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Karl Popper’s Solution to the Problem
of Induction and Hume’s Problem.
The Minimalist Conception of
Rationality
by Dmytro
Sepetyi
Onĺ of the most important achievements,
if not the most important
achievement, on which Karl Popper prided himself was his solution to the
problem of induction or Hume’s problem. These two names, ‘the problem of
induction’ and ‘Hume’s problem’, are used as synonymous by Popper and other
participants of the discussion. I suspect that this may be misleading for
understanding of Popper’s solution or, rather, solutions. Really, Hume’s
problem seems to be the problem of the justification of induction, but there is more to it: it is the problem of the justification of induction, as well as
the problem of the justification of any
possible alternative with which induction may be replaced. Popper’s
solution to the problem of induction is hypothetico-deductivism and
falsificationism. Popper’s solution to the problem of justification – now of hypothetico-deductivism and falsificationism
instead of induction – is his critical, non-justificationist, minimalist
conception of rationality – critical rationalism.
The more specific problem of
induction can be formulated as follows: given that we obtain our general
theories by inductive generalization from experience, what must be the
inductive procedure, inductive method, inductive logics to demonstrate the truth
or, at least, high probability of our theories? Popper’s solution to this
problem is:
1) there
is no inductive logics, no correct inductive procedure, no way to demonstrate
the truth or, at least, high probability of our theories;
2) the “given”
– the theory that we obtain our general theories by inductive generalization
from experience – is mistaken. In fact, we obtain our theories as conjectures made
in attempts to solve our problems; after this, we should expose these
hypotheses (tentative solutions to our problems) to critical discussion and
empirical testing, which are attempts to refute,
falsify the theory at issue by demonstrating that its predictions contradict with the
results of properly made reproducible (usually, experimental) observations;
hypotheses that stand these ordeals are to be tentatively accepted as true. (The
normative component, expressed by ‘should’ and ‘are to be’, defines favorable
conditions for the development of our knowledge, the major factor of the progress
in science.)
Though some of Popper’s
critics say that his hypothetico-deductive falsificationist theory is in fact a
variety of induction, there is very little in common, as we can see from the
schemes below, which represent the structure of cognitive process according
with the theory of induction and according with Popper’s theory.
Inductivist theory:
Popper’s
theory:
Now we turn to the more
general problem – Hume’s problem of the justification
of induction, or of whatever we put in the place of induction. Hume contended that it is impossible to properly rationally
justify induction; hence our reliance on it is irrational. Here, ‘proper
rational justification’ can be defined as a logically valid argument without
unjustified premises. We obtain a proper rational justification if and only if the
argument is logically valid and all its premises are justified. If (some of) the premises
aren’t justified, then the conclusion drawn from them is just as unjustified. But
such a proper rational justification is obviously impossible! It either involves
us into infinite regress or closes us into a vicious logical circle. And this
argument hits not only induction but any contender for its place in our general
account of how we obtain and develop our theoretical knowledge!
Popper’s solution to this
problem is ‘biting the bullet’. Yes, it is impossible to justify, in the way
demanded, anything whatever (including, surely, hypothetico-deductivism and
falsificationism). But, in the one very important meaning of the word
‘rationality’, this doesn’t mean that it is impossible to be rational (it is
inevitable to be irrational) with respect to all, or most, or some our ideas. This
meaning – which I will call critical or minimalist or non-justificationist
conception of rationality – is that we admit that we may be mistaken in our
views, and we keep our views open to critical discussion and are willing to renounce
or revise them if some arguments to this end happen to be convincing for us. As far
as the content of the notion of rationality is concerned, this is all that can
be defended and retained after Hume’s attack. And this is all that needs to be defended
and retained.
Popper’s philosophy as a whole
can be considered as thorough thinking through the consequences of this
conception of rationality. His critical rationalism is the faith in critical
discussion as the way to improve our knowledge, as well as to achieve political
solutions (whether as a matter of agreement or of compromise), in the force of
argument as opposed to violence (which inevitably follows the disdain of
arguments).
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