"The Unknown Battle of the Great Patriotic War."

Written by V. Zamulin Tankomaster #5, 1999.

Translated and adapted by [email protected]

Part 12.

      The quantity of weapons and the number of troops - are important but not the only factors which influence the outcome of a battle. A victory is achieved when the goals match the real possibility of their accomplishment, careful consideration, thoughtful maneuvers and skillful command of the forces in battle. All these are the tasks of the front's command, army headquarters, and because of this, a very important role is played by the personal qualities of these people, their preparedness, experience and professionalism.
         General Vatutin and the command of the Voronezh Front have been criticized by many researchers for the mistakes and shortcomings during the defensive operation and especially the Prokhorovka battle. None of these criticisms are unfounded. It should be admitted, that the timing itself of the July 12th counterattack was imperfect. Conclusions, that the Germans strengthened their forces near Prokhorovka at the expense of the flanks, turned out to be mistaken. Two fresh guards armies were brought into the battle without sufficient information about the enemy, proper reconnaissance and serious preparations. Nor could these be accomplished in such a short period of time. "The Army was brought into action, while we did not know the situation well, which turned out to be very complicated and tense, - A.S. Zhadov remembered, - There was no continuous information about the enemy actions and our own forces as well... Such information was vital though, as the enemy still kept advancing." Zhadov is concurred by Rotmistrov: "Without having full knowledge about the opposing enemy forces and their intentions, the forces of the Voronezh front began the counterattack on the morning of July 12th."
         While formulating army objectives, the front's command underestimated the character of action and possible developments in the next 2-3 full days. This resulted in the offensive being launched right into the face of the enemy group, and not against its flanks, how it was intended. There was not enough coordination and cooperation among our units, which led to some combat among them, air bombardment of our positions, and so high unjustified losses.
         Technical service of the advancing armies was very poorly organized. Artillery forces were "starved," e.g. 5th GA's stockpiles were enough only for one half of a package for each gun, instead of proper 2,5-3 times during a major advance.
        Yet, as we all know, war is a collective activity and army commanders share responsibility with the front command. "... On July 16th the deputy supreme commander Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov arrived at our command post. He was interested how the army's attack was organized on July 12th," - remembered A.S. Zhadov - "... When left alone with me, he harshly presented his displeasure with the way army entered into battle. He made a personal warning to me that a complete, well prepared army was thrown into combat without sufficient support of tanks, artillery and very small supply stockpiles. As a conclusion he said: ‘If, by any reason, the Front headquarters did not supply you with everything necessary, you should have addressed the Front commander personally or, in the worst case, ask STAVKA. The army command, corps and divisional commanders are especially responsible for their forces and the accomplishment of their objectives.' By the way, I didn't even think about addressing STAVKA about any advice and help."
      The 5th GTA found itself in a very difficult situation. Its tank corps entered combat not after the initial penetration of the tactical defensive lines, as they were ought to, but immediately after a short artillery barrage. No secret, that T-34's had a hard time battling the main German tank Panzer IV, not talking about "tigers." One third of the entire army near Prokhorovka was composed of light T-70 tanks, meant mainly for reconnaissance and communication. Near Prokhovorka, though, these light machines marched along T-34's against the panzers. Self-propelled artillery support was insufficient. Two regiments, 1496th SPAR and 1447th SPAR, were not sufficient for the whole army. Added to this, was the fact that their SU-76M and SU-122, created in December 1942, were far from perfect for these tasks.
        It is not hard to imagine, that such an operation could not destroy the enemy, at best it could disrupt their advance and lead to considerable losses. According to the 5th GTA's headquarters reports, for the period of 12th to 16th July the enemy destroyed 323 tanks and 11 SPG's. Our losses at the "tank field," just by our data, surpassed those of Germans 3 times. The precise number of the personnel loss cannot be established. After half a century, search teams still find tens and hundreds of nameless defenders of the Motherland.
      "I.V. Stalin, after finding out about our losses, went into a rage, - remembered P.A. Rotmistrov in an interview with a history professor F.D. Sverdlov, - the tank army, by Stalin's plan, was meant for the counteroffensive and aimed at Kharkov. But then - it had to rebuilt again. The supreme commander wanted to relieve me and even send to the tribunal. A.M. Vasilevsky told me about this. It was also him who carefully explained Stalin the whole situation and made conclusions about the failure of the entire German summer offensive. Stalin then slightly calmed down and did not raise this topic again. By the way, the Front commander N.F. Vatutin even recommended me for the order of Suvorov, 1st class. But I didn't receive the order this time."
       I should also mention that Stalin created a commission to investigate high losses suffered at Prokhovorka. Participants in the investigation were G.M. Malenkov and even the member of the Voronezh Front's military council, N.S. Khrushchev. The commission produced a report, given to Stalin in August 1943. The conclusions were disconcerting. All the action on July 12th near Prokhorovka were labeled as an example of a very poorly conducted operation.
       The story of the Prokhorovka battle is not yet written to the end. Today, attempting to study and understand this major battle of the past war, we must not only give proper respect to the courage and stamina of the Soviet soldier, but we should also fairly and honestly judge not just the successes and talents of the commanders, but also the mistakes of those who planned and executed this operation. Otherwise, rumors and half-truths will always persist in our recent history.