get out of the way real fast.
And then can we turn our attention to sifting Fallujah for insurgents so that it does not remain a safe haven for insurgents to destabilize the entire area? We should go block by block and examine the papers of every military-age male in the city. The Marines seem happy with the situation but I remain skeptical. Quiet is not the same as pacified.
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“Design Flaw” (Posted
The Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier is a pile of floating junk.
The Charles de Gaulle airport is falling apart.
I don’t know whether this is bad luck or what, but the French clearly need to rethink their policy of naming stuff after this man.
I’d just avoid the Charles de Gaulle plaza is all I’m saying. It might lie over a sink hole or something.
On the other hand, as long as you don’t have to take off or land aircraft in the plaza, it might be just fine.
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“No Substitute for Victory” (Posted
The President will speak
to the nation on Monday about
I want the President to talk of our victory in
We seem to have forgotten that whole “victory” thing.
Once, after our World War II experience, we gained an instant tradition of total war and total victory. Never mind that in our history we’d fought limited wars. The experience of World War II was so broad and deep that it instilled this tradition. We expected victory.
The Cold War, with its habits of ending wars fast lest they
escalate to general war (that’s nuclear war, in case you’ve forgotten).
Only in the 1980s did we start to reverse this caution. In
Yet in the first really major war since
September 11 seemed to have reminded us that victory is our only salvation. We crushed the Taliban. We crushed Saddam.
But now we are seemingly panicking over minor league
opposition in
So I want the President to remind the American people that when we go to war, we must honor our soldiers’ sacrifices by pursuing only victory that will provide real security in a new day, and not the false dawn of a ceasefire that we will try so very hard to believe is peace in a new day. Until the enemy is ready again and strikes us even harder, proving that nighttime is still upon us.
There truly is no substitute for victory. And in this age, only our own doubts can deprive us of that victory.
Speak well, Mr. President.
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“Troop Strength” (Posted
Two big questions about winning the war on terror and the
On the bigger issue, I do favor adding troop strength to the Army. With our divisions becoming corps-like in function, I don’t think we need to add two more divisions. I’d rather add more separate brigades. Since our new divisions (the awful name of “units of employment” must die) will command up to eight “units of action” (another name that must die—how about “regimental combat teams”?) and the UEs will have a normal complement of 4 or 5 UAs, we could use extra loose brigades. Plus we can get more fighting boots by building separate brigades or even battalions instead of divisions. I don’t know if even this much is enough since we have 150,000 Army reservists on active duty now, but we can’t rapidly expand the Army anyway so let’s start with this goal (I’ve mentioned 40,000 on top of the temporary increases we’ve seen so far, but I’ll settle for 30,000) and see where we are in a couple years.
As for
So I have a suggestion to mull over. We are already planning
to stretch out rotations so we don’t have the big bang every spring with a
total turnover. While this undercuts my thought that a spring 2005 rotation
would be a good cover for an Iranian front buildup, we’ll see how it is
structured. But if we are stretching it out, we could artificially increase
boots on the ground even as we commit no more troops to
This overlap trick is something we did during
I still think we have enough troops in
Lord knows, many supporters of the war seem to have taken to their fainting couches of late. Maybe this will calm them.
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“The Fallujah Effect” (Posted
Speed has been my basic approach to fighting. Take the bandaid off fast, as I say. Fight wars fast to keep public opposition from developing and to crush the spirit of the enemy so they can’t react effectively. While some might think that fighting slower saves our troops’ lives, that is false compassion for our soldiers and Marines. It is better to lose extra men in the short run to win rather than let the battle drag out to give our enemies chances to kill more of us over time. Time is our enemy and if we give our enemies time they may use it.
Peters speaks of this need for speed, and points to the press for pushing us to fight faster:
That propaganda is increasingly, viciously,
mindlessly anti-American. When
our forces engage in tactical combat, dishonest media reporting immediately
creates drag on the chain of command all the way up to the president.
Real
atrocities aren't required. Everything American soldiers do is portrayed as an
atrocity. World opinion is outraged, no matter how judiciously we fight.
With
each passing day — sometimes with each hour — the pressure builds on our
government to halt combat operations, to offer the enemy a pause, to negotiate
. . . in essence, to give up.
We
saw it in Fallujah, where slow-paced tactical success
led only to cease-fires that comforted the enemy and gave the global media time
to pound us even harder. Those cease-fires were worrisomely reminiscent of the
bombing halts during the Vietnam War — except that everything happens faster
now.
In the post-war stabilization mission in
That said, I’ve been impressed with how we’ve fought Sadr’s thugs without speed yet without suffering the Fallujah Effect. By all reports we are killing at 50:1 or 100:1 ratios and squeezing the Sadr gunmen into a smaller and smaller area. And Sistani and the other clerics remain with us. And there is no Shia outcry over this battle even as it has dragged out.
This alone in contrast to the Sunni clamor should show that
we have support among the Shias. So far, the slow
battle has had one good effect on the war. As I’ve noted, even though the Baathists and Sadr thugs hoped to
unite in an anti-American alliance of Sunnis and Shias,
this has failed. While Shias around
Yet despite the success of our slow approach in the Sadr revolt (and indeed I counseled—well, to the Internet anyway—patience from almost the beginning), I still worry that the Sadr people (or their Iranian friends) will engineer the destruction of a major holy site and inflame the Shias against us. Now that we are in action, we must pull the bandaid off fast.
Even though the slow battles in the south are being waged successfully without the Fallujah Effect kicking in doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t strive to quickly achieve victory.
We are granting our enemy time and they might yet figure out what to do with it.
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"Civilian Casualties Sapping
Morale" (Posted
Is the toll on Iraqis from Baathist and Islamist attacks really going to cause
us to lose heart and thus lose the war? Coming out of nowhere, with no
warning, we have been unable to halt the attacks.
The V-2 offensive against
Why was it effective?
The offensive had significant adverse
strategic, political and psychological effects on
Winning the war was the only
real solution to this morale-shattering tactic. Today, winning the war will
make the morale effects of suicide and car bombings a footnote in the Iraq War.
Just remember what victory means. It means turning over a working government to
Iraqis so that Iraqis can pursue the killers with our help. Victory does not
mean we have to end all attacks before we turn over control to the Iraqis.
Don't get confused—or
discouraged—on the verge of victory.
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"Tapping the Convenience Petroleum
Reserve" (Posted
Some are pushing for the
government to release
oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve for a month to dampen price rises.
Why would a release of this
size for one month do anything when opponents of drilling in
Why can't we just view higher
gas prices as one of those sacrifices we're supposed to endure (whether we need
to or not) to fight the war? Since I need to buy 100 gallons of gas every month
just to commute, I don't feel too guilty. This price certainly hurts.
But I couldn't in good
conscience support such a move even if it did reduce prices. For people who
don't think we are even at war, it is no surprise that they have little
understanding of the difference between strategic necessity and convenience.
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"Are There Any Iranians
Present?" (Posted
Sadr's hapless thugs could be bolstered by Iranians if this
stuff from a CPA
briefing means what it seems like it means:
In the central-south zone of operations,
coalition forces defending the buildings near the Mukhaiyam
Mosque in
So are Sadr
fighters who think they might be welcomed in the Iranian quarter taking refuge
there?
There is also this:
People from the Iranian quarter
neighborhood are phoning to complain that coalition forces are not attacking Muqtada militia who have moved
into their neighborhood. They say there are no religious sites in their
neighborhood and they want Muqtada's militias out of
their home.
