THE DIGNIFIED RANT
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS AUGUST 2003 ARCHIVES
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"Dispersing (and Killing ) Them" (Posted August 30, 2003)
Up to a thousand Taliban massed in Afghanistan and for the past week Afghan and US forces have been pounding them:
Afghan officials claim well over 100 Taliban losses during the week, many of them killed by U.S. and allied fighter jets and attack helicopters which have been called in daily to support Afghan troops and U.S. special forces on the ground.
We are supposed to have them surrounded. Hope so. But it looks like we are on our way to dispersing them as we need to in order to end their military threats. Killing them is better as long as they have massed, of course.
I was worried about the Taliban's ability to mass and overrun Afghan police posts, but if we can rip this concentration apart, it will discourage them mightily and go a long way to reassuring Afghans that at the end of the day, the government will prevail against the thugs.
Computer is loopy. May be on last legs. Posting sparse.
"Intelligence-Reflection (Posted August 29, 2003)
On reflection, the assertion by the US general that we need better intelligence in Iraq and not more troops is not necessarily a contradiction from the past stories about cooperation from Iraqi citizens. Indeed, it is probably just a reflection of the difference between "intelligence" and citizen "tips."
The key is that piling more troops into Iraq is not the answer to what is really a low level problem. Some people are panicking at a low-level and localized resistance that we are beating. They are compounding this panic by advocating a solution that will actually make progress more difficult.
"Intelligence" (Posted
Perhaps it is that the
regulars on patrol aren't getting information and the special ops boys are—or
maybe information is deficient in the Sunni triangle area. I hope so because
otherwise this
is contrary to what I've read repeatedly"
The commander of
I know the press has been
deficient in portraying balanced accounts of the Iraqi fighting and rebuilding,
but at the same time I do not ever wish to be a mindless cheerleader. If we are
screwing up, we need to know and correct it. Our troops' lives are on the line
here and they are too valuable to squander in an effort to maintain a debating
point.
Unless it's
just the usual "not enough intelligence" complaint. There never is enough, after all. Not even with
satellites and UAVs and all manner of ground
surveillance radars and informants.
"Clearing the Decks" (Posted
We've scaled back our Saudi
presence:
With Saddam ousted
from office in neighboring Iraq nearly five months ago, U.S. military officials
transferred back to the Saudis control of portions of Prince Sultan Air Base
and deactivated the 363rd Air Expeditionary Wing that has operated there, the
Air Force said in a statement Wednesday.
This doesn't mean we invade
There's still that
Sadly,
nothing out of
Clear up the Axis of Evil as
much as we can. They were named to it for a reason.
"Negative Tone" (Posted
The North Koreans announced
they will
test a nuke:
The remarks by North Korean
Deputy Foreign Minister Kim Yong Il set a negative
tone at the conference and raised questions about the success of the
negotiations, which were scheduled to conclude Friday morning.
Yep, that's a 'negative tone'
alright. No doubt about it.
Repeat
after me—"Axis of Evil."
Is it really so difficult?
If the success
of the talks are in doubt, we have some real problems. Do we contain
I assume we start squeezing
Quite the
dilemma for the psychopath in
Right now we have cards to
play. Everybody but us are in range of tested North
Korean missiles. They may not be able to reach
"The Chinese Imperial Threat" (Posted
The future of
What we should not be
confused about is what the Chinese
leadership wants. They base their
legitimacy on an imperial model:
The result is a strange brew of economic
dynamism on the part of individual citizens, political apathy among the
population as a whole, a muted civic culture, and a form of Chinese racism.
Accepting a paternalistic state,
And for those who believe
economic modernization is automatically a path to political liberalization
rather than a means to increasing state and party control, far from opening up,
the Chinese have cracked
down on debate:
After several months of permitting
China's intellectuals the freedom to call for political reform, ponder far-reaching
revisions to the constitution and consider changes in the official history of
the Tiananmen Square crackdown, the Communist Party has ordered a halt to such
debate, and security personnel have begun harassing leading academics,
economists and legal scholars, sources here say.
While the Chinese communists
may not be able to pull this off, I think that they will sacrifice economic
progress in a heartbeat if they think it will undermine their political monopoly
of power. They will not be
THE DANGER of course is not
only that China might obtain this capability--last year's "Annual
Report" listed 350 short-range ballistic missiles deployed across from
Taiwan; this year's lists 450--but also that the military will convince
themselves and China's leadership that it can pull such a strategy off. It's
difficult to deter military planners who believe that they can overcome
shortfalls in real capabilities by being cleverer than the opponents or who
believe that their opponents are weak willed.
No rational Japanese leader
could have concluded that
Until the future of
The uncertainly of the future
facts does not change what they want their future to look like.
We won't like their planned future.
"Making Foreign Policy Choices" (Posted August 27, 2003)
An excellent piece on judging past foreign policy decisions based on our knowledge of what happened and our presumed ability to judge all that would have happened had we chosen differently in the past. Our installation of the Shah, support of the Afghan resistance in the 1980s, our decision to not march on Baghdad in 1991 have all been second-guessed. I agree that the decisions were reasonable and that all in all, we have done well. I never agreed with those who say we should have marched on Baghdad in 1991. It is certainly debatable but I was never egotistical enough to say that I knew that no other problems would have arisen. As I've written here in the past, we do what we can at the time. If we try to predict all possible consequences we will be frozen in indecision. We decide as best we can to solve the current problem and accept that future so-called "blowback" will have to be faced by leaders and people we hope are up to the task of their time. Anyway, this sums up what I got from the piece nicely:
American presidents, who have to make the truly big decisions of U.S. foreign policy, must come to a judgment with incomplete information, often under stress and merciless time constraints, and frequently with their closest advisors painting one another in shades of disagreement. The choices are never between obviously good and obviously bad, but between greater and lesser sets of risks, greater and lesser prospects of danger. Banal as it sounds, we do well to remind ourselves from time to time that things really are not so simple, even when one's basic principles are clear and correct. When President George W. Bush strove, from September 12, 2001 onward, to make the moral and strategic stakes of the war on terrorism clear, he was immediately enshrouded by an inescapable fog of irrepressible fact: namely, that our two most critical tactical allies in the war on terrorism, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, were the two governments whose policies had led most directly to 9-11. If that was not enough ambiguity with which to start the war on terrorism, the various sideswipes of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict soon provided more.
We do not make foreign policy decisions in easily compartmentalized problems. Do we take down the Saudi regime? What about our economy and the world's economy? Do we take out Iran or Syria? What will the North Koreans do? Do we take out the North Korean regime? Will our allies abandon us in fear of nuclear strikes? Do we confront the Pakistani regime? How will this affect Afghanistan or will Pakistani nukes disappear into the wild north?
We do not know so very much. Yet still we must decide what to do. I am amazed we have done so well under the circumstances.
