"The Unknown Battle of the Great Patriotic War."

Written by V. Zamulin Tankomaster #5, 1999.

Translated and adapted by [email protected]

Part 10.

      Heavy fighting raged in the sectors of the 95th GRD and the 11th MRB, some of their units were encircled but continued to resist. The resistance of our infantry and artillery was complicated by lack of armored support and the hastily engineered defenses lacking a proper network of trenches. Minefields were almost entirely nonexistent. All these shortcomings allowed the enemy not only to destroy our warriors by machine gun and artillery fire, but to simply bury them by tracks in their own foxholes. This led to a high number of missing in action. During just the 11th and 12th July the 95th GRD recorded about 450 MIA.
         An incredible heroic feat was accomplished by Senior Lieutenant P.I. Shpetny's anti-tank rifle platoon of the 284th RR of the 95th GRD on the southern face of the hill 236.7. There were 9 men including the commander in the platoon. They engaged a total of 7 tanks that day. Not one of the enemy vehicles passed through the platoon's positions, but all the anti-tank soldiers died as well. Already being badly wounded, Shpetny threw himself under the last tank with a grenade. For this feat he was awarded the title of the Hero of the Soviet Union posthumously.
         The Germans pierced the defenses of the 95th GRD and reached the hill 236.7 in the evening. Contact was lost with some of our units. Our forces suffered heavy casualties during the retreat over the open territory. During the two days of fighting the 95th GRD lost about 1000 men KIA, MIA or WIA.
         General A.S. Zhadov, having witnessed the division's battle from his commanding post, took over the command over these forces. He brought in two anti-tank destroyer regiments and a regiment of "Katyusha's." The enemy was stopped by concentrated artillery strikes.
        Darkness descended. The Germans left behind some anti-tank forces and pulled most of the armor behind the hill 226.6. Near midnight, due to the critical situation in the 95th GRD's sector, the commander of the 5th GA transferred here elements of the 14th Assault Engineer-Sapper brigade. Our command expected a tank attack during the night, so the brigade received the order to stop the enemy at any cost.
      Worried about his neighbor's difficult situation, which threatened to worsen if the Germans managed to overrun Rotmistrov's army rear lines of communication, the commander of the 5th GTA sent the 24th TB and 10th GMRB of the 5th "Zimovnikovsky" GMC into the region of the farms Voroshilov and Ostrenky. These were his last reserves.
        The recently available documents contradict Rotmistrov's claim that only the entrance of these brigades stabilized the situation beyond Psel on July 12th. From a report of the 5th "Zimovsnikovsky" GMC's commander Major-General B.M. Skvortzov about the materiel losses, it is evident that these brigades did not participate in the fighting on July 12th. They entered battle only on the morning of July 13th together with the 1447th SPGR to support the attacking elements of the 5th GA. This counterattack, however, was not successful. The Germans turned our defensive positions into a powerful anti-tank strongpoint at the hill 226.6 which effectively prevented us from throwing them behind the river.
       The penetration of the 3rd PzC of Army Detachment "Kempf" in the sector of the 69th Army was finally contained. At 1525 the 11th GMRB together with the elements of the 81st RD captured Shipy, and at 1900 threw the Germans out of Ryndinka. Equally successful was the 12th GMRB which advanced together with the elements of the 375th RD and with the support of the Group "Trufanov's" artillery and 53rd GITR. By the end of the day, these units captured the northern outskirts of Rzhavetz and went on the defensive. But the situation in that region was not simple: "The threat of a penetration of enemy tanks from the south in the region of Shakhovo, Andreevka, Alexandrovka remains to be real for tomorrow" - Vasilevsky reported to Stalin in the evening.
        Darkness descended upon the battlefield. The soldiers finally enjoyed the precious minutes of rest. But the headquarters worked feverishly, the disposition was analyzed, the day was summed up. Yet the summaries were disconcerting - the counterattack clearly failed. The participating armies only partially achieved their goal: to stop and destroy the enemy wedge. Even though, the 4th PzA was stopped almost everywhere along the front, in several sectors its units created a critical situation for the defending forces. For example, the divisions of the 5th GA in the bend of Psel were in particularly difficult situation. Only an outmost mobilization of the available forces and gigantic efforts allowed our forces to prevent an enemy advance into the rear.
        The 5th GTA was in especially difficult situation. This powerful full-strength unit, brought into battle from the first minutes of the counterattack, practically did not advance at all except a small success in the sector of the 18th TC. In some cases the tankists were forced to retreat even behind the starting positions. The army had suffered heavy losses in personnel and materiel. This unit's combat journal puts the irrecoverable losses of 299 vehicles on the July 12th. This figure, however, is unfounded and rouses some suspicion.