It is quite possible that
Iranians assumed they'd be welcomed with open arms in an Iranian part of town
but that the locals of Iranian origin want no part of the so-called uprising.
I can hardly wait for the
commission of inquiry that the Iranian mullahs will set up to explore why they
expected to be greeted with open arms when they entered
Seriously, if fighters are
there from
Be very careful and end this
confrontation with victory. Can't we get a sniper in range of Sadr?
Permalink to this post: http://www.geocities.com/brianjamesdunn/TDRFAMAY2004ARCHIVES.html#TDRNSA19MAY04A
"Why We Can't Abuse Prisoners"
(Posted
There are many reasons why we
cannot abuse prisoners. It is wrong. It is illegal. It doesn't even work—those
being tortured would admit that the Swedes were supplying them just to get the
pain stopped.
But some defend the idea that
anything goes because American soldiers' lives are at risk.
I've disagreed and in the
aftermath of the first reports stated that those guards might as well have
directly taken part in attacks on Americans for the effect their actions would
have. Yet this thought remained unformed.
Orson Scott Card focused my
reasoning. I may not be all on board with all the particulars, but the general idea
is right:
Aren't
our soldiers in
We expect our soldiers to run
through enemy fire to complete the mission. We expect soldiers to run gauntlets
down dangerous highways to complete the mission. When I was in the Guard,
completing the mission was most important. This was highlighted by what we
would do if doused with chemical weapons—after the attack, one member of the platoon
would be compelled to break the seal on their mask while the rest of
(hopefully) us watched the unfortunate soldier for signs of nerve gas
poisoning. That's how we'd know we were all clear and able to unmask and do our
jobs. The mission is paramount and soldiers understand that they risk death to
complete the mission. Being shot at outside the context of completing an
important mission just makes no sense.
So, no, we must not abuse
prisoners. Torturing or abusing on the pretext of getting information to save
our troops is bull when it will actually cause more deaths for our troops.
The mission is to pacify
In the long run, that will
save more American lives. And preserve the honor of those soldiers we send to
Permalink
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"Chemical Weapons and Why We
Fight" (Posted
It is sadly amusing to watch
the reporting gymnastics necessary to discount a Sarin
gas shell found in
Some U.S. officials and
weapons experts suggested the artillery shell may be an experimental design
that predates the 1991 Gulf War
Yet in a contradiction, this
is reported:
Often chemical and
biological weapons are marked to differentiate them from conventional artillery
rounds, so people know how to handle them. Officials have said Saddam may have
disguised his alleged weapons as conventional rounds to fool weapons
inspectors.
I just really want to know
why shells made prior to the Persian Gulf War would have been designed to fool
inspectors that arrived as the result of the war.
And more important, why is it
relevant to determine when the weapon was made when determining whether Saddam
had WMD when we invaded? Indeed, the definition of what justifies our invasion
is increasingly focused. Having the ability to make chemical weapons in the
near future was not enough of a reason. Now having actual weapons as long as
they were made before 1991 was not enough of a reason.
I'm getting a headache.
This article (via Instapundit) nicely
summarizes the situation:
In discrediting the war, the
Democrats have pushed the idea that neither dangerous weapons nor terrorist
networks existed in Saddam Hussein's
God help us if the ones who
rigged that IED know exactly where they got that shell. Find those Sarin shells.
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“How Can We Lose What They Say We Never Had?” (Posted
The most recent attack based on the rogue prison guards in
Has
That provocative question is on the lips of politicians,
human rights activists and ordinary citizens worldwide as the Iraqi prisoner
abuse affair exposes damning evidence against
Many wonder how the
As the scandal unfolds, the debate rages over the degree to
which
I find this absolutely shocking. I mean, our critics concede we once recently had the moral high ground?
This is such a typical way of attacking
Kind of like the “fraudulent coalition” charge before 3-11.
How do you portray the withdrawal of 1,300 Spanish troops in a bad light when
you refused to admit
Our moral high ground is still intact. We police our own.
And those bastards in
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“Promise of Destruction” (Posted
I swear, we don’t even blink when tyrants talk this way:
The
Chinese government warned Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian
on Monday to pull back from a "dangerous lurch toward independence"
or face "destruction." But it also offered economic, diplomatic and
other benefits if Chen acknowledges that
What has
Describing relations with
The Taiwanese don’t want to be ruled from
One more time: the Chinese will go to war to seize
But the Chinese are on a crash building program for
amphibious forces and naval/air forces that will allow them to invade
Were I king, I’d invade on the eve of the Peking Olympics.
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“So Tell Me Right Now—What is a Stockpile?” (Posted
I always thought that Saddam’s programs for WMD and his
intent were the most important reasons for crushing him. I did expect chemical
weapons stockpiles in
The loyal opposition now claims that only stockpiles of WMD count as reason to destroy Saddam. Well:
U.S. officials said Monday they are concerned
that other sarin-filled munitions may still exist in
Iraq — and may not be well marked — after evidence indicated a roadside shell
that exploded contained the nerve agent.
Yes, it is only one shell. And yes, the thugs that planted
it probably didn’t know it was a chemical shell (thought they might be heading
back to where they got this one to look for more). But where there is one,
there could be others. And we did not find it despite sitting on
Of course, even the discovery of one shell (though I think we’ve discovered Mustard gas shells already even though inexplicably the DoD has said that the liquid-filled shells discovered so far were not chemical weapons. Just what was that liquid in the shells!?) has led at least one guy to say this is insignificant since we have not proven that Saddam was producing chemical weapons at the time of the invasion! I guess the argument is being readied for the day when we actually find chemical weapons in numbers large enough that it cannot be denied.
But if that is the argument, I guess we need to go back and reexamine why Saddam kept ten years worth of pesticides in bunkers at his military bases.
Saddam had chemical weapons and wanted more of those, and bugs and nukes, too.
Permalink to this post: http://www.geocities.com/brianjamesdunn/TDRFAMAY2004ARCHIVES.html#TDRNSA17MAY04A
“This Makes Me Nervous” (Posted
I’ll be happier when that fool Sadr is in jail—or dead. As long as we keep fighting around the shrines and mosques we face a danger:
The normally bustling area around
I wouldn’t put it past Sadr—or his Iranian backers—to blow up some monumentally important site and then blame us.
While I’m pleased we are fighting successfully without any of the furor of the Fallujah battle, I get more nervous every day. End this with a victory.
Bandaid off a little faster, if you would.
Permalink to this post: http://www.geocities.com/brianjamesdunn/TDRFAMAY2004ARCHIVES.html#TDRNSA15MAY04E
“Blowback on a Tightrope” (Posted
The April 27
But a Syrian close to the government told The Associated
Press last week that among the men were two brothers, the Shlashes,
and a cousin, and that they were among Arab volunteers who went to Iraq early
in the U.S.-led war on Saddam Hussein's regime.
It may have seemed like a good idea in
Just remember the tremendously shaky ground that the
minority Alawite government in
Recent disclosures that point to the Bush administration beginning its
preparations for the invasion of Iraq soon after the war in Afghanistan
started, as well as the Pentagon's recent decision to place Lebanon and Syria
under the US Central Command led by General John Abuzaid,
have further fuelled anxiety in Damascus.