"Keeping the Peace in Iraq" (Posted August 27, 2003)
Much is being made of the statistic that American casualties from the Iraq War have been surpassed by the casualties of the post-war stabilization. This might be a big deal if we suffered heavy casualties in Iraq but we won the war with casualties half the level I expected if we didn't face chemical warfare or a Battle for Baghdad with effective die-hards. Obviously it is tragic for the military people we have lost and their families. (I hate having to add this caveat but people eager to discredit will call you callous if you don't) I remind myself of the cost of this war by reading every casualty notice the Pentagon sends out. Would that the opponents of the war on terror would read the death notice of a victim of 9-11 at the rate of one every other day, they'd still be reading after 16 years. But losing 3 or 4 troops per week is not militarily significant. Such low levels of losses just do not interfere with our military's ability to carry out its missions. Our troops and the British are very good and we are slowly grinding the Sunni Baathist and jihadist opposition down. (Austin Bay has a good piece on strategypage.com on this. Although I am skeptical of the deliberate nature of the whole "flypaper" theory)
We do have a problem, however, and it relates to the problem of getting American troops off the firing line in static guard posts and routine security patrols. As we put allied forces in place, it turns out-not too surprisingly-that they are less effective. From strategypage.com:
August 27, 2003: As troops from other nations begin to relieve American and British troops, a major problem is developing. US and British troops have the best civil affairs (working with civilians in wartime) capability in the world. The US Army has maintained a large force of civil affairs troops since World War II. The marines literally wrote the book (the Small Wars Manual) on these kinds of operations and have long been noted for their skill and enterprise in working with civilians. Many of the new troops coming in have experience with United Nations peacekeeping operations. Unfortunately, the UN operations are usually rife with corruption and mismanagement. In many cases in Iraq, efficient American troops are being replaced by contingents less willing to work, and more eager to steal. This is going to lead to more unrest among civilians, and make it easier for the criminal gangs, Saddam diehards and Islamic radicals to operate.
American commanders are not unaware of these problems, but they have limited resources to deal with it. There are an increasing number of Iraqi police and para-military security forces being put to work, and these are supervised by Americans (usually civilians.) There are still US Army civil affairs troops to work with the foreign contingents, but the new peacekeeping troops cannot be watched full time. Moreover, the new peacekeepers will not patrol, or operate against Iraqi resistance, as effectively as American troops.
International forces do not translate into more effective peacekeeping. Sure, getting allied help solves the problem of over-committing US forces but other problems result. We will have to watch them closely and intervene if necessary. It is a balancing act. Hopefully, we balance it right and get allied and Iraqi forces for guard duty and routine security patrols; civilians rebuilding the economy, government, and courts; American forces on the offensive against the thugs, criminals, and jihadists; and good intelligence guiding it all. It would be nice if the State Department could get Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia to keep the jihadists from flocking from their territory to Iraq. [pause for laughter to subside] Of course, absent successful diplomacy, other means may be necessary.
And if allied force under US command are less effective, imagine what it would be like under UN command. Think Bosnian "safe areas." Keep this in mind when opponents of the war insist that the UN must take command in Iraq. These people were wrong about the war and don't know what they are talking about in the post-war.
And part of keeping the peace in Iraq is, as I noted above, dealing with Iraq's neighbors. Ledeen has a piece on resuming the offensive. He is more pessimistic than I am though I share worries that delay is deadly. Sadly, some delay is necessary for reasons I've given already. We can't do everything at once for all our power. Still, we must keep focused on waging the war even when we pause. If we forget we are merely paused and not done, we will lose this war against terror.
"Scatter Them" (Posted
Air power is supporting US
troops and Afghan forces as we
go after Taliban/al Qaeda forces that have
recently massed to overrun Afghan government posts. As I wrote earlier, keep
them dispersed and they are a law enforcement problem. Let them mass and they
are a military problem.
Hopefully, this and future
actions will disperse the enemy once again. Yes, I know, when they mass we can
use firepower more effectively, but I'd rather have a slow police problem than
a spectacular military victory. Still, kill as many as we can while we disperse
them, of course…
No let up there, boys. Keep
them on the defensive worrying about what we will do to them.
But without active Pakistani
cooperation to wipe out the sanctuaries, knocking the Taliban types off for
good will be very difficult.
"More Troops in
Ran across
a good article on the Pentagon defense
of not pumping up troop strength in
Oh, and I should make on
point in defense of our large ground forces in
"A Good Offense" (Posted
Oh, and a nice piece on
dealing with
"The Cam Ranh Bay
Umpires Association" (Posted
A nice article by
Ignatius on why just pumping up troop numbers in
One former senior Pentagon official from
the
We need Iraqis and allies
(until the Iraqis can do it all) for point security and border security so it
doesn't look like an American occupation that alienates Iraqis. We need
American and allied special forces and precision air power to go after the
insurgents without tearing up the countryside. We need large American Army
formations as a hammer and to watch external foes in
Resist the Siren Song of
added troop strength.
"Expeditionary Strike Groups" (Posted
From strategypage.com. The Navy is putting to sea Expeditionary Strike
Groups:
This is a step toward what I
called an Expeditionary Battle Force (in Joint Force Quarterly
in the summer of 2001). Basically, I wanted a Marine Expeditionary Unit sailing
with surface warships and possibly a carrier (if organic Harriers weren't
enough air power) as a forward deployed reaction force. My addition was that
ships with enough equipment to expand the ship-based battalion task force to a
brigade should sail with the amphibious group. The Marines now have then docked
in ports overseas. The JFQ article
doesn't include supporting charts that I submitted, but these are available on
my web site here.
What with talk that the
Marines want mobile artillery instead of towed and AC-130s, it may be that the Marines
are taking to heart my concerns that amphibious warfare is too much of the
Marine Corps mission.
Of course, even though
I never said abandon the
capability. Let's just call this my Korean peninsula exception to the rule!
"The Best Defense…" (Posted
Ledeen is worried
that we are sitting on our laurels and forgetting to pursue terrorists and
terror-supporting states. Faster please, he urges.
I too worry about this. I
hoped that July 9 demonstrations in
Although I have some gnawing worries
about our ability and will to maintain the offensive, I am not
"officially" worried yet. My guess is that we are in a pause and not
abandoning the offensive war against terror-supporting regimes. It is simply a
fact that we can't do everything all at once.
Too many wars in one term
give too much ammunition to the people who charge "war monger!" Too
little time devoted to domestic policies leaves a president vulnerable on bread
and butter issues. The war on terror is not a table-top exercise after all, it is waged in the real world. Democracies wage war as
long as the people support the administration. Would it be better to put a
candidate in the White House who wishes to abandon all we have accomplished? Perhaps
one could argue that more victories would bolster electoral prospects, just as
For one, too many wars in a short
time strain our military too much. We need to rest, maintain, retrain and
reorient. These are volunteers and not conscripts or mercenaries.
We need to build more JDAMs
and cruise missiles.
We need time to train Iraqis
and Afghanis in security operations. We need time to turn over static
occupation duties in
In the short run,
I believe we are using this
time to prepare for future operations even as we seem to be paused for no good
reason. Like the pause of 3rd ID in the sandstorm after their romp
across the desert that preceded the capture of
Perhaps I am overly
optimistic but I do not think the war against terror has been declared over. We
just don't know who has to be next and who can wait a bit longer.
