index3

Following are edited excerpts from the Harrier Review Panel (HaRP). It is interesting to note the Executive Summary indicates that yearly updates are necessary or business as usual will continue to produce an unacceptable mishap rate. The Pledge by the USMC in 1988 to update yearly the progress on the more than 50 safety recommendations has not been honored, even though there were meetings in 1999 and 2000.
According to The Marine Corps Times (7-24-00), 1999 was one of the worst years in recent Harrier history. The apparent reduction in 2000 was because the Harrier was grounded for an extensive amount of time.
The USMC needs to prove it's rhetoric proclaiming the AV-8B Harrier to be a safe airplane in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Statements about safety from the USMC Command to their subordinates and the public should be true and forthright. Claiming that it is unpatriotic to question any institution that places anyone in danger unnecessarily is irresponsible. The public should evaluate recent statements about safety from the USMC Command and join the efforts to stop the needless deaths from occurring.

The web-site for the complete report may be found at: www.hqmc.usmc.mil/harp.nsf

First annual report of the Harrier Review Panel (HaRP)
30 September 1998

Executive Summary: (edited)

In November 1997, following the loss of two AV-8B Harrier II airplanes within the previous three weeks, the Commandant of the Marine Corps established the Harrier Review Panel to evaluate the AV-8B Program and Community and to make recommendations which will reduce the mishap rate. The Harrier Review Panel is co-chaired by the Deputy Chief of Staff (Aviation), Lt.Gen. T. Dake and the Deputy Administrator of NASA and former Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen J. Dailey (ret.). It consists of leaders from several government agencies, and draws upon the expertise of a number of outside sources. Groups received briefings, interviewed numerous operations and support personnel, and analyzed mishap data in an effort to expose any new adverse trends, and to develop recommendations for use by the Marine Corps in its efforts to reduce the rate of Harrier mishaps.

Since its introduction the AV-8B has outpaced all aircraft types with 68 (Now 77) Class A mishaps for a cumulative rate of 12.1 per 100,000 flight hours. In its review of mishap statistics the Panel found that pilot error, maintenance error and materiel failure have been the largest contributors to Class A cause factors. However, recently supervisory and maintenance errors have increased, reflective of decreasing average experience levels throughout the pilot and maintenance populations.

With these things in mind, the Panel made over fifty recommendations addressing major "needs" of the Harrier program and community:

If the responsible agencies satisfy these recommendations, a "best practices review" indicates that the Marine Corps can reasonably expect to achieve as much as a 50% reduction in the Harrier II mishap rate. Business as usual, however, will continue to produce a mishap rate of 10 (+) for the long term. The Harrier Review Panel will reconvene in 1999 to review progress on these issues and to audit actions resulting from its 1998 recommendations.

Findings: (Edited, but note in the original report some comments were highlighted. This emphasis is retained by italics)

The AV-8B Harrier II mishap rate is too high. With a cumulative Class A mishap rate of 12.1 per 100,000 flight hours, the AV-8B has consistently outpaced all USMC aircraft types in this statistic. It has been the single predominant contributor to the overall Marine aviation mishap story.

Since 1991 the rate has approximately 10 (+/-2) Class A mishaps per 100,000 flight hours. This rate is approximately 400% of the USMC F/A-18 rate for the same period. The causal factor data point to a gradual trend away from pilot error and toward maintenance and supervisory error in recent years. The obvious challenges are old news: funding shortfalls, upgrade delays, manpower retention problems, and operational tempo.

Because of consistently low DoN funding priorities, as well as consistently low regard for the platform by the Joint and Unified Commanders, the Harrier lags other aircraft in warfighting capabilities. Even after many years of shipboard deployments with Marine Amphibious Units and Marine Expeditionary Units, there remains a lack of uniform understanding of the aircraft's capabilities/limitations within the Navy and Marine Corps leadership. The predictable results are support deficiencies, morale erosion and, in recent years, one of the weaker manpower retention records in Marine Corps Aviation. This "vicious cycle" presents an unhealthy backdrop for a system that is already burdened with a high incidence of human factor mishaps.

With the Harrier the cause of mishaps is likely to be maintenance related, whereas for the Hornet it is most commonly a materiel failure. The discriminating issue is that regardless of cause, when the engine fails, the Harrier pilot must always eject, while 90(+) % of the time, the Hornet pilot returns home for an uneventful single engine landing.

The bottom line is that the probability that a maintenance mistake, pilot error, or materiel failure will result in catastrophe is much higher in an AV-8B squadron than in an F/A-18 squadron

Harrier mishap data continue to illustrate an experience interaction - pilots with 400 hours or less in type account for approximately 70% of the Class A pilot error accidents. Pilots with less than 200 hours in type cause 40% of the Class A pilot error mishaps. This represents a pilot error rate that is twice what would be expected by their representation in the pilot population and by their contribution to community flying hours.