At the same time, the regime of President Bashar
Al-Assad also faces the challenge of containing a
domino effect in the region. The prospect of eventual democracy in
Opponents of the Syrian leadership are stepping up their efforts to
promote an agenda of political liberalisation in the
country. Recent unrest between ethnic Kurds and Syrian security forces in the
northeastern region has further raised concerns that Iraqi Kurdish ambitions
for self-rule could foster an uprising among
Fear of the
But a bizarre and pointless attack in
And an aside. Please note that the
pressure for democracy is not taking place despite American actions. Don’t
critics of forceful
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“What Are They Going to Do? Bleed on Us?” (Posted
With a nod to Monty Python for the title.
The North Koreans are really slow learners on this whole negotiating thing. I know that we’ve spent decades training them that they can translate “negotiate” from English to “what can we give you for free” in Korean, but the game has changed.
A statement read by a North Korean official in Beijing, where talks
hosted by China began Wednesday, denounced as "humiliating" what it
said was Washington's refusal to discuss energy and economic assistance.
I guess when you can get beyond the humiliation of running a broken down state where you can’t feed your people or provide them with the level that pet’s in the South enjoy, then you can accept the humiliation of actually having to do something to have your own fat butts saved for a few months longer with foreign assistance.
While threats are usually the norm for
this point in the negotiating cycle. You know, “sea of fire” in
The
It would well come to that point. Somebody should explain to
the Pillsbury Nuke Boy that in any war, while the North may be able to hurt the
South, in the end the North will be destroyed and the South will run the North.
Oh, sure, the Chinese will probably invade too and occupy the northern part of
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“Unlikely Ally” (Posted
The
Catro’s response is to shut
down the “dollar stores” in
Still, the closing might just be temporary in order to jack
up prices. The Cuban government may hope to gain more scarce real money while
blaming the
The dollar-only shops have been associated with social
inequalities that have worried Cuban leaders. The elite, with access to
greenbacks, can easily buy everyday goods that a doctor cannot on a salary
equivalent to $25 a month.
This could be a short-sighted strategy. How long can Castro
blame the
I think it is nice to remind the also-rans that just because you aren’t on the Axis of Evil, doesn’t mean we won’t take action against you.
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“It Is a War on Terror” (Posted
This author doesn’t like the term “war on terror.” His basic contention:
Terrorism
is not an enemy. It is a method. It is the most sinister, brutal, inhumane
method of our age. But it is nonetheless just that: a method. You cannot, and
you do not, make war on a method. War is made on an identified — and
identifiable — enemy.
In
the here and now, that enemy is militant Islam — a very particular practice and
interpretation of a very particular set of religious, political and social
principles.
Now
that is a very disturbing, very discomfiting thing to say in 21st-century
I disagree with the premise and the idea that we are distracted by using the wrong terminology.
We are fighting Islamist terrorists and we’ve knocked off
psycho regimes in
Are all of these battles against militant Islamists? Certainly not.
As I’ve written before, taking down Saddam would have been
in our interest even if Islamist terrorists did not exist. Worry about
alliances between Saddam and Islamist terrorists added to the urgency of
destroying Saddam. And I’ll also concede that without Islamist terror it would
have been easier to just put in a friendly strongman in
But this is a war on terror. Without terror to threaten us
with nuclear weapons at their worst, why would we care if Wahabbi
Islamists pined for 14th century purity as they define it and railed
against Western influence? The Wahabbis have existed
since the late 18th century and we rose from a tiny enclave on the
east coast of
Indeed, simple nuclear proliferation, while undesirable, was
not too upsetting to us. What forceful measures did we take to reverse the
events when
We are at war with terrorism. Saying that does not negate
being at war with particular regimes or forces that make terrorism more deadly.
We did wage war on the states of
So if we can strip the Islamist terrorists of their state sponsors and hope for getting nuclear weapons or other WMD, if we can keep countries from tolerating their presence, if we can stop their major funding sources, if we can reduce the sympathy they get from their co-religionists, if we can kill off and arrest the current generation of terrorists, then we beat terrorism. In the end, what do we care if poverty-stricken and isolated Wahabbis continue to preach their twisted version of Islam if they do it in isolation and unable to harm us?
The old war on piracy didn’t stop all criminals even as it stopped piracy. But it channeled those disposed to criminality to other forms of crime that local governments could fight and which did not affect us.
I’ve got no problem with calling it a war on terror.
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“War of Attrition” (Posted
I've worried that Americans
might see the press coverage of Iraq and develop a "screw them all"
attitude and conclude that the Iraqis are ungrateful for being liberated and so
we can just let them enjoy despotism again if they don't want to stand with us.
Jeff at Caerdroia
expresses his frustration that emotion is starting to threaten his reason when
looking at
We know that the American press
is generally, how shall we say, skeptical of the war in
We know that our press is
biased toward action and blood. If it bleeds it leads. So one attack trumps
more reliable electricity or schools opened or the villages in
We know that the American press
latches on to anything we do wrong and remain blasé about the enemy's crimes. Pictures of our crimes? Publish them. Pictures of something
we think might be an American crime? Publish them and don't worry about
verifying the pictures or the charge. Pictures of the enemy's
far worse crimes? Suppress them. Mustn't upset the American public,
don't you know. Or ignore them. I mean, they are mass graves from the Saddam era, right? Where would the press
start? How on Earth would Koppel read all the names of those discovered in one
show? Even if he skipped commercials? In part it is
because our reporters expect our side to behave better. In part because they
assume the other side will naturally behave badly. In part it is because they
don't understand what is and what is not lawful behavior in war and assume any
death or damage inflicted on civilians must be a crime. In part it is because
the press' attempts to be balanced lead them to elevate the enemy and lower us
to appear even-handed. Let's not even discuss the Western or Arab press.
We know that our press uses
their former Baathist minders as translators. How
many "typical" Iraqis quoted are their Baathist
buddies conveniently ready to talk?
We know that the press
already undermined our cause by a decade of failing to report on the horrors of
Saddam's regime in order to maintain their access to
We know that the press tends
not to leave the
We know that polls show that
Iraqis are no worse off and in many cases better off than before our invasion.
We know that the people say they want us out in a few months (inaccurately
reported as "immediately") but that past polls showed Iraqis feared
our departure too soon. We also know that it takes a good reporter to get past
the initial cries of "you Americans need to get out" to admissions
that "you Americans have made things better."
We know that the vast majorities
of Iraqis have not even had any contact with American troops and are just
getting on with their lives. We know from our own experience here that those
marching and chanting the loudest don't represent the majority of people who
just want to live, work, and raise their families. We fail to use that
knowledge to counter the emotional impact of seeing chanting Iraqis happy at
American dead.
We also know that any
pro-American marches (or anti-insurgent/terrorist) rallies will hardly be
mentioned.
We know from anecdotal
evidence from troops in the field that many Iraqis are happy we are there. We
read Iraqi blogs that show support and fear that
we'll leave.
We know all these things yet
the emotional impact of unrelenting televised complaints and predictions of
doom (even when they have to keep coming up with new predictions of doom when
the last prediction fizzles out) has an effect even on the stalwart supporters
of the war. Those in the middle that support the war only with victory evident
are easily discouraged. Let's not even discuss what the posters of Democratic
Underground feel. Their glee at reports of failure is discouraging. Their endless
suspicion of our actions and motives are fed by the press.
Truly, the failure of our
people to hold steady in greater numbers in the face of really minor league
resistance has amazed me. How on Earth did a silent majority of Americans still
support the Vietnam War in 1969 after tens of thousands of KIA and individual weeks
where we lost more troops killed in action than we've lost in the entirety of
the Iraq War and post-war stabilization missions? How did Americans endure the Pusan Perimeter and the retreat from Chosin?