"Security in
According to
AP:
About 150,000 American
troops are in
That's 10,000 more than I
though when I wrote earlier on troop strength. We have enough in
And what to
make of this? From the same
article:
Questions about
Huh? Let's see, the US
repeatedly tried to get the UN to agree to added security measures and
heavy armor outside the compound. The UN said no and—to really highlight their
security expertise—hired guards they knew had ties to Saddam's former
intelligence services. And this bombing incident is supposed to show that
I rather think not.
I say we follow Kofi Annan's wise advice as he commented
on the UN's refusal to accept better security at the
Annan said that
"we all live" in
"And that's
what should be done in
Apparently, Annan does not think the UN should be making security
decisions since it is up to the force providing the security to provide the
assessments. (I wish he had made this position clearer as we debated
"Troop Levels in Iraq" (Posted August 24, 2003)
It is interesting that those who generally oppose the administration and the Iraq War are calling for more troops to be sent to Iraq. It is hard for me to escape the nagging feeling that they call for more troops to get the quagmire they long predicted. Since the same critics leap on any bad news without looking at any of the good news, I am suspicious. Oh, not plotting for US defeat conspiracy suspicious, but just wondering. They'd be happier if we left, so why call for more troops? I really think they want more troops to strain the military and embarrass the administration. Or they want to put the UN in charge of Iraq to support their ideological outlook that only the UN can provide legitimacy and never the US and our allies alone.
I don't think we need more US troops in Iraq. We have say 160,000 US and allied troops. We have, according to Paul Bremer, more than 50,000 Iraqis in guard duties at facilities and the border as well as police. I've also read the figure of 70,000. We plan to have a 40,000-man Iraqi army in a couple years and we are training more police and security people. With just what we have now, we have 210,000 security personnel-most high grade US and British forces. What are they facing? I've heard estimates of several hundred to several thousand. It can't be too many-or if the number is in the thousands-they are not too active, since we've lost a soldier to combat on average every other day since the end of major combat operations declared on May 1st. We face about a dozen attacks every day, on average. But lets say several thousand-say 3,000 to be generous. The usual figure for defeating insurgencies is for the counter-insurgents to have a 10:1 numerical advantage. This is needed precisely because the insurgents are disguised and the authorities must guard lots of static positions in addition to having soldiers free to seek out the insurgents. By the traditional insurgency rules, we have a 70:1 ratio right now.
We simply do not need more troops. We need high quality troops to quietly seek out the insurgents. We need Iraqis to guard the borders and static positions. We need the support of the Iraqi people to keep those leads about insurgents coming in. We need to make more progress on the infrastructure and the building of local governments.
All these things we are doing.
All this ruckus about more troops for Iraq seems related to the cries about how the Iraq War has caused terrorists to flock to Iraq and we have created a terrorism haven where one did not exist when the purpose of the war was to fight terrorism. This is such an outlandish claim that one hardly knows where to begin. Are the proponents of this claim actually asserting that Saddam had no ties to terrorism? They always jump right to refuting a claim never made-that Saddam supported the 9-11 attacks-and then say this shows no ties to terrorism at all. Wow. Iraq was a threat conventionally to its neighbors, was a threat to us and our friends through support for terrorism, and a threat by its pursuit of WMD. This leaves aside the apparently trivial issue of Saddam's massive human rights violations. As for the Islamists flocking to Iraq, what of them? With Arab and Moslem countries perfectly at peace in contrast to the predictions of anti-war types that those "streets" would explode and cause Islamists to take control of those governments (we know now that the "street" was paid by Saddam's envoys to march and chant), can we fairly conclude that the presence of some foreign nutballs in Iraq proves the war was counter-productive? Are we to say that there were few nutballs out there prior to the war and we created them like that Harvard professor claims? Aren't the people making this claim missing something about the last twenty years-from the Beirut Marine barracks bombing to 9-11 to Bali and other numerous attacks on US and Western interests?
We did not create the Islamist nutballs we are now fighting. The difference is we are now seriously fighting them. We don't need more troops in Iraq to do that.
Now, if we're talking whether the Army should be larger... give me a couple medium-weight motorized infantry divisions with mostly HMMVW-mounted infantry and a battalion of armor and battalion of mechanized infantry for added protected firepower, plus some separate Military Police brigades and battalions. It would take a couple years to stand up a new division from scratch but the MP units could get on line faster depending on the MP training pipeline.
"UN Attack an Inside Job" (Posted August 22, 2003)
The nerve of people who say the UN bombing shows we must turn over Iraq security responsibilities to the UN is astounding. On top of the refusal of the UN to accept US security outside their headquarters, we find out that the attackers may have had inside help. Even if this particular suspicion does not pan out, we find out that the UN guards outside were former Saddam spies and the UN knew who they were!
Are we really willing to turn over security to people with a world view this stupid?
Will the proponents of the wisdom of the international community please explain how this would be superior?
And shouldn't this experience tell us of the folly of letting Baathists remain in positions of responsibility? De-Baathification even if it takes out some expertise is worth the price.
"REMF Training" (Posted August 22, 2003)
PFC Lynch and her unit will probably get a movie deal. Line units, such as those in Army V Corps and First MEF are understandably upset that a rear echelon unit that got cut up gets the attention while their drive north gets little public glory. I'd rather see movies about 3rd ID or 101stAB or 82nd AB or 1st MEF. Shoot, look at the audacity of parachuting a two-battalion 173rd AB with a tiny heavy task force into the north of Iraq where several Iraqi army corps were nearby as well as a couple Republican Guard divisions!
But the real reason for this post is the issue of rear echelon troop training. I read at strategypage.com that the performance of the Lynch unit really did reflect poor combat training. Rear area types, like I was, receive little fighting training. I do think our unit made it through better than lots of units from other countries would have done, but with a small army we need to do better.
Lets look at my training when I was in the service.
