Expanded Notes Pages 23&24


OTUs:
Dunmore&Carter , p55
Casualties at many advanced training units were as bad as, or sometimes even worse than, those on operational squadrons - the inevitable result of inexperienced crews operating elderly, overworked aircraft, most of which should have been scrapped. Bomb aimer George Sweanor recalls one course losing ten out of fourteen crews.

More on Casualties
Stats  Dunmore&Carter , p55
Bomber Command's practice was to define operational casualties only as those incurred beyond Britain's shores. Thus , the many aircraft that crashed on take-off or landing were never included in operational totals despite the undeniable fact that they were engaged in ops. By such means, the chilling tally of bomber losses was made as palatable as possible for the public.

Barris , p95   During the second world war in the United kingdom, more than 25,000 aircrew were lost in non-operational
flying accidents. Throughout their entire involvement in the war, the American Air forces lost more aircraft in training and routine flights than they did in combat.


"Crewing Up":
Dunmore&Carter , p50    After AFU came OTU, Operational Training Unit, where in subtle but important ways, every airman ceased to be an individual and began to think of himself as part of a crew. The creation of a crew was a significant moment in any crewmans career. Recognizing this, the authorities showed rare good sense and left the crewing-up process largely in the hands of the airmen themselves. in most cases, it was as simple as ushering groups of pilots, navigators, bomb-aimers, wireless operators, and air gunners into a large room, and telling them to "get on with it."

There followed a curious ritual: young men standing in awkward clusters, trying not to glance too closely at one another, yet trying to do precisely that. Some of the bolder types simply selected crew members by the look of them, relying totally on first impressions. It was as good a method as any. Steve Puskas of Hamilton, Ontario, a pilot who later served with 429 Squadron, recalls the rite vividly. At his OTU, five pilots were introduced to five navigators. All the navigators were officers. But only two pilots, not including Puskas, were commissioned. Feeling somewhat self conscious, Puskas asked the nearest navigator if he wanted to "crew-up." The  man shook his head; no, he was thinking of flying with -him-, he said, indicating another pilot. Puskas waited until all the other airmen had crewed up; he discovered that Jasper Still, the navigator with whom he had conversed, remained unattached. "His" pilot had teamed up with another navigator. So Still and Puskas joined forces after all. (The pilot Still had originally favoured was lost early in his tour of operations.)

More on Crews:
Crew Loyalty Dunmore&Carter , p51 "A crewman's first loyalty belonged to those with whom he flew. The crew met the need of a man to identify with something bigger and more important than himself. The crew was the band of comrades with whom he would enter the dangerous world of operational flying.

Dunmore&Carter , p58 "With few exceptions, bomber crews were extraordinarily tightknit groups, their members lives enmeshed on the ground just as much as they were in the air. Seven strangers became united in a common endeavor ... Every man sensed that he was a vital component in a complex organism. He experienced an intensely satisfying sense of belonging, taking genuine pleasure in performing a demanding job with efficiency and despatch.

Dunmore&Carter , p262 "the young men of Group 6 had to deal with death on a regular basis. For that reason, the majority seldom made close friends outside their own crews....

All this takes on huge significance in view of the events of   February 14/15, 1945 .


GEE:
 Dunmore&Carter p25: Late in 1942, Bomber Command began to use an electronic  navigational aid known as "GEE."... The device relied on radio impulses transmitted from England by three stations situated one hundred miles apart on a "base line"...
Station A, the "Master," controlled the pulses from B and C, the "Slaves." Aboard the bomber, the navigator watched the cathode ray tube of his GEE box noting how long pulses from B and C took to arrive. Then he pinpointed the intersection of the lines on a special grid superimposed on a map. In about a minute he had determined his precise position.
    Originally conceived as a blind bombing device, GEE proved insufficiently accurate for that purpose. But it became an indispensable navigational aid, providing crews with excellent fixes up to three or four hundred miles from England. Beyond that range, its readings became progressively less accurate. Thus, the device could not normally be used with much confidence beyond the Ruhr.   More on GEE .