How did we endure D-Day and
Are we weaker than our
forefathers?
No. I don't believe so. Our
troops have demonstrated their skill, valor, and tenacity. Yet Americans at
home have never had to keep their faith and resolution in such a complete
absence of regular support and in defiance of a constant stream of images that
convey defeat.
Supporters of the war must
keep reason strong. Strong to support our troops and strong to analyze problems
and offer corrective solutions.
We can't let our enemies win.
We can't afford to get tired so early in what must be a long struggle with
Islamism and terror and rogue WMD-owners. And our enemies will win if we walk
away from
And as I've said before, our
administration needs to hammer the simple fact that we are at war at every
opportunity. Our President must explain why we fight and how we are doing every
day. His administration must hammer this point. To Hell with
the theme of the week. Let undersecretaries for whatever handle those
things. The top men and women must hammer away in support of the most important
issue of our age at every chance they get. As our troops win in
Reason must be supported to
win over emotion. Every damn day.
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“So Who Is Right—Big Picture” (Posted
This WP article is interesting. The lead paragraph:
Deep
divisions are emerging at the top of the
So, is this right? Certainly, no war is unlosable
or unwinnable. I’ve noted that we could blow the
post-war since
And even though the article leaps at drawing a comparison to
One unnamed American general said:
I do not believe we had a clearly defined war strategy, end state and
exit strategy before we commenced our invasion.
With all do respect to his star (s), that
is just plain silly. Our war strategy was to invade
The American general should review Clausewitz, since the general seemingly is upset that our enemy is not going along with our plan. Enemies react and adapt. So must we. It is simply folly to assume that we can plan for every step on the way to victory.
Yet this quiet grumbling is not what many officers say. US commanders say they are cautiously optimistic:
Commanders
on the ground in
"I
am sure that the view from Washington is much worse than it appears on the
ground here in Baqubah," said Army Col. Dana
J.H. Pittard, commander of a 1st Infantry Division
brigade based in that city about 40 miles north of Baghdad. "I do not
think that we are losing, but we will lose if we are not careful." He said
he is especially worried about maintaining political and economic progress in
the provinces after the turnover of power.
Others who think we are losing argue that privately, officers are actually pessimistic:
The
worried generals and colonels are simply beginning to say what experts outside
the military have been saying for weeks.
In
mid-April, even before the prison detainee scandal, Peter Galbraith, a former
Yet this instant analysis is wrong. Fallujah is quiet for now. Sadr is getting hammered and isolated and looking for an escape. No real surge in the remainder of the Sunni Triangle has been evident. How is the resistance spreading?
Yet we are not suppressing the core resistance in the Fallujah-Ramadi area. And polls show that our troops are wearing out their welcome. If security was that bad, I’d imagine that there would be less impatience. If Shias are starting to be upset more about our troop presence than safety and prosperity, it is imperative to hand off routine security duties to Iraqi units. And despite the burden of having foreigners in their country, we can’t just pull out:
Inside and outside the armed forces, experts generally argue that the
One critic who believes we are on the road to disaster states his opinion:
Likewise, Rep. John P. Murtha (Pa.), a former Marine who is one of most
hawkish Democrats in Congress, said last week: "We cannot prevail in this
war as it is going today," and said that the Bush administration should
either boost its troop numbers or withdraw.
Yet boosting numbers can’t be the solution since that would simply increase the burden of a foreign presence. We’d fail to solve the problem of keeping Shia support and simply hasten the day we’d have to withdraw—and we’d be pulling out with a larger force making it look like we are running.
The article focuses on three solutions, implying endorsement. First:
Like many in the Special Forces, defense consultant Michael Vickers
advocates radically trimming the U.S. presence in Iraq, making it much more
like the one in Afghanistan, where there are 20,000 troops and almost none in
the capital, Kabul. The
Second:
In
addition to trimming the
Instead,
he predicted that if the Bush administration wins reelection, it simply will
settle for a stable
Third:
Finally, some are calling for the
Certainly, something different must be done. The American public will not accept drawn-out fighting with no prospect of victory. We owe our troops and people a victory and not just endless expenditures of treasure and blood.
The first solution is closer to what we should do. If the static guard duty and routine patrols are carried out by loyal Iraqis, we can focus on using special forces backed by conventional forces to seek out the resistance and break them up so they can’t overrun Iraqi posts.
But just pulling the Army (and Marine) conventional units
out of
The second objection is just silly. A free and democratic
I don’t think much of the third suggestion, either. Fallujah shows what happens when we leave the Baathists and their Islamist allies of convenience alone.
Do we want a Fallujah-like rump Sunni state able to
organize itself to fight our interests? Do we imagine that the Sunni rump state
will stick to its oil free area and enjoy their Baathist
poverty? No, they will plot against the Kurds and the Shias
and attempt to regain their country and power and money. And I do shudder to
think of what is buried in the Sunni triangle that will be dug up if we leave
after partitioning
And as we consider these complaints, remember that the Army,
which has paid the largest price for this war, feels screwed by Rumsfeld. The Army lost Crusader and it lost Comanche.
These were the two biggest items scheduled to come on line. And although plans
(well, that’s too strong—let’s say tendencies) to cut at least two and maybe
four Army divisions are dead, the feeling that Rumsfeld
undervalues boots on the ground makes for hard feelings. The Army could sure use
a couple more divisions (or in my opinion, separate brigades and battalions
from the same amount of manpower which would put more boots on the ground) to
manage troop rotation for a long war on terror that will go beyond
So examine how we are fighting the war. By
all means. But don’t take the latest panic too seriously as reflecting
the ground truth. Opponents of the war said prior to the war that we faced
disaster. During the war they said we faced a new
We have not won the post-war stabilization mission. But we’ve
hardly lost. We’re not even losing. The enemy has proven to be stubborn even as
it has not been especially costly in historical terms. Remember that as critics
call April 2004 our Tet, we’ve lost maybe 550 KIA in
the entire period since March 2003. In
So fight on confident that we can win and that we are flexible enough to adapt. And keep turning over authority to the Iraqis. I may not be sure whether our willpower will outlast the Sunnis or not, but I am pretty sure that the Shias and Kurds will outlast the Sunnis in a battle of wills when our allies know what will happen to their necks if they lose and let the Sunni Baathists put their boots back on. And we can back our side to the hilt.
And remember that losing or even walking away from all or
part of
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“So Who Is Right?” (Posted
US Marines with Iraqis drove through Fallujah:
Iraqi police and masked insurgents shot off rounds and
people flooded the streets, waving Iraqi national flags and honking their car
horns in jubilation over what they mistakenly believed was a deal between the
marines and the city's leaders to scale back the
Or:
But Johnson expressed befuddlement about the swirling rumours among Fallujans that the
marines were on the verge of a further withdrawal.
"Eventually we want to recede to the horizon ... but
just because we have one meeting in town it doesn't mean we're leaving Fallujah."
I guess we have to wait and see if the Fallujah Brigade carries out what we say is their mission:
The coalition wants the Fallujah
Brigade and police to round up the insurgents' heavy weapons and start taking
steps to find the culprits behind the March 31 murders, as well as a February
14 attack on Iraqi police and ICDC that killed more than 20 Iraqi officers.
I sure as heck don’t know who is right at this point.