In six years, I had one weekend of riot control training in the Guard. The vehicle identification tests were mostly opportunities for me to mess with the testers-when shown an AMX-30 tank and asked to identify it as friend or foe, I'd always say, "It depends-it's French." In signal school, there was one day of testing for basic skills like map reading and the like. In basic training, we learned fire and movement, some grenade skills, and lots of M-16 usage, but nothing really practical as far as tactical situations. No squad tactics even. On our field exercise, we couldn't even dig fox holes because of environmental rules. On the march to bivouac, we were ambushed (after I spotted the ambush and yelled "ambush!" our entire company hit the deck before the machine gun could open up. Our cadre got us back up, formed us up, and marched us into the ambush anyway). But nowhere did anybody teach us about the best way to beat an ambush while marching. I knew the best response was to attack, but I was pinned down under the MG. I tried getting our squad mates who were off to the side to attack but nobody moved. Later, when cadre attacked out positions at night there was no discussion of how you use grenades at night so as not to reveal your position. I got my revenge by scattering large rocks along our squad's perimeter. I heard lots of cursing as our drill sergeants ran along our perimeter nearly falling as they ran! The never attacked our frontage. While on forest patrol, we never really learned anything. They just popped tear gas at us. It was more like playing soldier than anything. In the Guard, we drew up paper fighting positions when we went on summer training, but manned only the front gate. One year, our bunker covered the main road but a draw on the other side of the road led right past the bunker. My company CO ignored me when I noted this when the CO inspected our position while I was manning the M-60 position. Later, when the MPs attacked us (I was not on guard duty-in fact, I was heading off with an NCO to get supplies and we drove past the MP headquarters as they directed the attack), they attacked up the draw and penetrated out perimeter in about 5 seconds. And this was the only time while I was in that we were attacked. One year, we did have to put out a listening post, but we just sat there in the dark with no way to communicate with anybody if we did hear or see anything. Basically, we assumed an attached infantry unit would provide security. We never learned tactical driving or anti-ambush routines or anything like that.
Clearly, the drive on Baghdad in the Iraq War showed us that our rear echelon troops need to spend time with basic soldier skills like defending their units and anti-ambush drills. They need more than annual familiarization with their rifles.
If the future of our ground forces reflects the Iraq War with well-trained American combat troops supported by air power attacking into masses of enemy forces that greatly outnumber our troops, we will have fewcombat troops to guard the rear area troops in the early chaotic days when enemy forces are bypassed. Our rear echelon troops will need to be able to protect themselves. They need anti-ambush drills, the ability to call in air power and artillery, reliable organic weapons, and the confidence to fight and not just perform their technical jobs. And remember, the situation may get worse for US ground forces in the future. As I've written in past posts, the Iraq War actually reflected our long-held view of what a major theater war would take to win. We had about 60 US line battalions-nearly half Marines-which is the equivalent of 6 divisions of troops. Add in a British division and we had 7 good divisions. Our plans for a generic MTW call for 5 Army division and 1 or 2 Marine divisions-6 or 7 divisions. If Rumsfeld's view of a transformed Army envisions fewer troops with lots of precision firepower in support, combat units will be even scarcer on the battlefield.
I know I wasn't trained nearly enough to fight. I may have been a decent phone guy, but I was an Army phone guy. I should have known how to fight in situations my unit could reasonably be expected to confront.
"The Big Hammer" (Posted August 22, 2003)
The Iraqis are going to Saudi Arabia to get support from the Saudi government. Truly, the Iraqis need the Saudis to halt the flow of fanatics into Iraq to fight the provisional government and coalition forces.
Given the Shia support for us in Iraq and Iran, I think we may be able to develop a sizable hammer to bring the Saudis in line-or if they don't, to cut off the money for Wahabbi fanaticism.
A Shia revolt in Saudi Arabia. By a nice coincidence, the Shias of Saudi Arabia are concentrated in the oil-rich eastern provinces. The Saudis are worried enough, having seen Shias take over the Grand Mosque back in 1979 (?). Oh, in defiance of Moslem sensibilities, French commandos reportedly took part in the bloody assault into that holy place to free the mosque. But our troops don't take their boots off when they enter a Saddamite home...
Anyway, I digress.
Seriously, if Shias disposed to be friendly to us take over and finally get a share of the oil wealth that now goes to the Sunni royal family, we can just let the Wahabbis enjoy their 18th century "purity" in the desert with the holy places of Islam at Mecca and Medina. They'll get money from the oil pipeline going to the Red Sea but this will be a far cry from the wealth they use to spread fanaticism.
Yeah, we need their oil. But after the election, when the threat to cut off the oil flow will not be so potent, we can probably afford to get tough with the Saudis. This confrontation is coming. Only the timing remains in question.
Unless the Saudi royal family gets a clue and reforms. And is effective. Strategypage.com says the Saudis really are fighting the al Qaeda people:
Saudi Arabia's government has been engaged in a bloody, bitter war with Al Qaeda since 9-11, with efforts intensifying over the last few months. The conflict has taken against a back drop of confusing kaleidoscope of circumstances, divided loyalties, innuendoes, suspicions and misunderstandings.
This is a start. Saudi Arabia can be a friend, an enemy, an ineffective friend, or an ineffective enemy.
We shall see.
Also remember that as we focus on North Korea, we can ill afford to press other potential enemies even as we settle Afghanistan and Iraq down. The North Koreans probably fear us a lot more now that we have finished the Iraq War with such decisive and rapid battlefield success. They won't fear us if we get involved in another war right now.
We're darn busy. Those who think we need to stop Saudi Arabia last week need to keep this in mind.
"Russian Interference in
Did the Russians try to scrub Iraq of
WMD prior to our invasion? From, Ion Mihai Pacepa,
a former Soviet bloc intel
guy:
As a former Romanian spy
chief who used to take orders from the Soviet KGB, it is perfectly obvious to
me that
Interesting
if true. It would certainly explain a lot. We knew
Earlier, I said I expected
US, Russian, and EU spooks would be racing each other to get the goods on the
WMD programs and other records once we broke the Iraqi military resistance. I
may have under-estimated the Russians. On the bright side, the Russians seriously
under-estimated our military and expected a long siege of
The end of the summer is
approaching and when the war ended it seemed reasonable to me that by September
we should be in a position to say with some authority what we have found. I
hope we do publish what we have. I hope it is good. We would suffer an
undeserved blow to our credibility if we cannot show that
"New Rules of Engagement—Part Two" (Posted
So just how is the international community of nations helping us deflect
this
kind of threat:
As
readers of The Post learned last week, North Korean ships that covertly
transport assembly lines for missiles have been discovered marketing their wares
for cold cash.
International
controls on the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology, missiles, chemical
arms and biological warfare instruments are being flouted by a new category of
mercenary rogue states -- the determined proliferators. North Korea and
Pakistan head this infamous list, with Libya,
We are supposed to ignore
this threat in the interests of soothing international law fetishists. We are
supposed to look the other way and do nothing. But when some state or group
detonates a crude nuclear device in one of our cities, only then we can legally
respond.
I'm sure millions will light
candles and cry that they are all Americans now, in the wake of that tragic
event. But when we then seek to destroy those who would destroy us, we will be
called cowboys and worse.
Preemption is the only way we
can stop such madness from engulfing us in such a catastrophe.
I admit it is hardly
sophisticated of me. I don't care.
"The Logic of Surrender" (Posted
I was only home a brief time
last night but was lucky enough to catch Jessica Stern, the Harvard prof I
linked to yesterday who asserted that
Yet her continued defense
revealed a very basic failing in her reasoning. You see, she has talked to lots
of terrorists and she is impressed with how they can twist any event into a
reason to join the jihad and kill innocents. Thus, she says, our invasion of
We know that when we sat and
took it—or just lobbed a few tons of explosives at some real estate and then
went on our merry way, that the Islamists recruited plenty of nutballs. The sight of Britney Spears' navel was apparently
more than enough to inspire the recruiters for good material. Now, of course, Stern says that the
humiliation of having
John Gibson appropriately
asked the esteemed doctor what she thought was the solution. She, in a manner
that will doubtless inspire her students, failed to answer the question and
instead rewrote the question to one she could answer without looking like an
idiot. She simply repeated the clever recruiting line she had spoken about
earlier.
