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Poor operational availability was, by far, the most consistent theme heard during the Panel's interaction with the FMF (Fleet Marine Forces) pilots. The underlying causes of poor operational availability are very broad - insufficient resources (publications, parts, support equipment), recurring materiel problems, poor reliability & maintainability, and inadequate manning & experience levels. Lack of aircraft to schedule and fly was seen as the major degrader. Poor availability is a driver that produces a general malaise in the program -- an inadequate FRS syllabus, insufficient flying time/consistency, decreased training opportunities, poor retention, and increased risk. The product of poor operational availability is low average sortie/hour rates for Harrier pilots. Over the past few years, Harrier pilots have flown 63-66% of the average hours flown by their USMC TACAIR counterparts in the Hornet community.

The struggle to cope with poor availability has generated a high level of hangar deck frustration. One contractor noted the typical "can do" attitude of Marines had been replaced by one of "I'm doing all I can."

Harrier maintenance errors are occurring at all levels of maintenance; O-/I-/and D-level. The resulting mishap rates exceed USMC F/A-18 maintenance error rates by more than an order of magnitude.

The most obvious difference in maintenance approach between the USMC and the RAF is their concept of a strong maintenance experience base. They keep people in their specialty environment for a long time, developing a considerably more experienced group of maintainers at all levels than is seen in USMC aviation. Within the Marine Corps, enlisted personnel policies demand that greater emphasis be applied to non-AV-8B related activities, even for highly trained, critical specialists. The RAF also sends their engines to the Rolls Royce factory for rework, whereas the Marine Corps uses the Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP) at Cherry Point. Harrier squadrons expend extraordinary amounts of effort just managing the engine change process, which takes 550 man-hours per event.

The probability of creating even more maintenance problems during this complicated and unwieldy procedure is high. When compared to the F/A-18, which was designed from day one with the maintainer in mind, AV-8B squadrons have routinely spent more direct maintenance man-hours per flight hour with fewer technicians/mechanics per airframe.

The F/A-18 program clearly demonstrates the impact that the incorporation of R&M (Reliability and Maintenance) during the design phase can have on the maintenance process and the potential for errors. The RAF Harrier program demonstrates the impact that a highly experienced work force can have in these same areas. The USMC Harrier program lacks both of these successful attributes.

The Engine Working Group survey was conducted with I-Level engine maintainers in MAG-13 and MAG-14. The 45 survey participants, ranging from E-2 to E-6 had an average age of 22.2 years. A partial recount of the survey result follows:

� Formal school was not adequate - 43% concur
� Not using all the required maintenance manuals and Maintenance
Requirements Cards (MRCs) - 28% concur
� Maintenance manuals inadequate in terms of ease of use -34% concur
� Not enough support equipment to do the job - 71% concur
� Taking shortcuts in their work - 41% concur
� Reusing parts meant to be thrown away - 46% concur
� Inadequate in-shop Pre-Expended Bin (PEB) - 68% concur
� Inadequate supply allowances - 74% concur
� Been forced to do something wrong or dangerous - 35% concur
� Seen someone else do something wrong or dangerous - 60% concur

The types and quality of training tools (pubs, lessons, simulations, syllabi, trained instructors) available to the maintainer are not on par with the pilot training system. Lack of a formal career training progression and lack of high quality training tools generates difficulty in building, maintaining, and retaining the required skill levels in operational squadrons.

There are questions about the Warfighting Relevance of the Harrier. Despite a substantial level of effort on the part of the Marine Corps, the aircraft still lacks an appropriate synergy of attributes that would make it truly relevant in today's operational environment, which now focuses primarily on support of the Marine Expeditionary Unit.

Although the amphibious basing capability and radar of the Harrier II+ provide the opportunity to provide force protection for our amphibious shipping and assault support evolutions, the aircraft lacks a beyond-visual range air-to-air weapon system that can provide the full range of protection that is required. While the aircraft is uniquely available to meet ground attack needs, unfortunately the AV-8B is susceptible to IR (infrared) missile threats and its vulnerability is less than desirable in exactly those types of employment scenarios.

The Panel found a concern among FMF Harrier operators regarding the relevance of the airplane (real and/or perceived) to its primary operational mission, the fixed wing component of the MEU (SOC) Air Combat Element (ACE). This concern was expressed in several ways:
� Poor understanding by some ship and MEU (SOC) commanders of the Harrier's capabilities and limitations.
� Poor utilization of the airplane, even when it could be of help to the MEU(SOC) mission
� Low flight time for deployed pilots (sometimes as low as 8 hrs per month)
� Low (if any) integration of Harrier pilots into Aviation Combat Element department head jobs. There has never been a Harrier pilot ACE or MEU Commanding Officer in 25 years of amphibious ship operations with the airplane.
Bird Strikes have caused the loss of five USMC AV-8B's. The nature of the losses indicates that an effective material solution would have to address the survivability of the canopy, engine and airframe. Such solutions are costly, have generated other problems in communities that have attempted them, and are still relatively limited in terms of the size of bird & speed of impact against which they can protect.
An alarming number of the System Safety Program's hazard analyses for the Harrier II have a very high "Hazard Risk Index" (HRI)-- an indicator of the likelihood that a failure will lead to a mishap and the potential for damage as a result of that mishap. Many of the risks have been waiting years for Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) incorporation. Viewed singularly, any of these risks would appear to be workable. Viewed in the aggregate (and in the context of the Harrier's material mishap rate) they are cause for concern. Additional concern is generated by the program's "fly-to-fail" philosophy on some critical aircraft components (e.g., electrical generator, flap actuator, nose wheel steering control valve, etc.). At its most basic level, it appears to the Panel that the hazard matrix and the mishap rate statistics all point toward the need for more priority than is evident in the program and the community.

It is sobering to see how many AV-8B ECPs that are still "in-process" have come from Class A mishaps. Equally disturbing is the number of times that an identified material deficiency has caused additional mishaps before it was eventually corrected.