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“Lay the Groundwork” (Posted
Part of the justification for assisting the Iranian military and/or opposition in an effort to overthrow the mullahs could involve demonstrating Iranian meddling in Iraq that has led to American deaths. The results of an investigation could be interesting:
Reports from inside
Yet as of late last month, the U.S.-led coalition held only
15 Iranian prisoners, according to the
When you add this to the failed EU/UN effort to shut down
We are running out of time to deal with
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“Reassuring the Shias” (Posted
This is good
news given some worries that Saddam could somehow return the Sunnis to
power in
The head of
Not only will this reassure the Shias (and Kurds too) that Saddam and his cronies will face justice rather than act out some fanciful plan to return to power, but it will compel the Shias to take action against the Baathists and so bind the Shias to our side. I’ve called for Iraqi trials of Baathists for probably a year now, in order to make sure the Shias don’t get the attitude that they can sit on the sidelines and watch us fight the Baathists (and now Islamists to a certain degree). I assumed we’d have to try Saddam and some of the high-level guys but after this amount of time, the Iraqis are hopefully ready to carry out this responsibility. We think so, apparently.
We may have to wait until July 1st, to adhere to international conventions, I hear.
Permalink to this post: http://www.geocities.com/brianjamesdunn/TDRFAMAY2004ARCHIVES.html#TDRNSA11MAY04B
“Interim Government” (Posted
An expanded Governing Council should appoint
and oversee the work of a caretaker government due to take over from the
U.S.-led occupation June 30, the U.S.-picked body said Saturday.
Of course, that’s not what Brahimi wants to do. He wants to dump the existing council for former Baathists. Then dump them and make sure that those who take power in the early 2005 elections are completely inexperienced. Plus, these newbies will be saddled with departments of government staffed by the “former” Baathists in the interim.
Yeah, that will work, eh?
I hope the Council’s opposition to being dumped has some
influence on our policy. The most representative national body
Expand the Council by having local elected councils select members of their own bodies for promotion up to the national expanded council. Let them know that they can stand for election in 2005 so that they will feel accountable for succeeding and not just looting while they pull a lame-duck duty.
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“Cluod This Sopof Dtaa Sftiers?” (Posted
Reading this is easy:
Aoccdrnig to rscheearch at Cmabrigde Uinervtisy, it deosn’t mttaer in word ind the ltteers in a word are, the ind iprmoatnt ind is word the frist and lsat ltteer be in the rghit pclae. The rset can be a taotl mses and you can word raed it wouthit porbelms. Word is bcuseae the
For humans it is easy. Can our computers that sift email communications worldwide looking for terrorist plots compensate for such an easy code?
Just wondering. I have no idea.
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“This is Where Our Success Will Lie” (Posted
Rule of law must be cultivated in
The Iraqis are learning:
The 28 [Iraqi] judges were attending a two-day conference
starting Wednesday with two U.S. Supreme Court (news
- web
sites) justices, the most senior judge in Britain, the head of a U.N. war
crimes tribunal and other legal experts.
Following the ouster of Saddam Hussein (news
- web
sites), occupation authorities vetted nearly 1,000 Iraqi judges and allowed
them to return to their courtrooms.
Most of the Iraqi judges attending the conference already
preside over domestic courts, and some are potential candidates for a seat on
an Iraqi supreme court to be created under a new constitution.
Zuhaire al-Maliky, an investigating judge for the Central Criminal
Court of
"Under Saddam, it was hard for any judge to express
his independence," he said. "Judges were like ordinary government
employees. ... Now this has stopped. Now we are running our own affairs."
The Iraqis questioned the
We have so much damage to undo that was inflicted by Saddam. It is truly frustrating that we must also undo the damage of soldier prisoner guards who failed to treat prisoners in their charge with human decency and their commanders who failed to command.
And while I take exception to the comment in this
article about the need for more troops, we are still doing well in
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“Our Apology Not Good Enough” (Posted
That’s what some overseas are saying (these are scattered excerpts not continuous quote):
While he (Rumsfeld) has been in
charge, murder, torture and humiliation were heaped on Iraqi detainees almost
as a matter of course," the Saudi daily Arab News commented.
"Rumsfeld's apology came too
late," said Jordanian analyst Hani Hourani.
"For us in Kuwait these (abuses) mean a lot of things,
and recall the brutal acts by Saddam Hussein's regime in the same prison, Abu Ghraib, which held many Kuwaiti detainees," he was
quoted on Saturday by newspapers as saying.
The Arab News dismissed Rumsfeld's
review of the scandal.
"Rumsfeld's suggestion that
an independent inquiry be set up into what happened is a waste of time, and
Iraqis simply do not have time to waste," it said.
"If he resigns without fuss, perhaps he may begin to
redeem himself by making a tiny contribution to the restoration of
Underscoring the intense emotions in the Arab world,
Of 60,000 respondents to a poll on the Web site of leading
Arabic satellite channel Al Jazeera, some 87 percent
said the
Ah yes. The outrage is clear.
Let me preface what I’m about to say with the ritual, “The actions of our soldiers and their commanders is unacceptable and must be fully punished. We are better than our enemies and we expect better of our troops.”
Now, this is the apology I’d have liked to hear Secretary Rumsfeld give:
“I would like to apologize to the people of
“I am also sorry that we allowed Saddam to inflict far worse atrocities
on the people of
“I’m sorry that the Arab and Moslem worlds ignored your plight because
they feared
“To the people of the Arab and Moslem worlds, I would also like to
offer my apologies. I’m sorry that you cannot have some perspective and see
that improving Iraqi prisons from Saddam standards to LAPD standards is such a
tremendous improvement by your standards that you should be applauding us. I’m
sorry that you don’t appreciate that we do not consider even that improvement
sufficient and that our society demands we improve that and punish those for
failing to meet our own standards.
“I am sorry that your governments imprison and
torture you [from NRO] on a scale
that makes our violations look like amateur night. I’m sorry that we have
supported those governments friendly to us. I’m sorry that we’ve allowed our
enemies to continue to oppress their people. I am sorry that
“And I’m sorry that our rescues and liberation of Afghanis, Iraqis,
Kuwaitis, Kosovar Moslems, Bosnian Moslems, and our
attempt to feed starving Somali Moslems somehow indicate in your opinion that
we are new Mongols out to kill your children. I’m sorry that this record is
unable to improve our image in your eyes.
“And I’m really sorry that I can’t get too worked up over your
selective outrage.”
But that’s just me.
We are taking these crimes seriously. More seriously than anybody else would if their own troops were involved. The world’s outrage? That I can’t take seriously. Look what failed to outrage them already.
It is nonetheless true that we are held to higher standards by the world and by ourselves. We have our work cut out for us to erase this image. Victory would be a good start. As the President said (and I hope he means it):
"This has been a difficult few weeks," Bush said.
"Yet our forces will stay on the offensive, finding and confronting the
killers and terrorists who are trying to undermine the progress of democracy in
There is little point in complaining about the unfairness of our dilemma. Suck it up and work harder. Show that we may make mistakes but that we correct them in good faith.
And there’s more to come out…
That said, read Austin Bay. He recalls what he wrote not longer after 9-11:
"Every war is complex, chaotic, physically and emotionally
debilitating and -- no matter how right the cause -- at some point morally
compromised. This war (i.e., The War on Terror) will be no different. America's
biggest strategic challenge will be one as old as war itself: maintaining the
will to persevere and pursue the task of victory despite understandable fears,
gnawing doubts, the occasional coward and inevitable body bags."