Using Dr. Stern's reasoning,
the only way to undercut Islamofascist recruiting would be to absolutely and
completely surrender to the nutjobs. We'd all need to
convert to Islam, stone adulterers (defined as any woman not married), kill
deviants (which would include what in their heads? I shudder to think), and
basically turn
The problem with Stern's
logic—and many others I've read or talked to over the years since 9-11 (and
even during the Cold War too for that matter)—is that they fundamentally miss
one important factor.
We are at war.
This is not some accounting contest
to see if we can reduce terrorist ranks by undermining their ability to meet
membership goals. Our CIA should not be exultant over a 3% drop in al Qaeda recruitment because we failed to do anything that
week to rile up the proto-nutballs on the verge of
chucking their family life and heading off to jihad.
Oh sure, we do want to cut
down their ranks—like by about 99%. And I'm not saying that we shouldn't try to
work hard at removing the incentives for joining jihad. Or incentives for
providing support to jihadists. Our war on terror is
not primarily a military war—notwithstanding the very necessary Afghan and
Perhaps we've embarked on too
many rhetorical "wars" (that the left and right are both guilty of
doing) that the Sterns of our country have forgotten that "war" is
not just some struggle for perfection over some societal problem. Perhaps this
is also why the Sterns of our country are also so keen on insisting that
"jihad" is a personal struggle for self improvement forgetting that
all those Islamofascist calls for jihad against America are not calling on
Moslems to embark on a 12-step program of personal growth—they are urging
Moslems to kill infidel westerners wherever we are. And although I don't buy
the idea that we delibarately embarked on a
"flypaper" strategy to encourage the nutballs
to go to Iraq where we can shoot them, it is nice that they prefer to go to
Iraq rather than Manhattan to finish the job they started back in the early 90s
with the first World Trade Center bombing.
This is an actual war, and we
need to kill the nutballs and the nutball
recruiters. Maybe the surrender advocates are right that the Islamofascists
wanted a war between themselves and
We're not done doing that.
Not even close.
"U.N. Headquarters Bombing" (Posted
I love it when a writer I
like sets forth what I am thinking so I don't have to bother. Peters has a good posting
about the
Our
enemies' initial "
And this should end the idea
that turning over the administration of
Oh, one other thing bothers me—the
rush to blame
America. Figures. The attack is useful as a cudgel
to attack
Except
for the recently built concrete wall, U.N. officials at the headquarters
refused heavy security because the United Nations "did not want a large
American presence outside," said Salim Lone, the
U.N. spokesman in
The UN had better learn (as
well as the rest of the world) that there is no neutrality in the war between
civilization and terrorism. The UN people did not deserve to die. Living in
your fantasy world is hardly a crime worthy of death even if its effect is to
bring harm to others. Though the UN staffers may have suffered from a naiveté
that is aggravating in its morally superior pose, they were trying to help
Iraqis gain a better life. And make no mistake, the Baathists
who still fight and the Islamists who probably carried out this bombing care
not one bit about the welfare of the Iraqi people. They and their ilk will kill
again until we kill them. They will kill Americans, and Norwegians, and UN
civil servants, and Jewish children on a bus. Even good Iraqi Moslems are
targets. All are "against"
them.
The terrorists clearly
believe that you are either with them or against them. But unlike the
"Pressure" (Posted
On the eve of talks that
include
'I'd
like to solve this diplomatically, and I believe we can," President Bush
told Armed Forces Radio and Television in an interview released by the White
House today. "It's going to take a lot of persuasion by countries besides
the
Even victory would be bloody.
"
An opinion
piece on
The final Lockerbie compensation offer
marked the triumph of a deliberate American policy pursued by three successive
administrations. A Libyan state that once served as a model of how to deal with
rogue states can now serve as a model of how to deal with a revolutionary
regime weary of its isolation and ostracism.
I'm not sure if we can fully
bring
If we show others that they can
step back from confrontation, it will have a real good effect.
"Not Possible" (Posted
It is simply not possible for
al Qaeda to be urging Moslems to
go to Iraq in order to fight on the side of Saddam's insurgents. Why,
everybody opposed to the Iraq War said so, right? I mean the very idea that organizations as different as Nazis and Soviet Russians
could cooperate at all, right?
Yet it happens. Who'd have
thought that a common enemy could unite Islamofascists
and secular anti-Americans. Live and learn.
Hmm. Not
possible-part two. (via Instapundit) Saddam's people
paid for demonstrations all over the Arab world to simulate an angry
"street" as well as journalists and western politicians. Terrorist
organizations too, although that linkage was supposed to be a Neo-Con wet dream
or something. And, according to Instapundit, Al Jazeera is carrying on this scheme to generate
"stories" that, if they are lucky, will include Iraqi casualties.
First, communists organized protests here; and now we find Baathists
funded supporters and terrorists overseas? Gee, who'd have thought it possible?
"Rules of Engagement" (Posted
The
This is all fine and dandy if
you assume the UN charter means something. If you assume that collective
security against those who transgress against the common peace actually means nations
will band together to thwart aggressors and thug regimes.
But the lofty goals of the UN
are not a reality and so the lofty goal of banning all military responses to
anything but overt, actual attacks is an invitation to getting attacked. This international
agreement to use force only against actual attack is based on the assumption
that the community of nations will actually deter any state from launching
aggression. This bargain has not been put into effect and so we cannot carry
out the first half of the bargain in the absence of the second half. And in the
light of 9-11 and nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons proliferation, this
is a criminal standard for our leaders to adhere to. The international
community will not protect us in all circumstances. We must maintain the right
to act as a nation.
In essence, the global community's
rules of engagement are a crock. We cannot count on the international community
to deal with genocidal and dangerous regimes. Did we not try this route with
one of the more egregious violators of the world's peace and prosperity when we
begged the UN to let us deal with Saddam's defiance of the UN?
We need a new international
organization of willing members who will fight with us. It doesn't even need to
be a formal organization that explicitly abandons the UN. The UN should not,
however, have a political role that limits our ability to defend our people in
the absence of international resolve to protect our people. The UN should be
restricted to UNESCO and WHO and the like.
We need rules of engagement
that let us shoot the SOBs when we recognize them—not
when they open fire. We're talking nukes here one day, people. The UN is not
nearly enough.
"Foreign Business Opportunities" (Posted
Amazing what awaited me in my
inbox when email went unchecked for five days.
Wow, a son of Charles Taylor
and the attorney for some multinational oil firm employees in
Do people get these emails
and actually start seeing fortunes dance before them? As I understand it, a
bunch of us in the west really are chumps who fall for this scam. If pirates
from these countries stole this money by boarding our cruise ships and pointing
guns and the foreign government didn't stop them, we'd send the Marines to bust
them up.
