In the Seven Days Battles (June 25-July 2, 1862), Lee hurled his 85,000 men against McClellan's 100,000. Successive clashes at Oak Grove, Beaver Dam Creek, Gaines's Mill, Savage's Station, and Glendale brought the armies to the terrible battle of Malvern Hill on July 1. Here Lee was checked, but McClellan, ordered by Washington authorities not to take the offensive with his weakened troops, retreated to the Union base at Harrison's Landing, and the campaign ended in failure.
Seven Days Before Richmond June 25 to July 01, 1862
Lee had an uncanny ability to "get into his opponent's head", and in the case of McClellan he saw that he would use his engineering expertise and superior fire-power to move slowly forward from one entrenched position to the next until he finally took Richmond. However, before Lee could cope with this, he needed time to improve his own defenses. Fortunately for the Confederacy, the next ten days were continuous rain and McClellan's heavy artillery train was immobilized. The Confederates neutralized any attempt to bring them up by rail by their own 32-pounder artillery piece mounted on a railroad car -- the first railroad gun in history. Shovels soon replaced muskets in the troops' hands and the earth was seen flying in the construction of new fortifications.
Lee pulled reinforcements from every quarter until he could muster an effective force of about 85,000 men. The new plan was to leave some 30,000 south of the Chickahominy in the newly-constructed entrenchments to hold McClellan's 75,000 on that side of the river and use the remaining 55,000 Southern troops to crush the 30,000 Federals on the north bank. If Lee were successful in defeating and destroying a large portion of this force, he would then capture McClellan's supply base and force him out into the open. During June 12-15, J.E.B. Stuart's Southern cavalry rode completely around the Federal army, spreading confusion and confirming the Federal dispositions. Jackson was returning from his Shenandoah Valley campaign and was due to arrive on June 25. To allow for possible delays, Lee planned the Confederate attack for June 26.
McClellan, for his part, was now convinced that he faced a massive army of some 200,000 Confederate troops and was badly outnumbered. If he really believed this was the situation, his subsequent actions during the confusing series of battles known as the Seven Days, become somewhat more understandable. To McClellan it seemed only logical that if Lee was attacking with 55,000 on the north bank of the Chickahominy, it must be a diversionary attack and the real blow would come in the south. The only prudent thing therefore, would be to fall back on the James River and Harrison's Landing.
The Confederates, after some minor fighting on June 25, moved north out of Richmond on June 26. Mechanicsville was taken easily, but an attempt to move east across Beaver Dam Creek was stopped by Federal forces in strong defensive positions. Jackson was supposed to have arrived and turned the flank of the position, but he did not show up that day.
The morning of June 27, the Beaver Dam Creek position was carried but only because the Federals had fallen back to another prepared position on Turkey Hill behind the Boatswain's Swamp Creek. Fitz-John Porter's command of 35,000 Federal troops was protected by a triple line of entrenchments with artillery support and marshy ground to their front. When Jackson's troops finally arrived that evening, the position was carried but with heavy Confederate casualties.
On Saturday, June 28, Lee spent much of the day trying to ascertain exactly where McClellan was retreating to. When Lee realized that McClellan was obviously falling back on the James River, he had to revise his earlier plans and decided to try and catch the Federals on either side of White Oak Swamp. The following day, Magruder was ordered to link up with Jackson and attack the retreating Federals. The Confederates were badly handled in a clash at Savage Station, primarily because Jackson again failed to show up on time. However, McClellan was forced to abandon much of his supplies, and an ammunition train sent forward to the Chickahominy railway bridge exploded with impressive results.
Monday, the sixth of the Seven Days, saw a remarkable lack of cooperation among the elements of the Confederate pursuit. Huger decided to cut an alternate road through the thick forest when he found his designated road blocked by felled trees. Holmes command ran into a naval bombardment. Jackson, who had difficulty in crossing the White Oak Swamp Creek, decided to lie down and take a nap at about 3:00 p.m.! As a result, only Longstreet's and A.P. Hill's troops were really involved in any fighting that resulted in another loss of some 3,300 Confederates at Glendale.
On July 1, the last of the Seven Days, Lee discovered that McClellan was protecting the last leg of his retreat by taking position on Malvern Hill. This defensive position was held by Porter and Keyes with two divisions each, more than one hundred artillery pieces, and a further four divisions in reserve. It looked formidable and it was. Lee first attempted to bring his artillery to bear on the position, but it soon became apparent that he was out-gunned. Lee looked for, and failed to find, a satisfactory alternative approach, but confusion in orders resulted in Huger, Magruder, and Hill launching a series of uncoordinated Confederate assaults. These resulted in nothing but another 5,500 Southern casualties. Jackson again failed to arrive in time to assist in the battle.
The series of hammer blows Lee had delivered during the Seven Days had achieved its objective of relieving Richmond from McClellan's forces. However, this had been accomplished at a very high cost. The Confederates lost 20,614 casualties compared to Federal losses of 15,849.
Source:
Last Updated 24 April 2002
It was the best of times, it was the worst of times
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