We’ve apologized enough. Move on.
No doubts about the objective. No doubts about our ability. No doubts about our will to win.
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“Results of Pressure” (Posted
Kristof is a little off in this piece about Iran. He says:
Left to its own devices, the Islamic
revolution is headed for
collapse, and there is a better chance of a strongly pro-American democratic
government in
Basically, Kristof says that we
are wildly popular in
Yet wasn’t their inclusion by us on the Axis of Evil
supposed to do that? A rather inconvenient fact to note our popularity now was
not really dented by being named an enemy of ours. Apparently the people of
And our invasion of
And our pressure over the nuclear issue in contrast to the European appeasement angered the Iranian people, too, huh?
Seems we are quite popular contrary to Kristof’s cause-and-effect argument.
Yes, somehow
And besides, are we really to let the mullahs get nukes by
the end of 2005 comfortable in the knowledge that by 2014, the mullahcracy will fall and there will be a pro-American
Might not nukes give the mullahs freedom of action to do what they want?
People under the heel of dictators often need help to overthrow the state apparatus of power that controls them. We need to go after those nutjobs in Tehran and I dare say when we help the people of Iran overthrow the mullahs, the people of Iran will still like us quite a bit. They still like us despite our mutual hatred of the Iranian government, after all.
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“Welcome Progress” (Posted
Some of the opposition is calling on Rumsfeld to be fired or to resign:
[Senator] Harkin, a critic of the administration's
foreign policy, said in his statement that "the secretary must be held
accountable" for abuses in military prisons. "The
While I disagree on the particulars of firing Rumsfeld (the opposition has been gunning for him since before 9-11), I am comforted that there is new recognition that abuses by subordinates should be traced to higher levels of command. If Rumsfeld, whose military was actually investigating crimes committed contrary to orders, should be fired, how much more insistent might advocates of firing be if somebody actually ordered torture, murder, mutilations, rapes and other sundry crimes on a mass scale for a couple decades as a matter of policy to impose his will on the majority?
I’d say they’d be pretty miffed and demand action. Right?
Oh, no. Wait. Such a man would provide “stability.”
Nuance is so tough to grasp.
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“Green Light” (Posted
I’ve called for patience in dealing with Sadr until we could work something out without angering the Shias. This might be the result.
The Shia clerics gave us the green light to do something about Sadr’s Mahdi Army:
Representatives of Iraq's most influential Shiite leaders met here on
Tuesday and demanded that Moktada al-Sadr, a rebel Shiite cleric, withdraw militia units from
the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala,
stop turning the mosques there into weapons arsenals and return power to Iraqi
police and civil defense units that operate under American control.
Part of the meeting said we should not enter
And there is this news. US forces moved
on Sadr forces in
The
coordinated attacks here [Karbala] and in Diwaniya
began hours after powerful Shiite politicians and religious leaders met in
Baghdad to urge Mr. Sadr to withdraw his militia from
the holy cities of Najaf and
Interestingly, I assumed we were trying to calm the
situation in the Shia areas in order to storm Fallujah and crush the Baathists
there. Instead, we’re using the calm in Fallujah plus
visible cleric support, to go after Sadr’s forces.
Not like the Marine assault, however; but the amateurs of the Mahdi Army don’t need the same treatment. Still, the
clerics did say we should avoid
One good effect this Sadr/Fallujah sequence has had may be to undermine the possibility of cooperation between hostile Sunnis and Shias against us. The Sadr people and Fallujah insurgents tried to spark a nationwide revolt. Instead, although the Fallujah people got some sympathy, there was no Shia revolt in support of either Sadr or Fallujah. Now, with an agreement in place in Fallujah, the Baathists and Islamists there aren’t in position to come to Sadr’s rescue—or pretend to anyway. Shias didn’t help Sunnis and now Sunnis won’t help Shias.
Score one for the good guys, I’d say.
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"New Amphibious Approach"
(Posted
Strategypage notes:
The
This seems to be moving
toward a concept I wrote about for Joint
Force Quarterly in 2000 (see here
for background material, some supporting visuals, and a link to the article). I
advocated sailing Navy surface warships with an amphibious ready group carrying
a Marine Expeditionary Unit (a reinforced battalion) plus pre-positioning ships
that would carry the balance of a Marine brigade's equipment and supplies to
meet initial demands. I called it a Marine Expeditionary Battle Force (that
term was basically edited out. A couple times now I've had graphics stripped
out of articles that carried vital information. I've learned my lesson).
The Navy as already created
amphibious/warship combinations with Expeditionary Strike Groups. Now it will
create units of ships to carry equipment sets to rapidly expand the MEU landed.
I will wait with interest to see how those pre-positioning ships are deployed.
Will they sail with the ESG as I called for or kept separate?
The Sea Swap is an angle I
didn't see.
The power of our Navy and Air
Force that we've demonstrated in
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"What to Do" (Posted
We need to focus on how to
win in
We’ve made mistakes in the
post-war stabilization mission. Some of the mistakes aren't the ones that
critics have forecast or raised since before the war. I won't go over them
again, but critics of the war effort really should explain how before the war
we were supposed to sift the concerns that proved false with the concerns that
panned out.
And I may get frustrated with
some of the complaints made by the anti-war side. I may question whether some
are complaining to solve problems or just to make sure their side wins in
November. But since we are a society that retools itself after analyzing
problems, in the end our effort will be stronger. To those who would
like criticism silenced, we have only to point to the
It is crucial to remember
that war is not a game that can be waged error free. Both sides in a war will
make errors. The key is exploiting the enemy's errors more effectively than the
enemy exploits yours. Learning to cope with the enemy's strengths and your own
weaknesses and learning to exploit your enemy's weaknesses and find new
weaknesses will move your side to victory. Our military is so strong that we
forget that
So rather than endlessly
debate the post-war thus far (and God help me, continue to debate the question
of whether to invade or not), what should we do from this point forward?
We stand with Al Anbar province in revolt with the al Qaim-Ramadi-Fallujah
corridor the site of the most determined resistance. Powerful gangs that used
to be the subcontractors for Saddam's regime, Baathist
soldiers and intelligence operatives, and Islamists seem to dominate the
resistance.
North of Baghdad in the
former Baaathist stronghold, there is no uprising to
match the Fallujah revolt. Some of the Iraqi security
forces failed to show up while others remained loyal. While activity isn't that
high, it seems like the enemy has at least learned to fire mortars more
effectively. It is not a crisis point, however.
The Kurdish area remains
solid with few Americans required to help stabilize the area.
South of
Further south, the Shia areas remain pretty calm with British and allied
troops providing the backbone. Iraqi security force stood fast. An attempt at a
seaborne attack in the Gulf on Iraqi oil exports was foiled.
Overall, reconstruction in
So what do we do from this
point on?
Reconstructing
Reconstruction
will get the Iraqis busy in work, governance, and security. The money Congress
appropriated will help when it finally gets through the pipeline and into
Back home,
the administration has to hammer home the good things going on and hammer home
the reasons why winning is important. The blogosphere
has carried this load for a long time giving voice to what in the past would
have been called a silent majority. But this is not enough. Ignore the press
since they will always focus on bad news. Complaining about the press is a waste
of time better spent showing success. Ultimately, we must operate under
scrutiny and if the government highlights the good, it will also work hard to
change tactics when the bad comes out. After all, without the press
highlighting the bad, the bad might continue uncorrected. We can only wage war
if the people back home are supportive. The troops must know they risk death
protecting us. If they think they are just being hung out to dry or are
fighting for no good reason, morale will sink and effectiveness will erode. Every
day somebody in the administration should be out front showing the good we are
doing. Lower ranking people should be flooding local TV and radio. Show the
public that progress is visible and that we will eventually reach a point
called victory when a friendly Iraqi government takes control. Stop assuming
that things will work out and that the public will then support the war in
victory. Fight for victory now.