I expect that the next wave
will be from staff or relatives of Idi Amin who desperately need help in spiriting out the vast
sums of money from his estate in
So what is the appropriate
response to this stuff? Send in the spooks? JDAMs? A simple bombardment
with Navy 5-inch HE shells? Figure anyone who falls for it should lose the
money to preserve the Darwinian balance? Ask the UN to do something about it?
Dunno.
"Regrouping" (Posted
Taliban and allied elements
are launching attacks in
greater strength. After getting waxed in 2001, it was natural that the
Taliban and their allies were scattered and unable to attack in large numbers. In
time, it was always possible that the scattered remnants would coalesce into larger
units. And since we never really had the southerners on board during the
This is worrying.
We need effective Afghan
government and government-allied troops in the provinces. We need American and
western special forces linked to air power to bring
firepower to bear when the Taliban are engaged. The Taliban must pay a price
whenever they mass. In time, they won't mass. When they can't mass, they cannot
be more than nuisances. We need to shut down the
We do not need to blanket the
country with either American or UN-umbrella soldiers. We cannot make our
presence seem like an invasion or occupation. We don't need to man those border
posts, scattering our soldiers to make them vulnerable and inviting incidents
that will enflame the locals against the "invaders."
The key is to keep the
Taliban isolated and in small numbers. Do that and no police stations will
succumb to attack and the Taliban will be a police problem. The people will
cooperate with the government to find the Taliban. But let the Taliban continue
to mass and this becomes a war again. Locals begin to hedge their bets not
wanting to bank their future on the government winning.
We had a great success in
depriving al Qaeda of their
The war on terror is not
over. We must adapt and fight. They are.
"
"
Long ago, I posted that we
should be prepared to lift sanctions on states like
Now, Britain
will propose lifting sanctions on
Since
The target audience is the
wider Arab world, not just this petty dictatorship.
"
Iraqi insurgents are striking
more Iraqi civilian
targets. Perhaps the effectiveness of American troops
who patrol to invite ambushes confident we can win even these encounters, is
pushing the Saddamites to hit easier targets. Yet the
failure to press attacks against American troops to provoke American
over-reaction against innocents (and raise Iraqi anger at
"
I need to get back into the
krill flow of news. Jumping in after even just 5 days away from my usual steady
stream is unsettling. What am I missing from the last days? So I'll respond to
an email about my August 8 (and earlier) posts on a Korean War II ( ).
VS writes that:
One thing
seems to be left out of your analysis of August 8 and earlier. That is the question of what should we expect
the Chinese to do, or as important; not do, if we go to a shooting war with
Sure; we win
a conventional war with NK at the probable cost of great damage to
Indeed I did ignore the
possibility that
Second, I don't think the
Chinese would intervene. This isn't 1950 and the Chinese are long past
ideological purity, so intervention to support communist "brothers"
in
Perhaps most important from
All the
options I can see are bad. My one hope
is that the Chinese find a nuclear armed
I did mention this decade
sucks, I think, once or twice. Yes, all our options are bad—some just less so
than others. I too hope that
But keep in mind, I am not actually advocating invading
And they will try this
without the resources, friends, and useful idiots that
In short, war would suck—but
we would win. But we probably don't have to initiate war to win. I just think
that talk of "surgical" means of ending the crisis is folly. If we
must go the military route, go all out. To steal from Napoleon, if we're going
to take
And in the meantime, we will practice
interdicting dangerous cargoes in the
"Idi Amin Dead" (Posted August 17, 2003)
I heard, while I was on an island in the middle of a bay off of Georgian Bay, that Idi Amin died. This is how evil should die. Without power. A shrug and a 'was he still alive?' No quiet prayers that the SOB was finally dead and that maybe his minions would no longer do his bidding--killing and raping and sucking the life of a nation dry. No. He's just some guy from the 70s who's dead. Thank you Tanzanians for your regime change.
But in one way it is unsatisfying. I don't like the example of a mass murderergoing off to comfortable exile after losing. He should have suffered. He should have known the fear he inflicted. He should have stood trial. In the end, he should have been executed.
We should not be in the business of saving the hides of horrible dictators. When we deprive them of the power that makes their evil a mass production evil, we should finish them off. Leaving them alive sets a bad precedent.
"Human Shield Fined" (Posted
A human shield back from
She
and others from 30 countries spread out through
Whoa! I thought those types
said we were invading to get the oil? Why would shields need to park their
morally elevated butts on Iraqi oil refineries? And furthermore, why aren't any
of them dead? Was
And given the Saddamite attacks on the refineries after the war,
shouldn't the shields be clamoring to go back to their old posts in the Iraqi
refineries? Shoot, electricity and fuel shortages are undeniably harming the
Iraqi people. Saboteurs are doing real harm.
Oh, but their shieldomness was never based on concern for the Iraqi
people, now was it?
And besides, we know that
using civilians as shields is a violation of the laws of civilized warfare. If
she did volunteer, we'd say no.
What a loser.
"The Price of De-Baathification"
(Posted
From strategypage.com, comes
this:
August 12, 2003: The
occupation authorities, at the urgings of the majority of Iraqis, are firing
most Baath Party members from their jobs. The
coalition occupation authorities had resisted this, because many of the most
competent and experienced government and industry executives were Baath Party members. It was thought that most Iraqis would
understand that no senior government or industry executive could hold a job
without being a Baath Party member. But the majority
of Iraqis are so bitter about the depredations of the Baath
Party over the last three decades that they are adamant that Baath Party members be kept out of senior level jobs. But
this creates some problems in finding Iraqis with managerial experience or
technical training to run key operations.
I argued early on that de-Baathification had to run risks going deep rather than
being shallow to retain expertise. I still believe this is absolutely the right
thing to do. The fact that Iraqis are pressuring us to do it should show how
important this is to Iraqis. Difficulty bringing infrastructure back on line is
a price we must pay for this until lower level "clean" Iraqis can be
trained up. Until then, the press will continue harp on the lack of electricity
in
We just need to keep this
period of less-than-first-rate service as brief as possible. And reach out to
the Iraqis more, apparently, so they know why services haven't been magically
restored to pre-1990 levels.
"Learning" (Posted
Mistakes like
this have to stop. We can't regularly shoot up cars if they get near one of
our checkpoints. We took risks in the war to protect civilians and we need to
find different ways to keep potential car bombs away from our checkpoints. I
don't want our soldiers needlessly dying but if incidents like this keep up, we
will provoke a backlash and resistance. This will lead to more soldiers dying. We
must learn from our mistakes.
All the more reason to resist
the call for blanketing
In the short term, apologize
and pay off the families. In the medium term, make progress in getting Iraqi
life to a post-Saddam normal. In the long term, turn over more defensive security
and law enforcement duties duties to Iraqis who are
de-Baathified. And seek out and kill the die-hard
resistance.