Letting the Iraqis know they will be sovereign is key. The
coalition needs to be out there letting the Iraqis know what we are doing to
move
Show the wider world of Arabs
and Moslems that we are winning. Show
our power. The strong horse is
And we could use more allies.
That has always been true and we have consistently tried. If giving the UN some
minor role can get us a resolution that brings in allies—even the French—we
should do it. We don’t want allies to tie our hands but if we can get allies
more involved we give them a stake in success, too. But since few of our allies
will want to help in the Sunni triangle, don’t give up too much to get help. We
hardly need to give away the store just to get allies to take over quiet
sectors. Real concessions can be made when allies with high quality troops take
over some sectors in the tough areas. Or guard the borders with
Our military forces should
keep the insurgents at bay with minimum firepower so as not to interfere with
reconstructing the Iraqi economy, government, and military. We can’t destroy
infrastructure in our haste to kill the enemy. We can’t stress out a new Iraqi
government by having high profile battles in which their constituents get
killed. We can’t be too strenuous in fighting so that the Iraqis won’t sit back
and let us fight for them. This isn’t being casualty averse. This is making
sure the Iraqis carry the burden. Remember, we don’t get points for having a
brutally efficient kill ratio. With June 30 approaching, we’ve lost our ability
to really go after the enemy, anyway. Fallujah may
have been our last real chance to smash up the enemy prior to turnover of
sovereignty. We should have smashed up this area long ago, but as I said, it’s
too late for what might have beens. Pull back troops
where we can to act as a reserve where we can. And start pulling troops out of
We need to support a new
Iraqi government in everything we do. Even if it isn’t as
efficient as doing it ourselves.
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“Lt. Paul Reickhoff Should Be Ashamed”
(Posted
I listened to this officer home from
Stephanopolous was giddy at the
chance to talk to an officer and get him to criticize the war effort. Of
course, the anti-war side finally finds one junior officer to criticize the
government and he gets a national radio slot for the Democrats and time on ABC
Sunday morning. I guess Air
The lieutenant thinks he was inappropriately used. He was
trained to kill as an infantry officer and when the war ended he was ordered to
build schools and reconstruct
He is a fool. He has no idea of the history of the military
and what it has done. He has no appreciation for the mission he was sent on in
He said that he wants
What a fool. What a tool of the anti-war side. I wasn’t an officer so I don’t know what kind of oath he took, but I know that I was expected to keep quiet about politics.
When I was in the Guard, I kept my mouth shut on politics. I was a soldier under Presidents Reagan, Bush 41, and Clinton. I didn’t even join the bitching in private about the latter that frequently broke out.
And this lieutenant went public in the most politically partisan way. He was used inappropriately alright. By the anti-war side, I’d say. Luckily, he spoke out in a self-contradictory way, too. After all, he was trained as an infantry officer—not a MoveOn.org attack dog.
This isn’t a manner of free speech. He went beyond letters to editors, writing a critical blog, or talking to friends. Yes, he is back in civilian life, but he is using his rank as his authority to criticize. He put himself in league with a political party in an election year to attack his commander-in-chief.
That lieutenant should be ashamed.
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“Appeasing the Islamists” (Posted
Some continue to argue that American foreign policy has caused the Islamists to direct justified anger at us. This anger somehow makes 9-11 somehow excusable if you squint your eyes and dim the lights as long as you preface your remarks with “9-11 was wrong… but.”
So what if we reduced our presence in
Well then, what if we converted to Islam? I mean, they want us to be Islamic right? I mean, we can’t guarantee everyone will convert but if almost everyone does, that will be enough, right? We’ll keep our democracy of course. But no, that won’t work either. The Turks tried that and even refused to let us launch an attack out of their territory. They preferred to appease the French to ensure entry into the EU. But no, that neither worked to get into the EU and failed to keep Islamists from bombing the Turks and killing lots of Moslems.
But wait, on top of having most of us Moslem, what if we
persecute and kill the few who remain Christian or whatever? That’s got to
count for something in the Islamists’ book, right? Darn it, that sounds like
Well what if we converted to Islam entirely, made
discrimination against Christians, Jews, and whoever else the law of the land
and generously funded and promoted extremist Islamist ideology? Surely, this is
enough. Well darn it all, that describes
Ok, forget it. This isn’t working. Let’s just say screw ‘em. Let’s occupy an Arab country, slaughter the locals in
an effort to keep them under our heel (Hell, let’s colonize them, too. In for a penny, in for a pound!). If we have to kill 70,000
of the enemy and lose 10,000 of our soldiers, so be it. Let’s invade a
sovereign Arab state to control their resources and to prevent them from
sending aid to our enemies even though we have no proof and it turns out to be
false. Wait, there’s more! Let’s work with the Israelis, too, and have
Dang this is tough. Just how does one curry favor in the Islamic world? How exactly is our foreign policy causing the Islamists to justifiably hate us?
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“Sabotage” (Posted
We need to turn over governing functions to the Iraqis and guide them to post-Saddam sovereignty. After more than two decades of Saddam’s brutal rule, we must instill rule of law and democracy. Clearly, the Iraqis need some guidance to arrive at a functional society.
So what is the glorious UN’s plan? What has Lakhdar Brahimi proposed?
Why, to destroy all progress in providing experience in
governing
Consider that the UN plan provides that the Governing
Council shall have no role in the interim government. Never mind that this is
the only body with national experience. Never mind that polls show it has more
support now than early on in its existence. We are supposed to toss the most
representative national body ever to hold office in
No, the UN plan is to give power to a smaller body of
“technocrats.” Read that “Baathists.” Because the
only people allowed to gain technical expertise in
Saddam’s
Then, to add to the UN plan’s failure to guide leaders to responsibly exercise full sovereignty, the UN plan calls for this interim body to just retire in 2005 when elections are held for officials of the new Iraqi government. I suppose that this might be good to get rid of the former Baathists who would hold the interim technocrat positions in the interim government, but shouldn’t we assume some success? Shouldn’t we assume that these guys don’t staff the government with former Baathists while they hold the power? (the UN expects them not to stack the deck—and nobody would undermine the UN’s will, right?) If these technocrats manage to carry out their function without alienating the Shias or stacking the deck against the Shias and Kurds, these guys will be tossed.
So, nearly two years of American guidance will be completely tossed as the newly elected rookie leaders take power.
Or the government will be over-represented by Sunnis and Baathists.
One would almost think the UN is setting us up for failure.
Expand the Governing Council by promoting local council members up to this body to act as a proto-parliament. The local councils were elected and can elect one of their own to move up. And let these people stand for election in 2005 so they have to run on their records. We have to watch them of course to make sure they don’t pass out plum jobs to friends. But we have to let Iraqis gain experience in governing. How will we turn over power to Iraqis if we don’t let good experience develop?
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“
On the one-year anniversary of the President’s declaration
that our mission was accomplished has led to predictable cries that our mission
is not accomplished. Did we accomplish our mission on
You bet.