And by all means, our
administration needs to press home the good we are doing (in
What
does all this mean? Western societies from ancient Athens to imperial Rome to
the French republic rarely collapsed because of a shortage of resources or
because foreign enemies proved too numerous or formidable in arms — even when
those enemies were grim Macedonians or Germans. Rather, in times of peace and
prosperity there arose an unreal view of the world beyond their borders, one
that was the product of insularity brought about by success, and an
intellectual arrogance that for some can be the unfortunate byproduct of an
enlightened society.
I
think we are indulging in this unreal hypercriticism — even apart from the
election-season antics of our politicians — because we are not being gassed, or
shot, or even left hot or hungry. September 11 no longer evokes an image of
incinerated firemen, innocents leaping out of skyscrapers, or the stench of
flesh and melted plastic, but rather: squabbles over architectural designs,
lawsuits, snarling over Mr. Ashcroft's new statutes, or concerns about being
too rude to the Arab street.
I do fear we have forgotten
what if means to fight. What it means to lose a war—truly lose, not just the
pull out from
We won the wars in
Learn. And win.
"Amphibious Option" (Posted August 8, 2003)
Globalsecurity.org has lots of stuff on a future Korean War II. On the amphibious aspect, Operational Plan 5027 envisions an amphibious attack on Wonson on the east coast of Korea roughly to the east of Pyongyang that could then drive west across the mountains to attack Pyongyang. This would be done either with troops attacking from the Seoul region linking up with the Wonson landing, or in tandem with the troops driving north from Seoul directly for Pyongyang.
Nothing is mentioned about anything on the west coast. Still don't know whether a landing west or northwest of Pyongyang is possible. Yet a Wonson landing that then must drive across the mountain spine of North Korea seems pretty problematic. In the first Korean War, troops from the western side of the peninsula , after Inchon, were sent by sea to the east coast rather than move overland.
The new Op Plan 5030 that calls for psychological pressure on the North with no-notice military maneuvers and other provocative moves may put some military people in a scared-witless mood worried that they will be next in line for the American military machine. Some may think that all our high tech gear will count for nothing when our infantrymen come face to face with North Korean infantry, but the Taliban and Iraqis both believed the same and yet when our infantry went up against theirs, ours prevailed in close combat. The silliness of those who claim our technology is unmanly is astounding. It's not like those "manly" militaries have turned their back on technology in favor of scimitars, crossbows, and the like. They want the most advanced stuff too! We're just a hell of a lot better. And even if we banned all technology, our training and organization would still give us the advantage. Our people are our advantage in winning wars. Our technoloy is our advantage in crushing our opponents rapidly.
North Korea has reason to worry now. Pursuit of nuclear weapons to preserve their regime is turning out to be a bad idea. Their nukes are buying our attention-not our surrender. They can only hope to cause casualties if it comes to war. One wonders if the North Korean leaders are starting to realize that they really don't want to provoke a war if regime survival is their goal. With luck, as this seeps in, they may do the unthinkable and agree to real disarmament that is verifiable when the 6-nation talks wrap up.
"Gore Speech" (Posted August 8, 2003)
Must read Gore's speech. I don't understand why he is criticizing the war to resolve the Iraq problem. Didn't he invent the problem during his tenure?
"
What to do about
Not yet. We still have two of
the original members of the axis of evil to deal with. We are still engaged in
Clearly, just as we have
before, we must still push them to help us and cut off the Islamist fanatics.
So I am not saying we do nothing. But a full blown regime-change confrontation
is not the right thing to do now. Just because we are doing things quietly
doesn’t mean we are doing nothing. Hoagland
put it well:
Containing the damage to this still
useful relationship -- while prodding
That said, if we really
aren't pressuring the Saudis quietly, I would be upset.
"Wow" (Posted
This is what the grandson of
the Ayatollah Khomeini, Sayyid Hussein Khomeini, said, according
to the NYT:
The grandson of the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the strident Iranian cleric who built
his Islamic revolution on a platform of attacking all things American, said
today that the overthrow of Saddam Hussein would allow long-awaited freedoms to
flourish throughout the region, and if they did not,
Granted, he has no sizable
following, but still…wow.
"
There were two really awful
commentaries on
David Kang
says we should guarantee North Korean security to soothe North Korean fears.
I'd actually like to spend a lot of time detailing why I think it is awful, but
let me settle for attacking the absurd notion we should guarantee their
security. It is often tough enough to guarantee our allies' security, why
should we help this nutball regime? If they think we
are out to get them after 50 years of tolerating them, what could we say that
will soothe them? And you can't blame their insecurity, as Kang would like, on
the Bush administration, since Kin Jong-Il's program
predates even the apology-prone Clinto
administration. Even if we did apologize, why wouldn't the North Koreans just
think we are lying and plotting anyway to destroy them? With all the silly talk
about how our invasion of
If we have to offer any
guarantees as part of a policy to isolate and squeeze North
Korea—yet also reassure them so they don't invade the ROK—surely there is some meaningless reference
in the UN charter to peaceful nations happily playing with one another that we
can harmlessly point to as applying (duh) to North Korea.
The other awful piece
was co-authored my Michael O'Hanlon and Mike Mochizuki. O'Hanlon is a guy who
is always in print or on TV but one whom I get the impression is almost always
uniformly wrong on anything defense-related more complex than successfully
distinguishing between a tank and an APC. The other guy I don't know. He put
his name with O'Hanlon, however. They of course blame the Bush administration
for enhancing
They couch their proposal in
tough terms, citing Rumsfeld for a general maxim and
saying that we will make "firm demands." Yeah, we demand you take our
money. Sure sounds like giving in to blackmail to
me.
And why do these guys think
the North Koreans are mostly interested in their economy? Do these two actually
think Kim Jong Il cares one
whit about feeding anybody but his army, nuclear and missile scientists, and
Joy Brigades? You know what North
God help us when our so-called
best and brightest are proposing that we give our enemies security guarantees
and fix their economy with massive infusions of money.
Next thing you know, everyone
will want to be on the Axis of Evil. God, it's "The Mouse That
Roared" strategy.
"
Well, if the American
commitment on the ground really is just a small
logistical detachment, our intervention in
We better get a good UN
resolution on
One thing I noticed on NPR
this morning: the glowing report on the success already in
Good luck Marines. Hope you
don't have to pick and choose among the psychopaths vying for power in
"Invade
On an amphibious invasion of
the north, Nampo is apparently a good harbor west of
I will say,
that if our Marine Corps (aided by 2-1/3 ROK marine divisions) can't launch an
amphibious assault on the Korean peninsula, then amphibious capabilities that
focus on anything but battalion-sized permissive environment missions or river
crossings are a waste.
"Victory Over
The Wall Street Journal article
raises an important point about dealing with
If our theoretical precision
air and missile strikes fail to smash the North Korean nuclear infrastructure,
what will the North do? Secure that they took our best shot, the North may
retaliate with nukes or with conventional artillery on
Plus, how do we know if we
succeed? How can we possibly know if the known targets are truly wrecked and
how do we know if we knew about all the targets? We may gain false security
thinking we succeeded while
At best, if we succeed and
know we succeeded, we kick the problem down the road by successfully destroying
And this assumes
If they do not accept the
defeat, they do what they could as described above after surviving a strike
with nuclear facilities largely intact. What do we do? In the end, we will need
to invade the North and overthrow the regime to end the war that spiraled out
of control after the first "surgical" strikes designed to split the
difference on policy options.