The very conquest of
This is why I supported the invasion of
The justification for war against Saddam's
Part II expands on this case for war.
Based on my reasons how did we do?
Saddam’s despotism is greater than we thought as we find the mass graves and peer into his files cataloging his regime’s crimes.
His record of aggression stands unaffected by the war.
His pursuit of weapons of mass destruction is also clear as
the Kay report to Congress and the more recent statements by Kay’s successor, Duelfer, point out. Saddam went to great lengths to hide
his programs but they existed in violation of UN Security Council resolutions and
would have given Saddam WMD once sanctions were lifted under pressure by the
Arab world and led by
Before the war, I expected Saddam had a nuclear program that would take years to bring him a bomb. But I was uncomfortably aware that we had grossly underestimated Saddam’s progress toward a nuclear bomb back in 1990.
I figured he had a biological weapons program but since it could be hidden so easily, its status was a great unknown to me. Bio weapons programs could have been early or advanced and I thought we had no way of knowing what it was. My main worry was that we could have underestimated it as we had until the mid-90s when a defector fingered the Saddam regime.
I was most confident about chemical weapons and that was because chemical weapons were the one WMD we know Saddam had. It was also the WMD I worried the least about. Against well-trained troops it is not a large-scale killing weapon. It could be funneled to terrorists but I worried far more about bios or nukes in either Saddam’s hands or terrorists. Still, failure to find chemical weapons since the war do not erase the fact that Saddam had them and used them liberally in the 1980s. If Saddam did not have them in March 2003, that was a temporary gap that Saddam could have ended at any time of his choosing.
Missiles I did not talk about since I assumed he either had missiles or could get them. It turns out that he had missiles of prohibited range and even tried to get North Korean assembly lines for even longer range missiles.
The bottom line is that the threat from Saddam was not imminent as much as it was inevitable if we didn’t overthrow Saddam while we could at an acceptable cost.
And I think much of what we found in
So we indeed accomplished our mission as I saw it by
What we are fighting for now is a better
Yes, the post-war fighting is a struggle that is harder than
I expected. I thought the resistance would peter out more rapidly. Indeed, the
failure of the Iraqi regime loyalists to mount any type of last ditch defense
in
Yet despite the difficulties we’ve had the past year, the
540 KIA we’ve suffered since we invaded
The losses since a year ago hurt. I’ll not pretend otherwise. But we fight for a just goal. And we fight for an objective that will make us safer if we can achieve it. How many casualties is it worth to win this grander struggle? I don’t know. But we know that our enemies can kill 250 Marines in a single day’s suicide attack. We know that we can lose 3,000 in a September morning. We know our enemies aimed for ten times as many. We know they still try to kill us and anyone else who does not share their vision of a 14th century world ruled by Islamist fanatics.
Even if we cannot turn
But we can win far more in the wider war on terror by
converting
I just don’t know if our enemies are right or not in their assessment of us. Only we can beat us.
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“Horn of
I’ve not been shy in predicting offensive action in the Horn of Africa. Air strikes, special forces, and conventional Army and Marine units in company-sized or smaller raids to kill or capture al Qaeda types hiding in the Horn region.
While nothing out of the routine has happened, I have noticed that briefings seem to bring up the Horn more often than in the past. Is this an indication that something will happen soon?
Or has the Iraqi mini-crisis led us to cancel offensive actions in the Horn to minimize casualties overall?
I could easily just be completely wrong. Looking for evidence to bolster what you expect is easy to do. Just a hunch on my part bolstered by thoughts of what I’d do were I king.
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“Perception of Victory” (Posted
I worried that the dazed survivors of our killing machine in Fallujah would stand up, blink, and start yelling that they won. Well:
Scores of Iraqis gathered in the streets
Saturday morning, some flashing "V" for victory signs and raising the
Iraqi flag. Motorists drove through the streets, shouting "Islam, it's
your day!" and "We redeem Islam with our blood!"
Some were masked with kuffeyahs
and raised automatic weapons, members of the insurgency that put up stiff
resistance against the Marines. Some guerrillas drove through the city, honking
horns and waving their guns out the windows.
I concede that this local perception of victory may not last if the Marine plan of putting an Iraqi unit (the previously unknown Fallujah Brigade) into Fallujah to sift it for weapons and insurgents works. I’ve always preferred Iraqis doing this type of work. Perhaps by the end there were more local criminals than Baathists and Islamists still fighting and so the locals want us to sift out the Baathists and Islamists who survived our assault while the local boys/criminals go home. We could have bribed the gangs, I guess.
The Marines think this will work, apparently. We’ll see.
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“Well This isn’t Working the Way We Planned,
Dear Leader” (Posted
The North Koreans have been bankrupting and starving their
countrymen in order to build nuclear missiles in order to blackmail the
Anyway, just as the North Koreans get some nukes and missiles and perhaps have a means of mounting the former on the latter, we go and do this:
The U.S. 8th Army's new 35th Air Defense
Brigade, located at Fort Bliss, Texas, and equipped with Patriot Advanced
Capability 2 and 3 systems, will be deployed to South Korea, the U.S. and South
Korean Combined Forces Command in Seoul said in a news release.
The PAC 2 and 3 missile systems are designed
to intercept and destroy incoming ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and enemy
aircraft. There are already several batteries fielded in
After seeing the ability of our missiles to shoot down other missiles, the North Koreans are now faced with the fact that their gambit has failed. Their missiles are not unstoppable as they assumed.
So what do they do now?
Starve and collapse, I hope. We just took away their light at the end of the tunnel.
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“Needed Justice” (Posted
Iraqis should be starting investigations and trials against the Baathists for their crimes:
AFTER WAITING FOR MORE
than three decades, Iraqis brutalized by Saddam Hussein and his regime will
begin to see justice "in the next few weeks," according to Salem Chalabi, the director-general of the tribunal system
established to try regime criminals. The court proceedings themselves are not
likely to start until early next year, Chalabi says,
but the investigations will be transparent and some of the interrogations will
be shown on television.
"Under the civil
law system, individual judges question defendants before their trial,"
says Chalabi, nephew of the head of the Iraqi
National Congress, Ahmed Chalabi. "You can begin
to show the atrocities. You can begin to show the shit that the old regime did
and you'll see this in the next few weeks. We'll have meetings with the
defendants and we'll show them on TV."
The current plan is to
try low and mid-level Baathist functionaries first
and work up to senior regime figures and Saddam Hussein. "It's easier to
try people who are lower-ranking because it's easier to try someone for one
crime than twenty," says Chalabi. Once
investigative judges have established that crimes have been committed by
specific individuals, they will begin to work their way up the chain of
command.
About time. In the midst of polls showing Iraqis are glad we deposed Saddam but showing weariness at the presence of US troops who must fight those who killed and tortured freely before we invaded, it will be good to remind people who we fight in Iraq. Memories of Saddam’s evil are fading already.
Plus, it will help to get Iraqis prosecuting Baathists to get them engaged on our side. As I’ve written, we can’t have the great majority of Iraqis neutral as we fight the Baathists and Islamists. Iraqis need to step forward and prosecuting Baathists will help do this.
And finally, even as we take responsibility for the idiots or criminals who abused Iraqi prisoners, it would be nice if we could contrast our isolated, relatively minor crimes with the widespread and lethal crimes of Saddam’s regime. Contrasting that we police our own with Saddam’s promotion of those who killed the most Shias would help too.
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