The authors of the article
believe decisive victory could be achieved in 30-60 days. They are probably
right. We would need carrier battle groups in range and Air Force units based
in
How would we use these
forces? The authors don't really say, of course.
The North Korean army is
forward deployed. It is large. It has lots of armor. On the other hand, the
equipment is obsolete. And after the starvation and economic ravages of the
last decade, there is a good chance the army is brittle. How good can it be at
large-scale fighting when they have little money for training? How will it
fight when it is hit hard and continuously and is forced to fight on the
defensive?
The North Korean air force is
a joke.
Their navy is a bit better
and they could get luck with one of their ancient subs. We'd need South Korean
and Japanese naval help to blockade the North's ports.
The invasion is the big
question. How do we do it? Up the west coast pushing north
from
But should we commit the full
US ground component to this thrust?
It seems that we should take
advantage of four factors. One, the North Korean are forward deployed. Two, we
control the sea. Three, this war would be for keeps. Four, we control the air.
With a Marine Expedionary
Force of over two divisions-size plus a couple ROK marine divisions, we could
have quite the
End the war with one pudgy
dictator hung from a
I freely concede I don't know
if we can land on the west coast. I’ll have to read up on that. But no military
option short of regime change makes sense. Any lesser military option will
either fail to achieve our goal or escalate to a fight to the death anyway. We
need some frank discussions with our South Korean allies and
The authors conclude:
We
are not eager to see force used on the Korean peninsula. It is better to
resolve this crisis without war. However, unless
The North Korean threat is
very real. I've long argued that stopping the rogue state with no nuclear
weapons from getting its first trumps stopping the rogue state with two nukes
from acquiring its third. At some point, this logic fails, however, and I don't
know if having 6 or 12 or 20 is the tipping point that reverses the logic. If
A lot depends on the six-nation
talks the North Koreans have agreed to participate in. The logic of this
confrontation argues for complete, march-on-the-capital, decisive victory
should the military option threshold be breached. We either talk them into an
agreement that actually is verifiable (and I honestly don't know if that is
possible) or we contain and undermine their regime and push them to collapse
before their nuclear arsenal reaches the tipping point. Or we prepare to invade
before the tipping point is reached. Once the tipping point is reached, we are
probably in the position of only being able to contain the regime and hope it
collapses. This may even be the correct strategy to begin with.
I have no idea what strategy
is best. But I am moving from thinking that containment and pressure is the only
prudent course of action to arguing that any military contingency plans should
aim for regime change. I don't think military half measures will work. (Hey,
will all the North Korea-first people support war or will they now demand
better proof and more debate if we finally go after
Oh, I suppose we could get
lucky and somebody in
Our options are all poor. Did
I mention this decade sucks?
"Endless War? (Posted August 3, 2003)
The morning news shows led the talking heads to opine-as I did quite some time ago, thank you-that the administration plans no military offensives prior to the '04 elections. Domestic considerations, especially the economy, are priority. And the military must rest. Iraq is going to be enough on the plate for now. I only mention this because opponents of the administration think there is a master list of target for the military. On the other hand, the lull does not mean this President will rest on his laurels and fail to prosecute this war to victory. A lesser man would declare victory knowing that they could probably skate to their retirement with nothing major happening and let his successor handle the problem.
In two years, Iraq should be a place where US troops are garrisoned and not a place where US forces are fighting. This means they join the forces ready to fight elsewhere instead of being forces that are subtracted from the forces ready to fight-akin to forces in Germany except that they are really close to the arc of crisis-central region. In two years we may have the rest of our ground forces better balanced for war. The Navy will be refitted for a new policy of surging carriers for crises instead of constant 2-3 carrier deployment schedules. The Air Force should also be rested and ready to go with replenished and improved precision weapons.
This does not mean we are doing nothing. As I've long said, this war is not primarily a conventional war, although smashing states that could make terrorism a nuclear nightmare is a conventional military problem in extremis. We must work to contain North Korea, slow their nuclear developments, push them toward collapse, and prepare for a defensive war on the Korean peninsula combined with aerial assaults that target nuclear, missile, and leadership targets should Kim Jong-Il get seriously stupid and launch an invasion of the ROK.
We also need to support Iranian dissidents to crumble the Iranian mullahs. This front has been quiet and I don't know if it is just the media's usual refusal to address Iran seriously or if the regime has cowed the dissidents for now.
And by all means avoid silly interventions like Liberia. We must husband our military for the real battles that may erupt. Just because we don't plan offensives doesn't mean we don't have to be ready to fight one that erupts on our enemies' timetables.
The war goes on.
"Afghanistan Situation" (Posted August 3, 2003)
A story on Afghanistan that-if read thoroughly-seems to offer a balanced assessment.
Overall, he story admits that Afghanistan is better than it has been in recent years. But it highlights the problems in the Kandahar region. Remember, this area did not support us wholeheartedly in the war against the Taliban. Indeed, the region was the regime's home base. It is not too surprising that resistance is still here. It is worrisome that the situation could develop where locals fear the Taliban more than they hope for a better Afghanistan. It is worrisome that this in turn could lead the area to be a leading indicator for the whole country.
The issue is what do we do about it? Too many seem to want to send large numbers of peacekeepers to pacify the country. I think this would be an error. A grave error. We would make our presence look like an occupation and simply create targets for the Taliban to strike. We would then create more opportunities for peacekeepers to over-react and provoke hostility.
The key is to use special forces and locals to go after the bands while American conventional infantry and air power provide a reserve hammer that discourages the Taliban from massing troops. We have to keep resistance at a low level to rebuild Afghanistan and buy time for the central government to grow stronger and for local governments to accept central authority.
One huge obstacle is the failure of Pakistan to control their border regions. This area has long been a no-drive zone for the Pakistani central government and their recent stationing of troops there is a good sign that the Pakistanis want to do something; but it does not seem nearly enough yet. How we can pressure the Pakistani government to increase their actions without provoking a loss of what we have now-and without provoking an Islamist coup gaining control of Pakistan's nukes-is a problem for which I can offer no solution. Muddling through and trying to get the situation on the ground better a yard at a time seems the only solution. No magic bullet.
What I will offer is that we do not have to set our sights as high as we do in Iraq for rebuilding Afghanistan. Iraq starts at a much higher level of education and modernity so let's not over-reach in Afghanistan. I'll settle for a state that does not harbor terrorists, that has a functioning non-oppressive government, and that has sufficient economic development to ensure people have hope for the future and disdain for the Taliban solution to their problems. Once these objectives are accomplished, Afghanistan becomes peripheral in the war on Islamist terror. We must not get tied down fighting in the non-decisive arena.